A Primer on How to Lie for the Indonesian Military
by John Roosa Stanley Weiss, chairman of Business Executives for National Security,
knows how to lie for the Indonesian military. In his short op-ed for the International
Herald Tribune (appended below), he manages to pack in a whole slew of lies. Learn from
his op-ed and you too will soon be able to lie for fun and profit.
1. Say that the military's dual function is enshrined in the 1945 constitution.
2. Say that the military became involved in business because the government didn't give
it enough money.
3. Say that "the single greatest cause to corruption and violence among the
military and the police" is "low pay" (and then offer to send US tax
dollars to keep these poor, starving soldiers and policemen from turning to a life of
crime).
4. Say that the East Timorese struggle against an illegal occupation of their land was
a case of succession.
5. Say that the victory of the East Timorese in evicting the the army of occupation is
evidence of how weak and in need of reform the army is.
6. Say the post-ballot scorched earth campaign in East Timor was due to certain
"hardline" elements.
7. Say that the new 'civilian' defense minister and the new commander are committed
reformers.
8. Say that the Indonesian military needs more training from the US military so that it
will learn to respect human rights. (Don't say anything about the implication: that
Indonesian officers are so stupid and inhuman -- after all the training they have received
from the US -- that they do not know that massacring civilians, ransacking hospitals,
trashing bazaars, kidnapping activists, and torturing detainees are no-nos.)
9. Say that a democratic system is dependent upon thirty percent of the population
having clean water, electricity, food, housing, and health care, and thereby endorse the
Suharto's 'economic development' justification for authoritarianism.
Whatever you say, keep smiling and don't say anything about crimes against humanity.
International Herald Tribune Wednesday, November 3, 1999
Next, Indonesians Need to Reform Their Military
By Stanley A. Weiss International Herald Tribune
WASHINGTON - After the successful transfer of power to President Abdurrahman Wahid and
Vice President Megawati Sukarnoputri, Indonesia's political leadership is turning toward
the challenge of bringing stability, prosperity and democracy to the far-flung archipelago
nation.
There is no shortage of outside advice. Many in the West want the new president to
focus on returning nearly a quarter of a million East Timorese still in camps in
Indonesian-controlled West Timor. Others, particularly foreign bankers, brokers and fund
managers, want Indonesia to do whatever it takes to pull out of its worst economic crisis
in a generation, even at the expense of democratic reforms.
President Wahid, while not ignoring any of his country's many daunting problems, is
focusing on reforming the most powerful and influential element of society, the military.
One of his first acts has been to appoint a civilian as minister of defense and security.
For the first time in Indonesia's 54 years of independence, a civilian is in charge of the
armed forces and the police.
The 1945 constitution assigned the military the ''dual function'' of defending the
nation from invaders and ensuring social and political stability. With the army as its
backbone, the armed forces have had a monopoly on state coercive power, reaching down to
the village level. They served as the only unifying force in the nation's early days, but
over time they assumed more and more police functions. After the 1965 coup, President
Suharto folded the police into the armed forces, and the military moved from protector of
the people to oppressor.
Like its counterparts in China, Thailand and Vietnam, the military became involved in
business to supplement an inadequate defense budget. Its corporate wealth is almost $10
billion, including share holdings (with the Suharto family) in timber concessions and
telecommunications in East Timor.
The weakness of the military helps explain its violent excesses in East Timor, where it
was powerless to prevent secession. Some elements, including a core of hard-line active
and retired military officers and police-intelligence personnel, organized and supplied
militias which pursued a scorched earth policy to send a clear message to other separatist
movements that destruction would be the price of independence.
Enter Juwono Sudarsono, the new minister of defense and security, a leading strategic
analyst with degrees from the University of Indonesia, the University of
California-Berkeley and the London School of Economics. He previously served as minister
of the environment and as minister of education and culture. He faces the enormous task of
reforming the armed forces.
He will have help. Mr. Wahid has appointed a naval officer as armed forces commander,
which should bring a new emphasis on Indonesia's real external security challenge - coping
with piracy and smuggling.
Mr. Juwono must create transparency in the dreaded BIA, the armed forces' intelligence
agency, and put it under strict civilian control.
Most important, he should ask the president to separate the military from the police.
The police were made nominally distinct last April but continue to report to the minister
of defense and security. They should answer to the minister for home affairs.
Indonesia's new leadership cannot do all of this alone. Instead of weakening
military-to-military ties, as Washington did in the wake of the violence in East Timor,
U.S. policymakers should increase those contacts.
Admiral Dennis Blair, U.S. commander of Pacific forces, should be a frequent visitor to
Jakarta, offering to help build up Indonesia's navy. The International Military Education
and Training program should be expanded so that more Indonesian officers can spend time in
the United States.
The U.S. State and Justice Departments should continue sending police commanders to
offer advice to Indonesian counterparts on how to deal with crowd control and improve
relations between the police and the people.
Washington could help Jakarta fix the single greatest cause to corruption and violence
among the military and the police - low pay. It should consider aid specifically targeted
to raising their pay, as a way to get the military and police out of business.
Only when the military is under control can Jakarta begin to share power and revenues
with the outer islands. Only then will secessionist forces be stilled and the nation's
stability ensured. Only when Indonesia is stable will foreign investment that brings
prosperity begin to flow. And only when that prosperity creates a strong middle class will
democracy take firm root.
Mr. Juwono has told me that when 30 percent of the population has ready access to
electricity, potable water, adequate housing, primary health care and food, Indonesia will
be ready for democracy. It is not there yet. Only about 5 percent of the 210 million
people could be classified as middle-class.
Creating the conditions for democracy will take time. At least President Wahid knows
where to start.
The writer, founder and chairman of Business Executives for National Security, an
organization of U.S. business leaders, contributed this comment to the International
Herald Tribune.
John Roosa is a historian of South and Southeast Asia who holds a Ph.D. in history from
the
University of Wisconsin-Madison. |