Subject: Sa'he Study Club Criticism of the Autonomy
Plan
Date: Sat, 12 Jun 1999 10:44:06 -0400
From: raimata@indo.net.idCRITICAL NOTES ON JAKARTA’S PROPOSAL FOR A SPECIAL
AUTONOMOUS REGION OF EAST TIMOR (SARET)
This document was written after a lengthy discussion held by Sa’he Study Club
(SSC) in Jakarta on May 8, 1999. SSC is a study group consisting of East Timorese and
Indonesian pro-democracy activists. We intend to trace the origins of various thoughts on
nationalism in Timor Leste. Contact persons for SSC: Nuno Rodriguez and Aderito de Jesus
Soares. E-mail: sahe_s_club@hotmail.com; telp/fax: 62-21-791-925-64
Introduction
After 16 years of negotiations on the problem of Timor Leste, Portugal, Indonesia and
the United Nations signed an agreement on May 5, 1999. They agreed to hold a vote, called
a “popular consultation,” in Timor Leste on August 8, 1999. The East Timorese
have waged a long and exhausting struggle for the past 23 years. Now, they are expected to
determine their fate on one day. Under this “popular consultation,” the people
of Timor Leste will be given the choice of either accepting or rejecting the Republic of
Indonesia’s offer of creating a Special Autonomous Region of East Timor (SARET). If
they accept it, East Timor will remain under Indonesian sovereignty; if they reject it,
they will begin a transitional period toward full independence.[1]
There have been various reactions to this May 5 agreement. Among the East Timorese who
support continued Indonesian sovereignty, two views prevail. One group believes that the
SARET plan does not offer the East Timorese any substantial advantage. In their view, the
SARET plan, if implemented, would not lead to better conditions in Timor Leste; if fact,
it might make conditions worse. Even though they are not in full support of the agreement,
this group faces a dilemma. They wish to remain citizens of Indonesia but Indonesia is not
offering them an acceptable form of citizenship. They are opposed to the “popular
consultation” but do not have the power to stop it.
The second group among the pro-integrationists blindly supports the SARET plan without
fully understanding the contents and consequences of it; some of them perhaps feel
intimidated into supporting it.
Those who support independence for Timor Leste reject the SARET proposal.
If the East Timorese accept the SARET plan, there will likely be an important, yet not
widely recognized, consequence: the East Timor issue will be removed from the UN agenda.
The UN will presume the East Timor case to be resolved and will be able to strike it from
the list of those territories that have not yet exercised an act of self-determination.
What is the SARET plan? After careful examination, the Sa’he Study Club (SSC) has
arrived at a very critical perspective about the plan. We find that there are many vague
clauses that permit the Central Government of the Republic of Indonesia to intervene in
matters that are supposed to be under the authority of the SARET Government. It is clear
to us that the Central Government will have the authority to regulate not just foreign
relations, external defense and finance; it will have the right to control all aspects of
the SARET Government.[2]
When we look at the existing Indonesian laws that regulate Provincial Governments --
the old law (Law No. 7/1974), the new one, and the proposed bill for regulating the Budget
Balance between the Central and Provincial Government we find no substantial difference
between these laws and the SARET plan offered to the East Timorese. It is important to
mention that many Indonesian legal experts believe that the new laws regarding the
relationship between the Central and Provincial Government are more conservative than the
old ones. Therefore, it can be assumed that the SARET plan offers nothing but the same
under a new name; its content is identical with what is offered to other provinces in
Indonesia under the new Law of Provincial Government.
II. SARET Concept as the Final Trap
The following sections will examine several important articles out of the 59 articles
within the document.
PART I
FOREIGN RELATIONS In Chapter I, article 1, the document states, “The Indonesian
Government, hereinafter, referred to as the Central Government, shall have responsibility
for and competence over the foreign affairs of the Special Autonomous Region of East Timor
(SARET). It shall consult the Government of the SARET for the purpose of taking into
account the views of the Government of the SARET on issues of particular relevance to the
SARET."
This regulation clearly has the consequence that all matters related to foreign affairs
will become the responsibility of the Central Government in Jakarta. The Central
Government will represent the Government of the SARET on all international affairs. One
possible consequence of this regulation, for example, is that the East Timorese who
receive pensions from the Government of Portugal will not receive them anymore.
EXTERNAL DEFENSE At a glance, articles 2, 3 and 4 appear to merely regulate the
authority of the Central Government regarding the external defense of East Timor. Yet, if
we take a closer look, the Central Government will also be responsible for internal
security operations within SARET. As is stated in article 2, “The Central Government
shall have responsibility for and competence over the external defence of the SARET, as
part of the territory of the unitary state of the Republic of Indonesia.”
