Indonesian Verdicts Strengthen Calls for International Tribunal
by John M. Miller
Indonesia’s ad hoc court on the 1999 violence in East Timor delivered
its first verdicts in August. The result was the acquittal of six
Indonesian security officers; only the pro-Indonesian East Timorese
governor Abilio Soares was convicted. He received a three-year sentence,
far less than the 12 years prosecutors requested. [At press time, the
court — known formally as the Ad Hoc Human Rights Court on East Timor
— acquitted 4 more Indonesian
officials, but sentenced the notorious
East Timorese militia leader Eurico Guterres to 10 years in prison. Few
observers expect him to serve much if any of the sentence.]
In response to the summer verdicts, ETAN joined East Timorese and
Indonesian activists in reiterating calls for an international tribunal to
try military and political leaders responsible for war crimes, crimes
against humanity and genocide in East Timor. All called for trials to
include crimes committed throughout the occupation, not just the final
year. East Timorese officials, while expressing anger (Prime Minister Mari
Alkatiri called the proceedings “a farce”) said they would await the
final conclusion of the Indonesian trials before deciding how to proceed.
The acquitted included the former head of the Indonesian police in East
Timor, Timbul Silaen, who has been directly linked to meetings where
violence was planned and encouraged. Five other Indonesian military and
police officers were acquitted of charges related to their role in the
most infamous post-ballot atrocity, the massacre at the Suai churchyard.
According to eyewitness accounts, four of these officers personally
directed the attack, which killed three Catholic priests and scores of
refugees.
“The conduct of the trials confirms that their purpose was to deflect
international criticism rather than to get at the truth. The prosecutions
in Jakarta have been crushed under the weight of their limitations,”
ETAN said in a statement
as the verdicts were announced.
Activists urged UN officials and member governments — who had said
they would wait for Indonesia to show it could effectively prosecute its
own — to acknowledge the long-evident flaws of the Indonesian process
and begin to establish a tribunal.
Incredibly, the Bush administration, while acknowledging that the
trials did not meet international standards, said they would serve as a
“warning [to] those who might consider new violations of human rights in
Aceh and elsewhere.” All other observers drew the opposite conclusion,
with many warning that reinstating military assistance while Indonesia
resists Congressional conditions calling for military accountability will
only embolden the armed forces to continue their abuses.
Calling the trials and verdicts a “mockery of East Timor’s demands
for justice,” East Timorese lawyer Aderito de Jesus Soares wrote that
“Indonesia has had its chance to put on credible trials. Washington must
take the initiative at the UN to set up the international tribunal that
Jakarta’s now-broken promise to hold credible trials forestalled.” In
January 2000 a UN investigative commission found that ultimately the
Indonesian Army was responsible for the intimidation, terror, killings,
and other acts of violence committed before and after the referendum, and
recommended the establishment of an ad hoc international human rights
tribunal, but only for crimes committed in 1999.
Indonesia’s ad hoc court began in March under a very limited mandate.
Only 18 suspects are being tried for failing to prevent massacres and
other crimes committed in three of East Timor’s 13 districts during just
two months — April and September 1999 — of the 24-year occupation. The
defendants were accused of failing to prevent the actions of others rather
than of directly ordering the atrocities.
Prosecutors, echoing an oft-repeated military myth, described the
violence in 1999 as a result of conflict between East Timorese factions.
Yet the razing of East Timor was undeniably part of an orchestrated plan
by top Indonesian military and political officials, first to intimidate
the East Timorese into voting for “autonomy,” and then to punish them
for supporting independence.
None of the top-ranking officers and officials named by Indonesia’s
own human rights commission in January 2000 were seriously investigated,
much less indicted. During the trials, powerful military officers
dominated the proceedings by sitting in courtroom. Most East Timorese
witnesses called to testify refused; those who appeared were harassed.
East Timorese do not appreciate seeing low-level militia tried in East
Timor receiving long prison sentences while their former military masters
go free. The day after the August acquittals were announced,
detainees in East Timor’s main prison forced their way out of the
building; many cited the acquittals as justification for their actions.
Indonesia continues to refuse to extradite anyone to East Timor for trial.
(For updates, see ETAN’s Justice pages: www.etan.org/action/issues/h-rights.htm).
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