Executive Summary Report
on the investigation of human rights
violations in East Timor
Jakarta, January 31, 2000
Part I Introduction
After the Indonesian Government announced the two options on January
27, 1999 concerning the future of East Timor, that is, to either accept or
reject special autonomy, agreements were signed in New York on May 5, 1999
between the Indonesian and Portuguese Governments under the umbrella of
the UN. The agreements covered the implementation of the popular
consultation in East Timor, including provisions governing the maintenance
of peace and security in East Timor.
Since the two options were offered, especially after the announcement
of the results of the popular consultation, various forms of violence
developed that are considered gross violations of human rights.
Faced with these facts, KOMNASHAM issued a statement on September 8,
1999. The first point reads, "at the time the lives of the East Timor
people had reached a state of anarchy and acts of terrorism by both
individuals and groups were widespread, witnessed openly and allowed by
the security apparatus".
Both the local and international community were gravely concerned by
the situation that developed in East Timor. The UN Human Rights Commission
convened a special session in Geneva on 23 27 September 1999 concerning
the East Timor plight. This was only the fourth special session held since
the commission was formed 50 years ago. This shows the serious assessment
of the international community concerning the human rights violations that
occurred in East Timor.
Simultaneously, on 22 September 1999, the National Human Rights
Commission (KOMNASHAM) established the Commission for Human Rights
Violations in East Timor (KPP-HAM) in Resolution No. 770/TUA/IX/99, which
was revised in Resolution No. 797/TUA/X/99 dated 22 October 1999. These
resolutions were issued in light of the mounting human rights violations
in East Timor after the popular consultation and take into consideration
Law No. 39/1999 concerning Human Rights and Regulation No. 1/1999
concerning the Human Rights Court.
KPP-HAM's mandate was to gather facts, data and information concerning
violations of human rights that occurred in East Timor from January 1999
until the Parliament Ruling of October 1999 that ratified the results of
the popular consultation. The investigation focused on whether genocide,
mass murders, torture, forced deportment, gender-related crimes and a
scorched-earth campaign occurred. KPP-HAM was also assigned to investigate
the involvement of the state apparatus and other institutions. The
assignment continued from 23 September 1999 until December 1999, and was
then extended until 31 January 1999 by the Resolution from the Chairman of
KOMNASHAM No. 857/TUA/XII/99 dated 29 December 1999.
KPP-HAM's authority, in line with Article 89 (3) of Law No. 39/1999
concerning Human Rights and Articles 10 and 11 of Regulation No. 1/1999
concerning the Human Rights Court, is to conduct an investigation and
inspection concerning reports of human rights violations in East Timor,
request statements from victims, summon and question witnesses, gather
evidence and inspect several sites, including buildings required for the
purpose of the investigation upon approval of the Chief Justice.
Furthermore, KPP-HAM was authorized to inspect and request government
documents for the purpose of the investigation upon approval of the Chief
Justice, provide protection for witnesses and victims and process and
analyze the facts discovered in the interest of prosecution and
The report of the results of the KPP-HAM investigation was submitted to
KOMNASHAM who then submitted the report to the Attorney General for the
purpose of investigation and prosecution in the Human Rights Court.
KPP-HAM consists of 9 members, 5 members from KOMNASHAM and 4 human
rights activists. In carrying out its assignment, KPP-HAM was assisted by
a team consisting of 13 assistant investigators, 14 secretariat staff and
3 resource persons. During the course of the assignment, one of the
members of KOMNASHAM resigned because he became the Attorney General.
To carry out its task, KPP-HAM established work procedures and systems
in line with Criminal Law Procedures and in fulfillment of international
standards, particularly those contained in the Manual on the Effective
Prevention and Investigation of Extra-Legal, Arbitrary and Summary
Executions and the Guidelines for the Conduct of United Nations Inquiries
into Allegation of Massacres. The KPP-HAM investigation was impartial and
was not focused on the accountability of a certain group that was involved
in violations of human rights in East Timor.
The process began by gathering secondary and tertiary information
concerning human rights violations from both printed and electronic mass
media publications, reports of institutions/organizations and individual
complaints. The information was computerized and process using the HURIDOC
program. The data was then analyzed and re-verified through the inspection
of evidence, documents, witness testimony and field inspections and
interviews and questioning of parties who were involved in human rights
KPP-HAM conducted six field inspections to Kupang NTT, three visits to
East Timor and inspected a mass grave in NTT. An expert forensics team
accompanied KPP-HAM to inspect the mass grave. KPP-HAM also gathered new
information, interviewing 55 victims, 23 witnesses and 45 other people who
were involved in human rights violations.
