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Part 4: Regime of Occupation

4.1 Introduction

1. From the early days following Portugal's Carnation Revolution in April 1974 and the beginning of the decolonisation process, the Indonesian military began to intervene in the political future of Timor-Leste.^{*} The Indonesian armed forces imposed military solutions to the emerging political problems with disastrous consequences for the people of Timor-Leste. Indonesia's concerns over the emerging post-colonial Timor-Leste need never have resulted in military intervention if hard-line military leaders had not played such an important role in President Soeharto's New Order regime. Once committed to military intervention, ABRI was dominant during the early years of the occupation: by increasing military violence they sought to achieve the political objectives of pacification and integration. To do this, they brought the conflict to every level of East Timorese society, involving East Timorese men, women and children in combat, intelligence, torture and killings to control the population. By the late 1980s, when full-scale military conflict shifted to clandestine resistance by a new generation of East Timorese youth, the Indonesian military again sought violent solutions to the problem. Death squads and paramilitaries in the mid-1990s became forerunners to the widespread militias formed in 1998-99. From 1974 to 1999, there was a consistent pattern of forming East Timorese armed paramilitary forces that operated with impunity with the support of ABRI.

2. This military strategy had extensive and long-term consequences for the people of Timor-Leste. The scale of violence was multiplied and brought into even the smallest villages across the territory. Fear and distrust were sown in communities as Timorese were turned against Timorese, especially through intelligence and surveillance operations. Impunity for perpetrators and the lack of any effective system to uphold the rule of law meant that East Timorese people could not trust police and the mechanisms of civil administration to protect them. The civil administration was effectively subservient to the military as an institution and to powerful individual commanders throughout the occupation. Many key civilian posts, from the national to district levels, were filled by military or ex-military figures. This compromised the civil administration's capacity to operate and implement national development objectives.

3. This chapter provides background on the Indonesian military and governance systems as they were applied in Timor-Leste throughout the period of occupation. It serves as a reference to assist in understanding the context of the human rights violations reported in other chapters.

4.2 The Indonesian armed forces and their role in Timor-Leste[†]

Introduction

4. The Indonesian armed forces played the leading role in the Indonesian intervention and 24-year occupation of Timor-Leste. In 1974-75, after the Carnation Revolution in Portugal opened the way to decolonisation in Portuguese Timor, the Indonesian military intelligence agency, Bakin, and the closely associated civilian think-tank, the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), masterminded covert operations and a destabilisation campaign in the territory. From late

^{*} ABRI, the acronym for Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia (Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia), existed until April 1999 at which time the police were separated from the other three services - the army, navy and air force. These three were then jointly named Tentara Nasional Indonesia (the Indonesian National Army) or TNI.

[†] This section focuses on the conventional military role of ABRI. ABRI's socio-political role is discussed in the section on civil administration below.

1974, these groups began to arm and train East Timorese in West Timor, thus extending the conflict into Timorese society, a practice that was to continue until 1999.

5. The Commission heard testimony from a senior CSIS official, Yusuf Wanandi, who said that military hardliners dominated the debate when Indonesia decided on full-scale military intervention and invasion in 1975. From the outset they characterised the Timor-Leste intervention as an heroic anti-communist crusade, joining it to the ideology and historical antecedents of the New Order regime in order to attract western support in the continuing cold war situation. The invasion of Timor-Leste was a large-scale military exercise. The ABRI hardliners had convinced the Indonesian leadership and their international backers that absorbing Timor-Leste would be a quick and simple matter. ABRI's credibility was invested in this venture. When military victory did not come as quickly or as easily as expected, ABRI sought and gained international military assistance that allowed it to intensify its operations.¹

6. While ABRI could claim to have military control over Timor-Leste from the late 1970s, it was never able to eliminate the armed resistance. As the Resistance shifted to a strategy that relied primarily on clandestine networks, urban protest and an international diplomatic campaign, ABRI applied oppressive measures to subdue this resistance. It established a pervasive hold over Timorese society and the economy. Its territorial structure extended down to the village level, paralleling and dominating the structure of the civil administration. It maintained intelligence networks across the country and mobilised East Timorese civilians into paramilitary forces during the 24-year occupation, culminating in the militias of 1999. It maintained control over the police until April 1999. It also established powerful business interests and monopolies in the territory, which, like its other activities, had a damaging impact on the everyday lives of East Timorese (see Chapter 7.9: Economic and Social Rights). The invasion of Timor-Leste and the subsequent inability of the Indonesian military to crush resistance to its occupation made the territory the main arena in which Indonesian soldiers could gain experience in combat and anti-insurgency during the 24 years of occupation. Generations of officers used combat experience gained in Timor-Leste to further their careers. Operating in a distant province on the periphery of the Indonesian archipelago, the Indonesian military went about its task with virtually no outside scrutiny within a system where the civil administration had no power to maintain balance or control the military's actions. The Indonesian armed forces operated with impunity.

7. The chapters in Part 7 of this report on human rights violations set out the consequences of actions by the Indonesian armed forces for the East Timorese, and their experience of living under a system dominated by the Indonesian military. This section provides information about the Indonesian military and its operations in Timor-Leste in order to provide a context for the violations chapters.

Background of the Indonesian armed forces

The historical background to ABRI and TNI²

8. First the Dutch and later the Japanese recruited Indonesians into their armed forces. Officers in the Royal Netherlands Indies Army (KNIL) were mostly Dutch, but the troops were Indonesians trained by the Dutch. The Japanese invaded in March 1942 and by the end of that year they had established Heiho as an auxiliary unit with guard duties. On 3 October 1943 the Japanese formed a more formal fighting unit known as Peta (*Pasukan Sukarela untuk Membela Tanah Air*, Volunteer Force for Homeland Defence) to support them should allied forces land. During the transition from Japanese control to the recognition of Indonesia as a fully independent nation, a number of armed organisations arose. These groups reflected a wide ideological range from Muslims struggling for an Islamic state to radical nationalists and Communists to those who advocated a secular state. On 22 August 1945 the Preparatory Committee for Independence (PPKI) formed the People's Security Body (BKR) comprising mostly former Peta members and officers. Following the arrival of allied troops in late September 1945, the BKR became the

People's Security Army (TKR) on 5 October 1945 under a centralised command. In a decree issued by Sukarno on 26 January 1946, the People's Security Army became the Army of the Republic of Indonesia (TRI). The TRI was consolidated in mid-May 1946, and on 26 June 1946 both the air force and navy were placed under the command of the TRI's commander in chief, Sudirman, rather than falling under the jurisdiction of the Minister of Defence. On 5 May 1947 Sukarno joined the TRI with other armed groups (*askar*) to form the Indonesian National Army (TNI). During the 1950s the commanders of the army, air force and navy were under the command of the President, but following the political upheavals and widespread killings in 1965, these services were consolidated along with the police in December 1965 to become the Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia (ABRI) under the commander in chief of the armed forces. In April 1999, with the separation of the police from the armed forces, ABRI became the TNI.

The armed forces as saviour of the nation

9. Indonesia's struggle for independence from Dutch colonial rule was long and complex. Its armed phase after the Second World War mobilised a broad cross-section of Indonesian society to evict the Dutch who attempted to reassert their colonial authority following the surrender of the Japanese. The Army of the Republic of Indonesia (Tentara Republik Indonesia, TRI) and later the Indonesian National Army (Tentara Nasional Indonesia, TNI) were formed to lead this struggle and played a key role in forcing the Netherlands to depart after the revolution of 1945-49. During this period the relationship of the armed forces with politicians and the many citizens' militias that sprang up to fight for what was called the Revolution was not always easy. While Indonesia's civilian leadership adopted a democratic constitution in 1950, the military saw itself from the outset as having a major role to play in Indonesia's political future.

10. In the years following independence, a number of milestones marked the consolidation of military power that enabled the military to promote itself as having saved the nation. During much of the 1950s, the armed forces were engaged in combating secessionist and Islamic movements. In 1957-58 Indonesia faced two federalist revolts, one in Sumatra (Pemerintah Revolusioner Republik Indonesia, PRRI) and one in Sulawesi (Perjuangan Semesta, Permesta). Both revolts had strong support, including backing from some elements in the military. President Sukarno declared martial law in 1957 and the military, led by General Abdul Haris Nasution, crushed both rebellions. Confident from these victories, and its takeover of nationalised Dutch enterprises at around the same time, the Indonesian military adopted an increasingly aggressive political stance in the late 1950s, first against political parties and then against the democratic system itself. With the support of the military, Sukarno abandoned parliamentary democracy in 1959, reinstating the 1945 Constitution and instituting what he called Guided Democracy which gave greater powers to the president. Guided Democracy also gave the military, as one of several so-called "functional groups", the right to participate in politics.³

11. Following a tumultuous period in the early 1960s when Sukarno presided over an increasingly divided Indonesia, the army, under the command of Major General Soeharto, effectively deposed the president and initiated a violent purge against its main political rival, the Indonesian Communist Party (Partai Komunis Indonesia, PKI). With the active support of the military, between 250,000 and 1million suspected communists were killed in 1965-66, and many more leftists and Sukarno supporters were incarcerated in prisons and prison camps.⁴ In Soeharto's New Order, the military was once again represented as having saved the nation, this time from communism.

12. In 1974, the Indonesian military used the threat of communism to justify its involvement in covert operations in Timor-Leste (see Part 3: The History of the Conflict). At the height of the Cold War this was a powerful symbol for Indonesia's international allies, particularly as the United States sought to control the spread of communism in Southeast Asia. Though there was no evidence that communism was a major force in Timorese politics, or that communist nations were actively wooing Timor-Leste's political leaders, the armed forces depicted the possibility of an

independent Timor-Leste as a threat to the stability of Indonesia. For years after the 1975 invasion, ABRI continued to insist that it was fighting a communist enemy in Timor-Leste.⁵

Armed forces doctrine

13. The Indonesian armed forces basic doctrine is known as the Total People's Defence and Security System (*Sistem Pertahanan Keamanan Rakyat Semesta, Sishankamrata*), according to which all citizens have a role to play in national defence. The concept emerged from the war of independence in which the armed forces depended on the support of the population.⁶ Originally a concept based on the idea that the entire nation would need to resist an external enemy if it overpowered the conventional military, over time its focus changed as the armed forces came to see the greatest threat to national security as being internal.

14. The role of the Indonesian armed forces in national political life changed significantly when in 1959 President Sukarno declared "Guided Democracy" and gave the armed forces the right to participate in politics. Under the leadership of General Abdul Haris Nasution, the armed forces formed a dual function policy (*dwifungsi*), claiming for itself both a security role and a social-political role.

15. From 1965 and the advent of President Soeharto's New Order regime, ABRI was concerned almost exclusively with internal security. This was articulated in a range of policies and concepts further justifying its engagement in all spheres of the nation's life. In 1966, for example, it adopted the all-embracing concept of *ipoleksos* - ideology, politics, economic and social.⁷ The consolidation of the territorial structure, which gave it a geographical presence throughout the country (see below), reflected this preoccupation with internal control.

16. During the course of the New Order regime intolerance of internal dissent increased to the point where any criticism of the regime was regarded as a threat to the state. The 1982 Defence Act laid out ABRI's social-political role, stating that:

National defence and security includes defence against both external and internal threats, and these threats may be directed against national freedom and sovereignty, national unity and solidarity, the integrity of the nation and national jurisdiction, and the values of the national ideology, *Pancasila* and the Constitution.⁸

Territorial structure of the Indonesian armed forces

17. The structure of Indonesia's armed forces is divided into two broad operational sections, a combat command and a territorial command. The territorial structure is a particular feature of Indonesia's armed forces, with its roots in the war of independence when the Indonesian armed forces were composed of local, non-professional units that fought a guerrilla-style war against the Dutch. These local units developed into the formal territorial structure that exists today which parallels the civil administrative structure. At the top of this structure operationally is the Regional Military Command (Komando Daerah Militer, Kodam) which oversees a number of Sub-regional Commands (Komando Resort Militer, Korem).⁹ At this level the military commands do not always correspond to the same administrative units across the archipelago. The populous provinces of Jakarta and West, Central and East Java, have their own Regional Commands and in the case of the last three, Sub-regional Commands cover a number of districts. Most Regional Commands, however, cover more than one province while Sub-regional Commands cover the territory of a single province. This was the case in East Timor during most of the period of the occupation (see

* Until 1985 groups of Kodam fell under the command of a higher territorial unit, the Kowilhan (Sectoral Defence Command). The Kowilhan was abolished because it came to be seen as redundant.

below). Below the Korem, the structure invariably corresponds to the civil administrative units: each district has a District Military Command (Kodim) and each sub-district a Sub-district Military Command (Koramil). In most villages there is a non-commissioned "village guidance" officer called a Babinsa (*Bintara Pembina Desa*). The Indonesian military also has civil defence forces known as Wanra (*Perlawanan Rakyat*, People's Resistance) and Ratih (*Rakyat Terlatih*, Trained Civilians) under its command. These paramilitary groups are recruited from the civilian population in villages and represent a cost-effective way of extending military control and of enlisting the general public for security duties (see section on militarisation of East Timorese society below). The result of this structure was an institution able to exercise power on both the government and the population at all levels of society, and a large standing army that in 1993 fielded one soldier for every 900 people.⁹

18. During the early years of President Soeharto's New Order regime this territorial structure was consolidated and enlarged. ABRI became the core of the regime, and through its territorial structure was able to use a range of methods to ensure its dominance. It institutionalised consultations with high-ranking members of the civil administration and the police called *Muspida* (*Musyawarah Pimpinan Daerah*, Regional Leadership Consultation) at provincial and district levels, and Tripika (Tri Pimpinan Kecamatan, Sub-district Leadership Triumvirate) at the sub-district level. In other areas, the New Order presented a largely civilian face to the world. For example, it exhorted the public to pledge allegiance to the state through ensuring public participation in the ceremonial aspects of Indonesian nationalism. ABRI also implemented public works projects such as "ABRI Enters the Village" (*ABRI Masuk Desa*) in keeping with its dual function (*dwifungsi*).