Central Government intervention into the internal defense is affirmed in article 3,
“For such purpose, the Indonesian armed forces (Tentara Nasional Indonesia - TNI)
shall maintain a military presence in the SARET in the context of defending and
safeguarding the external security of the SARET.” The TNI will maintain a military
base within the SARET territory and whenever there is a threat on the territory from
outside forces, the TNI has the authority to expand its forces throughout the SARET. This
is mentioned in article 4, “In the event of an external armed attack, or an imminent
threat of such an attack, the Indonesian armed forces (TNI) may be deployed outside their
bases or normal areas of operation in the exercise of its duty to defend the sovereignty
and territorial integrity of the unitary state of the Republic of Indonesia.”
Who has the right to determine whether SARET is under a threat? What is the criteria to
decide what constitutes an emergency condition? According to the Indonesian Constitution
of 1945 -- which is stipulated as the major point of reference for the Government of the
SARET -- the president of the Republic of Indonesia has the right to declare a state of
emergency. Thus, the president of the Central Government can declare a state of emergency
at any time and allow the TNI to launch operations beyond its designated base. Under the
pretext of maintaining the security of the region, the TNI can form para-military units as
it has done for the past 23 years. The fact that the TNI still operates under the doctrine
of Dual Function means that the TNI can easily justify extensive involvement in the
internal politics of SARET.
In article 51, we find that the Central Government has license to involve itself in the
police force of SARET: “In the performance of its duties, the Police Force of the
SARET shall consult and cooperate with the Central Government authorities with respect to
the enforcement of Indonesian national laws in the SARET.” The possibility of direct
control over the SARET police is mentioned in article 54: “In exceptional cases the
Indonesian National Police will assist the Police Force of the SARET in the performance of
its functions.” This means that the Indonesian police can intervene in the internal
matters of the SARET whenever they consider it necessary.
ECONOMIC AND FISCAL POLICIES Economic and monetary policies designed by SARET will have
to be approved by the Central Government. Article 5: “The SARET shall be a part of
the Indonesian monetary and customs unit subject to those national monetary and fiscal
policies, and laws and regulations of Indonesia which are consistent with this
Agreement.” SARET will receive aid from the Central Government, as stated in article
6, “The Central Government will continue its assistance to the development of the
SARET.” SARET is also expected to take loans from the Central Government, as article
10 states: “The Government of the SARET can enter into domestic loans to finance part
of its budget with the consent of the Regional Council of People's Representatives of the
SARET.” The Central Government can easily subvert the economic autonomy of SARET
because all foreign aid for SARET will have to go through the Central Government, as
stated in article 9: “For the purposes of its overall development, the Government of
the SARET may receive foreign assistance which is to be channeled through the Central
Government.”
These two latter articles (9 and 10) are identical with article 11 from the proposed
new bill on the Budget Balance between Central and Provincial Governments of the Republic
of Indonesia which states that: “(1) The Provincial government can receive assistance
from inside the country to finance part of its budget plan; (2) The Provincial government
can receive foreign assistance with the agreement from the Central Government.” It is
clear here that the SARET concept in principle is not different from the concept of the
Provincial Government Law and the proposed bill for arranging the budget between the
Central and Provincial Governments within the territory of the Republic of Indonesia.
With regards to taxation and natural resources, the Central Government will receive
special privileges based on article 7 and 8. Article 7 emphasizes that, “The Central
Government shall have exclusive competence over national taxation and the Government of
the SARET shall have exclusive competence over Regional taxation, in conformity with the
existing laws and regulations.” The consequence of this precept is that SARET can
only collect “small” revenues, such as regional retribution taxes, parking
taxes, etc., while the big revenues, such as export tariffs, will be collected by the
Central Government. Therefore, if the East Timorese produces coffee for export, the
revenues from this product will be channeled to the Central Government.
Article 8 which regulates the management of natural resources stresses that,
“Natural resources in the SARET, except those considered to be strategic or vital
under national laws, shall be under the control of the Government of the SARET. In the
exploitation of all natural resources, the Central Government and the Government of the
SARET may establish cooperative or joint undertakings.” The problem is who determines
which natural resources are strategic and vital? Obviously, according to this article, the
Central Government will have the authority to set up the criteria based on the Indonesian
national law. Natural resources which before were not categorized as vital can become
vital due to the increasing price in the market. Natural resources in Timor Leste, such as
oil, uranium, copper, marble, etc. will be controlled by the Central Government, and the
SARET government will only be able to glean what is left by the Central Government.
