Subject: ETO: Assessment of compliance with the 5
May Agreement - 5/22 May
Date: Fri, 04 Jun 1999 17:45:32 -0400
From: Comissão para os Direitos do Povo Maubere <cdpm@esoterica.pt> East Timor
Observatory / Observatório Timor Leste / Observatoire Timor-Oriental
All peoples have the right to self-determination... all armed action or repressive
measures of all kinds directed against dependent peoples shall cease in order to enable
them to exercise peacefully and freely their right to complete independence. (Declaration
on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples - UN Gen.Ass. Resolution
1514, 14/12/1960)
Ref.: SE02–1999/05/29eng
Subject : Assessment of compliance with the 5 May Agreement From 5 to 22 May 1999
Note: The 5 May 1999 Agreement does not mean that legality has been restored, but
rather that just one step has been taken in the process to restore legality. It is
surprising that, under the terms of the Agreement, the invader has been entrusted with
responsibility for maintaining law and order during the run-up to the popular
consultation. The only possible explanation for this paradoxical side to the Agreement is
that Indonesia has bluntly refused give in on this point, and Portugal and the United
Nations (UN) must have concluded that it was better to have an agreement without an
international military force than to have no agreement at all. Indonesia’s obstinacy
also highlights the lack of international determination. The international community is
said to be willing to contribute to the resolution of the problem in East Timor but, above
all, it is concerned with developments in Indonesia, the country with the world’s
fourth largest population.
The 5 May 1999 Agreement: Portugal, East Timor’s "de jure" administering
power, and Indonesia, the territory’s "de facto" administering power since
the 1975 invasion, requested the UN SG to organise and conduct a consultation in East
Timor to determine what political status the East Timorese people themselves want for the
territory (self-determination). The UN Secretary General (SG), with the agreement of the
two State parties, was explicit about the essential preconditions for the consultation:
"through a direct, secret and universal ballot … in an atmosphere free of
intimidation, violence or interference from any side" (5 May 1999 Agreement). The
procedures and provisional schedule for the consultation proposed by the SG were consigned
to an Appendix to the Agreement. However, in view of the violence that had escalated in
the territory ever since Jakarta gave signs that it would accept a negotiated settlement,
the security issue has become the main focus of attention. In addition to the references
to security already contained in the Agreement and Appendix I, it was felt there was a
need for a further Appendix to deal exclusively with security matters. This Appendix too
was signed by the three parties (UN, Indonesia and Portugal). The SG went further, and
included a Memorandum in which he pinpointed "the main elements that will need to be
in place" for the consultation to proceed. The terms of the Memorandum were also
agreed to by Indonesia. (Texts of the Agreement, Appendices and Memorandum are available
in English at http://homepage.esoterica.pt/~cdpm)
The Appendix on Security contains four points: 1. A secure environment devoid of
violence and intimidation is a prerequisite for the holding of a free and fair ballot. Law
and order must be maintained, and the "absolute neutrality" of Indonesia’s
Armed forces and Police is essential. 2. The Commission on Peace and Stability established
on 21 April 1999 (composed of representatives from the pro-independence and
pro-integration sides, local authorities, local police commands, and armed forces) should
become operational without delay and, in co-operation with the UN, elaborate a code of
conduct, by which all parties should abide, ensure the laying down of arms, and take the
necessary steps to achieve disarmament. 3. Prior to the start of registration, the SG
shall ascertain that the necessary security situation exists for the peaceful
implementation of the consultation process. 4. The SG will make available a number of UN
police officers to act as advisers to the Indonesian Police in the discharge of their
duties.
The 8-point Memorandum by the SG appears to be the best tool with which to assess
compliance with the Agreement on security matters. Below, each numbered point taken from
the Memorandum is followed by extracts taken from the SG’s first report to the
Security Council (S/1999/595) and other relevant information.
