| Subject: FEER: INDONESIA Loath to Take The
Rap
INDONESIA Loath to Take The Rap
The United States wants to enlist Jakarta's help in the war on
terrorism, but the apparent reluctance of top military leaders to accept
responsibility for abuses by their men in East Timor and elsewhere is
holding up resumed military-to-military ties
By John McBeth/JAKARTA and Murray Hiebert/WASHINGTON
Issue cover-dated March 07, 2002
TWO-AND-A-HALF YEARS after Indonesian troops and local militias went on
the rampage against pro-independence voters in East Timor, it is not clear
whether Jakarta's top military brass is ready to accept responsibility for
the bloodshed. Until that happens, the United States will find it
difficult to draw an already reluctant Indonesia into its war on
international terrorism. "We just haven't decided how to move forward
and even after we make up our minds, Congress will have a lot to say about
what will actually happen," says one senior Washington official.
It's not as though the generals are not aware of the importance of
accountability. H.S. Dillon, a member of the Indonesian Commission on
Human Rights, recalls meeting a group of senior officers in September
1999, days after the death and destruction in East Timor that outraged the
world and prompted the U.S. Congress to adopt legislation barring military
ties with Jakarta. "There has to be some form of damage
control," he told them earnestly. "If you think these actions
won't have a cost, you're dreaming."
Today, human-rights trials for those responsible for the rampage remain
the only significant obstacle to the resumption of military ties. But even
with specially legislated ad hoc courts finally in place to try the
handful of Indonesian officers, militiamen and civilian officials indicted
so far for genocide and crimes against humanity in the former Indonesian
province, the army apparently still needs convincing.
Even if the military leadership does decide to sacrifice one or two
generals, diplomats say it will still be up to the U.S. Congress-and
probably the United Nations too-to judge whether Indonesia has gone far
enough on the general issue of accountability.
LET OFF THE HOOK
The signs aren't good. For example, many are angered that former
armed-forces commander Gen. Wiranto and his then representative in East
Timor, former military intelligence chief Maj.-Gen. Zacky Anwar Makarim
appear to have been let off the hook for what happened in the territory.
The government, moreover, clearly worried about setting a precedent, won't
consider extraditing 17 low-ranking suspects to face trial by an
international tribunal in East Timor for crimes against humanity.
The military has also raised hackles at home by turning its back on an
investigation by the Commission on Human Rights into the sniper killings
of four students at Jakarta's Triskati University-the incident triggered
bloody riots in May 1998 that left 1,500 people dead and led to the
resignation of former President Suharto. To rub salt into the wound, the
officer who presided over those events, Maj.-Gen. Syafrie Samsuddin, was
recently appointed military spokesman.
This leaves the U.S. in a dilemma over how to engage the Indonesian
military on counter-terrorism. The U.S. Pacific forces commander, Adm.
Dennis Blair, says there is a "continuing policy review" under
way to figure out how to work with not only the army, but with the police
and other security forces. "We all sort of fall into talking about
congressional restrictions on our policy, but that's not a really accurate
way to talk about it," he tells the REVIEW. "It is our policy.
We will deal with the Indonesians in a certain way because of the
interests we have and the things we expect of them."
The longer the situation drags on, however, the more Jakarta could
become isolated. Both the No Safe Harbour bill before Congress and the
recent expansion of the multinational Financial Action Task Force's
mandate to tackle terrorist financing, as well as related money-laundering
activities, promise tough new economic and travel sanctions on nations
that don't cooperate. Using a baseball analogy, a U.S. law enforcement
officer says: "We can't even find them [Indonesia] in the dugout, let
alone stepping up to the plate."
American, Malaysian and Singaporean officials, including Singapore
Senior Minister Lee Kuan Yew, have all referred to Indonesia as the weak
link in the region's crackdown on Islamic extremists. Lee's assertion that
terrorists remained free in Indonesia's vast archipelago angered the
government and triggered protests by hardline Muslim groups in Jakarta.
