Subject: Nation (US): "License to Kill in
Timor" by Allan Nairn
Date: Sat, 15 May 1999 11:27:41 -0400
From: "John M. Miller" <fbp@igc.apc.org>[as published]
"License to Kill in Timor" by Allan Nairn
The Nation, 31 May 1999
Following the ouster of Indonesia’s President Suharto last year, the new
government agreed to give the people of East Timor—which was illegally seized by
Indonesia a quarter-century ago—the chance to vote for independence. But as veteran
journalist Allan Nairn reports, the powerful Indonesian military and its militias in Timor
are engaged in a ruthless effort to intimidate the Timorese population. —The Editors
Jakarta
According to the number-two commander of East Timor’s notorious newly formed
militias, the Indonesian armed forces (TNI-ABRI) have made a secret “accord”
with the militias, authorizing them to assassinate members of local independence groups.
Herminio da Costa, chief of staff of the thirteen Timorese militias, says the accord
has been in effect since late January. He says it authorizes his men to “attack
homes, interrogate and kill members of the CNRT [the National Council of Timorese
Resistance, the nonpartisan, pro-independence umbrella group] and Fretilin [a left-leaning
pro-independence party],” as long as the militias refrain from common crimes like
“car theft and stealing food.” Speaking in a series of phone interviews from
militia headquarters in occupied Dili, da Costa described how his men had executed unarmed
“enemies of the people” but said that these killings had been carried out with
prior clearance from TNI-ABRI.
Da Costa said he was disclosing the existence of the accord for the first time publicly
in order to illustrate his claim that the militias are, in fact, independent. Reacting
testily to questions about Jakarta’s role in launching the militias, da Costa denied
that he and his men were operating with impunity. “We can be arrested at any time
like any ordinary Timorese,” he said. When asked exactly what he meant by that, da
Costa said that the Timor police and army command, with formal approval from Jakarta, had
worked out with his men a series of ground rules for mayhem in occupied Timor that, in
effect, grant the militias an official—but conditional—license to kill.
Da Costa spoke warmly of the Indonesian army now occupying East Timor, an army that has
caused the deaths of one-third of the original population. The army guarantees his local
business holdings (he claims the militias are self-financing), and he has long served it
openly as an informant and collaborator. He praised General Wiranto—now the TNI-ABRI
national commander and Indonesia’s Defense Minister, who once served in Timor—as
a “very good friend”; he said the same of Gen. Zacky Makarim, who now oversees
Timor policy. But he complained that since the independence vote for Timor was announced
in January (the vote is now set for August 8, under a UN agreement), the army has been
under pressure to provide protection for its longtime enemies. Da Costa says the accord
was in part a solution to this political problem and in part a means of addressing the
fact that “unauthorized violence” by the militias was at times causing headaches
for the army and its subunit, the police.
Da Costa portrays the militias as an autonomous player in this deal. He says, contrary
to much evidence, that the army gives them only “moral support.” Even if that
were true, it would not change the nature of the accord: In January the army and the
militias worked out a division of labor. “Now the ABRI was ‘protecting’ the
Fretilin,” da Costa explained, “and we were the ones who were assaulting
Fretilin and CNRT homes.” He argued strenuously that this license came at a price.
The law was laid down to them, da Costa said: no stealing, no mugging, no rackets. In the
event of such actions, “we can be arrested and disarmed.” He added, “But if
we kill CNRT or Fretilin members, no, there is no problem.” Consistent with da
Costa’s claims, none of the militiamen have been arrested for political murders (one
foreign diplomat estimates a toll of 100 victims in the past month)—though it is also
the case that they have openly continued their common-crime spree. Da Costa says that the
accord was worked out in Dili with the police chief, Col. Timbul Silaen, and the army
command staff and that Timor’s army chief, Col. Tono Suratman, “gave permission
to do assaults on houses but not without his authorization and knowledge.” The same
applies to interrogations of independence supporters. Col. Suratman did not respond to
messages left at his home asking for comment. Col. Silaen could not be reached.
Shortly before the first high-profile militia massacre, in Liquisa on April 6, da Costa
was sworn in as militia chief of staff in a public ceremony by Gen. Adam Damiri, the
TNI-ABRI commander for the region that includes East Timor. Following Liquisa, on April
17, after open threats to “invade” Dili and “wipe out” and “clean
up” all vestiges of independence support, the militias staged a public ceremony,
overseen by the occupation governor and attended by General Makarim and at least three
other senior officers, in front of the Dili government palace. There followed an open
militia rampage through the deserted streets of Dili—with police and army standing
aside, cheering and giving high-fives—that left the houses of key independence
leaders sacked and burned, an estimated twenty dead and several dozen missing.
When I asked da Costa about Liquisa, Dili and militia executions generally, he said
that all these killings fell under the terms of the January accord. “We don’t
have authorization to kill every day,” he explained, “only when we are
assaulted”—though the assaults apparently need not be physical. He claimed that
the Liquisa killings arose from physical attacks on militia members by pro-independence
youth instigated by the CNRT and Fretilin. (The militias do not attempt to engage the
armed Falintil guerrillas, the resistance force that has fought in the mountains ever
since Indonesia invaded in 1975 and that has, according to US officials, been in a
“stand down” posture in recent months.) But da Costa does not dispute the fact
that his forces assaulted the Liquisa church and rectory, a horrific attack that left
blood and pieces of scalp on the walls, and dozens hacked to death.
Da Costa’s point is that the Liquisa victims had it coming politically. Yayasan
Hak, the Timorese human rights and legal group, says the victims were refugees. It has
published the names of fifty-seven dead, many of them women and children; some survivors
say many more died. Da Costa claims that local “people asked us to kill them [the
victims]. For us it wasn’t a disaster. For the people of Liquisa it was a
liberation.” He adds that in Liquisa the militias asked the TNI-ABRI for
backup—and got it from the BRIMOB, a unit specializing in crowd control. As BRIMOB
lobbed in tear gas and fired gunshots, the militia machete-men waded in.
Da Costa says, “We assaulted the church and the rectory as Fretilin command posts.
Those who died were not simple people. They were activists, CNRT members.... If we kill
them, they say they died as people. But no, they died as Fretilin.”
Manuelito Carrascalao, the 16-year-old son of Manuel Carrascalao, a CNRT political
leader, died in the Dili rampage when militias attacked his father’s house, murdering
him and more than a dozen of the refugees sheltering there. Survivors were taken away and
have reportedly been put in a concentration camp. For da Costa, Manuelito’s death was
consistent with the militias’ mission. Manuel Carrascalao, he said, is “an enemy
of the people.” When the militias arrived, they found that Manuel was not home (he
had left moments before to seek help from Colonel Suratman, who had brushed him off). The
execution of Manuelito was “punishment for his father’s activism,”
according to da Costa. “If he hadn’t been the son of Manuel, he wouldn’t
have died.”
As this was written, reports came in of another Dili rampage, with at least three
reported deaths. No arrests have been made.
On May 5 Indonesia signed a UN deal in which the government pledged to stay neutral in
the Timor vote and to enforce the law impartially. But speaking on May 11, da Costa said
that as far as the militias knew, their accord with TNI-ABRI “remains in force.”
The license to kill still holds.
Allan Nairn was banned from Indonesia and East Timor as a “threat to national
security” after he survived the Dili massacre of 1991. Arrested and deported last
year and threatened with six years in prison, he recently re-entered Indonesia without the
army’s permission. This is the first of a series of editorials. For more information,
go to www.thenation.com.
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