Indonesian armed forces and the police

19. Indonesia's police force was structurally part of the military throughout the New Order. This long history of effective subservience to the leadership of the armed forces had a profound effect on the independence of the police and their capacity to enforce law and order. This history has contributed to the impunity enjoyed by the armed forces and those who work with it. The police force doctrine, founded on a belief that security is the responsibility of the total population, is similar to that of the armed forces. Under its System of Neighbourhood Security (*Sistem Keamanan Lingkungan*, *Siskamling*) members of the community have a role in maintaining security in their locality.¹⁰ Like the military, the police force also has a territorial structure, including a presence at the village level (*Bintara Polisi Daerah*, *Binpolda*). In addition to its normal duties, the police maintain an armed division called the Mobile Brigade (Brimob). Brimob originally had responsibility for internal security, but as this role was taken over by the military during the New Order this division began to specialise in riot control and was used extensively for this purpose.

Indonesian armed forces funding and its role in the Indonesian economy

20. Since its inception the Indonesian military has played a role in Indonesia's economy. This is largely because the armed forces received inadequate budget allocations,¹¹ and consequently were forced to raise funds themselves.¹² This practice of "extra-budgetary" funding became institutionally entrenched.¹³

21. During the Revolution, the armed forces had to improvise to supply its troops, but its deep involvement in the economy dates from the late 1950s, as the military took on a central role in all aspects of national life. The nationalisation of foreign-owned enterprises in 1957 gave the military control over a number of state assets which it used for institutional and personal gain. Military officers also seconded to powerful positions in key state agencies such as the National Logistics Agency (*Badan Urusan Logistik*, Bulog)¹⁴ that is responsible for the distribution of basic staples. This was the beginning of the armed forces' institutionalised role as a source of economic dominance within the nation.

22. During the New Order, President Soeharto moved to reduce the budget allocation to the military from almost 30% to less than 10% of government expenditure.¹⁵ He won praise for what appeared to be a reduction in the role of the military in the society. However, at the same time ABRI grew in size and territorial reach, and developed its role in state affairs. The shortfall in government funding was made up by ABRI's business ventures.¹⁶

23. The development objectives of the New Order regime provided a justification for ABRI's economic role.¹⁷ The concept of *kekaryaan* (assignment to civilian posts in state and government agencies, and nationalised enterprises) sanctified ABRI's role in the nation's economy.¹⁸ This tied in closely with another key military concept, namely that "guidance", as exemplified through military discipline and integrity, was vital to the progress of the whole nation. In order to coordinate these functions, ABRI maintained a central office for social political affairs (*Kasospol*).¹⁹ The result was a class of civilian officers that by 1992 numbered 14,000²⁰ (see section on civil administration below).

24. The military's control of key state assets allowed it to ensure that lucrative contracts were granted to ABRI-linked businesses. This often resulted in the inefficient running of state agencies for military gain. A clear example of this was the near-bankruptcy of the state oil conglomerate Pertamina in the mid-1970s after it had accumulated massive debt and become "a state within a state" answerable only to President Soeharto.²¹ The Pertamina crisis coincided with the build-up to intervention in Timor-Leste and initially gave the military pause about the feasibility of launching a full-scale invasion of the territory.²²

25. In addition to their formal role in the bureaucracy and state enterprises, ABRI officers also operated in a variety of extra-legal capacities. They were able to use their position to operate as middlemen for entrepreneurs willing to pay for privileged access. Many entrepreneurs were Indonesian-Chinese investors who provided the capital and financial management skills while the ABRI officers provided the political influence and, if required, military force.²³ A prominent member of this group was Liem Sioe Liong, a close partner of Soeharto's since before the New Order. Foreign investors entered into similar relationships.²⁴ For example, in the PT Freeport gold and copper mine in West Papua, the Indonesian military was contracted to provide security as part of with the mining company.

New Order reorganisation of the armed forces

26. During the Sukarno era the four military services (Army, Navy, Air Force and the Police) had been rivals, and the joint chiefs of staff were not effective in coordinating them.²⁵ Greater unity and centralisation were achieved in the late 1950s and 1960s, and in 1967 President Soeharto, using the New Order, placed the military services under the command of a single ministry, the Department of Defence and Security (Departmen Pertahanan dan Keamanan, Hankam).²⁶ From 1967 until the end of the New Order army generals held the position of ABRI commander in chief. Operational authority was taken from the service chiefs and given to the Minister of Defence and Security who tended to be the ABRI commander in chief. These changes confirmed the army's *de facto* dominance over ABRI.

27. Under Soeharto, the intelligence sector grew to a position of great power within the military. Intelligence became one of the core aspects of internal security operations which also

¹⁵ *The Jakarta Post*, 13 March 2003 article which said that Freeport-McMoran Copper and Gold Inc. sent "a confidential document to the New York City controller's office and the US Security and Exchange Commission, disclosing that in 2001 it paid US \$4.7 million for the employment of about 2,300 'Indonesian government security personnel'."

¹⁶ *The Australian Herald* (article Sian Powell) on 15 March 2003 reported Freeport disclosed that it had made payments of US \$11 million to the TNI over the preceeding two years. Freeport stated that "The Grasberg mine has been designated by the Government of Indonesia as one of the Indonesia's vital national interests. This designation results in the military's playing a significant role in protecting the area of company operating." The Freeport statement described that it paid expenses for "government-related security" for the mine operations of US \$5.8 million in 2001 and US \$5.6 million in 2002. [see <http://www.minesandcommunities.org/Action/press127.htm>].

included territorial, combat and law and order operations.²⁷ Repression of internal dissent was a major function of the armed forces. Combined with the new centralised command structure, this growing intelligence sector had a major impact on the military's policy and behaviour.

28. President Soeharto came to power in turbulent times and one of the first structures he established to secure his position was the Operational Command for the Restoration of Security and Order (Komando Operasi Pemulihan Keamanan dan Ketertiban, Kopkamtib). He had direct control of this initially extra-constitutional and very powerful institution.²⁸ It was overwhelmingly anti-communist in intent and its mission was to:

Restore security and order from the consequences of the G30S/PKI revolt (the 1965 alleged coup) as well as other extremist or subversive activities.²⁹

29. In 1966 the Central Intelligence Body (BPI) was renamed Coordination of National Intelligence (KIN) and was subordinated to President Soeharto through Kopkamtib. A more informal body that played a prominent role in early New Order Indonesia was General Ali Moertopo's Special Operations unit, which helped to manage the 1971 elections and responded covertly to a variety of challenges such as ending the "confrontation" with Malaysia and orchestrating the "Act of Free Choice" in West Papua in 1969.³⁰ In 1974 the Special Operations unit worked closely with the civilian think tank, the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), in developing the strategy that led to the takeover of Timor-Leste (see Part 3: The History of the Conflict).

30. In 1974, after a major riot known as the Malari affair exposed both widespread dissatisfaction with the New Order and serious divisions in the military itself, Soeharto consolidated and centralised intelligence and the internal security apparatus. Extensive powers were concentrated in the hands of Major General Benny Moerdani who headed the intelligence section at the Department of Defence and Security, was deputy chief of Bakin (Badan Kordinasi Intelijen, Intelligence Co-ordinating Agency) and who was also head of the Ministry of Defence and Security's Strategic Intelligence Centre. The system of military and political checks and balances that might normally restrain intelligence bodies was removed, and intelligence services attained an unprecedented level of power and influence. Generals Moertopo and Moerdani, and their intelligence networks, played a key role in the development and implementation of policy for Timor-Leste in 1974-75.

Organisational structures of the Indonesian armed forces in East Timor

31. How the military command structures of the Indonesian armed forces over the 25 years of Indonesia's intervention, invasion and occupation of Timor-Leste were made to conform with those in Indonesia will be examined below. However, the nature of the conflict forced Indonesia to treat East Timor as a special and extreme case throughout the period of occupation.

32. Throughout the 24-year period of occupation there were a number of structural and policy shifts in the way the Indonesian military was organised in East Timor. These modifications were influenced by the nature of the conflict in Timor-Leste, by levels of international assistance, at times by the level of international scrutiny and ultimately by international pressure on Indonesia to withdraw from the territory. The phases of Indonesian military involvement in Timor-Leste were:

- Covert intelligence operations in 1974 in preparation for full-scale military takeover and occupation
- The establishment of a East Timor regional command structure for a "transitional period" which lasted until the end of the 1970s as ABRI sought to consolidate its position and crush the armed resistance
- The transfer of command into the conventional regional command structure as ABRI declared East Timor "pacified"
- The expansion of the territorial structure of ABRI after 1979 to control the civilian population as people came down from the mountains and were resettled in camps and villages
- The establishment of parallel combat and territorial command structures in the 1980s
- The decision to treat East Timor as a "normal" province as Indonesia partially opened East Timor at the end of 1988
- The shift of focus to intelligence operations and the use of riot police, Brimob, to counter the spread of clandestine activities and public demonstrations in the 1990s
- The deployment of Army Strategic Reserve Command troops (Komando Strategis Angkatan Darat, Kostrad) in late 1998 as the militias were formed
- The creation of a special command structure after the Popular Consultation when President Habibie declared martial law in East Timor
- Liquidation of the special command structure in late September 1999 and replacement by a Task Force for East Timor to coordinate the Indonesian withdrawal with the incoming International Force for East Timor (Interfet).

33. This outline provides background to the chapters on human rights violations in Part 7 of this report and to Part 8: Responsibility and Accountability. It does not aim to give a comprehensive analysis of all the factors that contributed to structural or policy shifts in the Indonesian armed forces or to their consequences. Instead it highlights key developments relevant to the Commission's core concerns.

Table 1 - Military Commands in East Timor

Dates	Command	Major known operations
Late 1974	Operasi Khusus (Opsus) ³¹	<i>Operasi Komodo</i>
Early 1975	Assistant I/Intelligence of Defence and Security Department with support from Special Warfare Command (Kopassandha) ³²	<i>Operasi Flamboyan</i>
31 August 1975	Operation Seroja Joint Task Force Command (Kogasgab Seroja) ³³	<i>Operasi Flamboyan</i> <i>Operasi Seroja</i> (invasion)
August 1976	East Timor Regional Defence and Security Command (Kodahankam)	<i>Operasi Seroja</i>
October 1978	Operation Seroja Joint Task Force Command (Kogasgab Seroja)	<i>Operasi Seroja</i> <i>Operasi Skylight</i>
26 March 1979	Sub-Regional Command 164/Wira Dharma (Korem 164) (Territorial command)	<i>Operasi Keamanan</i> <i>Operasi Kikis</i> <i>Operasi Persatuan</i>
1984	Security Operations Command for East Timor (Koopskam Timor Timur) (Combat and Intelligence Command)	<i>Operasi Watumisa 1</i> <i>Operasi Watumisa 2</i>
May 1990	Operations Implementation Command in East Timor (Kolakops Timor Timur)	
March 1993	Sub-regional Command 164 (Korem 164)	No formal operations conducted, although combat troops permanently in East Timor
7 September 1999	Martial Law Authority Command in East Timor (Komando Penguasa Darurat Militer Timor Timur)	

23 September 1999 Indonesian Task Force for East Timor (Satuan Tugas Indonesia di Timor Timur)

Source: CAVR research and compilation

Operation Seroja Joint Task Force Command,³⁴ August 1975 to August 1976

34. Indonesian military involvement in Timor-Leste began in mid-1974 when Major-General Ali Moertopo's Special Operations (Opsus) unit began to work covertly in *Operasi Komodo*. In early 1975, *Operasi Komodo* ended and was replaced by *Operasi Flamboyan* under the control of Major-General Benny Moerdani, the chief of intelligence at the Department of Defence and Security. The new operation received more resources and involved Special Forces (Kopassandha) units. It undertook a wider range of activities than had *Komodo*, including destabilisation, intelligence gathering, and the paramilitary training of East Timorese recruits. On 31 August 1975, the commander in chief of the armed forces and minister of defence and security, General Panggabean, established the Operation Seroja Joint Task Force Command (*Kogasgab Seroja*).³⁵ This brought Indonesian military involvement in Portuguese Timor under the direct control and central command of ABRI.

