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EAST TIMOR HUMAN RIGHTS CENTRE

"Escalating Violations in East Timor: Is a Peaceful Solution Possible?"

Annual Report of Human Rights Violations in East Timor 1998

28 February 1999 Ref: SR2/98

A. INTRODUCTION

"It is better to fight with diplomacy, with intelligence, with discussion, rather than fighting with guns." (1)

- Bishop Carlos Ximenes Belo, Bishop of Dili February 1999

1. East Timor Hopes for Political Solution

1998 and early 1999 have seen promising developments take place in East Timor's peace process. For the first time in its long and difficult struggle for peace, East Timor is hopeful that a political solution, leading to independence from Indonesia, is possible. In June 1998, the new Indonesian President, B.J. Habibie, under increasing pressure from the international community and the deepening economic crisis in Indonesia, proposed a wide-ranging autonomy for East Timor, on condition that East Timor accepts integration with Indonesia. Discussions of the autonomy proposal have been advanced in the context of the UN talks taking place between the governments of Portugal and Indonesia under UN auspices, but plans for an autonomy agreement to be reached by the end of 1998 did not eventuate. The stumbling block has been the question of self-determination, with Indonesia insisting that autonomy must be seen as a final solution, rejecting calls for a referendum which, its says, would open old wounds and lead to civil war in the territory. Meanwhile, Portugal has said it will not compromise on the East Timorese people's right to decide their own future through a UN-supervised referendum.

On 27 January 1999, Information Minister Yunus Yosfiah announced an unexpected policy change, saying that if East Timor rejects autonomy as a final solution, the President will ask the People's Consultative Assembly (MPR) to consider granting East Timor independence, after the June 1999 election. It is the first time Jakarta has publicly acknowledged the possibility of an independent East Timor and appears to be an admission that Indonesia has lost the battle over East Timor.

The autonomy being offered is "autonomy plus", which would, of course, require the East Timorese to give up the possibility of rejecting Indonesian sovereignty in the future. Yunus Yosfiah said the "mass" of East Timorese will be asked to accept or reject the autonomy package and if they reject it, the second option of independence will then be put to the MPR. This is the first indication that the East Timorese people will be given the opportunity to decide their future and the offer was made more concrete at the February 1999 round of UN talks, where Indonesia agreed, in principle, to consult the East Timorese people about their future.

However, Indonesia has still not explained how it will establish whether the people accept or reject autonomy and the method of consultation, which Alatas said could be a ballot, is still to be determined. Indonesian Foreign Minister, Ali Alatas said: "We have agreed in principle to now discuss a methodology...to find out whether this autonomy is acceptable or not acceptable to the East Timorese..."(2) Indonesia remains steadfast in insisting that a referendum is not possible: "What we would like to see is an effective method but not a full-fledged referendum...because we believe that a referendum contains more risks and dangers than it contains a possible solution to the problem."(3)

Indonesia has also steadfastly refused to release the jailed East Timorese Resistance leader, Xanana Gusmao, on grounds that he is a "criminal", although President Habibie has indicated that Gusmao will be released if autonomy is accepted as a final solution. Indonesia has, however, now bowed to international pressure to release Gusmao, and has transferred him to house arrest. This will enable Gusmao to play more of a role in the peace process, although this role is obviously still limited while he remains under house arrest. It is important that Gusmao is immediately and unconditionally released to enable him, as recognised leader of the East Timorese Resistance, to fully participate in all discussions and negotiations about East Timor's future. This should include direct participation in the UN talks.

On the ground in East Timor, the shifting Indonesian government policy appears to have contributed to greater instability, with clashes breaking out between pro-referendum and pro-autonomy groups. There has also been a marked escalation in human rights violations, with offensive military operations being launched by the Indonesian military. Paramilitary and civilian militia groups, which have been armed and trained by the military, are also wreaking havoc, terrorising the local population and even killing supporters of independence. The sincerity of the government of Indonesia's commitment to finding a peaceful solution is seriously undermined by this deterioration in the human rights situation. On the one hand, the government of Indonesia is considering independence for East Timor, while on the other hand, it is responsible for the recent escalation of violence in the territory.

Indonesia says there is a possibility East Timor will be free as early as January 2000 and concerns have been expressed by some commentators, and also by some East Timorese, that sudden independence for East Timor without preparation could precipitate a civil war, especially given that pro-integration groups have been heavily armed by the Indonesian military.

