From “Scorched Earth Operation" to “Humanitarian Operation”
(A note on the conduct of international NGOs and UN institutions in
post-referendum Timor Lorosa’e)
"Here there is no luxurious house, bar to drink beer, discotheque,
how can humanitarian workers want to stay here”, an indigenous leader
said when he was asked for his comments about the lack of health services
by international NGOs and UN institutions in sub-district Alas, Same.
"Do you have an identity card? Does your institution have any
experience in distributing food materials in this area?” This was the
question asked by WFP (World Food Program) staff when a local/national NGO
which has operated for a long time in Timor Lorosa’e saw him in his
office to arrange coordination for distributing food in Baucau, Timor
Lorosa’e.
I. Introduction
The Scorched Earth operation in Timor Lorosa’e by the pro-integration
militia and Indonesian military caused extraordinary damage. Lives and
property were lost as a result of that operation. From the international
political perspective, it can be said that the UN representative office in
the area at that time was slow in taking action. As a result of the “ignorance
politics” of the international community (UNAMET and UN in particular),
the militia and the Indonesian military freely launched their operation
after the announcement of the result of the ballot on September 4, 1999.
After becoming the victim of this scorched-earth operation, now Timor
Lorosa’e faces a new operation, i.e. “humanitarian operation”.
The destruction of Timor Lorosa’e after the referendum has created
new problems. Even though it has to be admitted that Timor Lorosa’e was
able to drive away Indonesian military, it appears that the destruction
was meant to open a road for several groups to launch another “operation”
in Timor Lorosa’e. Under the facade of humanitarian aid, various
international NGOs as well as intergovernmental institutions are competing
to carry out their programs in this burned-down country.
The flood of humanitarian aid through different NGOs and
intergovernmental agencies in Timor Lorosa’e does not necessarily end
the chain of misery of the East Timorese. On the contrary, it appears like
it will become a new chain which will tie the East Timorese to external
dependence in perpetuity.
The number of international NGO operating in Timor Lorosa’e has
reached about thirty. There are also a number of intergovernmental
agencies, such as UNHCR, UNICEF, UNESCO, FAO, and WFP. While the local
NGOs are only about 20. These humanitarian organizations have come with
all sorts of programs, like food distribution, health service, shelter,
refugee service, distribution of seeds and many others.
It is interesting to examine how these international organizations have
coped with the crisis in Timor Lorosa’e. Before we discuss the various
problems faced by the NGOs and intergovernmental agencies in carrying out
the humanitarian operation, we will first discuss the politics of
humanitarian aid.
II. Politics of Humanitarian Aid
History notes that there has been enormous amount of humanitarian aid
given to African countries. Whenever there is an upheaval, as a result of
internal or external politics, various groups, international NGOs and UN
agencies, each with its own method, entered the conflict under the name of
humanitarian aid. Mozambique, Angola, Rwanda, Somalia, and many other
countries in that continent have become a frequent recipients of a “humanitarian
operation.” Despite the abundance of aid, the mortality rate in the
region due to starvation and disease has not decreased; it has actually
increased.
We can identify several specific problems that arise when humanitarian
aid is distributed through international NGOs as well as through UN
agencies. The source of the problems are as follows :
First, the problem of transparency in financial matters. In executing
their programs, most international NGOs make use of funds supposedly given
to the government of the country suffering from the catastrophe. For
instance, in 1989 Mozambique suffered from serious conflict which led to
starvation. International NGOs and UN agencies began to enter the conflict
area and address the problem. Apparently, the largest single source of
funding for this operation was taken from the aid/grant given to the
government of Mozambique.
Second, the problem of dependence. Bangladesh is an excellent case
study of the effects of humanitarian operations organized by international
NGOs and UN agencies on the country’s self-sufficiency. For some time,
the society was flooded by humanitarian relief so that when the aid
stopped, the society was shocked and was not ready for self-sufficiency.
Besides, such an operation often times marginalizes people in the remote
areas due to the ineffective mechanism of distribution. The aid, on the
contrary, enriches certain groups of people in either urban or suburban
areas, and make the poor become dependent on the nouveau riche.
