Subject: Fw: Security Council Report
Date: Thu, 16 Sep 1999 18:25:52 +0700This is the report which triggered the resolution
on sending a multinational force to Bumi Lorosae (East Timor). S/1999/976
14 September 1999
ORIGINAL: ENGLISH
REPORT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL MISSION TO JAKARTA AND DILI
8 TO 12 SEPTEMBER 1999
I. OBJECTIVES OF THE MISSION
1. The Security Council Mission dispatched to Jakarta and Dili from 8 to 12 September
1999 was entrusted with the task of discussing with the Government of Indonesia concrete
steps for the peaceful implementation of the 5 May Agreement (S/1999/513). The Mission was
to welcome the undertaking by the Government of Indonesia to fulfil its obligations under
the 5 May Agreement, but to note that the Government's efforts so far had not been able to
prevent an intensification of violence in the Territory. It was to state its particular
concern at the recent campaign of violence against the United Nations Mission in East
Timor (UNAMET) and urge the Government to ensure security and to allow UNAMET to implement
its mandate without hindrance. The Mission was asked to stress that the people of East
Timor had made a clear choice in favour of independence, that their will must be respected
and that the international community looked forward to working with the Government of
Indonesia in bringing East Timor to independence.
II. COMPOSITION OF THE MISSION
The Mission was composed of the following members: Ambassador Martin Andjaba (Namibia),
Head of mission Ambassador Hasmy Agam (Malaysia) Minister Alphons Hamer (Netherlands)
Ambassador Danilo Türk (Slovenia) Ambassador Jeremy Greenstock (United Kingdom of Great
Britain and Northern Ireland) Mr. Francesc Vendrell (United Nations Secretariat), Deputy
Personal Representative of the Secretary-General
III. PROGRAMME AND SUMMARY OF MEETINGS
3. Briefing by United Nations and UNAMET staff (8 September). In the briefings, staff
described unequivocally the deterioration in the security and humanitarian situation in
East Timor since the announcement of the result of the ballot, in contrast with the
attempt by the Indonesian authorities to give a reassuring account. This and other
briefings left the Mission in no doubt that large elements in the military and police
authorities had been complicit in organizing and supporting the action of the militias.
4. Meeting with Foreign Minister Alatas (8 September). The Mission conveyed to Foreign
Minister Alatas the grave concern of the Security Council over the current situation in
East Timor and expressed its wish to work with the Government in a spirit of pragmatism
and cooperation to address the security and humanitarian situation. The Mission emphasized
the need to ensure that UNAMET and international relief organizations would be allowed to
return to East Timor and carry out their functions fully. A final withdrawal of UNAMET
would send a very bad signal of the failure of the Government to stabilize the situation.
Foreign Minister Alatas expressed Indonesia's shared concern over the crisis in East
Timor, but insisted that while the Government would welcome any assistance in providing
humanitarian relief, it would not contemplate any foreign military presence in East Timor
before the Indonesian Parliament met and addressed the outcome of the popular
consultation. Until then, Indonesia should be allowed to resolve the security situation.
The Mission stressed that if the situation were to continue deteriorating while the
Government did not accept the offer of help from the international community, Indonesia
would be subjected to severe international criticism.
5. Meetings with the Jakarta diplomatic corps (8 and 10 September). The Mission
discussed the current situation in East Timor with Jakarta-based ambassadors. A number of
ambassadors firmly underscored the complicity by the Indonesian military and police in the
actions of the militia and described a coordinated campaign to rid the Territory of all
foreign presence. Concerns were also expressed that the Government no longer had control
over the military, at least with respect to the situation in East Timor, where the
military was wilfully contradicting the policy of the Government. The ambassadors strongly
supported the idea of the visit of the Mission to East Timor. They expressed doubts that
the Government would agree to cooperate with an international security force in East
Timor. Following the Mission's visit to East Timor, the ambassadors were briefed on the
Mission's findings.