Others, including the ETHRC, believe talk of a possible civil war is unhelpful as it only fuels tension between opposing groups in the territory. Civil war is only one possible outcome, and not even the most likely one. Another possible outcome is that a hasty move towards independence could lead to chaos unless there is a transitional period in which the East Timorese people, with the support of the international community, can prepare for independence:

"To be cast adrift as early as mid-2000, with no long-term transition period in which to rehabilitate the traumatised society, also offers the East Timorese a dangerous short-term future, fraught with the possibility of further bloodshed and the breakdown of essential services." (4)

This scenario could be avoided if there is sufficient commitment to finding a peaceful solution. Such a commitment requires immediate steps to be taken to reverse the trend of escalating human rights violations and to create a peaceful transitional period, to enable the East Timorese people to realise their hope for independence. What is needed is an agenda for ensuring that a solution is found by peaceful means, through dialogue and diplomacy, and not by violence.

2. Escalating Human Rights Violations

The escalation of violations in 1998 has paralleled the new political freedom enjoyed in the territory since a caretaker government was installed in Indonesia last May, under B.J. Habibie. The freedom to organise, conduct political rallies and express opinion in public has clearly not been matched by a relaxation of the Indonesian military's efforts to suppress opposition to Indonesian rule.

The openness which has allowed the East Timorese to engage in public discussion of the territory's future has led to the formation of numerous political groups advocating independence for East Timor, via the conduct of a referendum. The mass support for this movement has been manifest in the attendance of large sections of the population at public meetings, known as "dialogues", held throughout East Timor. The increase in human rights violations in the latter half of the year is, in part, a reflection of the Indonesian military's campaign against those suspected of participating in or organising these events, but it also reflects a renewed effort to strengthen military control in the territory by undermining the effectiveness of Falintil, the East Timorese National Liberation Army.

The types of violations predominating in this period have been characterised by intimidation of civilians to prevent public expressions of dissent, including support for independence, and by the conduct of punitive raids in areas where political dialogues took place. Intimidation has taken the form of death threats and shooting at suspects, while raids have been attended by beatings, torture, and indiscriminate shooting. Many people in rural areas have had to flee their homes, fearing for their safety. There have also been numerous arbitrary arrests, with detainees being interrogated, tortured and ill-treated. Most notably, the inhabitants of the Bobonaro district have suffered doubly from military operations launched in response to a political dialogue held in Atabae in early November, and the killing of ABRI personnel in Cailaco later that month.

Indonesian military retaliation for attacks against military personnel constitute the source of the most serious violations in terms of the number of victims involved and the nature of the abuses suffered. The operations against the civilian population in the subdistricts of Alas and Cailaco caused a mass exodus of the residents of both locations, and left up to fifty civilians dead in Alas. Numerous others were victims of beatings and torture in a wave of attacks on the surrounding villages of each area.

Arbitrary executions have also become increasingly common, most often in the style of "death squad" assassinations or premeditated murder. The profile of the perpetrators of these and other violations also altered considerably in late 1998 and early 1999, with a marked increase in violations by members of civilian militia and paramilitary organisations, which have been operating alone or with the support of regular military units.

Large-scale offensives involving both paramilitary and regular units were launched in September in a renewed effort to destroy Falintil, the armed wing of the East Timorese resistance. These offensives followed a steady increase in troop numbers in the territory, which began in late August, contrary to claims by Indonesia that troops numbers had decreased following the much publicised withdrawal of 1,000 troops in early August. While the military operations were directed at the guerrilla army, East Timorese civilians were frequently targeted as sources of intelligence and subjected to torture and ill-treatment.