Third, problem of lack of coordination. Many international NGOs and UN
agencies conduct their operation in different places with a minimal
coordination with local organizations. As a result, local/national NGOs or
other potential groups within the society become “second class”
people. Even worse, in order to carry out their programs, the local NGOs
have to beg from the international NGOs or UN agencies to get their share
of the aid granted to the local government for handling the catastrophe in
their own country. At this point it seems like the governments which
pledge their support or international donor agencies are more interested
in contracting the humanitarian work to international NGOs, especially
those which have special connection with the UN as well as various UN
agencies themselves. Thus, the aid or grant promised to the local
government in turn is mostly spent by institutions outside the country
which suffers the catastrophe. It is often the case that the donor coun!
try even looks to the international NGO itself to carry out the
humanitarian operation and design the blueprint of the program. Therefore,
international NGOs and UN agencies involved in humanitarian relief works
are often defined as Private Voluntary Organization (PVO). As Joseph
Hanlon observes in Mozambique, many international NGOs, such as World
Vision or Care International, act more like big enterprises or
transnational corporations that have branches in different countries. As
such, the interest of these NGOs are disbursal of money, distribution of
food, and emergency aid. For the overhead cost of the institutions, they
can either receive interest from the aid/grant aside from their own
fundraising effort. Without consulting local/national NGOs, these
multinational institutions design and attempt to launch colossal projects,
but these might not be the priority of the target groups they think they
would help.
Fourth, the problem of “hidden message.” Many big international
NGOs have a hidden agenda to send to the target groups in the countries
facing problems. For instance, World Vision, when operating in Mozambique,
was part of the US government effort to sabotage the FRELIMO government.
It is an evangelical, anti-Communist organization that was opposed to the
socialist government and in favor of the bandits and terrorists of Renamo.
It openly stated that Renamo should seize power from the government. World
Vision also has close relationship with repressive military regimes in
Central America. Another example is the work of Care International,
especially Care USA, which assisted the US government gather intelligence
in Mozambique during the 80s. In some cases these international NGOs have
more complete information about the society than the local groups, even
the government of the country where they work. This information is first
shared with the US government as the donor country,! instead of the local
organizations or governments.
II. The Case of Timor Lorosa’e
How have international NGOs and UN agencies operated in Timor Lorosa’e
after the Indonesian military left the area? As it was mentioned before,
international NGOs and UN agencies swarmed into the area, operating from
the capital city of Jakarta or Darwin, and attempted to reach the remotest
areas in Timor Lorosa’e. They either worked to aid Internally Displaced
Persons (IDPs) or provide general humanitarian assistance.
In order to understand the conduct of these international organizations
or institutions in Timor Lorosa’e several factors need to be considered
:
1. Misleading Perspective
Misleading perspective is the fundamental problem of all humanitarian
operation of the international NGOs in Timor Lorosa’e. These
institutions perceive that the East Timorese at this moment “need food,”
so all they have to do is just provide them with food. They have an
assumption that the East Timorese are not able to organize themselves to
overcome the emergency situation and they need “help” to get the food.
With such a perspective all they care about is dumping food in an area.
The East Timorese now are good at inquiring “when is the rice going to
be distributed?” instead of “when are we going to be able to produce
our own rice or corn?” Aside from the misleading assumptions on
providing aid, there is also a degrading perspective about the East
Timorese in general. In their eyes, the East Timorese are only capable of
menial work. Therefore, in these organizations East Timorese are purely
treated as wage workers and there is no attempt to transfer the knowledge
or technolo! gy to the local people. The use of “local” in this
humanitarian operation is limited to the hiring wage workers (about whom
more will be said below). There is no partnership and no cooperation
between the international agencies and the East Timorese; the latter are
viewed only as passive recipients of the activity of the former.
2. Lack of Communication with East Timorese
It is bad enough for the international agencies to view East Timorese
as passive recipients; it is even worse for them not to consider these
passive recipients worthy of being told basic information of the aid they
can expect to receive. Similar to experiences in other places,
international NGOs and UN agencies involved in the humanitarian operation
in Timor Lorosa’e tend to treat the local NGOs as second class people. A
large part of the problem is that the international agencies simply do not
communicate with the very people they are supposed to be helping.