35. The Seroja Joint Task Force Command was led by Brigadier-General Soeweno, who directed the full-scale invasion in December 1975 known as *Operasi Seroja*. This was a combined military operation involving troops from all service branches, including:

- The Army Strategic Reserve Command (Komando Strategi Angkatan Darat, Kostrad)
- The Special Warfare Command (Komando Pasukan Sandhi Yudha, Kopassandha)
- The Air Force Rapid Response Troop Command (Komando Pasukan Gerak Cepat, Kopasgat)
- Marine and infantry battalions from several regional commands.

36. Although the Operation Seroja Joint Task Force Command had direct command over all troops, operations were conducted under the strategic reserve command (Kostrad), initially under its Second Combat Command (Kopur II), and after March 1976 under the Airborne Combat Command (Kopur Linud).

37. In early 1976 Seroja Command divided East Timor into four operational sectors. Sector A covered Dili and the enclave of Oecusse, Sector B the districts of Bobonaro, Covalima, Ermera and Liquiça, Sector C Aileu, Ainaro, Manufahi and Manatuto, and Sector D Baucau, Viqueque and Lautem. With the exception of sector A (Dili), a composite Combat Team Regiment (Resimen Tim Pertempuran, RTP) was assigned to oversee operations in each sector. Each Combat Team Regiment comprised six to eight territorial battalions supporting artillery, cavalry and engineering units that were designated "combat support units" (Banpur).

East Timor Regional Military Command, August 1976-October 1978

38. Soon after the Indonesian parliament passed the law integrating East Timor into the Republic of Indonesia in July 1976, ABRI reorganised the military structure in East Timor to incorporate what had been external operations into the conventional military structure. On 14 August 1976, the Ministry of Defence and Security in effect made its operation in East Timor into a domestic operation by establishing the East Timor Regional Defence and Security Command (Komando Daerah Pertahanan dan Keamanan Timor Timur, *Kodahankam Timor Timur*). Ministry

³⁵ Indonesia adjusted some district boundaries (Zumalai was originally part of Bobonaro/Ainaro, not Covalima), and also changed some names in the late 1970s (Same became Manufahi, Lospalos became Lautém).

documents defined its role as consolidating the military position during what was called a transitional period:

The East Timor Regional Defence Command was established with the aim of laying the foundation for the Guidance and Development of Defence and Security in East Timor during the “transitional period”, which lasts until the end of the Second Development Plan (in 1979), along with implementing the Guidance and Development of National Defence and Security Policy.³⁶

39. The changes were far-reaching:

- The military began to establish a territorial system of District Military Commands (Komando Distrik Militer, Kodim) and Sub-district Military Commands (Komando Rayon Militer, Koramil). The Kodim were initially numbered from 01 (Dili) to 13 (Oecusse). The February 1977 instruction regarding the organisation of the Regional Defence Command envisaged that eight of the Kodim would operate under a Sub-regional Military Command (Korem), while the other five were to operate independently and report directly to the Regional Defence Command. However, given that Sub-regional Military Command 164 was not established until March 1979, all of the Kodim were in effect under the direct command and control of Regional Defence Command and, from October 1978 until March 1979, its successor, Seroja Joint Task Command (Kogasgab).
- Under the Regional Defence Command were several kinds of combat units. Continuing the practice of its predecessor, the Regional Defence Command deployed Combat Team Regiments (RTP) in the operations sectors. In late 1976-early 1977 these included RTP 16 in sector B, RTP 13 in sector C, and RTP 15 in sector D. In addition Independent Combat Battalions and Independent/non-RTP Combat Support Battalions, comprising artillery, cavalry, engineering and other specialist troops, were also deployed.
- The Regional Defence Command included a unit called the Intelligence Task Force/Implementing Body (*Satuan Tugas/Badan Pelaksanaan Intelijen*, abbreviated Satgas/Balak Intel, or simply Satgas Intel). This unit played a prominent role in internal repression, which it would continue to play throughout the next two decades.
- Military Police were deployed in Dili and other major towns. Available evidence suggests that Military Police played an active role in the growing system of detention centres and the establishment of prison facilities. The Commission does not have any evidence to suggest that Military Police took disciplinary measures against military personnel during this period.
- Provincial, district and sub-district police units were established at this time, although they operated directly under the command of the Regional Defence Command for several years.
- The military bureaucracy also expanded greatly.*³⁷

40. During this period, ABRI was engaged in full-scale military operations against Fretilin/Falintil, which controlled significant areas of the interior and a large proportion of the civilian population. International military hardware, especially from the US, played a critical role in giving ABRI the capacity to destroy Fretilin’s mountain and forest bases and to end this phase of the resistance.

* In addition to the general staff already present, the East Timor Regional Defence Command commander was also served by a number of service specialties (information, finance, mental development, history, law, and psychology), implementation bodies (communications and electronics, Military Police, health, personnel administration, Command Logistics, a naval station and airforce base), and operational units (Brigif/RTP, an intelligence task force, independent battalions, territorial units, navy and air force task forces, etc.).

Operasi Seroja Joint Task Force Command, October 1978 - March 1979

41. On 12 October 1978 a new Operation Seroja Joint Task Force Command (Kogasgab Seroja) was established.³⁸ The Seroja Joint Task Force was placed under the control of Regional Military Command XVI/Udayana (Kodam XVI/Udayana), which included the Indonesian provinces of Bali, and West and East Nusa Tenggara.³⁹ A month later operational control over East Timor was transferred from the Ministry of Defence and Security, which had administered the territory directly until then, to Regional Defence Command II (Kowilhan II), which covered Java, Bali and all of Nusa Tenggara. These changes signalled a judgment by ABRI that it had substantially achieved military victory over Fretilin/Falintil, and that “normalisation” would soon be in order. The ministerial decree establishing the new command stated:

From the time of its founding and in the shortest possible time Operasi Seroja Joint Task Force Command (is to) destroy the remnants of the armed Gang of Security Disturbers (Gerombolan Pengacau Keamanan) to maintain and increase the security of the region, and to assist in preparing to normalize the functioning of the civil administration by carrying out Domestic Security Operations in the province of East Timor.⁴⁰

42. Brigadier-General Dading Kalbuadi, who had run the Regional Defence Command since 1976, was appointed Commander of Regional Command XVI/Udayana and hence retained direct command over military operations in East Timor.

43. Under the command of Colonel Sutarto, the Seroja Joint Task Force Command oversaw the final stages of *Operasi Seroja* in Timor-Leste in late 1978 and early 1979 (see Part 3: The History of the Conflict). With the fall of the last Fretilin base areas on Mount Matebian (November 1978), Mount Kablaki (about January 1979), Fatubessi, Ermera (February 1979) and Alas, Manufahi (March 1979), ABRI had achieved nominal control over all territory in East Timor. The death of Fretilin President Nicolau Lobato on 31 December 1978 provided further reason for the Indonesian military to think that the war was over. These developments set the stage for a further reorganisation of military structures in East Timor.

Sub-regional Military Command 164/Wira Dharma, 1979-99

44. Declaring East Timor pacified, ABRI brought *Operasi Seroja* to an end, and on 26 March 1979 established the territorial Sub-regional Command 164/Wira Dharma (Korem 164).⁴¹ This was one of four sub-regional commands under Regional Military Command XVI/Udayana headquartered in Denpasar, Bali. As the civilian population surrendered and was resettled in detention camps and later villages, the territorial structure was expanded. Non-commissioned village guidance officers (Babinsa) extended the reach of the military into the villages. By the 1990s the number of village guidance officers exceeded the total number of villages in East Timor.⁴²

45. When carrying out operations, the sub-regional commander was also the commander of the Operation Implementations Command (Kolakops). This was really just another name for the sub-regional command, though with the addition of non-organic troops.⁴³

46. In 1979, the Ministry of Defence and Security issued an instruction on combat operations in Indonesia for 1979-80. The aim of operations in East Timor was explained as:

a) Destruction of the remaining activities and ability of the armed resistance of the Gang of Security Disturbers so they no longer have strategic significance, particularly with regards to political resistance by elements of the Gang of Security Disturbers overseas.

b) Partition off East Timor so it is not possible for the Gang of Security Disturbers to escape from the territory or for the smuggling of physical assistance from abroad into the territory of East Timor.

c) Assist in the infrastructure rehabilitation programme and normalise the activities of the populace.⁴⁴

Security Operations Command for East Timor, 1984-90

47. In 1984 ABRI established a new combat command structure called the Security Operations Command for East Timor (*Koopskam Timor Timur*).⁴⁵ The commander of the Army Strategic Reserve Command's (Kostrad's) First Infantry Division headed it, and his staff filled the new combat command structure.

48. Throughout this period there was a hierarchical relationship between the Sub-regional Command (Korem) and the Security Operations Command (Koopskam). The Security Operations Command was the superior command with responsibility for combat and intelligence operations, while Sub-regional Command 164 was responsible for territorial affairs. The head of the Security Operations Command was a brigadier-general and thus outranked the commander of Sub-regional Command 164, who was a colonel.

49. Both the Special Warfare Command (Kopassandha) and the Army Strategic Reserve Command (Kostrad) played major combat roles in Timor-Leste during this period. The officers appointed to command the Security Operations Command (Koopskam) during the mid-1980s served simultaneously as commanders of the West Java-based Strategic Reserve (Kostrad) First Infantry Division. This dual appointment facilitated coordination between the Special Warfare Command (Kopassandha) and troops from the Army Strategic Reserve Command's First Infantry Division (Divif I/Kostrad) based in West Java.

50. In July 1988 the Army Strategic Reserve Command Second Infantry Division was appointed to replace the First Infantry Division within the structure of the Security Operations Command for East Timor. A military history indicates that at the time of the handover ABRI considered Falintil to be weak, but acknowledged its capacity to both mount operations and influence the population.

The remnants of the GPK (Gerombolan Pengacau Keamanan, Gangs of Security Disturbers) running wild in the forests of East Timor, particularly in the central and eastern sectors, physically total less than 244 people. They possess around 217 weapons composed of various light, long and short types.

* This can be confirmed for Brigadier-General Sugito (c.1983-85), Brigadier-General Warsito (1985-87) and Brigadier-General Mantiri (1987-88), and is likely also the case for Brigadier-General Sutarto (appointment date not known-83).

They are former leaders and members of Fretilin and they have communist, Marxist and Leninist ideological sympathies. They are still capable of indicating their existence. Through various means they influence a minority of the people to support an independent nation separate from the Republic of Indonesia.⁴⁶

Operations implementation command (Kolakops) Timor Timur, 1990-93

51. In December 1988, in response to a request by Governor Mário Viegas Carrascalão earlier in the year, President Soeharto signed Presidential Decree No. 62, 1988 granting the province of East Timor “equal status” with the other 26 provinces of Indonesia. Decree No. 62 permitted freer travel within the province, allowed Indonesian citizens from elsewhere in Indonesia to enter East Timor, granted foreign tourists entry into East Timor and allowed foreign journalists to visit East Timor (subject to official approval). This was an attempt to put a kinder face on the Indonesian military occupation of the territory. In 1989 the sub-regional (Korem) commander, Colonel Rudolf Samuel Warouw, announced a new operation called Operasi Smile that aimed to reduce travel restrictions, release a number of political prisoners and curtail the use of torture during interrogations.

52. The decision to treat East Timor like a “normal” province also entailed a further transformation of the military structure. In May 1990 the Security Operations Command for East Timor was turned back into the Operations Implementation Command in East Timor (Kolakops Timor Timur).⁴⁷ The Korem commander, Colonel Warouw, was appointed to command Kolakops and promoted to brigadier-general, replacing the hard-line Brigadier-General Mulyadi.

53. However, this period coincided with the rise of the urban youth and clandestine movement of the Resistance, and the use of public demonstrations against the Indonesian regime (see Part 3: History of the Conflict). On 12 November 1991, Indonesian military troops were filmed as they massacred peaceful demonstrators at the Santa Cruz cemetery in Dili (see Part 3: The History of the Conflict and Chapter 7.2: Unlawful Killings and Enforced Disappearances). Although a Military Honour Board was convened and a number of officers were dismissed from active service and some non-commissioned officers and privates court-martialled, there was no immediate move to alter the military structures in East Timor.

Sub-regional Command 164/Wira Dharma (Korem 164), 1993–99

54. Despite international condemnation of the Indonesian military after the Santa Cruz massacre, ABRI was confident that it had brought the Resistance under control. An August 1992 military document stated:

The repressive actions of the Government of the Republic of Indonesia have broken up a large part of the clandestine network, both inside and outside East Timor.⁴⁸

55. Military confidence increased further with the capture of Xanana Gusmão on 20 November 1992 and of Mauhunu (Antonio Gomes da Costa) on 3 April 1993.