The leaking of Indonesian army documents to Western embassies and the media in late October provided conclusive evidence as to the true extent of Indonesia's military commitment in East Timor and the nature of its organisation. The leaked documents revealed that the total number of ABRI forces in the territory was more than three times higher than the most conservative estimates cited by the Indonesian government. While Indonesia's Foreign Affairs Minister, Ali Alatas, had claimed that there were only 6,000 territorial troops and no combat troops remaining in East Timor, the army personnel data showed that there were approximately 21,000 troops on the ABRI payroll.(5) The US-based East Timor Action Network, which obtained a copy of the leaked documents, put the number of troops as high as 21,620.(6)

In relation to the withdrawal of combat troops from East Timor, Ali Alatas stated that "the withdrawal of battle troops will be done continually, based on the condition[s] and situation in East Timor".(7) However, the army records point to the existence of five combat battalions in East Timor, each consisting of 985 personnel, plus a further ten companies based in Dili. The troops stationed in Dili also include a Kopassus company and a Kopassus headquarters command and intelligence unit. Based on this information, the total number of combat troops in East Timor stands at 7,938.(8)

Also evident from the data is the fact that between late 1997 and August 1998, overall troop numbers had, in fact, risen by 1,766. Moreover, local sources reported an additional influx of troops into East Timor from August to September via the West Timor border and in night-time coastal landings at sites along the north coast remote from the capital. While estimates for these additional troops range from 2,000 to 8,000, it is nevertheless apparent that the numbers involved are well in excess of the increase evident from the leaked documents. It is clear then that these last figures represent a covert build up of troops preparatory to the operations against Falintil in September.

The organisational structure of ABRI in East Timor, as evidenced by the leaked personnel data, clearly shows the official standing of locally raised paramilitary and civilian militia groups as part of Indonesia's defence force. The leaked documents listed a total of thirteen paramilitary or militia-type organisations under ABRI control in East Timor. The aggressive way in which these units have been employed against the civilian population, confirms the pattern of divide and rule already established with the recruitment of East Timorese into the territorial units of the regular army. Paramilitary units, such as Halilintar, Team Alpha and Team Saka, have received substantial training from the Indonesian military and operate as uniformed members of the Indonesian army. They have been widely used in counterinsurgency operations from the early to mid 1990s onwards.

The divisive role of paramilitaries has been taken further with the creation of new civilian militias in late 1998. While formed under the aegis of RATIH, a national militia being raised by ABRI, the militia groups raised in East Timor have taken names such as Mahidin, "Life or Death with Integration" and have been organised by local East Timorese leaders loyal to the Indonesian government. Members of the groups have been issued military weapons and given minimal training, and attacks staged by the groups appear to have taken place with the tacit support of the Indonesian military. Together with the manner in which the new militia groups have been raised, the support and licence given the groups points to a deliberate attempt by ABRI to continue the conflict initiated by Indonesia with the invasion of East Timor in 1975.

3. Overview of Human Rights Violations: 1997 to 1998

The increase in human rights violations in the second half of 1998 has continued the downward spiral of conditions in East Timor witnessed during the first half of the year. This report focuses on human rights violations in East Timor in the period July to December 1998, but also includes some earlier violations not previously documented by the ETHRC and some violations which have taken place in early 1999.

The report documents serious violations by Indonesian security force personnel including extrajudicial executions, arbitrary detention, torture and ill-treatment, disappearances and rape. Many of these violations can also be seen as restrictions of freedom of expression and association. In addition, the report contains some reports of violations allegedly perpetrated by Falintil, the East Timorese armed resistance.

The statistics below for the second half of 1998 show a sharp increase in violations compared with the first half of 1998. The Justice and Peace Commission, run by the Dili Diocese of the Catholic Church, documented similar statistics for violations in 1998: 212 cases of arbitrary arrest and detention, 54 extrajudicial executions, 19 disappearances, 234 cases of intimidation, 89 cases of torture and ill-treatment, and 24 cases of rape and sexual abuse.

Violations of Civil and Political Rights: 1998

Jan-June July-Dec Violations of Right to Life Extrajudicial Execution 23 28 Attempted Extrajudicial Execution 1 7 Violations of Right to Individual Liberty Arbitrary Detention, 107 149 256 Enforced Disappearances, 20 1 21

Violations of Right to Integrity & Security of Person Torture 95 63 Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment 74 120 Rape 4 1 ..Attempted Rape 3 - ..Sexual abuse - 2

Right to Due Process Breach of Procedural Guarantees 11

Violations of Political Rights Freedom of Expression and Association 1512 55

Other Violations Intimidation and Persecution 40 23

Total 1,890 460

4. Agenda for a Peaceful Solution

The recent escalation of human rights violations in East Timor has followed the increase in offensive operations by the Indonesian military and the arming of paramilitary and civilian militia groups in the territory. This has raised concerns that, in the short-term, East Timor is likely to face further violence and a breakdown in law and order and essential services. However, a peaceful solution is possible if there is a genuine commitment to peace. Such a commitment requires immediate steps to be taken to reverse the trend of human rights violations and to create an atmosphere of peace and cooperation in East Timor. Ideally, there will be a transitional period of two to five years, in which preparations can be made for a UN-supervised referendum, and the East Timorese people, with the support of the international community, can prepare for the expected outcome of independence.