One example occurred last year during the UNHCR/IOM repatriation
program from Jakarta, Indonesia. On October 25, 1999 about three hundred
East Timorese, some of whom had lived in Indonesia for years and some of
whom were refugees who had fled the post-ballot violence, came to the
Soekarno-Hatta Airport, Jakarta with all their cargo for repatriation to
East Timor. After waiting for several hours, they heard from the UNHCR
staff that the flight was canceled. No further information was provided as
to why the flight was canceled and when the next flight would be. When the
refugees asked the UNHCR staff about it, they said they did not know and
suggested that the East Timorese get all their luggage and return to their
original place. UNHCR did not appear to care that among the refugees there
were people who had to hid and disguise themselves while they were in
Jakarta to avoid being chased by pro-integration militia and the
Indonesian military. The international staff simply did no! t bother to
communicate with the refugees to figure out what to do. The flight was
delayed for 24 hours and the refugees were left with nothing, not even
food. UNHCR and IOM staff were not even present at the airport most of the
time.
What happened in Jakarta was just a minor problem compared to the
treatment of refugees within Timor Lorosa’e. After arriving in Dili,
many of them were left without any information at the emergency shelter
for a long periods of time. People were packed into the Don Bosco
dormitory in Dili where the facilities, such as bathrooms and kitchens,
were minimal. Some of the refugees were severely sick but they had to wait
for days, sometimes weeks, to return to their original place. The only bit
of information the refugees learned from the UNHCR was that the UNHCR
would wait until the number of people from a particular zone reached 100
before transportation would be provided. “We can’t go home because our
total is less than one hundred people, that’s UNHCR requirement,” a
refugee from Same told us when we saw her at the Don Bosco shelter.
Once the refugees were in East Timor and at Don Bosco, it was not clear
whose responsibility they were. Apparently, other international NGOs
besides the UNHCR were supposed to be responsible for health care but they
provided very little. We went to visit Don Bosco shelter and one refugee
from Ermera who suffered from malaria shared her story, “Four days ago
they gave me six tablets, but after two days the medicine was gone and I
haven’t yet recovered”. This is only one of many, many complaints we
heard from the refugees who slept on a tarpaulin mat for a long time at
Don Bosco dormitory in Dili.
Refugees in other places had a different story. On December 28, 1999
about 400 refugees from Atambua arrived in Beikala village, Hatudu
sub-district, Ainaro district. They said that from Atambua they had been
transferred to Suai district and had stayed there before leaving for
Ainaro. They had been in Timor Lorosa’e for weeks but it seemed like
there was no coordination between UNHCR and other international NGOs
working for humanitarian relief. The UNHCR had dropped off the refugees in
the village without making any arrangements with other organizations for
the delivery of aid. The refugees had received a certain amount of rice
when they were in Suai. But once they were taken to Beikala they only had
about one to two kilograms of rice left for each person. They did not know
where to go because all their houses were burned down. They also did not
know where to get food. In Beikala itself there is no public shelter,
because the only elementary school in the village was burned do! wn. None
of the international NGOs responsible for distributing food and providing
shelter for the refugees were around Beikala. A CNRT local leader
commented that probably the area was not a priority for the international
institutions. Meanwhile the UNHCR made it sound like the repatriation was
a great success even when the refugees were treated more like luggage.
They dropped off the refugees and provided no explanation as to where they
should stay if they do not have houses anymore and where to obtain food in
the transition period. The refugees began to panic as the rainy season
started.
A similar case happened to refugees from Lolotoe sub-district, Bobonaro
district who returned from Atambua in November 1999. On November 26, 1999,
because the road was damaged, UNHCR dropped off the some 300 refugees in
the middle of the road in Tapo village, about 30 km before entering
Lolotoe area. This was the second time they had been dropped off without
explanation. Before that they had to wait in Maliana for several days.
They were left with no food and none of the international NGOs accompanied
these refugees. After waiting for several days and no action taken by
UNHCR, finally the people from the village chartered a private car owned
by the locals to carry the refugees to Lolotoe. It turned out that there
was no problem with the road at all; their vehicle could pass through
without any hassle. Each family of the refugees had to spent at least Rp.
500,000 to rent the cars.