6. Meeting with Madam Megawati Soekarnoputri (8 September). The Mission explained its
objectives and asked Madam Megawati to refrain from treating any emerging willingness of
the Government of Indonesia to accept an international security presence as a stick with
which to beat the Government. She agreed, but declined to make a public statement in
support of the idea of international intervention. She criticized President Habibie
strongly for agreeing to the 5 May Agreement process when, as she alleged, his legitimacy
as leader of Indonesia was fading away. The Mission declined to enter into the domestic
political aspects.
7. Meetings with Mr. Xanana Gusmao (9 and 12 September). Mr. Gusmao appealed in the
strongest terms to the Mission to act immediately to save lives in East Timor. He stated
categorically that East Timor was not in a state of civil war; rather, it was suffering
what amounted to a campaign by the military to exterminate East Timorese and lay waste to
its cities, possibly with the intent to partition the Territory. He reported that 12
battalions of the Indonesian Armed Forces (TNI) had entered the Territory from West Timor,
and stated that, should that "invasion" reach the westernmost of Falintil's four
cantonment sites, Falintil would have no choice but to defend itself. There were currently
thousands of internally displaced persons seeking refuge at the cantonment sites.
Following the Mission's visit to Dili, representatives of the Mission called upon Mr.
Gusmao to brief him on the situation on the ground. When it became evident that the
Government was about to announce its willingness to cooperate with the international
community, Mr. Gusmao was encouraged to issue a statement in measured and conciliatory
terms.
8. Meeting with President Habibie (9 September). The Mission conveyed to the President
that the situation in East Timor had gone far beyond the acceptable and asked him to
consider the offer of assistance from the international community. President Habibie
rejected any foreign military presence before the Indonesian Parliament had acted on the
consultation result. He said that would send the wrong signal to Indonesians regarding the
military and risk the Balkanization of Indonesia. The Mission underlined the fundamental
point that the degree of confidence which the Security Council would have in Indonesian
actions would be directly related to the extent to which UNAMET could deploy and operate
normally. The President agreed that it was essential to keep UNAMET in East Timor and
maintained that security for the UNAMET compound would be redoubled and its water and food
needs met. The Mission reached agreement with the President that it would travel to Dili,
both to assess the situation first-hand and to show its support to UNAMET. On preparations
for phase III, the Mission suggested that bringing forward the preparation of the security
element of the United Nations share of the responsibility for the Territory would be a way
of contributing to the maintenance of security in phase II. President Habibie rejected the
idea.
9. Meeting with Defence Minister General Wiranto and the General Staff (9 September).
While acknowledging that there were problems in East Timor, General Wiranto stated that
TNI was committed to handling the situation, however complex. After the results of the
balloting were announced, the pro-integration group, concerned about what it considered to
be biased behaviour on the part of UNAMET staff, had erupted into violence. A further
complication was that a substantial number of the police and military in East Timor were
local East Timorese and were thus, in his words, "understandably" against
independence. Linguistic and cultural differences, coupled with the size of the territory,
had made the work of TNI more difficult. General Wiranto had full confidence that martial
law would allow his forces to stabilize the situation and begin to tend to the needs of
the refugees. In his view, pro-integration anger at UNAMET was so high that the situation
would only deteriorate further if United Nations troops were brought in at the current
stage. The Mission contested his analysis throughout and pointed to the lack of political
will on the part of the Government. News reports received during the meeting, telling of
violence against the UNAMET compound, graphically illustrated the General's misplaced
confidence.
10. Meeting with Indonesian NGO representatives (10 September). A group of Indonesian
NGO leaders met with two members of the Mission to convey their concerns and discuss the
situation in East Timor. The group presented a joint statement signed by 15 NGOs calling
for: immediate Security Council meetings to decide on the dispatch of a peacekeeping force
to East Timor; concrete steps by the Government to stop the violence in East Timor by
complying with the 5 May Agreement and arresting militias; and the immediate lifting of
the martial law in East Timor by the Government of Indonesia.