1. "as an urgent first step, the bringing of armed civilian groups under strict
control and discipline";
1.1. "I regret to inform the Security Council that credible reports continue to be
received of political violence, including intimidation and killings, by armed militias
against unarmed pro-independence civilians. I am deeply concerned to learn from the (UN)
assessment team that, as a result, the situation in East Timor remains extremely tense and
volatile. While the team was in Dili, several shootings occurred on the outskirts of the
city, the house of the head of a local human rights organisation was vandalised, and a
clash took place between pro-integration and pro-independence militias, resulting in the
deaths of at least three people." … "the militias" … "have
not only in recent weeks begun to attack pro-independence groups, but are beginning to
threaten moderate pro-integration supporters as well. Truckloads of pro-integration
militia are able to roam about freely in the towns and to set up checkpoints along the
roads without any intervention from the army or the police" (UN SG Report to the
Security Council, 22 May 1999, S/1999/595) 1.2. In the attack in Dili, referred to by the
SG as a clash between pro- and anti- independence militias, all the victims were
pro-independence (news agencies, newspapers, etc.) 1.3. Given that roadblocks set up by
pro-integration militias have prevented reporters and members of the UN team from freely
travelling around the territory, confirmation of violations reported outside Dili is
difficult to obtain. Most of them occur in the area by the border with Indonesia, which is
dominated by the pro-Indonesia militias. UNAMET (UN Assistance Mission in East Timor)
spokesman, David Wimhurst, condemned one such attack that led to the death of at least six
people: "the excess of Atara is the latest example" (UNAMET, 17.5.99). 1.4. The
SG’s report refers to threats and violations perpetrated against the head of a human
rights organisation, but other humanitarian organisations, such as Caritas in Dili, and
foreign physicians working in the Motael Clinic in Dili, have also been threatened. (AFP,
10.5.99) 1.5. The SG makes no reference to the refugees who have had to flee their
villages to escape attacks from pro-Indonesia militias, and who have been herded into
camps. The first pictures of the refugee camps were taken by foreign reporters
accompanying a group of pro-integration militias (the only way to get through the militia
roadblocks). The reporters discovered the camps, guarded by militiamen, Indonesian police
and soldiers, in which the refugees are forced to attend a daily Indonesian flag-hoisting
ceremony and to sing the Indonesian national anthem. A US doctor working in Dili described
these places as "concentration camps". An Indonesian organisation, the
"National Commission Against Violence Against Women", which visited some camps
between 1 and 9 May, estimated the number of refugees as 35,000, of which 98% were women
and children (Indonesian Observer, 18.5.99). The whereabouts of all the men are unknown.
1.6 Neither does the SG’s report mention the army’s operations. Timorese
guerrilla sources say that six Indonesian battalions are operating in the Ermera-Hatolia
area, trying to capture 200 guerrillas and Ular, their commander (John Martinkus, The
Australian, 19.5.99). The Indonesian army stated it had lost three men and two weapons in
a guerrilla ambush (Lusa, 18.5.99). As the militias and army refuse access to these areas,
it is not possible to obtain confirmation of these reports. 1.7 Soli Sorabjee,
representative in Indonesia and East Timor of the High Commissioner for Human Rights,
stated during a visit to Dili: "all reports I receive are not very encouraging"
and said he was "concerned" about the statements made by pro-integration groups:
"these statements are highly provocative, almost threatening the people who vote in
favour of independence that they will suffer consequences" (Australian quoted by
Publico, 23.5.99). 2 "An immediate ban on all rallies by armed groups while ensuring
the freedom of all political groups and tendencies, including both pro-integration
elements and also the CNRT and other pro-independence forces, to organise and conduct
peaceful political activities."
2.1 "Most of the pro-independence leaders have fled from Dili or gone into hiding.