Other case was the repatriation of the “Indonesian people” from
West Timor to Kampung Alor area in Dili on January 1, 2000. Without
consulting other parties, such as CNRT, churches, or UNTAET, UNHCR brought
back the Indonesians who used to live in Timor Lorosa’e. They fled the
area along with other refugees before the scorched earth operation. A
youth in Kampung Alor said that repatriation of these Indonesian people
took place at the wrong time. The East Timorese were anxiously waiting for
their family members to come home, but what they saw was the return of
unexpected “guests.” The East Timorese were understandably in an
emotional state. For them, most of these “guests” were the beneficiary
of the “integration cake” during the occupation of the Indonesian
military. The UNHCR did not realize that people actually began to suspect
that the UNHCR had intentionally arranged the repatriation of the
Indonesians in order to prolong the conflict within the East Timorese
society. Such! a careless action created new problems. Again, UNHCR
behaved as if it was just transporting “units,” lifeless bits of
unthinking flesh.
3. Inadequate knowledge of East Timor’s needs
Before the international agencies had stepped onto the island, they had
already devised a six-month plan. They had not made any assessment about
the real problems in the field. As a result, some of their programs have
not been able to be implemented and some have been implemented in poor
fashion.
There has been a lack of knowledge about the rice needs of the society.
In some places refugees received rice several times. Meanwhile, in other
places refugees or the local population did not receive rice at all. In
Waitama village, Uatulari sub-district, Viqueque district, since December
1999, the local population has not received anything. According to them,
they still have a small supply of rice, but it is insufficient and not all
families have rice, only those who work in the ricefields. They complained
that international NGOs do not seem to have comprehensive data about the
local conditions. Just because some families have a supply of rice, the
CNRT, international NGOs, and UN agencies assume that everybody has a
sufficient supply of food. Besides, they also think that the people can
fulfill other needs such as a medicine, toiletries, spices, and cooking
oil. In reality, these are rare items in the villages.
In Atelari village, Baucau sub-district, Baguia sub-district where the
population is mostly Moslem and Protestant, the people have not received
any aid. This is because the distribution of rice was coordinated by WFP
with Caritas International as the implementing partner. Caritas only gave
aid to Catholic community groups in accordance with the data compiled by
the Catholic church which understandably did not have data about the
Moslems and Protestants. Besides the problem of unequal distribution of
rice, the coordination with local leaders is also minimal; the CNRT
leaders in various regions have complained about the unequal distribution
of rice in their regions.
The distribution of corn seed for planting was done in a very careless
manner. The seed was distributed when the planting season was largely
over. So the people began to eat the seeds, not knowing that the seeds
were covered with chemicals and were not meant as food. The sacks of seeds
did have printing on the outside warning against ingestion of the seeds
but the people were either illiterate or did not know the language of the
warning. As a consequence, many people became sick.
Because the international agencies only had pre-packaged programs, they
could not respond to what the people actually needed. For instance, in
certain villages in Maliana and Baucau, the people cultivate rice, not
corn. What they need is mechanical equipment to start working on the rice
field. But none of the international NGOs and the UN agencies were geared
to meet this need. The people of Maliana complained that there were
neither tractors nor draft animals to work on the field, “Our oxen and
water buffalo were either killed or taken away by the militia and
Indonesian military,” a farmer from Ritabou village, Maliana told us
when we saw him in his house. It is ironic that there are so many vehicles
being transported to Timor Lorosa’e for use by the international
agencies -- some are even left unused in the warehouse. But there are no
tractors which are crucial to East Timor’s ability to overcome the food
crisis.
Part of the reason the international agencies lack adequate knowledge
of the society’s needs is due to their lack of cooperation and
coordination with local organizations. The international agencies have
divided up East Timor between themselves; certain agencies are responsible
for certain zones. They then expect East Timorese NGOs, who have always
worked throughout the country, to follow the bureaucratic divisions they
have set up. East Timorese NGOs are also supposed to restrict their work
to particular zones. When a national NGO came to the WFP office to
coordinate the distribution of rice, he was asked by the WFP official “What
is the identity of your NGO? Does your institution have any experience in
distributing rice in Baucau?” As if there were any NGOs in East Timor
that had specialized in rice distribution in the one district of Baucau!