56. Military efforts shifted increasingly to the control and repression of youth resistance, with Special Forces Command (Kopassus) taking the lead.⁴⁹ When Operations Implementation Command in East Timor (Kolakops) was abolished, the Joint Intelligence Unit (SGI) was transferred to Sub-regional Command 164 and renamed the Intelligence Task Force (*Satgas Intel*). In contrast to the official policy of normalising the status of East Timor and reducing the military presence, in late 1994 Colonel Prabowo Subianto and the Special Forces Command (Kopassus) initiated psychological operations to intimidate and terrorise the East Timorese

population, increased military training of civil servants and university students, expanded the paramilitary teams, and established new militia organisations.⁵⁰

57. The focus on repression of the urban resistance during the 1990s was also signalled by the large presence and extensive use of the anti-riot police, Brimob.⁵¹ Anti-riot police units were present in far larger numbers in relation to the size of the population than was normal in Indonesia during this period.^{*} By August 1998 nearly 7,400 anti-riot police, renowned for their violence, were deployed in East Timor, divided between territorial units (with 214 personnel) and units brought from outside the territory (7,156) (see Chapter 7.4: Detention, Torture and Ill-Treatment).

Continued combat troop presence

58. In March 1993, the Operations Implementation Command (Kolakops) was abolished and its functions were handed over to the sub-regional command (Korem). Combat operations are not the standard responsibility of territorial commands.⁵² The Combat Sectors A and B in East Timor were transferred to the Sub-regional Command 164 and ABRI continued to deploy large numbers of combat troops. Precise information on troop deployments is available from 1998, due to the availability of secret military documents that were passed out of Timor-Leste.⁵³ It is clear from these documents that combat troops were extensively deployed; five infantry combat battalions, as well as several special duty contingents, were in Timor-Leste in August 1998. In addition, Special Forces Command (Kopassus) training units were present, evidence that Timor-Leste was used as a training ground for ABRI's elite troops.⁵⁴

59. Between the time Operations Implementation Command in East Timor was abolished in 1993 and 1999 the Indonesian Armed Forces continued to deploy the Army Strategic Reserve Command (Kostrad) and the Special Forces Command (Kopassus) as well as infantry and other units from outside Timor-Leste. From 1993 until 1997, on average there were six external battalions posted in Timor-Leste at any one time. The Commission's data show that only one Army Strategic Reserve Command battalion was deployed in Timor-Leste at any given time. In 1995 ABRI began special deployments of strategic troops to Timor-Leste. The first contingent of these troops, code-named Rajawali (Hawk),[†] was deployed to the combat sectors under Sub-regional Command 164 in October 1995.⁵⁵ They were primarily drawn from the Strategic Reserve Command, and troops apparently served 12-month tours of duty. In late 1998 troops from the intelligence and counter-terrorism units of the Special Forces Command were deployed. These troops were attached to the Intelligence Task Force (popularly referred to by its previous title SGI). In 1998 the total number of external battalions present in Timor-Leste increased to at least 12.⁵⁶

Martial Law Military Command in East Timor, September 1999

60. In the violent aftermath of the Popular Consultation, and under intense international pressure to allow an external peacekeeping force into East Timor, General Wiranto sent a letter to President B J Habibie on 6 September 1999 about the "continual development of the situation in East Timor and policy recommendations to handle it".⁵⁷ Wiranto explained that security had deteriorated, becoming "brutal and anarchistic and had led to the loss of lives and property." Among the reasons he cites are the "disappointment of the pro-integration groups caused by the impartiality of Unamet" as well as the "misconception on the part of pro-integration groups who believe they can change the result of the referendum by force". International pressure prompted President B J Habibie to act on this letter, signing Presidential Decree Number 107 1999 that declared martial law in East Timor beginning at midnight on 7 September 1999.

^{*} The ratio of Brimob troops to civilians in Indonesia is 1:20,000 (Lowry, p. 94); in East Timor, this was around 1:700 (based on 1,013 Brimob in 1998; 1990 census 747,557).

[†] Distinct from Kopassus Rajawali.

61. Following the declaration of martial law, General Wiranto issued a Commander's Directive outlining the establishment of a Martial Law Authority Command in East Timor (*Komando Penguasa Darurat Militer Timor Timur*) as of midnight on 7 September 1999.⁵⁸ The stated objectives of this command were to return security in East Timor in the fastest possible time, to give security assurances so that the results of the Popular Consultation could be acted on and to maintain the credibility of the Government of the Republic of Indonesia, including that of the Armed Forces of Indonesia and the National Police.

62. Major-General Kiki Syahnakri was appointed martial law commander. He and other newly-appointed senior officers, several of whom were Special Forces Command officers,^{*} had served in East Timor during the 1990s and some had held command positions in the lead-up to the Popular Consultation. Thus a predominately Special Forces Command (Kopassus) leadership commanded Strategic Reserve Command troops during the martial law period. Wiranto may have wanted Special Forces Command officers in command positions to lessen the blow to Special Forces personnel who had played a primary role in organising the militia and to prevent inter-corps tensions from developing. The most egregious human rights violations of 1999 occurred during this period of martial law.

Martial law command liquidated: Indonesian Task Force for East Timor

63. The UN and key member states put Indonesia on notice that it had limited time to prove that martial law was effectively restoring law and order (see Part 3: The History of the Conflict). When it became obvious that this was not the case, President Habibie succumbed to this pressure and requested UN assistance. The Security Council passed Resolution 1264 on 15 September 1999, and Interfet, with full Chapter VII powers, was deployed on 20 September to restore peace. On or soon after 23 September 1999, President B J Habibie ended martial law in East Timor.⁵⁹ The Martial Law Operations Command in East Timor was liquidated and a new security command named the Indonesian Task Force for East Timor (*Satuan Tugas Indonesia di Timor Timur*) was established. The head of this task force was Police Brigadier-General J D Sitorus, the commander was Colonel Sahala Silalahi and the deputy commander was Colonel Suryo Prabowo. The Indonesian Task Force for East Timor was intended to coordinate with the incoming Interfet.

^{*} Those who had served in Timor-Leste were Kiki Syahnakri, Amirul Isnaeni, Gerhan Lentara, and those from Special Forces Command were Amirul Isnaeni, probably Liliek Koeshardinato and Irwan Kusnadi.

4.3 Militarisation of East Timorese society^{*}

Introduction

64. Over the course of the Indonesian occupation, East Timorese society underwent extensive militarisation. Although the extent and intensity of militarisation varied over the 24-year occupation, overall it was pervasive and had a profound impact on the lives of all East Timorese people.

65. Soon after the Carnation Revolution of 25 April 1974, the Indonesian military increased its intelligence focus on Timor-Leste with the aim of supporting the pro-integration Apodeti party. By the end of 1974, it was running covert operations in the territory (see Part 3: The History of the Conflict), and was arming and providing military training to Apodeti members in West Timor.⁶⁰ Indonesian military intelligence was the chief architect of the takeover of Timor-Leste. It conducted a diplomatic campaign to assert Indonesia's status as a concerned party that ultimately led Indonesia to the decision to invade Timor-Leste in October 1975.

66. Intelligence operations were a major part of Indonesian military operations throughout different periods of the conflict. Beginning with the covert operations of 1974-75, through the early years of the occupation of the main towns, and subsequently during the mass surrenders and resettlement of civilians in 1977-78, intelligence figured prominently (see section on, The Indonesian armed forces and their role in Timor-Leste, above; Part 3: The History of the Conflict). After the mass surrenders, the Resistance changed its strategy and began to develop clandestine networks where the civilian population had settled. Indonesian intelligence used East Timorese spies to try to break these networks, destroying the sense of trust and social cohesion in East Timorese communities.

67. Indonesia invaded Timor-Leste with the assistance of what it termed Partisans, members of Apodeti, UDT and other parties who had fled to West Timor from mid-1974. The Partisans established a precedent for the Indonesian military's use of East Timorese proxies. During the full-scale war that ensued in the late 1970s, Indonesia developed East Timorese battalions and paramilitary groups. It also mobilised civil defence forces and pressed men and boys into providing logistics support for combat troops. In the early 1980s, the Indonesian military forced massive numbers of civilians to march across the island to flush out the remaining resistance forces (see Part 3: The History of the Conflict).

68. The state structure that Indonesia imposed on East Timor was itself heavily militarised. This derived from the extensive involvement of the armed forces in Indonesian politics and the economy during President Soeharto's New Order regime (see section on, The Indonesian armed forces and their role in Timor-Leste and Civil administration, above). In East Timor, the Indonesian military had an even more pervasive role than in New Order Indonesia. It was directly involved in establishing the province of East Timor and thereafter dominated its administration (see section on Civil administration below). Throughout Indonesia's occupation of Timor-Leste, the province was a conflict zone, varying from full-scale war in the early years to a low-level conflict during much of the 1980s and 1990s. East Timor represented the extreme compared to other provinces of Indonesia where the armed forces were engaged in conflicts. Unlike those provinces, East Timor became part of Indonesia only through invasion, annexation and occupation. It was therefore distinct from Indonesia, and the armed forces had to adopt different

^{*} This section discusses the various types of paramilitary forces deployed in Timor-Leste by the Indonesian military. In this section the term "civil defence force" is used to describe Hansip, Ratih, Wanra and others., groups comprising East Timorese recruited by the Indonesian armed forces; the term "paramilitary" is used to refer to the East Timorese auxiliary units established by ABRI throughout the occupation and the term "militia" is used to refer to the groups that were established in the period leading up to the referendum in 1999. "Auxiliary forces" is an umbrella term used to describe these various groupings collectively.

methods to subjugate it.⁶⁰ In addition, East Timor was an external acquisition. For these reasons East Timor was categorically distinct from Indonesia. This was the context for the heavy militarisation of East Timor by the Indonesian authorities.

69. In the 1990s East Timorese youth became more open in their willingness to protest the Indonesian occupation. The primary response to this was a shift in military strategy from waging war against Falintil to an intelligence war against the growing clandestine resistance.

70. The scout movement, martial arts groups and student bodies in schools and at universities aimed to instil discipline and loyalty to Indonesia into East Timorese youth. Indonesia placed great emphasis on its national ideology (*Pancasila*) and the performance of nationalist rituals through military-style ceremonies and events to celebrate national days.

71. While these activities may have had an insidious militaristic quality, the recruitment of East Timorese youth in the mid-1990s to form paramilitary groups was brutal. These groups, under the protection of the Special Forces Command (Kopassus) conducted organised crime activities by day and disappearances of independence supporters by night. These youth groups were forerunners to the militias that were rapidly developed by ABRI/TNI in 1998-99. As in 1974-75, the Indonesian military again used East Timorese to give non-Timorese troops “plausible deniability” for their role in the violence. Nevertheless, in 1999 it was clear that the militias were an extension of the TNI.

Pre-Indonesian militarisation of Timor-Leste

72. Timor-Leste is a mountainous country that was historically divided into regional kingdoms. Most traditional regional kings (*liurai*) maintained armies of local men, who, from time to time, would fight armies in neighbouring kingdoms.⁶¹ In its dealings with Timorese kings, Portugal used a strategy of divide-and-rule, often using the armed forces of “friendly” kings to crush the dissent of others (see Part 3: The History of the Conflict). This pattern where Timorese kings were used by an outside power as intermediaries to raise forces in defence of that power was replicated by Indonesia in its covert activity in 1974-75 and in the subsequent years of occupation.

73. The Second World War first brought Australian and British troops to neutral Portuguese Timor and then Japanese occupation forces. Many East Timorese took great risks to assist the small numbers of Australian troops in their guerrilla activities, while others sided with the Japanese or were caught between the warring international forces. Over 40,000 East Timorese civilians are reported to have died during the Japanese occupation, and the war left deep divisions.⁶²

74. When Portugal returned after the Second World War, it maintained a professional armed force, comprising Portuguese soldiers and recruits from Portugal’s African colonies. The police were technically part of these armed forces. East Timorese were also recruited to the armed forces, though few held positions above the lower ranks. There was not much resistance to the Portuguese colonial authority during these years that were dominated by Salazar’s authoritarian regime. The Portuguese secret police, PIDE, monitored all signs of opposition among the East Timorese and had a fearful reputation.⁶³ This suppressed freedom of expression, the ability to form political associations and to have political debate. Compared to the subsequent experience under Indonesia, the impact of the armed forces on society was minimal.

