| Subject: JP: Hard
lessons to be learned from East Timor
Jakarta Post December 14, 1999
Opinion
Hard lessons to be learned from East
Timor
By John Hargreaves
JAKARTA (JP): A number of questions stand
out about the chapter of East Timorese history which just ended. One
question is what made Soeharto and Western countries decide to integrate
East Timor in 1975 to 1976.
Many people say it was a Cold War
necessity influenced by events in Cuba and Vietnam in the 1960s and 1970s.
But Castro's rebels in Cuba were neither hard-line communists nor Soviet
allies when they overthrew Batista in 1958. They became so only after
three years of hostile and inappropriate U.S. policy.
The Fretilin rebels were even less
communist or Soviet aligned. They started out as the Social Democratic
Association of East Timor and saw Australia as a potential key ally. It
certainly was not inevitable that a Fretilin-led East Timor would turn
into a Soviet military outpost.
What really drove the Western-backed
takeover was the fear that a communist East Timor would contaminate
Indonesia and destabilize the Soeharto regime. They still believed in the
domino theory that justified the Vietnam War. But they did not foresee
that the Fretilin rebels would resist a foreign army and a brutal dictator
as fiercely as the Vietcong had.
Later Western policy on East Timor is
also questionable. For example, the Timor Gap treaty was said to be good
for Australian-Indonesian relations. But the East Timorese people were
likely to lose their oil for little return. At a local level, exploitation
of resources by foreign companies is a more important aspect of
international relations than friendliness between central governments.
Recent Australian actions have worsened
relations with Indonesia through bad presentation. When former president
B.J. Habibie announced his decision to allow independence, stories
circulated that a letter from John Howard had influenced Habibie. Actually
Habibie's policy was totally different from what Howard proposed. But the
policy was popular in Australia so the Australian government fostered the
impression that Australia had helped to shape it.
When violence broke out, Australia's
policy of military readiness was prudent. But it was accompanied by
misleading reports in some media and aggressive anti-Indonesian
demonstrations. Some comments from Australian leaders were more in tune
with the aggression of the demonstrations than with the prudence of the
policy.
Turning to Indonesia, the man most
criticized over East Timor was Habibie. For sure, Habibie took a risk by
offering East Timor independence, but all possible courses were high risk.
Habibie, stepping out of Soeharto's shadow, chose the course that offered
a quick resolution.
Nonetheless, the announcement of the
referendum was flawed. A normal procedure would be: legislature offers
referendum, referendum held, same legislature ratifies result. In this
case the procedure was: government offers referendum, referendum held,
wait two months, new legislature ratifies result. The two-month wait
became a mine field. The prointegration group hoped that if it lost it
could still persuade the new People's Consultative Assembly (MPR) to
reject the result. The president became trapped between foreign pressure
and fear of preempting the MPR.
Still, the big problem was security. It
has been said that Habibie's decision to offer independence triggered an
upsurge in violence. But Habibie's decision was indeed only a trigger.
Trouble was instigated earlier through the recruitment of civilian
militias to complement the official armed forces.
For Indonesia it is important to find out
how security arrangements went so wrong.
For the United Nations it is important to
ask whether any referendum of this kind can be held without an
international peacekeeping force. Several countries pressed Indonesia to
accept such a force bud did not insist for several reasons: fear that the
ballot offer would be withdrawn, fear of upsetting Indonesia's democratic
transition, need for unity in the UN and lack of enthusiasm among
countries required to supply and fund troops.
In this last regard, the United States
affirmed until well after the ballot that it expected Indonesia to keep
its security pledge and that the East Timor problem was only one of many
in the world. According to statements by John Howard and Jose Ramos Horta,
a change of mind by Bill Clinton made Interfet possible.
This indicates that United Nations action
depends excessively on the United States. It also suggests that media
pressure had an excessive influence when many international media reports
about East Timor featured exaggerated death tolls and stories of genocide.
In future, stories of a mere couple of thousand deaths may fail to move
world public opinion and world leaders, even when intervention is
practical. East Timor may find that once outrage subsides the funds it
requires will prove elusive.
For Indonesia, the East Timor crisis
creates or influences several important goals.
One aim is to build a friendly
relationship with East Timor. Beyond technical matters, this means a new
outlook. After so many years viewing Jose Alexandre "Xanana"
Gusmao and Ramos Horta as enemies of the state, some Indonesians may be
suspicious of East Timor. But East Timor will have a minor influence on
Indonesia while Indonesia will have a major influence on East Timor. While
East Timorese leaders will naturally want to get on well with Indonesia,
it is Indonesia which should lead as it is by far the larger and more
powerful country.
A second aim is to improve Indonesia's
position in the world.
An important route to this goal is to
develop the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. The recent crisis
showed that it cannot handle security and human rights problems, which
limits its influence on the world stage. While some members already seek
more cooperation in these areas, it is now up to the group's biggest
member, Indonesia, to take a stance.
It is also important to strengthen the
domestic base for foreign policy. While some commentators saw
nonrecognition of East Timor's integration as a failure of diplomatic
lobbying, the real problem was repression inside East Timor.
This also means strengthening the
decision-making process for foreign policy. The policy of opening trade
links with Israel, for example, has already suffered because it was sprung
out of the blue. Policies of great public concern should be fully
discussed before they are adopted and political parties and national
leaders should take a clear position. Otherwise, benefits from a policy
will be attenuated by doubts about its long-term direction.
A third aim is to restore order in the
province of East Nusa Tenggara. Officially, it is already government
policy to return as many refugees as possible to East Timor. But in East
Timor itself, lack of commitment in implementing official policy led to
disaster; there is a danger that the same will happen in west Timor.
A fourth aim is to preserve the unity of
Indonesia. The original invasion of East Timor was driven by the domino
theory that an independent East Timor would transmit communism to other
parts of Indonesia. Now it is feared that an independent East Timor will
transmit separatism to other parts of Indonesia.
The need highlighted is for
nation-building. For the military, nation- building meant extending the
gains of the war of independence: the 1945 Constitution, the expulsion of
the colonialists and the united republic. Anyone doubting any one of these
gains was a traitor. Thus, the government crushed regional rebellions
through force but could not handle the grievances that caused the
rebellions.
With a revised constitution and regional
autonomy, Indonesians now want to build a new Indonesia. But nothing can
guarantee that the Acehnese or others will want in.
A fifth goal is to prevent further human
rights disasters.
Improving civil control of the military
is important for this. Long-term plans to reform the bureaucracy, revise
the national budget and overhaul the judicial system will directly affect
the capability and professionalism of the armed forces.
In addition, civilians should plan
further internal reform, including in sensitive areas like intelligence
and special forces.
In the short term, the greatest need is
to try cases of abuse. But none of the high-profile cases from the Habibie
era have yet reached court.
In general, the East Timor crisis
highlights the need for greater commitment to uphold human rights.
Major cases like last year's May riots
have not been satisfactorily resolved. Soon after the riots, attention
shifted from investigating what happened, supporting the victims and
preventing a recurrence to the contention that all reports of rape during
the riot were fake. A report from a fact-finding team was filed and
forgotten.
Unfortunately, a similar outcome is
likely in East Timor. Even at the height of the violence, attention
shifted from ending the terror, supporting the victims and preventing a
recurrence to the contention that Indonesia was the victim of an
international conspiracy.
Although a team is now investigating, its
report may not be followed up. With the military already under pressure
over Aceh, where the political stakes are high, it is unlikely that the
government will want to pile on extra pressure over East Timor, where
there is no apparent political gain.
The writer, a graduate of Cambridge
University in Britain, is a teacher at the Jakarta International Korean
School.
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