What is needed is an agenda for ensuring that a solution is found by peaceful means, through dialogue and diplomacy, and not by violence. Immediate steps can be taken by the government of Indonesia, the East Timorese Resistance and the international community in order to contribute to the peace process. First, there should be an immediate end to all hostilities in the territory with a view to implementing a complete cease-fire. Second, the complete demilitarisation of East Timor, under UN supervision, is essential. This will require the complete withdrawal of Indonesian troops, the disarming of Falintil, the East Timorese National Liberation Army, and the disarming and disbanding of all paramilitary and civilian militia groups. A permanent UN presence is needed in East Timor to enable UN supervision and verification of these stages of the peace process.

Options for deploying a permanent UN presence to East Timor need to explored, in the context of the Tripartite Talks continuing under UN auspices, and in consultation with East Timorese leaders. The options include posting UN human rights monitors in East Timor, deploying UN peace-keeping forces, and/or providing a UN interim administration.

A transitional period, preferably under UN administration, would enable the East Timorese people to prepare for independence, strengthen East Timorese civil society, build effective institutions and move towards democracy and good governance. There is also be a need for a reconciliation process to be implemented in East Timor. This will not only contribute to a peaceful transition to independence but will also assist the East Timorese people to heal the trauma of 24 years of human rights violations under Indonesia and create a future based on respect for human rights. Local human rights organisations have an important contribution to make to the promotion and protection of human rights in East Timor. The international community could provide material and diplomatic support for their efforts.

Also aimed at promoting and protecting human rights is the agreement reached in August 1998 between the government of Indonesia and the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights for "technical cooperation" in the field of human rights. Under the agreement, which is valid for two years, the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights will cooperate with and assist the Government of Indonesia in the implementation of technical cooperation programmes. UN representative, Professor Sam S. Souryal, will implement the programme from the office of the UNDP (United Nations Development Programme) in Jakarta. It is understood he will be allowed access to East Timor.

The government of Indonesia has claimed that agreement for technical cooperation will advance human rights in East Timor, but the ETHRC believes it falls far short of what is actually needed in terms of international human rights monitoring in the territory. The agreement does not make it clear whether the UN officer will be able to monitor human rights abuses in East Timor, which is clearly what is required.

The release of all East Timorese political prisoners is also essential. In 1998, some political prisoners were released(9) and in early 1999, the Indonesian government bowed to international pressure to release Xanana Gusmao, moving him to house arrest. While these steps are welcomed, they clearly do not go far enough. In addition to political prisoners documented in this report, it is believed there are at least 97 East Timorese political prisoners still detained in East Timor and Indonesia.10 These prisoners should all be released as a confidence-building measure, while Gusmao should be unconditionally released to enable him to participate fully in the discussions for a peaceful solution.

In fact, genuine participation by a broad range of East Timorese in the discussions and negotiations about East Timor's future is necessary. This should include participation in the Tripartite Talks, which are continuing under UN auspices. The current forum for East Timorese participation, the All-inclusive Intra-East Timorese Dialogue (AIETD), remains ineffective. The fourth AIETD, which was held in late October, discussed options for East Timor's future but the meeting came to an impasse when pro-integration and pro-independence East Timorese failed to reach agreement on the question of self-determination. The pro-integration group rejected a CNRT(10) document, which proposed a transitional period of self-rule followed by a UN-supervised referendum in two to five years. CNRT has said it will not participate in any further AIETD meetings in their present form.

In the coming year, there is a need for greater cooperation by the government of Indonesia with the UN Human Rights Commission (UNCHR) and its human rights mechanisms. In 1998, the government of Indonesia showed some cooperation with the UNCHR by complying with some of the undertakings contained in the 1998 Chairman's Consensus Statement. Compliance with the 1998 statement led to a visit to East Timor by the UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, although the visit did not take place until February 1999. This has raised concerns that the Working Group will not be able to prepare its report in time for the 55th session of the Commission in March.