KPP-HAM met three times with the UN-established International
Investigation Commission for East Timor to exchange information. However,
evidence was not exchanged, as an agreement concerning the protocol of
cooperation was not reached.
To facilitate its work in the field, KPP-HAM opened a secretariat
office in Kupang, staffed with three assistants who were assigned to
expedite secretariat activities, arrange documents and communications,
prepare witnesses and assist with the evacuation of witnesses and their
Part II POST BALLOT EAST TIMOR RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE CIVIL AND
MILITARY AUTHORITIES AND THE MILITIAS
The violence in East Timor escalated after the Indonesian military
invaded the territory in 1975 and established and promoted armed civilians
who were later called WANRA, or People's Security Forces. Some of these
community security personnel were incorporated into the Indonesian Army
through a military training program and were salaried as regular soldiers.
The military top brass called these soldiers TNI Sons of the Soil and they
were only assigned to East Timor to assist the TNI operations there. The
elite of the pro-integration groups were made government officials, as was
the case of Joao Tavares, who became the Regent of Bobonaro, while
commanding the Halilintar militia.
The situation in East Timor after the Indonesian Government offered the
two options changed drastically. The May 5, 1999 Agreement in New York
provided opportunity for international observers to monitor human rights
violations and the Indonesian Government's responsibility to uphold peace
and security in East Timor. At the same time, various political and
security policies were introduced which strengthened the armed civilian
security groups, or militias. Violence increased and the pro-independent
supporters began to react. The violence continued in line with the need to
ensure that special autonomy was chosen.
After the two options were offered, more militia units were established
and manned by young men. A report from the Udayana Commander Major General
Adam R. Damiri to the Coordinating Minister of Politics and Security
declared that the pro-integration movement was directed by young men who
formed the Love Red & White organization. Other reports stated that
the young men who formed the Love Red & White organization were
originally members of the Gada Paksi and Garda Muda Penegak Integration
youth organizations that were established, trained and funded by Kopassus
(elite forces) from 1994-1995. Eurico Gutteres, the commander of the
Aitarak militia in Dili was a prominent leader of the Gada Paksi. The
militias then grouped together as the Integration Struggle Force (PPI),
with Joao Tavares as its commander. The deputy commander was Eurico
Guterres and the head of staff was Herminio da Costa da Silva. The
pro-integration groups, according to the Regents and Governor of East
Timor, were called Pam Swakarsa. The presence of the militias was
acknowledged by TNI General Wiranto and noted in Contingency Plan.
In follow-up to this acknowledgement of the pro-integration militias, a
massive program of support was launched involving the military apparatus
at various levels. The goal of the program was to breakdown the domination
of pro-independence groups while developing the domination of the
pro-integration movement among the people.
From the facts gathered, it is very clear there was a relationship
between the pro-integration militias and the military. Most of the
leadership and core cadre were former members of the community security
forces such as Kamra [People's Security, Wanra People's Defense, Garda
Paksi, Hansip [civil guard that worked with the army] and members of the
army itself. They were trained and armed with weapons that included SKS,
M16, Mauser, G-3, grenades and pistols and left over Portuguese rifles.
From witness testimony received by KPP-HAM, arms were supplied to the
militias by the Commander of Tribuana Unit and Commander of Suai military
district. The relationship was seen also in the joint operations and
The TNI's support of such operations caused the police to be unable to
function and take legal action in cases of violence, such as the attack on
the Liquica Church.
Based on the facts above, we see that, first, there was a strong
relationship and linkage between the TNI, Polri, government bureaucracy
and the militias. Second, the violence that occurred in East Timor
beginning after the announcement of the offer of the two options until the
period after the results of the popular consultation were announced was
not caused by a civil war but was the result of a systematic campaign of
Part III Pattern of Violations of Human Rights: Crimes Against Humanity
Based on facts, documentation, information and witness testimony,
KPP-HAM not only found actions that could be classified as gross human
rights violations for which the state is responsible, but also found
evidence of crimes that could be classified as crimes of universal
jurisdiction. These crimes included systematic and mass murder; extensive
destruction, enslavement, forced deportations and displacement and other
inhumane acts committed against the civilian population. These acts
constitute a gross violation to the right to life, the right to personal
integrity, the right to liberty, the right of movement and residence and
the right to property, as seen in the following Table.