In general, the principles regarding economic, monetary and fiscal matters within the
SARET plan are not too different from the “special treatment” granted to Aceh
and Yogyakarta during New Order regime. And, again, as they are compared with the statutes
proposed in the new bills regulating the relationship between the Central and Provincial
Governments, there are no significant differences. What is worse is that all these
regulations open the door to corruption. Indonesia itself is still trying to deal with its
world-renowned problems of corruption, collusion and nepotism and there is no guarantee
that the newly elected government will manage to repair the system in the near future. The
SARET Government will be subject to a chronically corrupt Central Government. As such, it
can not be expected that the economic situation under SARET will differ from that which
has existed for the past 23 years.
CONTINUITY OF INDONESIAN LAWS In legal affairs, the Central Government of Indonesia
will be able to intervene in SARET. The SARET Government will be forced to implement all
the repressive laws that are used to silence pro-democracy and pro independence activists
in Indonesia and East Timor. Article 11 explicitly states that, "Indonesian laws in
force upon the date of the entry into force of this Agreement that fall within the
competence of the Central Government, as defined in this Chapter, shall remain in force
for the SARET." This means that the Indonesian laws that are not based on human
rights principles, such as the Criminal Code and other repressive regulations, will become
the law for the SARET authority and will be used to oppress the people of Timor Leste.
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE SPECIAL AUTONOMOUS REGION OF EAST TIMOR The Government of SARET
will be rigidly "bound" to the Indonesian Constitution. This is evident from
article 13, "The powers of the Government of the SARET shall be exercised in
accordance with the provisions of this Agreement, and also in accordance with the
Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia." The regulation on workers in article 14
(b) gives the impression that workers rights will be respected. Yet, if the SARET
authority is expected to implement Indonesian labor law, workers in East Timor will suffer
from the same restrictions as Indonesian workers. The Central Government-established
Indonesian Trade Union (SPSI) could operate in East Timor and serve as a tool of
repression.
JURISDICTIONS OF THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE SARET
In accordance with article 15, the Government of the SARET will only have jurisdiction
over certain crimes committed within its territory, while other crimes such as treason,
terrorism, narcotics, and international crimes are within the jurisdiction of the Central
Government. This article gives the Central Government full authority to interpret what
activities constitute treason, terrorism, or international crimes. It is possible that
certain political activities disapproved by the Central Government can be categorized as
treason, terrorism, or international crimes.
PART TWO
EAST TIMORESE IDENTITY AND IMMIGRATION Article 18 states, "The Central Government
shall have the power to apply immigration controls on entry into and departure from the
SARET of persons who are neither citizens of Indonesia nor have East Timorese identity,
pursuant to its authority under Article 1 of this Agreement." This precept clearly
allows the Central Government to control who can go in and out of East Timor. It has been
common practice in Indonesia to compile a blacklist to prevent certain
"dangerous" people from entering Indonesia. This practice would be continued
under SARET.
The authority of the Government of the SARET to issue identity cards as it is regulated
in article 19 is similar to the function of sub-district authority in Indonesia according
to the Law on Provincial Government of Indonesia.
SYMBOLS OF IDENTITY In accordance with article 20, the Government of the SARET can have
its own coat of arms but the Indonesian national flag must be flown and the Indonesian
national anthem "Indonesia Raya" must be sung in SARET territory. The SARET is
not allowed to join international athletic and cultural events using its own name. When
non-state entities participate in the events, the SARET may use its own name only with
permission from the Central Government.
PART III
POWERS AND INSTITUTIONS OF THE SARET There will be no significant difference between
the legislative body of the SARET as it is regulated in articles 22, 23, 24, and 25 and
the existing provincial level parliament in East Timor. The role of the legislative body
is restricted by the constitution and authority of the Central Government. Article 22
states, "The legislative power of the SARET shall extend to all matters not within
the jurisdiction of the Central Government, as defined in Chapter I of Part One. This
power shall include, the establishment of political, economic, and social policies in the
SARET; cultural and educational matters; designation of a second language or languages in
addition to the official language, Bahasa Indonesia …" This is a "rubber
article" which can limit the role of the legislative power of the SARET. Even though
legislative power of the SARET -- as it would be exercised through the Regional Council of
People's Representatives of the SARET -- has the authority to arrange areas such as
economy, politics, education, etc, this authority is not independent. The Central
Government retains the power to intervene through various judicial mechanisms and this
authority is guaranteed in Part I. It can be said that the authority of the legislative
body of the SARET is a "pseudo" power.