Only one leader from the Timor National Resistance Council, Leandro Isaac, who had taken
refuge at the police headquarters in Dili, was available to meet some members of the team
during their stay in East Timor." (S/1999/595) 2.2 Pro-Indonesian forces continued to
organise rallies in which they announced the support for the autonomy package by
(pro-independence) CNRT leaders and members. Foreign reporters present in Dili were
invited to attend these rallies in which thousands of people, brought in by the truckload
from neighbouring villages, took part. For the journalists, these invitations were
practically their only opportunity to travel outside the capital. All those attending in
the rallies wore red and white headbands or carried red and white flags, but some
whispered to the reporters that they had been forced to do so (AP, 8.5.99). Militiamen are
also present at the rallies carrying their weapons (AFP, 8.5.99) 2.3 After a long
interval, due to the presence of militias in the capital, students from the University of
Dili once again staged demonstrations. The demonstrations were peaceful, although some
trucks carrying armed militiamen had passed by very closely. On the third day, Indonesian
police forced the students back into the University, claiming that they were obstructing
the traffic (AFP, 6.5.99). On 10 May, militias, that had been circling the area, fired
their weapons at the University’s walls, even though there was no one inside (AFP,
10.5.99) 2.4 At the time of the SG’s report, in addition to Leandro Isaac who had
taken refuge in a police station, all the leading members of the Dili CNRT had been forced
either into hiding or had fled: David Ximenes, hiding in Dili; Manuel Carrascalao, sought
safety in Jakarta; Mario Carrascalao, exiled. The house of Duarte Viana was set ablaze on
8 May. In other districts, CNRT leaders were killed, others fled to the mountains, while
others were forced into declaring that they supported integration. 3. "The prompt
arrest and prosecution of those who incite or threaten to use violence against others. In
this connection, it has been noted with concern that public threats have already been
issued to the UN by certain individuals." 3.1 "Despite repeated assurances that
measures would be taken by the Indonesian authorities to ensure security in East Timor and
curtail the illegal activities of the armed militias, I regret… (S/1999/595) 3.2 Even
though Eurico Guterres, leader of the Aitarak militia, openly admitted responsibility for
the killings in Dili that were referred to by the SG, and stated: "if we open fire it
is because we have been attacked", he is still free, and even has the support of
senior Indonesian military officials: when wanted to go to Viqueque but was unable to get
past Baucau, which is controlled by rival pro-Indonesian paramilitaries groups, Eurico
Guterres was transported in a military helicopter (Sydney Morning Herald, 26.5.99) 3.3
Even some pro-Indonesian leaders are beginning to feel embarrassed by Eurico Guterres, and
fear that they could justify a stronger UN presence. Francisco Lopes da Cruz, former
adviser to Suharto, called for the imprisonment of Eurico Guterres (Publico, 13.5.99) 3.4
"If, under Indonesian law, anyone going around with a weapon is breaking the law, I
do not see any problem in arresting those who are breaking the law, even in front of the
police and the military" said Soli Sorabjee (Publico, 23.5.99).
4. "Assumption by the Indonesian Police of sole responsibility for he maintenance
of law and order" (Memorandum), "absolute neutrality" (appendix on
security, p.1)
4.1 "Truckloads of pro-integration militia are able to roam about freely in the
towns and to set up checkpoints along the roads without any intervention from the army or
the police" (S/1999/595) 4.2 As well as setting up roadblocks, militias carry out
arrests. The fact that people who have been taken off by militias have ended up in police
jails or posts, is evidence that the armed militias are in connivance with the Police.
Further proof of police acquiescence to the militias is that they jointly guard the camps
in which the displaced people are now kept against their will. 4.3 While on his way to
gather information about the Atara massacre, UNAMET’s spokesman witnessed civilians
receiving military training at an Indonesian Armed Forces camp in Atsabe (CNN, 20.5.99)
4.4 Police Commander, General Rusmanhadi, announced the sending of Indonesian Police
officers who had previously taken part in UN missions in Namibia and Cambodia (Lusa,
Jakarta, 20.5.99).
