ISSN #1088-8136 Vol. 8, No. 1 |
|
East Timor Achieves Hard-won Nationhood
Changes and Challenges in Washington The Women of East Timor Demand Justice Documents Detailing Role of Kissinger and Ford in 1975 Invasion Released Ten Years for Justice and Self-Determination ETAN Continues Refugee and Justice Campaigns |
Documents Detailing Role of Kissinger and Ford in 1975 Invasion ReleasedU.S. support for the occupation of East Timor led to the formation of ETAN over a decade ago. More details of U.S. complicity in Indonesia’s illegal annexation of East Timor were made public on the 26th anniversary of the invasion. On 7 December 2001, researchers released previously-classified United States government documents which proved what many had known for years: the U.S. was informed in advance of Indonesia’s plans and approved them at the highest levels. The information, which included transcripts of two 1975 meetings between President Gerald Ford and Indonesian dictator Suharto, was obtained through the U.S. Freedom of Information Act and made public by the National Security Archive, a Washington-based non-governmental organization. In July 1975, Suharto visited Washington, meeting with Ford and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger. Although at the time East Timor was still under Portuguese rule, the Indonesian leader told the Americans: “…the only way is to integrate into Indonesia,” describing Fretilin [the leading pro-independence East Timorese party] as “Communist elements.” Before their next meeting with Suharto, Kissinger provided “talking
points” to Ford, which included the following: “We note Indonesia has
expressed willingness to see a merger of [East Timor] with Indonesia with
the assent of the inhabitants of Timor. This would appear to be reasonable
solution.” The same memo proposed doubling U.S. military aid to
Indonesia. When Suharto, Ford and Kissinger met in Jakarta, U.S. intelligence already knew about Indonesia’s recently-finalized invasion plans. Early in the meeting, Ford was “enthusiastic” about building an M-16 munitions plant in Indonesia. The Indonesian dictator then raised the Timor issue, saying, “We want your understanding, if we deem it necessary to take rapid or drastic action.” Ford replied: “We will understand and will not press you on the issue. We understand the problem and the intentions you have.” Although Kissinger acknowledged the illegality of using U.S. weapons for offensive attacks, saying , “the use of U.S.-made arms could create problems,” both he and Ford saw this as something that could be dealt with. But Kissinger warned Suharto: “it is important that whatever you do succeeds quickly. We would be able to influence the reaction if whatever happens, happens after we return.... If you have made plans, we will do our best to keep everyone quiet until the President returns home.” He added,”the President will be back on Monday at 2 PM Jakarta time. We understand your problem and the need to move quickly but I am only saying that it would be better if it were done after we returned.” Kissinger asked if Suharto anticipated “a long guerilla war” and the Indonesian leader replied, “[t]here will probably be a small guerilla war.” Indonesia launched their invasion soon after the meeting, while Ford and Kissinger were in the Philippines. Over 90% of the weapons used came from the U.S. Six months later, according to another recently-released document, U.S. State Department officials agreed, “We’ve resumed all of our normal relations with [Indonesia]; and there isn’t any problem involved.” These documents highlight the need to hold U.S. leaders, as well as Indonesian military and government officials, accountable for the invasion and occupation of East Timor. They offer further evidence that while the U.S. had no particular interest in East Timor, relations with the Suharto regime were of utmost importance to Washington. To Kissinger and Ford, the fate of hundreds of thousand of East Timorese clearly mattered little as long as Suharto was happy.
|