Systematic and mass murders
Much information and evidence was gathered, proving that extra-judicial
acts of violence and murder of a number of people continued with cruelty
and brutality. Murders occurred in residential areas, in churches and in
places where refugees fled, such as military and police headquarters.
Torture and ill treatment
In almost every case of violence committed by members of the TNI, POLRI
and militias, there is proof that the civilian public was subject to
torture and ill treatment due to their differing political views. Before
the popular consultation, the militias tortured and ill-treated civilians
who refused to become militia members. After the announcement of the
results of the popular consultation, terror, intimidation and death
threats occurred during every attack and assault and destruction of
physical infrastructure, including attacks on fleeing refugees.
Enforced disappearances occurred since the announcement of the two
options offer. Citizens with different political views were intimidated,
threaten and some disappeared. The militias were responsible for these
enforced disappearances. The militias are suspected to have received
support from the security apparatus regarding such kidnappings or summary
The evidence of the militias committing acts of violence against women
gathered by KPP-HAM involved torture, forced sex with underage girls, sex
slavery and rape. The rap of East Timor women took the following forms:
(a) a perpetrator and one women, (b) more than one perpetrator and one
women, (c) gang rape of a number of women in one location, and (d) use of
a certain location for repeated acts of rape.
Forced displacement of civilians
The information and evidence gathered by KPP-HAM shows two patterns of
forced displacement of the population, that is, the displacement that
occurred before the popular consultation due to increased violence from
newly formed militias and the displacement that occurred after the
announcement of the results of the vote when members of the TNI, POLRI and
militias committed violent acts and forced the population to flee.
KPP-HAM found evidence in East Timor that a planned, systematic and
massive scorched-earth campaign was launched in various cities including
Dili, Suai, Liquica and others. The scorched-earth campaign destroyed
residences, crops and livestock, stores, shops, hotels, office buildings,
places of worship, education facilities, hospitals and other public
infrastructure and facilities, and military and police installations. It
is estimated that the destruction reached 70-80%.
General pattern of violence
The crimes against humanity described above show a systematic program
that resulted from extensive planning. This is evident from the following:
Period after announcement of the two options
Formation and re-activation of armed civilian groups who were mobilized
in the name of pro-integration and security. These groups were under the
direct coordination of the TNI.
The mobilization of the militia forces to support the pro-integration
faction was accomplished through political terror. Murder, kidnappings and
forced displacement were committed by members of the TNI, POLRI,
government bureaucracy and the militias.
The mobilization of the militia forces was in line with various
policies of the military leadership and the Coordinating Minister of
Politics and Security that played a large role in creating conditions in
the interest of a special autonomy victory and involved the Tribuana Task
Force and the P4OKTT Task Force.
Period after the New York Agreement
Violence involving members of the TNI and POLRI abated drastically in
May 1999 when the New York Agreement was signed on May 5, 1999. Through
cantonment and the establishment of the Indonesian Task Force (P3TT), the
Indonesian Government attempted to show its neutrality in the interest of
the success of the popular consultation. However, policies initiated in
Jakarta called for preparation in the even of failure of the 1st Option.
These plans called for a general retreat and relocation of the people for
their welfare, stating UNAMET partiality and pro-independence retaliation
as the grounds for these actions.
Period after the popular consultation
After the popular consultation, violence increased drastically
throughout East Timor, including murders, kidnappings, rape, property
destruction, theft of homes and property, the burning and destruction of
military installations, offices and civilian residences, with the goal of
forced deportation. Members of the TNI, POLRI and the militias were the
key figures responsible for this campaign which involved the creation of
conditions, choice of acts committed, scheduling and planning of the
forced deportation. This campaign was initiated to convince the
international community that the results of the popular consultation
should be doubted and that the people of East Timor would rather choose to
live safely in West Timor.
Acts of violence and intimidation were directed at news reporters and
officials of various international agencies.
The final stage of the violence campaign has been the continued
cooperation of the TNI and militias to keep the refugees in West Timor in
their camps. The distribution of the refugees shows the effective control
of these camps by the militias and TNI through the end of October 1999.