11. Visit to Dili (11 September). The Mission had highly useful meetings with local
military commanders, toured the town and visited the UNAMET compound. It also met with
Bishop Nasciemento. While there were no security incidents during the period of the visit,
the Mission was left with a strong sense of shock at the destruction which had taken
place, concern at UNAMET's severe loss of confidence in the security provided by the local
forces and distress at the desperate state of the displaced population. A large media
party represented this to the outside world. During the course of the visit, it became
clear that General Wiranto's views had also undergone a change.
12. President Habibie's press statement and the Mission's visit with the President (12
September). Shortly before a scheduled visit with the Mission, President Habibie announced
to the press that while the Indonesian defence forces had done their utmost under very
difficult and complex circumstances to stabilize the situation in East Timor, they had had
to recognize that there were limits to what they could further achieve. He had therefore
informed the Secretary-General of Indonesia's readiness to unconditionally "accept
international peacekeeping forces through the United Nations from friendly nations to
restore peace and security in East Timor, to protect the people and to implement the
results of the direct ballot of 30 August 1999". Foreign Minister Alatas would travel
to New York to prepare for the implementation of the cooperative effort between the United
Nations and the Government of Indonesia.
13. During the subsequent meeting with the Mission, the President expressed his
Government's willingness to allow for evacuation to Australia of the internally displaced
persons in the UNAMET compound; to facilitate air drops of food and other necessities to
other internally displaced persons in the hills; as well as to ensure that Falintil would
not come under attack by the militias.
IV. ANALYSIS
14. Reports by the Secretary-General to the Security Council during phase I of the
popular consultation described the impunity with which pro-autonomy militias were allowed
to carry out violent activity. It was apparent to the Mission, through its own observation
and through discussion with United Nations staff, that this activity could not have
occurred without the involvement of large elements of the Indonesian military and police.
Briefings by UNAMET staff in Jakarta and Dili described how, during post-consultation
violence which forced the closure of UNAMET's regional offices, there were clear instances
when police and TNI forces stood aside to allow militias into towns to conduct organized
and coordinated campaigns of arson and terror. One aim of this was to rid the Territory of
any international presence, including UNAMET, humanitarian workers and the media, thereby
limiting outside observation. Another was to implement a coordinated, forced relocation
programme in which tens of thousands of East Timorese have been moved to West Timor. There
were consistent reports of the direct involvement of large elements of TNI and the police
in this forced relocation campaign. The organized and coordinated nature of this campaign,
the Territory-wide effort to force out UNAMET and other international presences and the
lack of adequate response to militia violence despite the overwhelming superiority of TNI
and the police all support the view that militia activities were organized and supported
by parts of TNI.
15. There was clearly a disconnect between the situation on the ground and the
assessment of the situation in East Timor as presented by President Habibie and his senior
advisers. They described the post-ballot violence as stemming from disgruntled
pro-autonomy supporters angry at perceived UNAMET bias, with the Indonesian military
struggling to resolve the latest expression of long-standing strife between East Timorese.
However, as outlined above, the widespread destruction on the ground was the result
neither of popular sentiment nor of civil war. Rather, there were clear signs that the
evidence could, as many UNAMET staff described it, be "switched on and off".
During its 11 September meeting with Defence Minister General Wiranto, the Mission
received word that militias were at that very moment attempting to loot vehicles from the
UNAMET compound. When General Wiranto had his staff check on the situation, he was
apparently told at first that the situation at the compound was normal, despite the
seriousness of the actual circumstances. The Mission had the distinct impression that when
the General travelled to Dili along with the Mission and toured the city, he had not been
prepared for the extent of the destruction. Accurate first-hand information as to the
situation on the ground may well have contributed to the change in Government policy.
16. It was clear to the Mission that martial law, implemented on 7 September, had not
succeeded in stabilizing the situation. In Dili, there appeared little left for the
militias to loot by the time of the arrival of the Mission on 11 September. Despite
assurances by the authorities that UNAMET's security would be a prime objective of martial
law, on 10 September, Aitarak militia were allowed freely past TNI and police checkpoints
into the environs of the UNAMET compound. UNA
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