75. When the Armed Forces Movement (MFA) took power in Lisbon on 25 April 1974, East Timorese quickly formed political parties (see Part 3: The History of the Conflict). The Commission heard testimony from leaders of the two major parties, Fretilin and UDT, who said

⁶⁰ The Commission notes that parallels exist with other conflict zones within Indonesia, such as West Papua and Aceh.

they used force and violence in their campaigning and efforts to gain influence in the community.⁶⁴ When UDT took power on 11 August 1975, it did so with guns from the police force. When Fretilin responded the decisive factor in its victory was the support from East Timorese members of the Portuguese armed forces and their weapons. Both UDT and Fretilin indiscriminately distributed guns to their civilian members, greatly increasing the scale of violence during the internal conflict.⁶⁵ Although the internal armed conflict was relatively brief, it intensified existing divisions and created new ones that scarred East Timorese society throughout the years of the Indonesian occupation. These divisions were manipulated by the Indonesian military in its efforts to crush the Resistance that included strategies of militarising East Timorese society.

Indonesian militarisation of East Timorese political parties before the occupation

76. The Commission heard testimony from Tomás Gonçalves, the son of Apodeti leader Guilherme Gonçalves, the king of Atsabe (Ermera), about how the Indonesian military employed a strategy of arming and training young men associated with the party from late-1974.⁶⁶ ABRI named this group the Partisans. In October 1974, Tomás Gonçalves travelled to Jakarta and met with senior Indonesian military figures. This was not long after Indonesian Foreign Minister Adam Malik had met with the Fretilin representative for foreign affairs José Ramos-Horta and assured him that Indonesia respected Timor-Leste's right to self-determination and independence. ABRI began to build its strategy of preparing East Timorese armed auxiliaries at a time when Portugal was attempting to conduct an orderly decolonisation process.

77. When Tomás Gonçalves returned in November 1974, 216 young men from the Atsabe (Ermera) area were mobilised and sent to West Timor where they received basic military training and weapons from ABRI operatives, including members of the Special Forces Command (Kopassandha).⁶⁷ At least some of these men were forced to participate by Apodeti leaders.⁶⁸ Tomás Gonçalves stated to the UN-supported Serious Crimes Unit in Timor-Leste:

I was appointed supreme commander of the Partisans on 2 December 1974. There was a supreme commander, myself, then there were two company commanders, eight platoon commanders, and 16 team commanders. There were 216 combatants in all. I was under the command of Yunus [Yosfiah of the Susi Team, a Special Forces command that was part of Indonesia's Operasi Flamboyan].⁶⁹

78. Around 50 Partisans were attached to each of the three Special Forces teams - Susi, Umi and Tuti - and deployed in home areas.⁷⁰ After the 11 August 1975 attempted coup by UDT, ABRI, with members of these Partisan forces, began cross-border raids from West Timor. The three teams conducted further cross-border raids in mid-September, again with limited success.⁷¹ These raids included the forced recruitment of East Timorese men to serve with the Partisans⁷² and a number of killings.⁷³

79. Following defeat in the civil war, UDT's armed forces and supporters retreated to the border and by the end of September to West Timor. According to UDT military leader, João Carrascalão, more than 500 of the 3,000 UDT troops who crossed the border were armed.⁷⁴ They were absorbed into the Partisan force. Further ABRI cross-border raids in mid-October involved larger numbers of Partisans and were better supported by naval artillery, enabling the capture of Batugade, Balibo (Bobonaro) and other border towns.⁷⁵ According to Tomás Gonçalves, the attack included 216 Apodeti Partisans, 450 Indonesian troops and 350 men under the control of João Tavares.⁷⁶ This last group was known as Halilintar. The Halilintar re-emerged in 1994 with the mission of suppressing the growing clandestine movement in Bobonaro District and went on to become one of the leading militia groups in 1998-99. In addition to providing valuable local knowledge of Portuguese Timor to Indonesian commando units, the Partisans were a vital part of

Operasi Flamboyan's continuing strategy of "plausible deniability". ABRI developed the myth that Indonesian soldiers involved in these operations were merely volunteers helping East Timorese return to take control of their homeland.⁷⁷ However, Tomás Gonçalves told the Commission that the planning and implementation of operations were led by members of the Indonesian military, with East Timorese Partisans used as support troops, guides and sources of intelligence.⁷⁸

80. It seems that selected Partisans took part in the invasion of Dili,⁷⁹ and others were involved in the landing at Baucau three days later. After the invasion, Partisans participated in attacks further inland. While generally ABRI reorganised its use of East Timorese auxiliaries, some Partisan units were maintained throughout the duration of the occupation, such as a group in Ermera that in 1999 numbered around 130.⁸⁰

Establishment of East Timorese combat battalions

81. In 1976 ABRI began providing formal military training to East Timorese when it sent 60 Partisans to Java. In June 1977 400 more East Timorese, some of whom had previously served as Partisans, followed. On 1 October 1977 these men graduated with the rank of private, and on 24 January 1978, the East Timor military commander, Colonel Dading Kalbuadi, formally established Infantry Battalion 744/Satya Yudha Bhakti. The new battalion of 460 troops was divided into four companies under the overall command of Major Yunus Yosfiah.⁸¹ In early 1978 these troops were given "raiders" training in Tacitolu, west of the Dili airport, and then declared ready for combat. A second group of more than 500 East Timorese recruits was trained in 1978. They formed Battalion 745/Sampada Yudha Bhakti which was inaugurated in September 1978 under Major Theo Syafei. Plans for a third battalion, 746, were dropped after the new recruits were deemed unacceptable.⁸²

82. The battalions were intended to be entirely manned by East Timorese. However, this goal was never realised. Among the East Timorese soldiers were Indonesian infantry and Special Forces troops, and the officers down to platoon level were Indonesian.⁸³ The two battalions were part of the permanent territorial Regional Military Command (Korem) structure in East Timor during the occupation, and were used extensively in combat operations as well as for internal security duties. They developed a reputation for brutality. The former Partisan, Tomás Gonçalves, described Battalion 744 in its early days:

*The Partisans only became evil after [Battalion] 744 was formed by Yunus [Yosfiah], and they became 744 members. 744 comprised Javanese commandos, and all sorts. The whole time Yunus was the commander of 744 there were extrajudicial killings going on constantly, massacres.*⁸⁴

83. ABRI also recruited East Timorese into the regular territorial structure. Some had formerly served in the Portuguese colonial army. Others were former members of civil defence forces (Hansip) who had been recruited into ABRI through the three month military training programme (see section on Milsas below). By July 1998 there were 6,097 East Timorese serving in ABRI, of whom 5,510 were in the army and 569 in the police. The chances of East Timorese becoming officers or non-commissioned officers were far less than those of Indonesians. The data show that in July 1998 only 0.4% of East Timorese serving in the Indonesian armed forces were officers and less than 24% were non-commissioned officers, while 76% were privates. The breakdown for Indonesians in the 17,834 armed forces in East Timor at the time was very different: 5.6% were officers, 34.1% were non-commissioned officers and just 60.4% were privates.⁸⁵

Early paramilitaries, 1976-81

84. From the outset the Indonesian armed forces aimed to bring Timorese into the conflict in Timor-Leste. It recruited East Timorese members into the armed forces and used East Timorese paramilitary groups to conduct covert operations. During the late 1970s the Indonesian military mobilised East Timorese specifically to fight against Fretilin/Falintil. The paramilitaries had a different role from that of the Partisans who had been treated more like porters or combat support personnel than as frontline troops. It also differed from the civil defence forces that did not normally play a frontline combat role. The paramilitaries established in the late 1970s and 1980s were generally closely linked to the Special Warfare Command (Kopassandha).

85. One of the first paramilitary forces was formed in September 1976 when Major-General Benny Moerdani personally granted the Special Warfare Command captain, A M Hendropriyono, permission to form a special platoon of East Timorese (Peleton Khusus, Tonsus) in Manatuto. The unit was recruited from an initial Apodeti core in Laclubar (Manatuto) and led by ex-Falintil member João Branco.^{*} It quickly expanded beyond platoon size. Tonsus was well-armed and assigned East Timorese to special combat operations in the central sector.⁸⁶ Tonsus was a successful initiative that recognised East Timorese as equals rather than as inferiors. Despite its successes, the unit lapsed in 1978, and ABRI resumed using East Timorese as auxiliary personnel such as logistical assistants rather than as front-line combatants.⁸⁷

86. ABRI recruited East Timorese for several other teams during the late 1970s. One group, called Nuclear Team (Tim Nuklir) operated in Moro (Lautém) under the command of Sub-district administrator, Edmundo da Conceição da Silva.⁸⁸ Ex-partisan members known as regional military command volunteers or Skadam (Sukarelawan Kodam) were involved in the assault on Mount Kablaki in June 1977. Their title seems to imply that they were formally incorporated into the ABRI structure.⁸⁹

Paramilitaries in the 1980s

87. In 1979 ABRI established the Wild Team Tim Morok under the command of Filomeno Lopes in Manatuto.⁹⁰ Comprising former Apodeti and UDT members, the Morok Team operated in Manatuto throughout the 1980s. A second team, called the Asahan Team, was established in 1980 by the intelligence section of the Manatuto District Military Command. It was placed under the leadership of Domingos (“Apai”) da Silva and Antonio Doutel Sarmento, but functioned for only a year.⁹¹ In 1981, at the time of Operation Security (*Operasi Keamanan*), a third team called *Alap-alap* was formed and used primarily to back up combat troops.⁹²

88. In the 1980s ABRI established a number of more highly trained paramilitaries. One of the first was Lightning Team (Tim Railakan) formed in about 1980 or 1981 under the command of an ABRI private, Julião Fraga, an East Timorese from Quelicai (Baucau) and operating in Baucau.⁹³ The Lightning Team engaged in a variety of tasks such as the arrest, interrogation and torture of suspected clandestine members and taking part in operations to search out Falintil. Around 1983 the group was renamed the Saka (Satuan Khusus Pusaka, Heirloom Special Unit) Team. Julião Fraga continued to command the renamed group until his assassination in Baucau in 1995. The Lightning/Saka Team was occasionally seen working directly with Kopassus⁹⁴ and regularly acted as an intermediary in conducting arrests for the Sub-district Military Command (Koramil).⁹⁵ At about the same time as the Lightning Team was renamed Saka Team in 1985, a sister paramilitary group called Sera Team was established in Baucau. Under the command of a former Falintil leader named Sera Malik, the Sera Team operated primarily in the Baucau-Vemassee-Venilale area. Alfa Team, yet another paramilitary squad from this period, was

^{*} Tomás Gonçalves (interviewed by SCU on 8 August 2000) described João Branco's men being trained in Dili. [CAVR Community Profile of Pairara, Moro (Lautém), 28 March 2003].

established in Lautém by the Special Forces Command (Kopassus) captain, Luhut Panjaitan, probably in 1986.⁹⁶

89. The paramilitary groups served a number of purposes, such as participating in offensives and operations. A deponent told the Commission:

Major Sinaga formed Parrot Team [Tim Lorico] in the village of Oestico Loilubo [Vemasse, Baucau] from former Falintil. He used them for jungle operations, and after they found a Falintil place ABRI troops would go in and shoot...After Sinaga left Timor-Leste, the members of Tim Lorico disappeared one by one.⁹⁷

90. The paramilitary groups also had functions that reflected their proximity to the Special Forces Command (Kopassus), such as covert operations and functioning as intelligence agents. These teams established the tradition of close relations between ABRI, specifically the Special Forces, and East Timorese paramilitary units. In the case of key individuals these relations were often sustained throughout the years of the conflict.⁹⁸

Civil defence forces

91. One of the ideological cornerstones of the Indonesian military is the concept of Total People's Defense and Security System (Sistem Pertahanan Keamanan Rakyat Semesta, abbreviated Sishankamrata), according to which all civilians have a role to play in national defense. In theory, Indonesian civilians may be selected to undergo basic military training, after which they are referred to as Trained Civilians (Rakyat Terlatih, Ratih). Further selections may be made from the ranks of the Ratih to form (a) the Civil Defense Force (Pertahanan Sipil, Hansip), responsible for protecting civilians in case of natural disaster or war, (b) the People's Security Force (Keamanan Rakyat, Kamra), which is responsible for assisting the police, and (c) the People's Resistance Force (Perlawanan Rakyat, Wanra), responsible for assisting the armed forces.[†] Although all of these categories are theoretically under the administration of the Department of the Interior (Departemen Dalam Negeri, Depdagri), in East Timor these groups operated directly under Indonesian military command and control.⁹⁹

92. The recruitment of East Timorese civilians into civil defence forces in East Timor during the conflict is an example of how ABRI adapted its standard territorial security role, but also in combat, surveillance and intelligence roles. In Indonesia, the Department of the Interior administers the civil defence forces, but in the early years of the conflict in East Timor civil defence forces were directly under Indonesian military command and control; it was only in the 1980s that responsibility passed to the Department of Home Affairs.¹⁰⁰

93. The widespread use of East Timorese civil defence forces had a dramatic impact on the East Timorese, bringing the conflict and the military into peoples' daily lives. Based in communities, members of civil defence forces were used as a link between the civilian population and the military. Intelligence gathering was a pervasive activity, and civil defence force members, either with members of the Indonesian military or on their own, were often involved in direct violations of civilians' rights. Protected by ABRI, they enjoyed some impunity for their actions. The Commission took many statements and heard many testimonies of the violence committed by other community members who were members of the military's civil defence forces (see Chapter

^{*} This concept is derived from the guerrilla strategy employed during the Indonesian revolution.