The international agencies running the rice distribution, WFP and World
Vision, have set up a rigid bureaucracy that East Timorese NGOs and small
foreign NGOs have had difficulty working through. Their proposals to
distribute rice are not handled quickly. Usually, it is not even clear
when the proposal might be processed. These unnecessary delays have led to
prolonged waits by many communities for rice deliveries.
NGOs have continued distributing food in regions where villagers are
engaged in cultivating crops instead of helping the ongoing production
process. In Aileu the population wants to harvest their rice but none of
the international agencies have any program to assist them. In Turiscai
the population has saved a considerable amount of coffee, but due to the
collapse of the distribution network and the lack of transportation, the
people do not know where to sell the coffee. A similar problem occurred in
Bubususu village, Manufahi district. According to the community leader
there, about 40 tons of coffee are stored there but the community does not
know how to market it. They raised the issue to the international NGO
operating in the area and they were told that there is no program for
marketing coffee for the time being.
International agencies are now in East Timor following their
pre-packaged project proposals. They are not adapting their work to the
particular needs of East Timorese society.
4. Dependency on foreign aid
Humanitarian aid has begun to engender a problem of dependency. This
phenomena is not due to the aid itself, but the manner in which it has
been distributed. The lack of aid for cultivating rice or selling coffee
noted above has meant that villagers have not been able to provide food
and income for themselves. Without the needed aid to do their own work,
they are left dependent on rice deliveries.
The method of rice delivery has actually encouraged people not to work
in the fields in the villages. Because of the unpredictability of supplies
in the districts, people have decided to stay in Dili to obtain rice. Many
people do not want to return to their villages to work in their farm where
they would be able to contribute to East Timor’s own food production.
In Liquiça, several fishermen groups tried to organize themselves into
a cooperative. They submitted their proposal to a Japanese international
NGO, Peace Winds, working in the area. These fishermen groups never got
any response from Peace Winds. “Maybe fishermen affair is not part of
their concern,” they complained when we asked for comments. If the
fishermen were aided to get new boats (to replace the ones destroyed),
they would be able to earn income and would not be wholly dependent on
food aid from WFP and World Vision. But the international agencies don’t
have any program for fishermen.
5. Lack of Transparency in Finances
Most people of Timor Lorosa’e do not know that the international NGOs
and UN agencies are carrying out their operations by using the money
pledged by the World Bank-led consortium. This is money meant for the
interests of “the people of Timor Lorosa’e.” Through an agreement
between the World Bank and donor countries in Tokyo on December 16-17,
1999 a grant of US$ 520 million for three years has been pledged for Timor
Lorosa’e. But there is no information about how this money is being
spent and how much of this grant is going to fund the operations of the
international NGOs and UN agencies. Meanwhile, these international NGOs
and UN agencies act like “saviors” who have come by virtue of their
own fundraising.
People have no idea where they money is coming from for these
international agencies nor any idea about their budgets. One international
agency, World Vision, told a group of East Timorese that it had no money
to transport rice to their village but that the villagers could transport
the rice themselves from the warehouse to their village. This was the
experience of the community from Leorema village, Bazartete sub-district,
Liquiça. World Vision claimed it did not have a vehicle. On January 6,
2000 the villagers, on their own, chartered four trucks for eight million
rupiah (about $1,150) to get their share of rice from World Vision
warehouse located in Liquiça city. Why is it that ordinary villagers were
able to find four vehicles to rent while World Vision could not? And why
is it that World Vision, in possession of far greater resources than such
villagers (who used their last savings for the charter), could not afford
the transportation?
We, like all East Timorese, are disturbed to see the way in which the
international agencies are spending money. The cost of maintaining the
foreign staff is obviously very high with cars, houses, hotel rooms
(reportedly near $200 per night), imported food and beer, transportation
in and out of the country. If the foreign staff consisted of a small core
of necessary officials such expenses would be unobjectionable but the size
of the staff appears terribly bloated. If the international agencies
relied on more East Timorese staff they could save money, put earnings in
the hands of East Timorese, and gain far more diligent and hard-working
employees.