5. "Redeployment of Indonesian Armed Forces" - and their "absolute
neutrality"
5.1 "… there are indications that the militias, believed by many observers to
be operating with the acquiescence of elements of the army…(S/1999/595) 5.2 A
detailed description, elaborated by the Yayasan Hak human rights organisation, of the
militia attack in Dili on 10 May, confirms that there was close collaboration between the
militias and Indonesian Police and Armed Forces. On the day of the attack, Police and
soldiers escorted the militias from the time they left the Hotel Tropikal where they were
staying. According to the report, at first, Police Mobile Brigade vehicles drove at the
head of the militia convoy. Later on, the Police inverted the order, and escorted the
militias from behind. Meanwhile, soldiers blocked the side streets leading on to the roads
being used that day by the militias. (HAK Report, 13.5.99). 5.3 Official statements
clearly illustrate the different treatment being given to pro-integration and
pro-independence: Col. Suratman, Military Commander of East Timor, complained of the
coverage given by foreign journalists to the pro-independence students’ demonstration
in front of the University: "The foreign reporters must not be used to serve the
interests of a few, and to sacrifice the majority of thousands of Timorese" (Antara,
6.5.99). 5.4 Col. Suratman criticised the statements made by UN Spokesman David Wimhurst,
concerning the killing of civilians by militias in Atara, and the burning down of 10
houses in Dili: "any public statement by the UN spokesman should first be clarified
with the head of security forces in Dili, to avoid misunderstandings" (Kompas and
Antara, 18.5.99, Sydney Morning Herald, 25.5.99). 5.5 General Wiranto condemned David
Wimhurst’s statements regarding the training of militias by Indonesian military:
"they (the UN) can only make suggestions to the Indonesian Police, because
responsibility for peace and order during the ballot is in the hands of the Indonesian
security personnel" (Jakarta Post, quoted by AFP, 20.5.99) 5.6 The Timorese
population feels that the military "are still favouring pro-integration groups and
supporting just one viewpoint", said Soli Sorabjee (Publico, 23.5.99).
6. "Free access to the mass media for the United Nations as well as both sides of
the political divide in East Timor" (S/1999/595)
6.1 The representative of the High Commissioner for Human Rights expressed surprise at
the different way in which pro-independence and pro-integration sides were being treated
on the streets of Dili: it is "strange" that there are posters and billboards in
favour of autonomy in various parts of Dili, but not one in support of independence, said
Soli Sorabjee (Publico, 23.5.99)
7. "Full participation of the UN in the Commission on Peace and Stability, which
should provide a forum for all parties to address and resolve effectively issues relating
to compliance with the Agreement during the consultative process and for resolving
disputes and frictions on the ground"
7.1 "The Commission on Peace and Stability, established on 21 April has yet to
become operational, despite the call in the Agreements of 5 May for it to become
operational without delay. This is largely attributable to the inability of the
pro-independence representatives to participate freely owing to the physical threats posed
by the armed militias." (S/1999/595)
8. "The immediate institution of a process of laying down of arms by all armed
groups, to be completed well in advance of the holding of the ballot."
8.1 The UN SG just refers to the need for disarmament in the Conclusions and
Recommendations of his Report, but without any detail or explanation as to how this should
be undertaken. 8.2 The surrender of weapons by pro-Indonesian militias is most urgent
because it is mainly these weapons that are now the causing of the killings in East Timor,
and is a matter of respect for "law and order", committed to the police in the
terms contained in points 1 to 4. Some old weapons have handed over to the military by the
militias, namely in Liquica (AFP, 8.5.99), but without being overseen by UN specialists,
the surrender of weapons is meaningless. 8.3 The surrender of weapons by combatant forces
is more complicated process. One step in this direction was taken after the fall of
President Suharto in May 1998, when a non-declared cease-fire came into effect that was
respected by both the Falintil and Indonesian regular forces. 8.4 The next step,
"disarmament" of the Falintil, is directly linked to "redeployment",
or the ‘withdrawal’ of Indonesian Armed Forces. Both of these processes should
take place simultaneously because these are the two forces that have been in confrontation
since 1975.
Conclusions:
"The Agreements of 5 May constitute an historic opportunity to resolve the
question of East Timor." Its implementation depends on "three essential
conditions": "first, it must at all times have the full confidence and backing
of the Security Council. Secondly, it must function with the full co-operation of the
Indonesian authorities. Thirdly, it must have the resources necessary to carry out its
tasks." (S/1999/595).
Observatory for the monitoring of East Timor’s transition process a programme by
the ‘Comissão para os Direitos do Povo Maubere’ and the ecumenical group
‘A Paz é Possível em Timor Leste’ Coordinator: Cristina Cruz
Rua Pinheiro Chagas, 77 2ºE - 1069-069 Lisboa - Portugal ph.: 351 1 317 28 60 - fax:
351 1 317 28 70 - e-mail: cdpm@esoterica.pt
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