Part IV PRIMARY CASES
KPP-HAM forced its attention on a number of primary cases during the
period from January 1999 to October 1999. These cases include: the
massacre at the Liquica Church on April 6; the kidnapping of 6 Kailako,
Bobonaro villagers on April 12; the murder of a civilian in Bobonaro; the
attack on Manuel Carrascalao's home on April 17; the attack on the Dili
Diocese on September 5; the attack on the house of Bishop Belo on
September 6; the burning of people's homes in Maliana on September 4; the
attack on the Suai Church complex on September 6; the murder at the
Maliana Police Headquarters on September 8; the murder of the Dutch
journalist, Sander Thoenes, on September 21; the murder of a group of
priests and journalists in Los Palos on September 25; and acts of violence
Massacre at the Liquica Church complex
On April 6, the Besi Merah Putih militia, armed with guns and sharp
weapons and supported by the district military command, attacked refugees
seeking protection in the Liquica Church complex. The refugees had fled
there because they had been terrorized by the militia. During the attack,
approximately 30 people died. The police apprehended the civilian members
responsible but let them go. The TNI did nothing regarding its members who
were involved. Five bodies were taken away by the police and buried on the
instruction of the district military command. The other corpses were
thrown in Masin Lake on order of the TNI (Rajawali Troops).
Murder of Kailaco villagers
On 12 April 6 people were kidnapped by the subdistrict military command
in Kailaco working together with the Halilintar militia. They were brought
to the subdistrict military command, then taken to the house of Manuel
Soares Gama and murdered.
On April 12 as well there was a retaliation by a group believed to be
Falintil against Manuel Soares Gama's group as they were travelling from
Maliana to Kailako. Three people were killed, including Manuel Soares
Gama. In addition, two other TNI members were killed in the attack. Four
persons were wounded.
The TNI and Halilintar militia retaliated the next day, April 13,
capturing six local citizens. After the six people were interrogated and
torture at the subdistrict military command and later executed publicly.
The execution was led by the Lt. Col. Burhanuddin Siagian, head of the
district military command of Bobonaro and Joao Tavares, commander of the
militia forces (PPI). The six corpses were then thrown into the Marobo
Attack on the home of Manuel Carrascalao
On April 17, 1999, a mass gathering attended by 5,000 pro-integration
supporters from the 13 districts of East Timor was held in front of the
East Timor Governor's office. The gathering was called to confirm the
appointment of Eurico Gutteres as commander of the Aitarak militia. Some
of the militia members destroyed the office of the Suara Timor Timor
newspaper. Towards the late afternoon, the home of Manuel Carrascalao was
attacked by Besi Merah Putih and Aitarak militias. The victims of the
attack were refugees who had fled from Liquica, Alas and Turiscai seeking
protection at the home of Manuel Carrascalao and his son, Manuelito
Carrascalao. 15 people died in the attack. The surviving 50 refugees,
including the families of Manuel Carrascalao and CNRT leader Leandro
Isaac, were taken by the Police to Police Headquarters.
Attack on the Dili Diocese
On September 5, 1999, the situation in Dili had deteriorated, with
shots fired repeatedly, houses burned and destroyed. During this chaos,
besides the fleeing refugees, security forces made up of TNI and POLRI
troops were patrolling the streets. Witnesses said they saw militias
dressed in black with Aitarak printed on their shirts and wearing red and
white head bands attack the refugees who were seeking protection at the
Camra Eclesestica (Dili Diocese) and then set fire to the diocese. During
this event, 25 victims died.
Attack on the home of Bishop Belo
On September 6, a TNI Lieutenant Colonel entered the home of Bishop
Belo to request that the Bishop leave his residence and be evacuated to
Police Headquarters. After Bishop Belo left his residence, a group of
militias, including those dressed in Aitarak uniforms, began to attack
around 5,000 refugees who were seeking protection in the complex. The
refugees were forced to obey the militias and leave the complex, which was
then burned. At least 2 people died in this attack.
Massive destruction and murders in Maliana
On September 4, there occurred massive destruction and burning of
peoples' homes in Maliana. Approximately 80% of the buildings in the town
were destroyed. From August 30, Maliana was under the control of the TNI,
POLRI and the Dadurus Merah Putih and Halilintar militias who restricted
movement in and out of the area, especially those who were considered
pro-independence and the staff of UNAMET. During this reign of
destruction, the perpetrators also kidnapped and killed two local UNAMET
staff and pro-independence activists. Villagers attempting to flee were
attacked with guns and sharp weapons. Since that time, the militias set up
checkpoints in the Bobonaro district, especially in Memo and Batugade, to
inspect refugees fleeing to West Timor. Several witnesses said that a
number of refugees had disappeared after being stopped at these
On September 8, people seeking refuge in the Maliana police station
were killed by the Dadurus Merah Putih militia with the direct support of
members of the TNI and POLRI. At least 3 people died.