6. Mistreatment of Workers
As noted above, the local component to the international agencies
consists only in the drivers, servants, cooks, and menial laborers they
hire. Even in this aspect of relating to local East Timorese society, the
international agencies have showed themselves to be incompetent. Again, a
large part of the problem is the refusal of the international agencies to
communicate with the workers, to summon the human decency to consider
these workers as people who deserve explanations about the terms of their
work. All the workers that we have spoken to have complained that they
have not received explanations about their wages, working time, or any
other aspect of their work. We find no reason to justify the kind of labor
practices that the international agencies have followed even if the
country is in a crisis period.
a. Use of day labor: The international agencies treat nearly all their
warehouse workers as casual, day laborers. Workers are only told to report
at a certain time in the morning. If there is work they will be called, if
there is none, they will not be called. This means that if workers invest
money in the transportation to get to and from the warehouse, there is no
guarantee they will be hired for the day.
b. Late payment or no payment of wages: Some workers have worked for
many days without receiving a wage. For instance, nine East Timorese
working for the rice warehouse owned by WFP in Viqueque worked from
October to December 1999 without receiving a wage. Each one of them only
received three kilograms of rice as compensation for a month of work.
Three other workers working in the WFP and Timor Aid warehouse in Betano,
Same experienced similar ill-treatment. One said: “We just keep working.
Once we asked about our wage, but that white boss told us to wait, the
wage will be given after we work.” These three workers only got three
kilograms of rice whenever they unloaded rice from the ship and brought it
to the warehouse. After two months, three of them received about one
million rupiah. Workers in Liquiça have a similar experience. About 10
workers working in World Vision warehouse since the past two months have
not received wage until the end of December 1999. According to our! source
of information, World Vision only paid their wage on January 14, 2000.
During the time they worked, they only received 10 kgs. of rice per month.
There is no contract between the workers and management of World Vision.
Workers at the WFP warehouse in Vila Verde, Dili went on a hunger strike
in the beginning of January, 2000 to demand a wage increase. They had been
receiving only Rp. 20,000/day but they had to spend about Rp. 6000 to Rp.
7000 for transportation per day and at least Rp. 10.000 for one meal. By
the end of the day the workers only had Rp. 2000-Rp. 3000 to bring home.
Cooks working at the kitchen of public hospital in Viqueque have worked
for weeks and they have not received any payment from MSF which is
responsible for managing the hospital.
c. Physical Abuse: Workers at the WFP warehouse in Vila Verde, Dili
have actually been physically abused. Some of them were beaten up by the
chief of the warehouse, a foreign staff member of WFP, because they were
late in coming to work.
d. Safety conditions at job site: Workers who work in the rice
warehouses do not get necessary protection such as masks, gloves, boots,
etc.
We find it shameful that an organization such as World Vision which has
enough money to pay its foreign staff hundreds or thousands of dollars per
month has such chronic problems in paying its workers about $3 per day at
so many of its warehouses.
7. Lack of Commitment in Providing Services
“Today is a holiday and there is no ambulance here,” an ICRC doctor
on duty at Bidau hospital responded when several people came to ask for
ICRC’s help to pick up one of their family members who was seriously
sick at home. Eyewitnesses said that at that time several ambulances were
parked in the ICRC garage. This is only one of many complaints we have
heard from people about the problems of the health services in East Timor
provided by international NGOs and UN agencies. They seem to behave as if
they merely want to reach a certain quota in their working proposal. In
some cases, it appears that they are using the East Timorese patients as
guinea pigs for their projects. Other sources of information indicate that
international NGOs and UN agencies do not want to deal with patients with
TB.
There are several international NGOs dealing with health services, such
as Medicins Sans Frontiers (MSF), Assistencia Medica International (AMI),
International Medica Corps (IMC), Medicins du Monde France (MDM-F) and
many others. The sad fact is that all of these health care professionals
are concentrated in Dili. Outside Dili, there is a near total absence of
health services. "Here there is no luxurious house, bar to drink
beer, discotheque, how can humanitarian workers stay here”, an
indigenous leader said when he was asked for his comments about the lack
of health services by international NGOs and UN institutions in Alas
sub-district, Same district.