In the 1998 Statement, the UNCHR Chairman stressed the need for the government of Indonesia to implement other commitments made to the UNCHR in previous Chairman's Statements which, to date, have not been implemented.(11) These include an undertaking to invite the Special Rapporteur on Torture to visit East Timor. The government of Indonesia has also largely ignored recommendations contained in the various resolutions adopted by the UNCHR(12) including a call to invite the Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances to visit. The government of Indonesia should, as a matter of priority, implement all outstanding UNCHR recommendations.

Concrete steps also need to be taken to address the human rights violations continuing in the territory. The ETHRC has made detailed recommendations to the government of Indonesia to address specific violations, including stopping the practices of arbitrary detention and torture of individuals, ensuring that detainees have prompt access to lawyers of their own choice, and ensuring that all East Timorese people have the right to freedom of expression and association.

There is also a need to investigate past human rights abuses and to bring the perpetrators to justice, ending the almost complete impunity which members of the Indonesian security forces responsible for violations in East Timor have enjoyed for more than 23 years. Past violations, including those documented in this report, should be investigated by an independent, international expert who, ideally, would be a representative of the UN. There is also an urgent need for the government of Indonesia to clarify the whereabouts of all people documented as "disappeared".

The government of Indonesia recently announced that the Indonesian National Human Rights Commission will establish a Peace Commission in order to address the escalating violence in East Timor. The Commission will be made up of East Timorese leaders, and representatives of the armed forces and the Indonesian administration. The principal role of the Commission would be to educate the East Timorese in order to bring about an end to the violence.(13) The establishment of the new Commission has been welcomed by Xanana Gusmao and also by the ETHRC, but only time will tell whether the Commission is able to make a contribution to stability and peace in East Timor.

Ultimately, peace in East Timor will only be possible if a solution to the political conflict is found, which is based on respect for human rights. The agenda for a peaceful solution contained in this report requires a genuine commitment to peace and human rights, and outlines concrete recommendations aimed at reversing the trend of escalating violations. It is hoped this will create the opportunity for a peaceful transitional period in East Timor, leading to a UN-supervised referendum, at which the East Timorese people can finally determine their own future.

B. RECOMMENDATIONS

To ensure that a solution to the East Timor conflict is found by peaceful means, through dialogue and diplomacy, rather than by violence, urgent steps are needed to address the escalating violations and to create a climate of peace and cooperation in which East Timor can realise its hope for independence.

1. RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE GOVERNMENT OF INDONESIA

The government of Indonesia should demonstrate its commitment to finding a peaceful solution by taking the following steps:

A peaceful solution to the East Timor conflict

1. Immediately cease all offensive military operations in East Timor and put an end to the human rights violations which continue to be perpetrated by the Indonesian military and by civilian militia and paramilitary groups. Take steps to bring about an agreement with CNRT for a complete cease-fire in the territory.

2. Immediately and unconditionally release Xanana Gusmao from "house arrest". Allow Xanana Gusmao and other leaders of the East Timorese Resistance to participate in discussions to find a peaceful settlement to the East Timor conflict. This should include full participation in the Tripartite Talks, which are continuing under UN auspices.

3. Immediately and unconditionally release all East Timorese prisoners of conscience, detained or convicted solely for the non-violent expression of their views, and any other East Timorese prisoners, detained or convicted for political reasons.

4. Explore options, in the context of the Tripartite Talks under UN auspices, and in consultation with East Timorese leaders, for a permanent UN presence in East Timor. The options include posting UN human rights monitors, deploying UN peace-keeping forces, and/or providing a UN interim administration.

5. Withdraw all Indonesian troops from East Timor and ensure that troop withdrawals take place under UN supervision.

6. Disband and disarm all paramilitary and civilian militia groups operating in East Timor. Ensure this is done under UN supervision.

7. Allow regular and unhindered access to East Timor for international human rights organisations, including the ETHRC, for the purpose of human rights monitoring. Allow local human rights organisations to undertake their work unhindered and without harassment.

8. Set a timetable for a UN-supervised referendum to enable the East Timorese people to exercise their right to self-determination. A UN-supervised referendum is the only democratic process which will enable the people to freely decide their future.