Massacre in the Suai Church complex
On September 4, the Laksaur militia and members of the TNI in Debos
Hamlet caused the death of a high school student. Consequently, villagers
fled for refuge in the Nossa Senhora de Fatima Church and the Ave Maria
Suai Church, where many refugees had been staying for a while. On the
evening of September, residences and government buildings in Suai were
burned down by the Laksaur militia and members of the TNI. Commencing
September 6, villagers were forced from their homes. The Suai subdistrict
military commander, 1st Lieutenant Sugito took part in the burning and
On September 6 at around 14.30, the Laksuar Merah Putih and Mahidi
militias and members of the TNI and POLRI attacked refugees staying in the
Suai Church complex. The attack was directly led by the Regent of
Covalima, Herman Sediono and the Suai subdistrict military commander, 1st
Lieutenant Sugito. Before this, the militias threatened to kill all of the
priests and both male and female refugees. At the time there were
approximately 100 refugees staying in the church complex and an unknown
number of refugees outside the complex. Father Hilario was shot once in
the chest and Igidio Manek a Laksuar militia member stepped on the
priest's body. Father Fransisco was stabbed and sliced by Americo, also a
member of the Laksuar militia. Another witnessed, Domingos dos Santos, saw
Father Dewanto killed in the old church. At the time of the attack, the
Police, the Loro Sae Mobile Brigade Contingent and members of the TNI were
outside of the fence shooting refugees who tried to flee outside the
church complex. It is thought that at least 50 people were murdered in
Twenty-six of the corpses were hauled by a truck and two cars and were
buried in Alas Village, Wemasa District, Belu Regency. The burying of the
corpses was directed by Suai subdistrict military commander, 1st
Lieutenant Sugito along with three members of the TNI and a contingent of
Laksaur militia. The corpses were transported from Suai at around 08.30 by
1st Lieutenant Sugito and his cohorts, after passing by the Metamauk
Police Post in the Wemasa, West Timor area. The exhumation of the mass
grave of the Suai Church victims found there to be 16 males, 8 females and
2 corpses whose gender could not be determined, ranging in age from 5 to
around 40 years of age.
Murder of a Dutch journalist
A Dutch journalist, Sander Thoenes was killed on September 21. His body
was found by locals in Becora, East Dili the next day, September 22. It is
thought that Sander Thoenes left the Tourismo Hotel, Dili between 16.30
and 17.45 on a motorcycle driven by Florinda da Conceicao Araujo heading
for Becora, Dili. The two men had gone only 300 meters when they were
stopped by unknown persons travelling on three motorcycles, a truck and a
car. The unknown attackers wore TNI uniforms and carried automatic
weapons. The unknown persons shot at Sander Thoenes and Florinda da
Conceicao Araujo, but Araujo was able to escape. At the time, Battalion
745 was crossing through the area.
Killing of religious figures in Los Palos
On September 25, a group of religious figures was attacked while on the
road to Baucau. The attack was carried out by Tim Alfa militia, led by
Joni Marques Nine people were killed, including the Indonesian journalist,
Agus Mulyawan. This incident is believed to have been on the order of a
Kopassus unit working with a Tribuana unit. The bodies were thrown into
the Raumoko River and the vehicle the group was travelling in was burned
Violence against women
At the end of September, at the refugee camp in the village of
Raehanek, Belu, West Timor, women and children of suspected
pro-independence families forced out of a car near the village
administration office. They were separated from the other refugees as they
were thought to be pro-independence supporters. They were placed in
special tents and by members of the Laksaur militia and forced to satisfy
sexual desires of militia members each night. One of the women was still a
nursing mother. If the women refused, they were threatened with death. One
of the female refugees was shot in the back with a homemade weapon and
still experiences trauma from the experience.
On September 6, two teenage girls from Ainaro were abducted and forced
to become sexual slaves by the commander of a Mahidi militia contingent.
While controlled by the militia, the two victims were gang raped
repeatedly for weeks by the militia members.