[†] For an overview of this system, see secret document Komando Resor Militer 164 Wira Dharma, Seksi-Intel, "Rencana Penyusunan Kembali Rakyat Terlatih," signed by Major Willem da Costa, dated 10 September, 1982, p. 2; and Robert Lowry, *The Armed Forces of Indonesia* (St. Leonards, NSW: Allen and Unwin, 1996), p. 111.

7.7: Sexual Violence, Chapter 7.2: Unlawful Killings and Enforced Disappearances, and Chapter 7.4: Detention, Torture and Ill-Treatment respectively).

94. The first East Timorese Hansip (Civil Defence) units were established during the second half of 1976, not long after Indonesia's act of integration in July 1976.¹⁰¹ By mid-1978 there were 5,897 Hansip in East Timor: numbers varied across the territory, with the largest numbers in Baucau (700) and Ainaro (665), and the fewest in Lautém (187).¹⁰² Hansip were regularly used as combat support personnel, a role typically filled elsewhere in Indonesia by Wanra units (Perlawanan Rakyat, People's Resistance). In Indonesia, the Civil Defense forces (Hansip) were an established institution whose members were salaried and so had some longevity of service, whereas Wanra members did not receive a salary. However, the distinction between Hansip and Wanra in East Timor was not always clear. This is either due to the military using Hansip in the capacity of Wanra, or because sometime between 1978 and 1980 Hansip were reclassified as Wanra. The two fulfilled essentially the same role. By 1980 the number of what by then were officially called Wanra reached 6,500, but two years later had decreased to 4,800.¹⁰³

95. The Trained Civilians force (Rakyat Terlatih, Ratih) was first established in East Timor in 1981 to assist in Operation Security (*Operasi Keamanan*). By the following year there were 6,000 members.¹⁰⁴ This rapid expansion coincided with a plan to convert Hansip/Wanra into Ratih, possibly to save money as Ratih were unpaid. A People's Security Force (Keamanan Rakyat, Kamra) was established by the Indonesian police in early 1981 and by 1982 numbered 1,690.¹⁰⁵ In sum, by 1982 nearly 12,500 East Timorese were involved in the various civil defence organisations. Although it is difficult to make a definitive statement without knowing exact population figures for Timor-Leste in 1982, this figure is roughly 2.25% of the population, higher than the national rate of around 2%.[†]

96. During 1981-82 the military command in East Timor demoted many Hansip members to Ratih status. At the time ABRI stated its goal as:

[D]eveloping a consciousness among the Timorese people of the need to defend the state, towards developing the realisation by every single citizen that he/she has the right and duty to take part without reserve in the defence of the state.¹⁰⁶

97. ABRI had trouble controlling its civil defence forces. In 1983, partly as a consequence of poor treatment, and possibly in response to losing their jobs as part of a 1982 downsizing plan,¹⁰⁷ many Hansip members defected to Falintil.¹⁰⁸

98. Civil defence units functioned within the already extensive territorial military structure, which at the village level included the Village Guidance Non-Commissioned Officer (Babinsa), a Village Guidance Policeman (Binpolda), and sometimes a platoon of Battalion 744 or 745 troops. ABRI put great effort into recruitment of civil defence units. Some members joined willingly; others under coercion.¹⁰⁹ Civil defence unit members generally received a short period of training from the local territorial command (Kodim or Koramil), and once trained they fulfilled a combat support role to ABRI and its paramilitaries:

[†] This calculation is based on Indonesia's 1981 census that calculated the population of Timor-Leste as 555,350. See *Timor Timur dalam Angka, 1981 [East Timor in Figures, 1981]*, Statistics Office, East Timor Province, p. 25.

[†] This figure is based on a 4million-strong civil defence force in a population of 200 million in 1992. See Robert Lowry, *The Armed Forces of Indonesia*, p. 112.

The function and task of the militia are to patrol, to block the trails used by the enemy when on the move (this can be executed on their own or together with Marine Troops 5). The functions and tasks of the Hansip are to guard certain TNI posts (at night), to act as guides on patrols, or to undertake combat support activities for the militia.¹¹⁰

99. In most cases Hansip were expected to take orders from the local Indonesian military command.¹¹¹ The Commission found that civil defence forces were implicated in a large number of violations during military operations.

“Three-month military men”, *Milsas* 1989-92

100. It appears that after taking control of the Hansip from ABRI in the early 1980s, by 1989 the Department of Home Affairs was unwilling to provide sufficient budgetary resources to maintain the Hansip and a group of reserves known as Societal Protection who were trained for disaster and emergency services (*Perlindungan Masyarakat, Linmas*). At the time, ABRI was struggling to attain its planned quota of 3.5% of the national population as civil defence members.¹¹² As membership of civil defence units in East Timor exceeded the national average, a cost-saving measure is a likely reason for this reduction.¹¹³ As a result the Department of the Interior decided to transfer many of the Hansip into the army. This programme was called *Milsas*, an abbreviation from *militerisasi*, or as “three-month military training”. In 2000, the Indonesian Human Rights Commission noted that:

Milsas - which senior military officials in Jakarta often referred to as regional sons of the TNI - functioned only in East Timor to assist TNI East Timor operations.¹¹⁴

101. In 1989, ABRI sent approximately 1,000 former Hansip to Malang (East Java) and Bali to attend three-month training courses. On completion of the course, the former Hansip became ABRI personnel and returned to East Timor where most were posted in the District Military Commands (Kodim). In 1992, a second group of 1000 former Hansip were selected and sent to Java and Bali for training. José Sales dos Santos explained:

*I was militarised in the second wave, with 1,000 Hansips from all districts. 700 were sent to train in Malang and 300 were sent to train in Bali. After three months, each returned for duty in his own Kodim.*¹¹⁵

102. Between 1989 and August 1991 the “milsas” programme led to a 50% reduction in the total number of civil defence forces, counting members of Hansip, the People’s Security force (Kamra) and People’s Resistance (Wanra) from 4,996 to 2,475.¹¹⁶

Operations assistants (TBOs)

103. The Indonesian military forced large numbers of East Timorese civilians to serve as porters, guides, cooks and personal assistants for the army, particularly during the period of intensive operations in the late 1970s and early 1980s. A military document from 1982 states that 60,000 East Timorese were involved as support personnel.¹¹⁷ These were designated as operations assistants (*Tenaga Bantuan Operasi, TBO*). Many people were recruited as TBO during the 1981 operation known as the “fence of legs” (*Operation Kikis*) (see Part 3: History of

¹¹⁰ The CAVR human rights violations database (HRVD) lists 784 acts perpetrated by Hansip from 1975-79. See in particular Chapter 7.7: Sexual Violence and Chapter 7.4: Detention, Torture and Ill-Treatment.

the Conflict and Chapter 7.3: Forced Displacement and Famine). One account describes the force used in recruitment:

In 1979 Francisco Amaral was visited by three Hansip and taken to Uatu-Lari...he was interrogated by [members of] the Sub-district administration and Battalion 202 about where [Fretilin] equipment was hidden, which he didn't know...he was beaten until he urinated and defecated and blood came out of his mouth and nose. After that a Marine company took him as an operations assistant [TBO].¹¹⁸

104. Many young people were taken as operations assistants (TBOs). They would be attached to a unit for variable periods of time, sometimes the duration of an operation, although sometimes much longer. The Catholic Apostolic Administrator, Dom Martinho da Costa Lopes, noted that this forced recruitment had disastrous consequences for ordinary rural people who were taken away from their fields at planting time. A 1978 police report offered a frank assessment of the social consequences of forced recruitment:

During Operasi Gempur in the central sector recently, people were forced to become TBOs. Implementing this caused anxiety among the people, primarily in Dili, which became quiet at night (because) parents became worried that their children will be taken by ABRI. Educational activities at school and scouting activities are somewhat interrupted temporarily.¹¹⁹

105. Chapter 7.8 on The Rights of the Child details the experiences of East Timorese children and youth taken as operations assistants by the Indonesian military. Many were subjected to combat conditions and gruelling forced marches carrying heavy military equipment, and were required to live in military camps with adult soldiers. Alfredo Alves recalled his experiences when he was taken from his mother as an 11-year-old operations assistant (TBO), and the intimidation and violence committed by Indonesian soldiers against his young East Timorese peer:

One day one of the TBOs who was carrying a heavy load, refused to accept more weight to his load. The soldier became angry. When they arrived back at base camp, all the soldiers in the platoon and the TBOs were gathered together. The commander said that a TBO is not allowed to refuse to carry something. He said the army had come to help and to bring independence. After that, the TBO who had refused to carry the goods was called and before everyone's eyes he was shot dead. They told us that if we refused to comply, our fate would be the same as his.¹²⁰

"Intel"—East Timorese spies

106. Throughout the course of the conflict military intelligence units employed East Timorese spies and informants to gather information. ABRI's first use of East Timorese in an intelligence capacity pre-dated the invasion of East Timor, when it relied on Partisan troops to provide local intelligence, and to serve as guides during early incursions into Timor-Leste. According to Tomás Gonçalves, the Partisans were questioned about geographic and political information about Portuguese Timor:

There, they [the Indonesians] did not communicate with us. They called us the Partisans, and the Partisans did not communicate with them...When they called me over they asked me, "More or less how many guns do they have in Timor? How many companies are there? Over there do many people know how to use guns? Do they know how to be guerrilla fighters?"¹²¹

107. Later, when mass numbers of civilians surrendered and were held by ABRI in detention camps and resettlement villages, ABRI's priority was to keep them separated from the remaining Falintil. However, ABRI needed intelligence sources to know who was close to the guerrilla forces. In late 1981 and January 1982, Sub-regional Military Command (Korem) 164 Commander Colonel Sahala Radjagukguk issued a series of orders concerning territorial operations and intelligence, the role of Babinsa, and urban security, including resettlement areas.¹²² These orders indicate that the military recognised that strong resistance remained among the civilian population. There was a need to focus on destroying the linkages to and support for the armed Resistance. To achieve this the documents set out goals such as building a society in which security forces were implanted deeply within each community, observing and relying on East Timorese informants to create a powerful intelligence operation capable of controlling the civilian population and limiting contact with Falintil. An example was an organisation formed in Quelicai (Baucau):

At that time [1981] there was an organisation called "Siliman" [Siguranca Sipil Masyarakat], formed by TNI-Koramil, with a goal of spying. The members were residents of Quelicai. Amongst them were [names listed]...The organisation often observed the movements of the deponent and if they were seen would report them to Koramil.¹²³

108. In the early 1980s, following the major surrenders of 1978-79, a significant number of Timor-Leste's population was forced into resettlement camps. Structurally, ABRI designed civil defence posts to be situated in surrounding cities and towns. The civil defence troops were expected to fulfil an intermediary role between the people and the military, typically represented at village level by a Babinsa or Village Guidance Team (*Tim Pembina Desa*). Their tasks included carrying out duties assigned by the military as well as monitoring their fellow citizens. In support, members of Trained Civilians (Ratih) would provide internal security:

Civilian males armed with spears and machetes can, in case of danger, be gathered in one place in their village [within the town].¹²⁴

109. This came during a period when ABRI wished to use more East Timorese as security/defence auxiliaries, aiming to bring East Timor closer in line with ABRI's doctrine of "Total People's Defence." A military document from February 1982 discussed the ideal:

With security taking hold [ABRI gaining control], SATPUR (combat units) would decrease in size while the role of civil defence (HANSIP-WANKAMRA) would increase and would even play the most important role in defending and securing their territories from the remaining GPK and extremists.¹²⁵

¹²¹ The presence of Babinsa posts in every village in East Timor was a far higher coverage than what was normal in Indonesia and reflected the goal of the Indonesian military of achieving tight control over East Timor's population.

110. East Timorese were recruited to work as informants in a number of ways. Some willingly offered to help the intelligence units, others were offered bribes, and still others recruited by force of threat. The military often sought to “turn” clandestine members and former Falintil guerrillas to work for the Intelligence Task Force (*Satuan Tugas Intelijen*).

