Subject: SMH - Op-ed: Timor poses fresh threat to
Jakarta ties - J. Dunn
Date: Sat, 14 Aug 1999 09:20:10 -0400
From: "John M. Miller" <fbp@igc.apc.org>Wednesday, August 4, 1999
EAST TIMOR
Timor poses fresh threat to Jakarta ties
The big test for our relations with Indonesia will come after East Timor's independence
vote, writes James Dunn.
DURING his flight home to Australia from Indonesia, Foreign Minister Alexander Downer
must have felt pleased with himself. And with good reason, for he had put the final
touches to a significant and progressive shift in Australian policy on East Timor without
much apparent pain.
That shift will enable us, however belatedly, to play a key role in settling adispute
which has dogged our relationship with Indonesia for more than a quarter of a century.
The minister apparently had frank discussions with all parties involvedin EastTimor -
and his involvement was generally welcome - though some arewondering, understandably, just
how far Australia is prepared to go ifthere is aserious deterioration in the situation on
the ground after theplebiscite on August 30.
The vote will allow the East Timorese to decide whether they wish to continue as part
of Indonesia or become independent. Whatever happens, our once-cosy relationship with the
Indonesian Government will probably be strained for some time after the vote, at least
until the character of the new regime in Jakarta has been established, and the role of the
armed forces (the TNI) is reshaped to meet the requirements of a democratic state.
In view of the Howard Government's unadventurous record in foreign policy initiatives
elsewhere, the sensitive Timor question seemed an unlikely vehicle for the biggest shift
in foreign policy in more than a generation.
That such a radical change was achieved is a personal victory for Downer who responded
positively both to the drastic political changes in Indonesia, and to the growing
international concern at the plight of the people in arguably the only former colony to be
denied the right to choose its own destiny.
With the United Nations Mission in East Timor (UNAMET) operation going relatively
smoothly so far, the change does not appear to have caused any serious problems, except
that the Canberra-Jakarta relationshi is not as comfortable as it was. Our greatest
challenges, however, are likely to be just ahead, in the aftermath of the plebiscite.
Many expect violence once the results of the referendum have been announced; an
expectation encouraged by the bellicose utterings of some militia leaders. Downer has
received firm assurances from the Habibie Government that security will be maintained,
whatever the outcome of the vote, but in this time of political transition, will the
Indonesian Government really be able to control the situation?
It could be several months after the referendum before a new Indonesian Government
under a new president is established. Undoubtedly the most cohesive force in Indonesia
during this period will be the military, so its response to the plebiscite is crucial.
The political uncertainties in Jakarta may offer those opposed to independence for East
Timor a last-ditch opportunity to obstruct such an outcome, by allowing, or even
encouraging, the militia to launch an insurrection, in effect creating the civil war that
some Indonesian generals have been predicting.
At this point, security is in the hands of Indonesian police units which were until
recently part of the armed forces - their effectiveness remains to be tested. More
important at this stage is the UN presence, but just what form this presence will take
after the plebiscite is apparently yet to be determined.
One thing is clear, however, it will need to change its role from an
election-facilitating mission to one focused on reconciliation and peacemaking.
UNAMET II will presumably need a new mandate in order to deal with post-election
security problems, and that means negotiating another agreement endorsed by Indonesia, the
UN and Portugal, a time-consuming process. Understandably, Downer does not like to talk
about an Australian presence in East Timor, for it can raise the prospect of clashes
between Australian and Indonesian forces, reminiscent of Konfrontasi in the early '60s.
But if there is a major breakdown in security in Timor, we may well find a military
involvement inescapable, to help end the violence.
SUCH an involvement would emerge from strong international pressure on the Habibie
Government, especially from the US and the EU countries, to allow in a UN peacekeeping
force, even before the plebiscite result is endorsed by the new Indonesian Parliament.
If the Indonesian Government bows to such pressure, which in the circumstances it might
do (however grudgingly in the face of strong TNI opposition), Australia, as a key player
in the drama so far, will be expected to assume a leading role. We would be asked to
provide troops as well as facilities in Darwin. It would be a request we could not really
refuse.
Such a development would sorely test the Howard Government's change of direction, not
to speak of our diplomatic skills.
Just how it would affect our relationship with Jakarta may depend on the outcome of the
Indonesian elections. But even in a worst-case scenario, I do not believe that a major
military clash would eventuate.
A first step towards a democratic Indonesia will surely mean restraining the TNI, and
although the Indonesian military remains essentially the creature of Soeharto's Orde Baru,
or "New Order", there are encouraging signs that it is slowly adjusting itself
to accommodate the shift to a more democratic format.
Moreover, the generals must be aware of the constraints imposed on Indonesia by the
present international environment, in which the kind of operations they have engaged in,
in Timor's past, are no longer accommodated.
More importantly, Indonesia's economic recovery is critically dependent on the response
of an international community which now strongly supports the right of the East Timorese
to take charge of their own destiny.
James Dunn is a foreign affairs analyst.
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