Subject: ETO: FA07 - SGI and ABRI in East Timor
Date: Thu, 08 Apr 1999 20:13:42 +0200
From: Comissão para os Direitos do Povo Maubere <cdpm@esoterica.pt> East Timor
Observatory / Observatório Timor Leste / Observatoire Timor-Oriental
All peoples have the right to self-determination... all armed action or repressive
measures of all kinds directed against dependent peoples shall cease in order to enable
them to exercise peacefully and freely their right to complete independence. (Declaration
on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples - UN Gen.Ass. Resolution
1514, 14/12/1960)
Ref.: FA07-1999/04/05
Military Intelligence Services (SGI) and the Indonesian Armed Forces (ABRI) in
East Timor
Summary: · In October 1998, official ABRI statistics were smuggled out of East Timor,
revealing that the true number of Indonesian military personnel in the territory was
neither 6,000 (as Ali Alatas had claimed) nor 10,700 (as Col. Suratman had assured the
world), but 20,000. The man responsible for leaking those statistics, Manuel dos Martires
(MdM), has revealed that there are many more sectors of the Indonesian armed forces, that
are not included in the official statistics, but are, nonetheless, operating in East
Timor. They come under the direct control of the SGI (Military Intelligence Services),
which keeps its own, entirely separate (and secret) set of personnel figures. This latest
revelation raises the soldiers per inhabitants ratio from 1:40 to 1:25.
ABRI recently decided to arm some sectors of the Timorese civilian population,
allegedly for their own protection. However, the intense military presence would refute
any such need. The large numbers of military involved, together with the
"institutional" mechanisms in place to conceal the true figures, leave no doubt
that this policy is being endorsed at the most senior levels of both the Indonesian Armed
Forces and State. This means that there are fundamental contradictions between what the
Indonesian Government is saying, especially within the framework of the talks underway at
the UN, and what it is actually doing in East Timor itself.
Context:
Indonesia’s military presence in East Timor is extremely high. While the Government
and military authorities were putting the figure between 6,000 (Ali Alatas) and 10,700
(Col. Suratman), leaked military documents made public in Australia showed the real number
to be over 20,000 men: one soldier for every 40 inhabitants in East Timor, which is seven
to nine times more than in Indonesia (see "Breakdown of Indonesian Armed Forces
stationed in East Timor", East Timor Observatory, FA03-1999/02/09).
In spite of all its military weight, ABRI decided to arm Timorese civilians, thereby
escalating the violence ("Militias & paramilitary groups armed by
Indonesia", East Timor Observatory, FA04-1999/02/17).
In various interviews and statements, Xanana Gusmão accused the SGI (the intelligence
wing of the Indonesian Armed Forces) of being behind the violence perpetrated by gangs of
armed civilians that "intimidate, terrorise and kill the people" (Público,
Lisbon, 3.2.99).
Col. Suratman, military commander of East Timor, has accused pro-independence activists
of killing their own supporters in order to pin the blame on the armed forces: "They
offer the lives of their own members to discredit ABRI or the Indonesian government"
(Indonesian Observer, 23.3.99).
The Facts:
MdM is a Timorese who worked with Indonesian military services for over 10 years, the last
five of which were spent in the military personnel statistics section at the KOREM
(regional military command) in Dili. He has revealed hitherto unknown information about
the numbers of Indonesian military posted to East Timor:
The statistics, which MdM managed to smuggle out, were made public in Australia in
October 1998. They revealed that the true numbers of military personnel in the territory
were, in fact, 2 to 3 times greater than the figures being given by the Indonesian
authorities.
The exact total in November 1998, according to ABRI’s own statistics (which MdM
was responsible for keeping updated), was 21,610 (although this figure included 1,589
civil servants who, like MdM, worked for the armed forces). The documents supplied by MdM
provide breakdowns of military personnel according to district, unit and services, and
there is even a diagram showing the chain of command and names of the respective officers.
MdM, who left his job after the documents became public in October, has revealed that
even these figures, which took most observers by surprise, still fall short of the true
total. In the KOREM building, where he was working, there were separate offices for the
Military Intelligence Services (SGI), whose members are known in Timor as "Intel /
Inteis". At his workplace, MdM over the years made a few friends among the
"Inteis" and was, eventually, used to enter their offices. On the wall of one
office there was a large chart (usually covered by a curtain), on which the movement and
numbers of troops were recorded. MdM soon realised that the figures on the chart bore no
resemblance to the numbers he was dealing with every day in his job. He became aware that
although entire Battalions were entering East Timor, at no stage were they ever entered
into the official personnel figures which he himself was in charge of keeping up to date.