On June 6, twenty-three women were held against their will by Besi
Merah Putih Militia near Gugleur, Maubara, Liquica. They were held and
forced to cook, clear and provide sexual services.
On September 5, a girl named Alola a third level junior high school
student from Suai - and other women were forcibly brought to the Laksaur
headquarters by Laksuar contingent commander Manel E. Gidu in Raihanek,
Belu, West Timor and forced to become sex slaves of the Laksuar militia.
Witnesses and the mother of the victim twice attempted to secure the
release of the victim, but were refused by the militia.
Rape took place at the district military command of Covalima on
September 6, after several women were taken there following the Suai
church massacre. Laksaur militia members tried to rape them. On September
7, one young girl among them, Martinha, was forcibly taken by a Laksaur
militia head named Olipio Mau and raped. When the girl was abducted, her
family went immediately to report to the district military commander, but
he was not there, so they reported to the cashier the next day but never
received any response. The girl was returned home only in the afternoon.
PART V Description of Victims and Perpetrators
KPP-HAM witnessed tremendous losses of both life and property resulting
from the reign of violence in East Timor from January October 1999. Those
who lost their lives were chosen due to their political views and included
high school and university students and CNRT activists.
Even those who had no political affiliation, such as women and children
and religious figures were also victims of violence such as happened
during the massacre at the Suai Church on September 6, 1999.
There were some victims from among the pro-autonomy supporters.
In addition, KPP-HAM discovered female victims of sexual violence who
were molested by both the militia and the authorities in East Timor and in
the refugee camps in West Timor. Property losses included both private
property, public infrastructure and other social cultural facilities.
There were three main kinds of perpetrators identified by KPP-HAM as
those responsible for the campaign in East Timor. First, those who
committed crimes directly, including militia members, TNI and POLRI.
Second, those who ran the field operations in the civilian bureaucracy
including district heads (bupati), the governor and local military and
local police officials. Third, those who held responsibility for security
policy, including high level military officials who were involved and knew
about the reign of violence but failed to do anything to prevent it.
Violent acts were also committed by those who opposed the special
autonomy option, such as the Falintil. Accounts of these crimes are found
in the reports of the Peace and Stability Commission and the reports of
government and military officials that were submitted to KPP-HAM.
Part VI CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
During the compilation of this report and summary to be submitted to
KOMNASHAM, KPP HAM carefully considered all of the findings in the field,
statements from witnesses, victims, perpetrators and other parties,
official and unofficial reports and documents and various other sources of
information. KPP HAM has also taken into consideration all reports and
other materials that were compiled by both UNTAET and INTERFET during
their respective investigations.
Due to the various restrictions involving time, facilities and
infrastructure, as well as the efforts of certain parties to destroy
evidence, the findings of KPP HAM gives only a partial picture of the
human rights violations that occurred.
KPP HAM was able to gather facts and evidence that strongly indicates a
planned, systematic, wide-scale and gross violation of human rights, mass
murders, torture and ill-treatment, disappearances, violence against women
and children (including rape and sexual slavery), forced evacuation,
property destruction and implementation of a scorched-earth campaign, all
of which constitute crimes against humanity.
KPP HAM also found strong evidence of the loss and destruction of
evidence that constitutes a criminal act.
From all of the facts and evidence gathered, KPP HAM did not find proof
of criminal genocide.
The facts and evidence also shows that the civil authorities and
military, including the police force, worked in cooperation with the
militias to create conditions that supported crimes against humanity, and
which were carried out by the civil authorities, military, police and the
The militia forces under various names throughout the territory, were
directly or indirectly established as Wanra People's Defense, Kamra
People's Security and Pamswakarsa Security Forces and were directly an
indirectly armed, trained, supported and funded by the civil, military and
The types of acts and the pattern of crimes against humanity were as
Mass murders resulting in a large number of civilian casualties were
carried out systematically and cruelly in various locations. Generally the
mass murders occurred in places of refuge such as churches, police and
military headquarters. Sharp weapons and firearms were used in these
attacks by the militias together with and or with the support of the
military authorities or the military and police authorities allowed such
Torture and Ill-treatment
Systematic, large-scale and widespread torture and ill treatment of the
pro-independence civilian population was carried out. The torture and ill
treatment occurred at various times either before the victims were
murdered or after the victims were indiscriminately detained to extract
information. In some cases, the torture and ill treatment also occurred
spontaneously as victims homes were raided. During the mass displacement
of the population, torture and ill treatment of university and high school
students and members of the CNRT was prevalent.