In Indonesia, the position of the regional parliament has recently improved slightly
compared to the one regulated by the old law on regional government. In the previous law,
the regional parliament was considered to be an integral part of the executive branch. The
new law, however, sharply divides the authority of the regional parliament from the
executive branch. Even with this amendment, many people still consider that the role of
the provincial parliament in an autonomous area in Indonesia will not undergo major
changes. It will be difficult to expect that the legislative power of the SARET will be
able to play a significant role because it will be conditioned to obey the rules set by
the Central Government.
EXECUTIVE POWERS AND INSTITUTIONS OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE SARET Candidates for
governor must acquire approval from the President of the Republic of Indonesia. As stated
in Article 28, "The list of candidates for the post of Governor of the SARET shall
first be consulted with and approved by the President of the Republic of Indonesia."
While article 29 stresses, "The Governor-elect shall be formally confirmed to the
post by the President of the Republic of Indonesia and shall be formally invested before
the Regional Council of People's Representatives of the SARET." This regulation is no
different from Law No. 7/1974 regarding Provincial Government.
Article 34 item 1 further states, "The names of candidates for the post of
Governor and Vice Governor chosen by the Regional Council of People's Representatives
shall be consulted with the president to attain his/her approval." Since the very
beginning of Indonesia’s rule over Timor Leste, the President of the Republic of
Indonesia has had great power to decide who will become the Governor. Under the SARET
plan, there will be the opportunity for the Central Government to continue to install
puppet governors who will allow it great authority over Timor Leste.
The Governor of SARET will not be under the authority of the Indonesian Ministry of
Internal Affairs. The Governor will be directly responsible to the President. Yet, in
executing the development programs, the Governor has to establish coordination with the
Department of Internal Affairs and other departments. For example, if the SARET government
requests foreign assistance, it has to coordinate the request with the related department
in accordance with the target of the foreign aid.
JUDICIAL POWERS AND INSTITUTIONS OF THE SARET In the SARET plan, judicial powers are
not included under the authority of the Central Government. However, if we examine the
mechanism to appoint judges and to declare regulations to be implemented in SARET, even
judicial powers are under the authority of the Central Government. For example, the
President of the Court of Appeal shall be appointed by the Chief Justice of the Supreme
Court of the Republic of Indonesia (Article 41, item 3). The Supreme Court of the Republic
of Indonesia is given the right to intervene in the judicial process in SARET. In this
context, the judiciary in SARET will be very much influenced by the law and legal system
in Indonesia.
SARET will not have its own Supreme Court. Thus, the Supreme Court of the Republic of
Indonesia will become the court of final appeal of the SARET as it is explained in article
44, item 1. Besides, there is always a possibility for collusion between the Supreme Court
of the Republic of Indonesia and the judges from the Court of Appeal of the SARET if there
is a case related to the interpretation of the agreement on the SARET. Article 44 item 2
states, "in all cases concerning the interpretation of this Agreement, provided that
the Supreme Court shall establish a special chamber to hear such cases composed of an odd
number of judges drawn from the Supreme Court of Indonesia and ad hoc judges drawn from
the East Timor Court of Appeal of the SARET." Thus, by analyzing the regulation on
judicial powers in the SARET, it can be said that there is no difference in principle
between the one proposed in the agreement and the one already contained in Indonesian law
(the Basic Laws of Judicial Powers).
PART FOUR
PROMOTION AND PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS Article 46 of the
agreement appears to support the promotion of human rights principles. The article,
however, does not give a clear explanation about the institution that will implement the
principles. For example, there is no mention of sanctions on perpetrators of human rights
violations, or of controls from the international community. The article is consistent
with what we have mentioned in Part I: the Central Government will be the one body to
control and to report on the implementation of the human rights principles in the SARET to
the international community since the Central Government is responsible for foreign
affairs. The Indonesian government will simply continue to do what it has been doing for
the past 23 years.
PART FIVE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE SARET
Article 49 mentions that the Central Government shall appoint a senior official to
supervise the Government of the SARET. This article shows that the governor of the SARET
will merely serve as a puppet governor. The senior official will supervise the governor in
carrying out his/her tasks. This kind of intervention becomes clearer in the regulation of
other sectors within the SARET as it is mentioned in article 50, "The Central
Government and the Government of the SARET may create bodies or other arrangements to
facilitate consultation, cooperation and coordination on such matters as police, tourism,
transportation, telecommunications, education, health and the environment."