Another story came from Atabae sub-district, Bobonaro district. MSF is
supposed to take care of health services in that region. MSF staff come
two times per week to the town of Atabae. They do not go to the villages
because they say the village roads are bad. For example, they do not go to
Aidabalete village because of the damaged road so if somebody gets sick in
that village, they will not be able to receive care. Some local nurses
offered to help by distributing medicine to the villages, but the MSF
staff do not trust these local nurses. These local nurses complained, “Do
we have to wait until sick persons die before MSF staff will come to our
village?”
Again, in the field of health care, we find that the international
agencies are unable to work with East Timorese people. Perhaps the nurses
are not highly trained but they can deal with basic health problems if
they have the right equipment and medicine. We are fully convinced that
one “barefoot nurse” or “barefoot doctor” living year-round in
districts is worth more to the health care of the people than a highly
trained foreign doctor who makes flying visits. This is an old truism but
one that seems to be ignored by all the aid agencies that have arrived
here. It would be better for the international aid agencies to focus on
the training and equipping of such a “barefoot” medical staff instead
of focusing on their own (irregular) provision of health care.
There is a strong impression among the people of Timor Lorosa’e that
many relief workers carry out their duty half-heartedly. They perceive
that these foreign relief workers only come to Timor Lorosa’e for an
adventuresome excursion amidst the suffering of the people.
III. Human Rights Context
In this section we will highlight various forms of human rights
violations that have occurred during the humanitarian operation.
Civil and political rights:
Right to information. The people of Timor Lorosa’e do not receive any
information regarding the basic principles and methods underlying the
humanitarian operation, particularly with regard to the funding for
carrying out the operation. Information about the programs and its
planning have to be made public so that the target group is aware of the
objectives of the programs.
Right to active participation. From our observation in the field,
people of Timor Lorosa’e are being treated more as the object of this
humanitarian operation instead of partners.
Right to be free from torture. Several workers in the warehouse were
beaten up by a staff at an international NGO supervising the distribution
of rice.
Economic, social and cultural rights :
Right to a fair wage. There is an obscenely large gap between the
salary of foreign staff and the wage for local workers.
Right to information about the job. Workers in the international NGOs
and UN agencies never receive any explanation about their rights as
workers.
Right to food. Some of the population receive food aid, but others do
not. This happens because the international NGOs and UN agencies do not
have sufficient information about the situation on the ground and there is
a poor coordination between international institutions and the local ones.
Social right to remain in one’s social environment. International
institutions do not attempt to make use of the existing social institution
to deal with the problems occurring in the field. They try to work on
their own and ignore the existence of the local institutions.
IV. Recommendation
Given the foregoing description, we believe that there are steps that
the international agencies can take in order to improve the humanitarian
aid work. The general goal must be to empower people, not to treat them as
thoughtless objects who only merit the privilege of being handed a sack of
rice.
· In order to make the operation effective, international NGOs and UN
agencies need to coordinate with all potential groups within the society,
the people in general, and national NGOs. The coordination meeting should
not be devoted to rhetoric about “partnership” (which is what we have
already received) but about concrete, practical activity.
· To fulfill the East Timorese right to information, international
NGOs and UN agencies, most importantly UNTAET, should inform the public
about the allocation of the funding granted by the World Bank to Timor
Lorosa’e.
· Humanitarian workers should open their hearts to work together with
the people of Timor Lorosa’e at the grassroots level so that it will not
appear that they only come to this burned down country merely to have a
picnic amidst the people’s suffering.
· There should be a clarification and dissemination of information as
to time international NGOs and UN agencies working in the field of
humanitarian relief intend to stay in Timor Lorosa’e. This is necessary
for the people to anticipate the departure of these foreign organizations
and the possibility of not receiving relief anymore. There must be a clear
schedule for the build up of East Timorese institutions prior to the
withdrawal of the international agencies.
Dili, 10 January 2000
Compiled by: Working Group for Study and Examination Yayasan HAK Dili
Timor Loro Sa’e
Note: For those without a fax application on their computer - CallCenter
V3.5.8, is a Native 32-bit Voice Telephony software application integrated with fax and
data communications... and it's free of charge! Download from http://www.v3inc.com/ |