When MdM resolved to leak the official (confidential) figures, he decided he would also
take notes from the SGI information on the wall chart.
Between 5 August and 10 November 1998, he copied from the SGI chart the following
information about numbers of troops entering East Timor – numbers which had never
been included in ABRI’s confidential figures. Entering East Timor :
- by sea via Seical (Baucau) on 5.8.98, Battalion Yonifter 521, with 984 men;
- by sea via Com (Lospalos) on 7.8.98, Battalion Linud 700, with 986 men;
- by sea via Oecussi on 15.8.98, and by road from Oecussi to Balibo (Bobonaro), Battalion
Yonifter 123, with 984 men;
- by sea via Betano (Same) on 28.8.98, Battalion Yonifter 511, with 984 men;
- by land via Balibo (Bobonaro) on 17.9.98, 200 men from Battalion 741 transferred from
Denpasar, 200 men from Battalion 742 transferred from Lombok, 200 men from Battalion 743
transferred from Kupang. These 600 men, who came via the Kupang-Batagade road, were
reinforcements for the local 744 and 745 Battalions (744 and 745 remained unchanged after
the reinforcements arrived).
- By land via Balibo (Bobonaro) on 10.11.98, 400 men from Kopassus, Group 4. They had been
transported in Hercules aircraft from Jakarta to Kupang, then continued the journey by
road to Batugade. (The Kopassus Group 4 are special elite troops, usually plain-clothed,
and specialised in intelligence gathering.)
The above troops – a total of 4,938 men – entered East Timor in just over 3
months. They were not included in the official statistics. MdM insists that there have
always been Indonesian military units controlled by the SGI which were never included in
official ABRI figures for East Timor, but that, following Indonesia’s promise to
progressively withdraw its troops, the number of these units increased. MdM estimates that
the total number of these "off-the-record" troops was about 11,000 men in
November 1998. They must be added to the 21,610 men who appear on the November statistics
that MdM smuggled out when he left the territory.
The delay in making public this new information about the SGI’s
"off-the-record" troops is due to the fact that MdM could supply no original
written documents with which to back it up. For it to be believed, the information would
have to be revealed by MdM himself. It was for this reason that MdM had to leave East
Timor and Indonesia.
Conclusions:
1. MdM’s information ties in with some of the reports about Battalions entering East
Timor at the very time that President Habibie was promising to reduce troop numbers in the
territory. His revelations would also explain why there was no mention of these Battalions
on the leaked official statistics made public in Australia in October.
2. In light of this new data, we are going to have to look again at all previous
assessments of Indonesian military presence in East Timor. The troops-to-population ratio
has now risen from 1:40 to 1:25 – unquestionably one of the highest in the world.
3. Such an intense military presence refutes statements by military commanders about
there being a need to arm Timorese civilians for their own security.
4. If such need does not exist, then why are ABRI supplying weapons to civilians?
5. Given that Indonesia has already admitted to the UN Secretary General that it is
prepared to pull out of East Timor if that were the will of its people, why is Indonesia
still arming civilians and still hiding the real numbers of its troops?
6. On 14 and 15 April, the UN, Indonesia and Portugal are to set the date, and decide
on the form of the ballot, through which the East Timorese will be able to choose their
own future. The people must be allowed to choose freely, without any pressure on them from
weapons - whether they be Indonesian weapons, or those of any sector of Timorese society.
7. It is, therefore, essential that, before the election campaign,
- civilian militias are disarmed
- ABRI are withdrawn and replaced by a UN supervised international force
- Timorese factions that have been involved in the war (the "Tim", wanra and
Falintil) are disarmed
- essential services and supplies needed for the people’s well being are secured,
and there is total freedom of movement for people and organisations.
Observatory for the monitoring of East Timor’s transition process a programme by
the ‘Comissão para os Direitos do Povo Maubere’ and the ecumenical group
‘A Paz é Possível em Timor Leste’ Coordinator: Cristina Cruz
Rua Pinheiro Chagas, 77 2ºE - 1069-069 Lisboa - Portugal ph.: 351 1 317 28 60 - fax:
351 1 317 28 70 - e-mail: cdpm@esoterica.pt
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