PART SIX
RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN THE SPECIAL AUTONOMOUS REGION OF EAST TIMOR AND OTHER ENTITIES
The Central Government will have power to intervene in social, cultural, trade,
environmental, scientific, tourism and sports activities at the regional and international
level. The government of the SARET can regulate the activities but it has to have the
consent of the Central Government, as it is mentioned in article 55. This clearly shows
that the authority of the Central Government actually spreads beyond the three areas
formally mentioned in Part I.
PART SEVEN
THE UNITED NATIONS Article 56 on the role of the United Nations Secretary-General
clearly indicates that this SARET plan is an attempt to legalize the integration under a
new name.
PART EIGHT
GENERAL PROVISION The special autonomy for East Timor offered by the Indonesian
government is actually based on Law of Regional Government, article 18 regarding the
formation of Special Regions. Thus, if the East Timorese agree to this SARET plan, East
Timor will not have a different political status from other Special Regions within
Indonesia such as Aceh and Yogyakarta.
PART NINE
BASIC LAW OF THE SARET Article 58 states, "The SARET shall be governed by a basic
law, enacted by the first elected Regional Council of People's Representatives of the
SARET and which shall be in accordance with the provisions of this Agreement." The
last clause of this article, "in accordance with the provisions of this
Agreement," means that the basic law of the SARET has to be in accordance with the
authority of the Central Government; the SARET plan has, in its first part, explicitly
stated that the Indonesian Constitution and all Indonesian laws will be implemented in
SARET. Even if the Regional Council of People's Representatives passes a law of its own
for SARET, the Central Government can cancel the law. The Council has very limited
authority. It can be seen that SARET will not result in any significant changes from the
existing situation.
PART TEN
TRANSITIONAL PROVISIONS If the people of Timor Leste accept this autonomy plan, the
United Nations, with the agreement of the Indonesian government, will regulate the SARET
during the transition period. The consequence of accepting this agreement is that the
problem of East Timor will be finally removed from the UN agenda.
III. CONCLUSION
What has been described above clarifies that the SARET plan is a final trap which will
be imposed on the people of East Timor. This concept essentially does not bring any change
to the political status of East Timor from the "integration" policy. In general
it appears that the authority of the Central Government of the Republic of Indonesia is
very limited. Yet, after we peruse and analyze the document we can see that the power of
the Central Government is like an octopus roaming all over the sectors of the East
Timorese life. Finally, in our opinion this SARET plan is merely an attempt to
"legalize" the integration of East Timor which has never had any legitimacy and
has been challenged by the people of Timor Leste for 24 years.
SARET = ATTEMPT TO LEGALIZE INTEGRATION
Jakarta, May 8, 1999
End notes:
1. The method of resolving the problem of East Timor through “popular
consultation” is different from the methods of decolonization that have been carried
out in other countries. For example, in Western Sahara, where the UN is also actively
involved, a referendum will be held in December 1999. Western Sahara was initially
colonized by Spain, then from 1884 to 1974 by Morocco. The people of Western Sahara formed
Frente Polisario as their resistance organization in 1973. In 1991, the UN, Morocco and
Frente Polisario agreed on a Peace Plan that provided for the holding of a referendum in
Western Sahara. For this purpose, they formed MINURSO (The UN Mission to Carry Out the
Referendum in Western Sahara). MINURSO will mobilize about 1,700 peacekeeping forces, 800
police and 300 staff comprised of people from 50 countries. The referendum itself is to
find out whether the people of Western Sahara want to be independent or integrated with
Morocco. This is obviously different from the ballot for the people of Timor Leste who
will only be allowed to vote on Indonesia’s autonomy plan not directly on
independence. Moreover, the timetable for the ballot in Timor Leste is much more hurried.
It is important to note that the resistance of the East Timorese is much greater than that
of the people of West Sahara.
2. In order to talk about autonomy status, Hongkong provides a good example as a
comparison. Hongkong, as it is was arranged with the government of the People’s
Republic of China, is known as Special Administrative Region (SAR) of Hongkong. SAR
Hongkong was formed in accordance with Article 31 of the Chinese Constitution (while the
SARET was based on Article 18 Indonesian Constitution). According to SAR, Chinese
government only has the authority to deal with foreign relations and defense matters. SAR
Hongkong has full authority to regulate almost every other matter, such as the justice and
legal system, economic affairs (SAR has its own currency), education system, regional and
national tax system, the legislature, full rights in immigration matters, full
participation as a separate entity and territory in international organizations such as
GATT, Economic and Social Commission for Asia Pacific in the UN and Asian Development
Bank. Besides, SAR Hongkong can independently conduct trade agreements with other
countries. Such a concept of autonomy is obviously different from the one offered to East
Timor through the SARET plan.
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