Forced disappearances occurred according to the following patterns.
First, disappearances occurred during the recruitment of the militias. A
number of civilians disappeared after refusing to join the militias.
Second, disappearances occurred as a means of forcing the pro-independence
supporters to submit. Third, there are reports that a number of students
and pro-independence supporters disappeared as a result of continued
militia activities in the refugee camps.
Sexual enslavement and rape
Sexual enslavement and rape occurred in civilian homes, military
headquarters and refugee camps both before and after the popular
The scorched-earth campaign was conducted before and after the
announcement of the results of the popular consultation, during which the
homes of civilians, various government offices and other buildings were
destroyed. Before the popular consultation, the homes of pro-independence
supporters were burnt to the ground. The campaign increased in intensity
and scope after the results of the popular consultation were announced and
involved the destruction of buildings and other property throughout most
of East Timor.
Forced displacement and deportation
Terror and intimidation before the popular consultation resulted in the
displacement of the population to various places of refuge such as
churches and the mountains. After the results of the popular consultation
were announced, a large-scale forced displacement and deportation of the
population occurred with logistic and transportation support from the
civil, military and police authorities in compliance with established
plans. The forced displacement was the ultimate target of the various acts
of violence and the scorched-earth campaign that occurred in many
locations. Terror and intimidation were the means to ensure the forced
displacement and deportation of the refugees and continues to be used to
obstruct the return of the refugees to their homes. Until now, there are
still many refugees who still are unable to return to their places of
Destruction and loss of evidence
The destruction of evidence by the perpetrators of these crimes against
humanity was planned and intentional and included the destruction of
documents, mass burials and the relocation of corpses to hiding places.
Mass graves are still be discovered.
There are three groups of perpetrators of these crimes against
those who committed crimes directly in the field, including the
militias and the military and police authorities;
those who ran the field operations in the civilian bureaucracy,
including District Heads (Bupati), the Governor and local military and
and those who held responsibility for national security policy,
including but not limited to, high-level military officials who actively
or passively were involved in these crimes.
The involvement of the civil administration and the military including
the police working together with the pro-integration militia groups in the
aforementioned crimes against humanity constitutes a misuse of power and
authority which resulted in the involvement of both military and civil
institutions. In detail, the aforementioned proof demonstrates that
members of civil and military institutions, including the police, are
suspected of involvement, including but not limited to, the following
Governor, East Timor Abilio Soares
District Head, Dili Dominggos Soares
District Head, Covalima Colonel Herman Sediono
District Head, Liquica Leoneto Martins
District Head Bobonaro Guilherme dos Santos
District Head, Lospalos Edmundo Conceicao E. Silva
Commander, Resort Military Command 164, Wira Dharma (East Timor) Brigadier
General FX Tono Suratman
Commander, Resort Military Command 164, Wira Dharma (East Timor) Colonel
M. Nur Muis
Chief of Police, East Timor Brigadier General Police Timbul Silaen
Sub-District Military Commander Suai (Covalima) First Lieutenant
Head of Intelligence, Bobonaro (Maliana) District Military Command First
District Military Commander, Bobonaro Lt. Col. Burhanuddin Siagian
District Military Commander Los Palos Lt. Col. Sudrajat
Commander, Battalion 744, Dili Infantry Major Yakraman Yagus
Commander, Battalion 745, Los Palos Infantry Major Jacob Sarosa
Member, Battalion 744, Dili Private (First Class) Luis
Commander of Company B, Battalion 744 Captain Tatang
Kopassus Officer/Intelligence Task Force Dili Military Command Lt. Col.
Staff, District Military Command, Liquisa 1st Lieutenant Yacob & Sgt.