Addressing human rights violations in East Timor

9. Stop the practice of arbitrarily arresting individuals for their non-violent political activities and ensure that all East Timorese people have the right to freedom of expression and association, without fear of harassment, arbitrary arrest, imprisonment, torture and ill-treatment.

10. Release all those in detention who have not been charged with a recognisable offence under Indonesian law and ensure that detainees have prompt access to lawyers of their own choice.

11. Stop the practice of using military forces to arrest and interrogate suspects, as these are functions of the police under Indonesia's Criminal Procedure Code (KUHAP).

12. Establish a central register of all detainees in East Timor and require all members of the military and police to report the names of detainees immediately so that family members can be notified.

13. Ensure that all East Timorese in police or military custody are treated humanely and in accordance with international standards.

14. Ensure that all trials in East Timor are conducted in accordance with international standards.

15. Clarify immediately the whereabouts of all people documented as "disappeared" in this report and conduct full and impartial investigations of other violations contained in this report. The perpetrators should be prosecuted to the fullest extent of the law and if found guilty, given sentences which reflect the seriousness of the crimes.

Co-operation with the United Nations

16. Cooperate fully with the UN Commission on Human Rights (UNCHR) and its thematic rapporteurs and working groups. Take steps to implements all outstanding recommendations made by the UNCHR and its mechanisms, including:

* Inviting the Special Rapporteur on Torture to visit East Timor (UNCHR resolution, 1997) * Inviting the Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances to visit East Timor (Recommendations of UN Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary and Arbitrary Executions, 1994)

2. RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE EAST TIMORESE RESISTANCE (CNRT)

The East Timorese Resistance should also take steps to ensure that a peaceful solution is possible:

1. Publicly state its commitment to the norms established under international humanitarian law and ensure the East Timorese Resistance, including its National Liberation Army, Falintil, abides by that commitment.

2. Issue instructions to Falintil to immediately cease all offensive operations in the territory. Take steps to bring about an agreement with the government of Indonesia for a complete cease-fire.

3. Under UN supervision, ensure the complete disarmament of Falintil.

3. RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY

The international community can support efforts to find a peaceful solution to the East Timor conflict in the following ways:

1. Express its concern over escalating human rights violations in East Timor.

2. Encourage the governments of Indonesia and Portugal to explore options, in the context of the Tripartite Talks under UN auspices, and in consultation with East Timorese leaders, for a permanent UN presence in East Timor. The options include posting UN human rights monitors, deploying UN peace-keeping forces, and/or providing a UN interim administration.

3. Support calls for the government of Indonesia to take the following steps: * Release all East Timorese prisoners detained solely for their political activities, including Xanana Gusmao, who remains in house arrest. * Withdraw all Indonesian troops from East Timor, under UN supervision. * Disband and disarm all paramilitary and civilian militia groups operating in East Timor, also under UN supervision. * Allow regular and unhindered access to East Timor for international human rights organisations, including the ETHRC, for the purpose of human rights monitoring. Allow local human rights organisations to operate unhindered and without harassment. * Set a timetable for a UN-supervised referendum to enable the East Timorese people to exercise their right to self-determination.

4. Provide material and diplomatic support for the efforts of local human rights NGOs to protect and promote human rights on the ground in East Timor.

5. Promote and support initiatives to establish a reconciliation process in East Timor, such as a Truth and Reconciliation Commission. This will not only contribute to a peaceful transition to independence but will also assist the East Timorese people to heal the trauma of 24 years of human rights violations under Indonesia and create a future based on respect for human rights.

6. Promote and support efforts to strengthen East Timorese civil society, build effective institutions and promote democracy and good governance.

7. In the context of the forthcoming 55th session of the UN Commission on Human Rights (UNCHR):

* Call for the UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention to make its preliminary report available in time for the session of the UNCHR and call for recommendations of the Working Group to be implemented. * Call for the government of Indonesia to cooperate fully with the thematic rapporteurs and working groups of the UNCHR. * Call for the government of Indonesia to implement all outstanding recommendations made by the UNCHR and its mechanisms, including inviting the Special Rapporteur on Torture and the Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances to visit East Timor. * Support calls for a strong resolution on the question of East Timor to be tabled at the UNCHR.

continued....

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