111. Towards the end of the 1980s as the Resistance developed a clandestine movement in the towns and cities, ABRI needed a strong local intelligence capacity in order to control this growing network. From this point, ABRI’s strategy changed from focusing on the guerrilla insurgency to trying to dismantle the growing clandestine resistance. Each of the territorial units (e.g. Regional, District and Sub-district Commands) contained intelligence personnel and each recruited its own network of informants. The most notorious intelligence unit was the Intelligence Task Force (SGI, *Satuan Tugas Intelijen*).^{*} This unit was first established under the East Timor Regional Defence and Security Command (*Kodahankam*) in 1976 and later transferred to successor command structures.^{†126} Formally under the control of the Regional Military Command (Korem), by the mid-1990s Special Forces Command (Kopassus) had extensive control over the Intelligence Task Force.¹²⁷

112. East Timorese referred to intelligence informants and spies as *mauhu*, “*mau*” being a male and “*hu*” meaning to blow. This system of intelligence informants and spies played a large role in creating suspicion among East Timorese. It enabled the military to penetrate the Resistance, as well as enabling it to plant rumours and misinformation. Many East Timorese were forced to play a dangerous double game, and were continually at risk of being suspected by either side. There were large numbers of East Timorese spies and their prevalence meant that civilians rarely knew who was *mauhu* and who was not, who to avoid and who could be trusted. The pervasiveness of the system sowed deep suspicion among the East Timorese population, and social bonds and cohesiveness were casualties of this undercover element of the conflict.

1990s and a focus on youth

113. By the late 1980s, young East Timorese had emerged as an important new element of the clandestine urban resistance movement. This was especially troublesome for the Indonesian regime that had invested its hopes in the new generation of East Timorese who had been educated within the Indonesian system.

114. In the late 1970s and early 1980s, Indonesian police, then formally part of the military, fostered the Indonesian scout movement (*Pramuka*) to instill nationalist discipline among East Timorese young people. This programme included military-style training such as marching and drilling, providing assistance to the Indonesian Red Cross, and attendance at official ceremonies. By May 1978 there were nearly 10,000 participants, rising to 22,455 by 1981.¹²⁸ Youth martial arts groups were also formed and encouraged. Through public physical training and wearing uniforms such groups mimicked the behaviour of soldiers.

115. East Timorese tertiary students were also targeted by the Indonesian armed forces. By the 1990s East Timor had one university and one polytechnic college and a student regiment (*Resimen Mahasiswa, Menwa*) was established on those campuses. In common with student regiments in Indonesia, this was an avenue for ABRI to provide additional indoctrination to students.¹²⁹ In East Timor the student regiment became a means for ABRI to infiltrate student organisations and clandestine groups active on campus. East Timorese students who went to Java and Bali to study were obliged to join the official East Timorese student organisation,

^{*} The military normally abbreviated the full name *Satuan Tugas Intelijen* to *Satgas Intel*, but there are also military documents from 1992-93 in which it is abbreviated SGI. Most East Timorese, however, simply know the unit by the name SGI.

[†] In 1978 the Intelligence Task Force was transferred to *Operasi Seroja*; in 1979 it was transferred to Sub-regional Military Command 164; in 1984 to the Security Operations Command; and in 1990 it was transferred to the Operational Implementation Command (Kolakops).

Imppettu (*Ikatan Mahasiswa, Pemuda dan Pelajar Timor Timur*, The East Timorese Student and Youth Association).¹³⁰ Many East Timorese were under intelligence surveillance.

Death squads

116. In the early 1990s a new style of paramilitary force known as Ninja gangs emerged as a part of ABRI's efforts to control the growing urban clandestine resistance. These gangs operated at night dressed in black and wearing balaclavas.¹³¹ They were feared for their role in the growing number of disappearances of suspected Resistance members. Effectively they were death squads.

117. In 1995, a new group emerged called Young Guards Upholding Integration (*Gadapaksi*)[†]. It was essentially a continuation of the Ninja gangs, with a similar focus on targeting the clandestine Resistance. This had strong links to the Special Forces Command (Kopassus), and was founded by President Soeharto's son-in-law, Special Forces officer, Colonel Prabowo, in July 1995.¹³² Although the organisation was officially intended to assist Timorese youths in small-scale business ventures, members quickly developed a host of illegal or semi-legal smuggling, gambling, and protection rackets. In addition, it continued to target and harass the clandestine movement in the manner similar to the Ninja squads. The Young Guards developed rapidly; by early 1996 it had 1,100 members. In April 1996 it was announced that there were plans to add 1,200 members per year, and in May of that year, 600 members were sent to Java to receive training from the Special Forces Command.¹³³ Despite its public links to the Special Forces, two years after its establishment the head of the Young Guards (*Gadapaksi*), Marçal de Almeida lamented the fact that his organisation was reputed to be full of spies (*mauhu*). The emergence of the Young Guards coincided with the ascendancy of the Special Forces Command (Kopassus) over the Army Strategic Command (Kostrad) in East Timor. Along with dominance of the Special Forces came a shift towards psychological operations designed to infiltrate, intimidate and destroy the clandestine Resistance. The Young Guards was a front line element in this strategy. In 1995, the various paramilitaries in Timor-Leste received military training in Aileu conducted by the Special Forces Command. The Young Guards continued until it was replaced by a variety of militia groups in 1998-99.

Militias, 1998-99

118. Many of the militias which emerged in 1998-99 had roots in groups formed much earlier in the occupation period. Below is a chart of the history of Timorese militias, including the names of the Timorese leaders, by sector and district, founded from 1975-99.

Table 2 - Militias in Timor-Leste, 1975-99

Sector A: East				
Commander: Joánico Césarío Belo, East Timorese Special Forces Command (Kopassus) Sergeant				

District	Name	Leader in 1999	Date founded	Background/links
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^{*} The Ninja groups' behaviour was very similar to the *Petrus* "mysterious killings" in Java of the early 1980s, although they served a different purpose. Masterminded by General Moerdani, perpetrators of the *Petrus* "mysterious killings" targeted criminals and left their bodies on public display.

[†] Sometimes spelt Gardapaksi.

Lautém	Jati Merah Putih (True to Red White)	José da Conceição	1985	Team Alfa originally established by Special Forces in 1985; renamed JMP in 1999
Viqueque	Makikit (Eagle) 59/75 Junior/Naga Merah (Red Dragon)	Afonso Pinto (Lafaek) Alvaro de Jesus	1983 1999	Sponsored by Special Forces Roots in the 1959 Viqueque rebellion
Baucau	Saka Sera Forum Komunikasi Partisan (Partisan Communication Forum)	Joanico C. Belo (Special Forces) Sera Malik Antonio Monis	1983 1986 1999	Formed by Special Forces from ex-Falintil and earlier Baucau paramilitary, Railakan, 1959-75 Founded by Special Forces as with Saka Re-formed from old Partisan members of 1975
Manatuto	Mahadomi (Manatuto LovesIntegration) Morok (Wild)	Aleixo de Carvalho Filomeno Lopes da Cruz (April 1999: Thomás de Aquino Kalla)	1999 ca. 1995	Founder and advisor Vidal Doutel Sarmiento, District Administrator (Bupati) and member of Special Forces

Sector B: Central

Commander: Eurico Guterres, former leader of Youth Guards "ninja" group, Dili, early 1990s

District	Name	Leader in 1999	Date founded	Background/links
Dili	Aitarak (Thorn)	Eurico Guterres	1999	Dili-based Young Guards militia; early 1990s; trained by Special Forces
Liquiça	BMP (Red and White Iron)	Manuel de Sousa	27 Dec 1998	Direct military link - based at Maubara Sub-district Military Command (Koramil)
Ermera	DMI (Red Blood for Integration) Ramelau (name of a prominent mountain in the central sector) Naga Merah (Red Dragon) Pancasila (Five Basic Principles) Team	Miguel Babo Manuel de Sousa	April 1999	Partisan and People's Resistance (Wanra) heritage

Sector C: South-West

Commander: Cancio Lopes de Carvalho

District	Name	Leader in 1999	Date founded	Background/links
Ainaro	Mahidi (Live or Die for Indonesia)	Cancio Lopes de Carvalho	17 Dec 1998	Ainaro Military Commander
Manufahi	Ablai	Nazario Corte Real	27 Mar 1999	Special Forces links
Covalima	Laksaur (a kind of	Olivio Mendonça		District Administrator (Bupati)

	bird)	Moruk		and military commander of Covalima
Aileu	AHI (I Live for Integration)	Horacio Araújo	27 Mar 1999	Set up and supported by district administration

Sector D: West

Commander: João Tavares, former leader of Halilintar paramilitary, part of pre-invasion covert operations in 1975

District	Name	Leader in 1999	Date founded	Background/links
Bobonaro	Halilintar (Thunder) Dadurus Merah Putih (Red White Tornado); Guntur (Thunder); ARMUI (I Volunteer to Die for Integration); Kaer Metin Merah Putih (Hold Fast to Red White); Harimau Merah Putih (Red White Tiger); Saka Loromonu (Western Saka); Firmi Merah Putih (True Believer in Red White)	João Tavares Natalino Monteiro	1975; re-formed in 1994	Long-term military links through Halilintar
Oecusse	Sakunar (Scorpion)	Simão Lopes	April 1999	Linked to Special Forces

Source: CAVR research and compilation

Formation of the militias

119. The Indonesian armed forces began to mobilise militia groups across Timor-Leste in mid-to late 1998. The militias were formed as a direct response to the new freedom of East Timorese to campaign for independence after the fall of Soeharto in May 1998 and the announcement a month later by his successor, B J Habibie, that East Timor could have the option of wide-ranging autonomy. After Habibie went further in January 1999 and offered East Timor a choice between autonomy and independence, militia groups mushroomed in every district.

120. In many ways the formation of the militias was the culmination of the strategy of militarisation described above. In creating the militias, the Indonesian armed forces drew heavily on the variety of auxiliary forces manned by East Timorese that had been developed over the years since 1975. Several of the militias, such as Saka Team and Sera Team in Baucau, Alfa Team in Lautém and Makikit Team in Viqueque, had in fact been in existence for a decade or more. Halilintar in Bobonaro originated as a unit of the Partisans in the months before the 1975 invasion, and having been inactive for several years, it was revived in 1994 to assist the Indonesian military in its campaign against the growing clandestine movement in the district. Others were descendants of earlier paramilitaries. The leadership of the Mahidi militia in Ainaro had also led the “volunteers” who had terrorised Ainaro in the early 1990s.

121. Other militias recruited their leadership from officially-sponsored auxiliaries such as the People’s Resistance (Wanra), Civil Defence (Hansip) and the Young Guards Upholding Integration (Gadapaksi). A military document dated April 1998 shows that 12 paramilitary teams, covering every district of East Timor except Dili and Oecusse, were then in existence. From the document it is clear that these teams, which included the Saka, Sera, Alfa, Makikit (Eagle), Halilintar (Thunder) and Morok (Wild) Teams - all of which retained their names when they

became militias - were part of the territorial structure.¹³⁴ The speed with which the militias were mobilised in 1999 was largely due to their ability to draw on existing structures. The antecedents of the main militia groups are summarised in Table 2.

122. The entire period leading up to and immediately following the Popular Consultation unfolded against a background of violence. Most of this violence was perpetrated by militia groups with TNI troops either playing a supporting role or being directly involved. The role of the Indonesian armed forces in planning and orchestrating this violence is well-documented. Investigations conducted by the Indonesian Human Rights Commission (*Komnas HAM*) and the UN-sponsored International Commission of Inquiry on East Timor (ICIET) in the immediate aftermath of violence, by the UN-supported Serious Crimes Unit in Timor-Leste during the UNTAET and UNMISSET missions, as well as the testimonies and submissions received by and research conducted by CAVR itself, all lead to the inescapable conclusion that the Indonesian military was deeply complicit in every aspect of the violence from the initial formation of the militia groups to instigating the final and most comprehensive phase of the violence in September-October 1999.

123. Aside from the historical evidence already cited, there is a massive amount of other evidence indicating that the militias were created, supported and controlled by the Indonesian National Army (TNI). This evidence is summarised below.

Indonesian National Army (TNI) involvement in formation of the militias

124. Senior Indonesian army officers were involved in the planning, formation and training of the militias. In February 1999 the former Partisan leader, Tomás Gonçalves, who claimed to have been offered but to have refused a senior position in the militia structure, spoke to the international media. He described the role of key military personnel in establishing the militia, naming the Sub-regional Military (Korem) commander, Colonel Tono Suratman, and the commander of Regional Military Command (Kodam) IX Udayana Major-General Adam Damiri, as well as indicating the prominent role of the Joint Intelligence Task Force (SGI) dominated by Special Forces (Kopassus) †¹³⁵ Tomás Gonçalves said:

¹³⁴ The Commission's summary of the evidence of links between the militias and the TNI relies heavily on Geoffrey Robinson, *East Timor 1999: Crimes Against Humanity*, A Report Commissioned by OHCHR submission to CAVR, July 2003, pp.82-129.

¹³⁵ In 1993, the Joint Intelligence Task Force (SGI) was renamed the Intelligence Task Force (*Satuan Tugas Intelijen*). However, it continued to be widely referred to as the SGI (see the section on The Indonesian Armed Forces and their role in Timor-Leste, above). In 1999 it was staffed by a Special Forces unit, named Three Earth (Tribuana) Task Force, under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Yayat Sudrajat. The Special Forces Command (Kopassus) had held a dominant role in the Indonesian military structure in Timor-Leste from the mid-1990s.