The Indonesians, for their part, insist they don't have the evidence to
act against radicals like Muslim cleric Abu Bakar Bashir, 63, the alleged
founder of Jemaah Islamiah, a regional extremist group and suspected
conduit for Al Qaeda financing since the late 1990s. Bashir denies he is
part of the Al Qaeda terrorist network. But Jemaah Islamiah's alleged
operations chief, fugitive Indonesian national Riduan Isamuddin, has been
directly linked to the September 11 terrorist attacks in the U.S. and the
October 2000 bombing of the U.S. destroyer Cole in Aden. And a third
Indonesian, Fathur Rohman al-Ghozi, has been in Philippine custody since
January for his alleged involvement in a December 30, 2000, Manila
train-station bombing that killed 22 people. He too has been linked to
Jemaah Islamiah.
All this worries U.S. policymakers, who feel that bringing the world's
most populous Muslim country on board is important in the effort to roll
up Al Qaeda and Southeast Asian Muslim militant networks that have been
identified by governments in recent years, such as the Jemaah Islamiah,
Abu Sayyaf in the Philippines and the Kumpulan Militan Malaysia.
But while senior U.S. officials believe some of Indonesia's top
military officers want to take a more active part in the counter-terrorist
campaign, they say President Megawati Sukarnoputri doesn't have the
political will to seriously tackle the issue. She fears it will antagonize
the Islamic parties in her fragile coalition.
Indonesia has, however, been making some effort to improve its
human-rights record. Three militiamen accused of the September 2000 murder
of three United Nations aid workers in the West Timor border town of
Atambua recently had their jail terms increased from between 10-20 months
to between five and seven years. The military also appears to have made
some progress in sensitizing soldiers to dealing with the civilian
population, particularly in the secessionist northern Sumatran province of
Aceh.
All the same, human-rights advocates worry that recent parliamentary
backing for the military's opposition to investigations into the Triskati
incident and the shooting of student protesters on two other subsequent
occasions could influence the outcome of the East Timor trials.
"There's a sense of resistance that may cloud the tribunals in a
way that lessens the [international] pressure on the courts," argues
Marzuki Darusman, a former attorney-general who sits on the Indonesian
Commission on Human Rights.
LEAHY'S TOUGH LINE
But U.S. Democratic Senator Patrick Leahy, who sponsored the 1999 bill
that cut military ties with Indonesia, is in no mood to allow the war on
terror to sideline human-rights cases and what he considers to be other
key foreign-policy objectives such as rule of law and military reform. And
that, he has made clear, includes accountability for past actions.
"Senior officers in the Indonesian military were responsible for
orchestrating the slaughter and destruction in East Timor," he tells
the REVIEW. "It is imperative they be brought to justice."
State Department officials acknowledge that a provision in this year's
defence appropriations bill, which seeks to include the Indonesian
military in a $21 million regional counter-terrorism programme, is not the
loophole it first appeared to be. In fact Leahy and his supporters have
said they are unhappy at what they consider to be efforts by Blair and
other defence officials to find a way around the military-to-military ban.
Blair downplays his differences with Leahy. The executive and
congressional branches have the same goals, he insists, but differ at
times on how to get there, particularly on when to use carrots and when to
use sticks. Asked if congressional restrictions hamper the ability of the
U.S. to fight terrorism, Blair says: "I don't know yet because we
have not really worked out all of those aspects on the post-September 11
period."
Channelling money to the Indonesian police would be one way around the
problem, but it would take time to bring the poorly equipped and poorly
trained force to the point where it could form the nucleus of a new
indigenous counter-terrorism agency. Moreover, bypassing the military
would likely exacerbate the testy relations between the police and the
army. It might also put current intelligence-sharing between Indonesia and
the U.S. at risk, given that the military has the only real database on
Islamic extremists.
In the meantime, concern has mounted over the implications of the No
Safe Harbour bill tabled by Republican Congressmen Lindsey Graham, a Gulf
War air-force veteran and member of the armed-services committee, and
Porter Goss, a former Central Intelligence Agency undercover operative and
current chairman of the select committee on intelligence.
Tabled in late January, the proposed legislation prescribes economic
and travel embargoes on nations that fail to extradite terrorist suspects,
allow fund-raising for terrorist activity or refuse to cooperate in
intelligence-gathering.
The Financial Action Task Force, a grouping of 28 industrialized
nations, has also ratcheted up the pressure by issuing new financial
standards to combat terrorist financing. Indonesia is already on the task
force's blacklist for failing to pass important money-laundering
legislation, which has languished for months in parliament while
politicians engage in domestic power games. As in many other areas, the
persistent failure of the Indonesian government to appreciate
international concerns may signal even more trying times ahead.
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