Subject: SMH: An open invitation to a bloodbath
Date: Sat, 07 Aug 1999 10:03:22 -0400
From: "John M. Miller" <fbp@igc.apc.org>Received from Joyo Indonesian
News:
Sydney Morning Herald Saturday, August 7, 1999
EAST TIMOR
An open invitation to a bloodbath
By HAMISH MCDONALD, Foreign Editor
The most worrying signal about what happens in East Timor after the vote is that
no-one, it seems, has yet got any senior Indonesian official to discuss the possibility of
a vote rejecting Jakarta's offer of autonomy and favouring independence.
In terms of stated government policy, President B.J. Habibie would accept such an
outcome and recommend East Timor's separation to the new People's Consultative Assembly
(MPR) convening in November. After some jawboning, the likely new president, Megawati
Sukarnoputri, has said the same.
But in terms of practical detail, it's an eventuality Indonesia's diplomats and
military officials simply refuse to talk about. Even at this late stage, the United
Nations is still trying to engage them on the subject.
As recently as late June, Indonesia's Foreign Minister, Ali Alatas, told the Herald his
Government was doing no contingency planning for a new independent nation on its eastern
border.
But if Jakarta is unreadable, the UN's plans are open to its member nations. As Mark
Riley's report makes clear, the UN intends to cut and run if serious violence breaks out
in the critical "Phase II" between the August30 vote and the MPR session.
Even then, it may take another four months for the UN cavalry to arrive. Shades of
Rwanda and Kosovo. By then, the work of the militias in cleaning out the independence
leaders and pillaging Timor's infrastructure could be complete. A wasteland called peace
for 10,000 soldiers to police.
Can the Indonesian military (TNI), which clearly set up the militias, be trusted to
restrain them, and at the same time quietly carry out its own withdrawal from a territory
that it spent 25 years and thousands of lives trying to subjugate?
Alexander Downer was "more optimistic than he's ever been" this week about a
peaceful outcome in East Timor, following Megawati's statement. The US State Department
thinks the TNI and its chief, General Wiranto, can be held to honour the UN process and
heed Indonesia's international reputation.
It may be - from its truculent accusations about the UN mission, the Australian
Government, international media, aid agencies being "biased" towards the
independence cause - that Indonesia's military-bureaucratic establishment is inwardly
prepared for a pro-independence vote.
Equally, it could be preparing for an "unfair" call if the vote is adverse
for Indonesia - especially if the margin is not wide.
Indonesia's ability to deny the reality in East Timor is legendary - from the covert
war of late 1975, to the invasion by "volunteers" in December that year, to the
horrendous famine of the late 1970s, to the Santa Cruz massacre in 1991, to the notion
that this year's violence has been "inter-factional".
Its military machine in the territory is still run by officers steeped in this
bloodshed and deception all of their careers.
There is a dangerous gap in the UN's plans. The UN's many failures, and NATO's
hesitancy in backing the Rambouillet talks on Kosovo with preparations for intervention,
show how weakness can be abused.
Indonesia's civilian politicians, and its voters yearning for democracy and a civil
society, may be ready to shake hands and leave East Timor to its own ways. But it's taking
far too much on trust to expect the military-bureaucratic machine to care what the
Timorese or the outside world thinks.
What should be done?
By all means, keep up the moral pressure on Jakarta, and keep up the threats that World
Bank and International Monetary Fund finance, military equipment and so on might be hard
to justify if it allows a bloodbath in Timor.
But that is not sufficient. The UN may pull back to a more secure compound, but it must
not withdraw from East Timor in Phase II, whatever the threat. Nor should Australia
withdraw the only diplomatic mission in Dili.
If the UN cannot rely on the 15,000-strong Indonesian garrison for security even in
Dili, there must be plans for an insertion force to protect UN staff, other international
workers, and any threatened Timorese leaders.
For John Howard, this worst-case scenario would be a dreadful moment of destiny.
Washington and other key allies have made it plain this crisis is Canberra's baby. Any
intervention would have to be launched from Darwin, using mostly Australian forces.
Australia says it will continue to recognise Indonesian sovereignty in East Timor until
the MPR severs it. We would have to live with the consequences of invading that
sovereignty. But at the very least, the Prime Minister should put some strategic ambiguity
into that pledge. Namely: in the contingency of the Timorese having voted for
independence, and Indonesia's security forces allowing the losers to vent their rage in
widespread violence, Jakarta would be seen to have relinquished control and responsibility
for East Timor.
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