(2nd Class) Regional Military Commander IX, Udayana Major General Adam
Security Advisor, Indonesian Task Force for the Implementation of The
Popular Consultation in East Timor Major General Zacky Makarim
Commander , Aitarak Militia Eurico Gutteres
Commander, Laksaur Militia Olivio Moruk
Commander,Laksaur Militia Martinus Member, Laksaur Militia Manek
Commander, Tim Alfa Militia Joni Marquez Members, Tim Alfa Militia Joao,
Manuel, and Amilio da Costa
Commander, Besi Merah Putih Militia Manuel Sousa
Commander, Halilintar Militia Joao Tavares
Other names involved either directly or indirectly can be found in the
All crimes against humanity in East Timor, directly or indirectly
occurred because of the failure of the Armed Forces Commander to guarantee
security during the implementation of the announcement of the two options
by the government. The police structure which, at the time, was still
under the command of the Defense Ministry had already weakened the ability
of the police force to carry out its security duties based on the New York
agreements. In view of this, Armed Forces General Wiranto as Armed Forces
Commander is the party that must be asked to bear responsibility.
As a special note, KPP HAM feels that without prejudice to the rights
of the parties under investigation to seek the best legal assistance, the
fact that all of those under investigation, with the exception of the
militias, have obtained legal assistance from the TNI Officials Human
Rights Advocacy Team, any conflict of interest among those under
investigation has been avoided. There is a strong possibility conflicts of
interest will arise among the TNI officials, police officials, the former
Coordinating Minister of Politics and Security and the former Minister of
Foreign Affairs. This fact, whether directly or indirectly, could obstruct
investigation efforts to gather facts and uncover the truth and is a
hindrance, therefore, to upholding the law and justice.
Based on the conclusions contained above, KPP HAM presents the
76. Requests the Attorney General to conduct investigations into the
perpetrators suspected of involvement in serious human rights violations,
especially but not limited to those named in the conclusions above.
77. Requests the Government to make protocol arrangements to gain
access to all the new facts and proof about human rights violations in
East Timor up to now which UNTAET and other international bodies are in
the process of uncovering.
78. Requests the parliament and the government to form a Human Rights
Court with the authority to try the perpetrators of human rights
violations and crimes against humanity relating to national and
international law (Human Rights and Humanitarian Law). The Human Rights
Court in question must have the authority to try human rights violations
occurring in the past as well as those that have occurred in East Timor to
79. Requests the Government to immediately ratify international human
rights instruments that are important to the upholding of human rights in
Indonesia including, but not limited to, the Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights and the First Optional Protocol.
80. Requests the Government to provide security guarantees to all
witnesses and victims.
81. Requests the Government to strive to provide rehabilitation and
fair compensation to the victims and their families.
82. Requests the Government to state clearly that each case of
gender-based violence is a human rights violation. In addition, the
government is responsible for providing various forms of service
(psychiatric, psychological) and other compensation to the victims.
83. Calls upon the National Human Rights Commission in the interests of
truth and justice as well as in the interests of history to carry out full
investigations of all human rights violations in East Timor since 1975.
The results of these investigations must be made into a formal human
84. Urges the Government to conduct a repositioning, redefinition and
renewal of the armed forces (TNI) so that it becomes a security
institution within a democratic country that holds human rights in high
esteem. For that to be achieved, the TNI's additional functions need to be
abolished, in particular the territorial functions that up to now have
become a restriction and hindrance to the good functioning of the police
and civil administration.
85. Calls on the Government to guarantee the function of upholding the
law as well as security and community order. In this context, the
institution of the police must be fully separated from the TNI. In
addition there is a need for a strengthening and empowering of the police
force through professional training and demilitarization of the police
86. Urges the Parliament and the Government to regulate intelligence
institutions and activities through laws that guarantee that state
intelligence functions are carried out wholly in the interests of national
and community security so that they do not become an instrument for
violating human rights.
87. Calls upon the Government and the Attorney General to ensure that
the legal process concerning crimes against humanity - - whoever is the
perpetrator, including members of the military is conducted freely and
independently without any interference whatsoever.
88. Requests the Government to facilitate and erase all restrictions
and pressure that will hamper the return of refugees who want to return
home. In this regard, UNTAET is requested to provide legal and security
guarantees for those returning to East Timor.
Jakarta, 31 January 2000 Commission to Investigate Human Rights
Violations in East Timor
Dr. Albert Hasibuan, SH. Dr. Todung Mulya Lubis, SH, LLM Chair Deputy
Asmara Nababan, SH. Dr. Engineer. H.S. Dillon Secretary Member
Drs. Koesparmono Irsan SH, MM, MBA Nursyahbani Katjasungkana,SH Member
Dra. Zoemrotin KS Munir, SH Member Member
See also UN report: http://www.unhchr.ch/huridocda/huridoca.nsf/(Symbol)/A.54.726,+S.2000.59.En
Human Rights &