A number of senior officers who had Special Forces Command (Kopassus) backgrounds and who had completed tours of duty in Timor-Leste played influential roles during the Popular Consultation. They included the senior intelligence officer Major General Zacky Anwar Makarim, who was officially the chief military representative on the Indonesian task force assigned to liaise with UNAMET. It is believed that he also played a key role in developing the militias during this period. Aside from Lieutenant Colonel Sudrajat, the Sub-regional Military (Korem) commander, Colonel Tono Suratman, had also previously been in Kopassus. His immediate superior, Major-General Adam Damiri, the Bali-based commander of the Regional Udayana division, was another Kopassus member. At the Indonesian cabinet level, another key figure in developing policy on Timor-Leste was the Coordinating Minister for Political Affairs and Security, retired General Feisal Tanjung, who was one of four ministers in the cabinet with a Kopassus background. Another was the Minister of Information, Yunus Yosfiah, whose extensive involvement with Timor-Leste went back to his pre-invasion command of the Susi Tim. (Robinson, pp. 28-29).

The order came from the regional commander, [Major-General] Adam Damiri, to the East Timor commander and the Special Forces Commander Yayat Sudrajat – liquidate all the CNRT, all the pro-independence people, parents, sons, daughters and grandchildren. Commander Sudrajat promised a payment of Rp200,000 to anyone wanting to serve in the militia.¹³⁶

125. In the indictment of the Serious Crimes Unit against General Wiranto and others, the Deputy General Prosecutor for Serious Crimes described a series of meetings in which senior officers planned the formation and recruitment of militias:

1. In or about August 1998 [the commander of Region IX Udayana, Major-General] Adam Rachmat Damiri arranged for a pro-Indonesian East Timorese leader to fly from East Timor to Denpasar, Bali for a meeting. At this meeting, Damiri told the East Timorese leader to establish a group to promote integration.
2. In or about August 1998 Damiri traveled to Dili and met with TNI commanders and pro-Indonesian East Timorese leaders. [The commander of Sub-regional Military Command (Korem) 164, Colonel] Suhartono Suratman was present at this meeting. Damiri told the group that international attention was focused on East Timor and this was a problem for Indonesia. He told them that they needed to come up with a plan for creating organisations that would spread pro-Indonesian sentiment throughout East Timor. He told them that they must form a solid civil defence force based on previous TNI-supported models and that this force should be expanded and developed to protect integration.
3. In or about November 1998 Damiri travelled to East Timor. During this visit he again met with pro-Indonesian East Timorese leaders in Dili, including individuals who later became leaders of militia groups. Damiri asked the men to join together and assist TNI to fight the pro-independence group Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor [Frente Revolucionaria de Timor Leste Independente, Fretilin]. During this meeting with pro-Indonesian leaders, Damiri praised future militia leader Eurico Guterres as being a young man eager to fight for integration and said that he was willing to give Guterres 50m rupiah to begin his work.
4. In or about November 1998 Suratman met with pro-Indonesian East Timorese leaders at his headquarters in Dili. [Tribuana commander, Lieutenant-Colonel] Yayat Sudrajat was present at this meeting. Suratman told the group that he wanted future militia leader Eurico Guterres to form a new organisation to defend integration similar to the pro-Indonesian Youth Guards Upholding Integration (Gadapaksi).
5. In early 1999 [Major-General] Zacky Anwar Makarim [who was head of the armed forces intelligence agency, BIA, until January 1999] received the founding members of the pro-Indonesian East Timor People's Front [BRTT] at his office in Jakarta. During the meeting he said that guerrilla warfare would be necessary to overcome independence supporters if the autonomy option lost at the ballot.
6. In or about February 1999 Damiri met with pro-Indonesian East Timorese leaders at Regional Military Command IX headquarters in Denpasar, Bali. Damiri told the men that TNI was ready to give secret support to pro-Indonesian forces. He explained that it must be secret in order to avoid international scrutiny and criticism. Damiri asked the men to gather East Timorese who had served in TNI. He told them that they should meet with Suratman for further instructions.
7. In or about February 1999 Suratman met with a pro-Indonesian East Timorese leader in Dili. He told him that because TNI was under a reformist regime, it could not take part in open operations against the independence movement. Suratman asked the pro-Indonesian leader to form a militia group. Suratman said that TNI was willing to provide any form of assistance required by militia groups.

8. In or about February 1999 Sudrajat met with TNI personnel and pro-Indonesian East Timorese leaders at Intelligence Task Force headquarters in Dili. Sudrajat told the group that the Intelligence Task Force had a list of independence supporters that were to be killed. He stated that the Intelligence Task Force and the pro-Indonesian groups would cooperate to carry out these killings. He said that Special Forces (Kopassus) dressed as thugs would start to carry out murders of pro-independence supporters.
9. In or about March 1999 [the assistant for operations to the army chief of staff, Major-General] Kiki Syahnakri met with pro-Indonesian East Timorese leaders at TNI headquarters in Jakarta. Syahnakri told the group that TNI would support their pro-Indonesian efforts and that Makarim was responsible for coordinating activities leading up to the popular consultation. Syahnakri told them that firearms had been sent to East Timor, and that when the men returned to Dili they should contact Suratman to arrange distribution of the firearms.
10. In early 1999 [the governor, Abilio] Soares encouraged the District Administrators [Bupati] to form militia groups in their districts. Some of these District Administrators became militia leaders.¹³⁷

126. One aspect of the TNI's role in the creation of the militias was its direct involvement in recruitment. In early 1999 the then Korem chief of staff, Lieutenant-Colonel Supardi, was quoted as saying that the TNI had recruited 1,200 militiamen and would continue recruitment until March.¹³⁸ In addition to using the financial incentive of Rp 200,000 to encourage recruitment, the TNI used threats and coercion (see further below). Targets of approximately ten men per village were established for the recruitment of militia members in each district.¹³⁹ In addition, training of the militias was conducted according to rules set out in instructions and reports issued by senior officers all the way up the regional command structure.¹⁴⁰

TNI endorsement of the militias

127. Members of the TNI and Indonesian administration conferred official status on the militias. They did this, for example, by attending militia inauguration ceremonies and rallies throughout Timor-Leste. The Sub-regional military (Korem) commander, Colonel Tono Suratman, met and gave "guidance" to members of the Red White Iron (BMP) militia at the district military command (Kodim) 1638 headquarters on 16 April 1999, ten days after the massacre of civilians in Liquiça church and one day before the militia rampage in Dili in which BMP also took part.¹⁴¹ As late as 8 May 1999, East Timor Sub-regional military commander, Colonel Suratman, attended the inauguration of the Manatuto Loves Integration (*Mahadomi*) militia in Manatuto. He and others, including the governor, Abilio Soares, the district administrator of Dili, Domingos Soares, and the then assistant for army operations, Major-General Kiki Syahnakri, were also present at the rally on 17 April 1999 at which Eurico Gueterres spoke to militiamen and encouraged them to kill "those who have betrayed integration". At the end of the rally, the militia dispersed and went on a rampage around Dili. Among their targets was the house of Manuel Carrascalão where several hundred people had taken refuge to escape militia violence in their districts. At the house they killed 12 people.¹⁴²

128. In addition to these shows of support, the Indonesian authorities gave the militias official endorsement by treating them as part of the formal auxiliary military structure. In official communications, militia groups were regularly referred to as being part of existing civil defence groups.¹⁴³ From April 1999, militia groups were also officially recognised as voluntary civil security organisations (Pam Swakarsa).¹⁴⁴

¹³⁷ At that time, Rp200,000 = US\$26.66.

TNI participation in militia activities

129. The close connection between the TNI and the militias is most clearly demonstrated by the overlap in their memberships. Many militia members were also enlisted TNI soldiers, a fact that has been confirmed through official Indonesian military and government documents.¹⁴⁵ At least one militia (Saka Team) had been a “special company” fully integrated into the structure of the TNI for several years.¹⁴⁶ In addition, militia leaders were treated as part of the official security apparatus and invited as such to meetings with military, police and government authorities.¹⁴⁷

The provision of training, weapons and operational support

130. The TNI also provided the militias with training, weapons and operational support. The role of the TNI in training militias has been confirmed by numerous sources including Indonesian documents, telegrams and at least one statement to the media by Lieutenant-Colonel Supardi, the Sub-regional military command (Korem) chief of staff in the early months of 1999.¹⁴⁸ Weapons were provided, and control over their use maintained by the TNI.¹⁴⁹ Ample evidence of this is found in documents but also in the very possession by militias of modern weapons of the type used by Indonesian military and police.¹⁵⁰ General Wiranto himself acknowledged to investigators that:

Sometimes weapons were provided, but this does not mean that [militias] carried weapons wherever they went. The weapons were stored at Sub-district military headquarters.¹⁵¹

131. The Deputy General Prosecutor for Serious Crimes made the following allegations in her indictment of General Wiranto and others:

11. In or about March 1999 [the governor], Abilio Soares held a meeting in his office in Dili. [The Sub-regional 164 commander], Colonel Suhartono Suratman and [the commander of the Special Forces Tribuana Task Force], Lieutenant-Colonel Yayat Sudrajat were present at the meeting. Soares told a group of pro-Indonesian East Timorese leaders that independence supporters who sought protection with priests and nuns were communists and ought to be killed. He also told the group that TNI would supply weapons to pro-Indonesian forces. He said that if TNI could not supply enough weapons, he would do so himself. He said that he would provide the pro-Indonesian organisation BRTT with funding.
12. In or about March 1999 Sudrajat and other members of TNI delivered a large number of firearms to a pro-Indonesian East Timorese leader. Sudrajat asked the East Timorese leader to give the weapons to pro-Indonesian militia groups.
13. In or about April 1999 [the head of the armed forces intelligence agency, BIA], Major-General Zacky Anwar Makarim told TNI commanders and pro-Indonesian East Timorese leaders that they should work hard for autonomy because if autonomy lost, more blood would flow. He offered pro-Indonesian East Timorese leaders the use of automatic firearms and ordered Suratman to arrange for the collection and distribution of these firearms.
14. In or about April 1999 Suratman, after being asked by Makarim to provide automatic firearms to pro-Indonesian East Timorese leaders, ordered his subordinate Sudrajat to arrange for the collection and distribution of the firearms.¹⁵²

132. The TNI also provided operational support to the militias. Sometimes such support took the form of militias using TNI bases and posts. In the case of militias established well before 1999, the use of a TNI base was simply the continuation of a long-standing relationship. One example was the use by the Alfa Team of the Special Forces (Kopassus) base in Lospalos.

Joint TNI-militia operations

133. Joint operations commonly involved the presence of TNI troops when militia attacks took place, with the TNI troops in position behind militiamen and firing only in their defence.¹⁵³ One such militia operation where TNI troops were present was the Liquiça church massacre in April 1999. The participation of TNI members became less frequent after the arrival of UNAMET in June 1999, though it did continue during the weeks leading up to the ballot, including in such high-profile instances as the attack on the UNAMET office in Maliana (Bobonaro) on 29 June 1999. Widespread joint TNI-militia operations resumed after the 30 August ballot, in September 1999, once international staff had been forced to flee the districts and were either under siege in UNAMET headquarters in Dili or had left the country.¹⁵⁴

Provision of financial and material support by the TNI and other agencies

134. Finally, there is substantial evidence indicating that the Indonesian civilian and military authorities funded the militias and provided resources for their use. An estimated US\$5.2m was channelled to the militias through the Indonesian civilian administration.¹⁵⁵ Standard budgets for the “socialisation of autonomy” were drawn up by each district, containing allocation for the militias, and submitted to the governor for approval. Additional funds were provided through other arms of the Indonesian government and the TNI. There is also evidence that pro-integrationist political groups, the United Forum for Democracy and Justice (*Forum Persatuan Demokrasi dan Keadilan*, FPDK) and the People’s Front of East Timor (*Barisan Rakyat Timor Timur*, BRTT) - both of which had close ties to the civil administration (see Civil administration below) - were used to channel funds from the government and the military to the militia.¹⁵⁶ The United Forum was chaired by the district administrator (Bupati) of Dili, Domingos Soares, while the People’s Front chairman was Francisco Lopes da Cruz, the former UDT president who had been deputy governor of East Timor in the early years of the occupation, and who before 1999 was a roving ambassador with a brief to push Indonesia’s case on East Timor internationally.¹⁵⁷

135. These close links between the militias, the TNI and Indonesian civilian authority led the UN Commission of Inquiry to state in its report that:

15. There is also evidence that the Indonesian Army and the civilian authorities in East Timor and some in Jakarta pursued a policy of engaging the militia to influence the outcome of the Popular Consultation. The approach pursued was to provide the impression that the East Timorese were fighting among themselves.
16. There is evidence that the policy of engaging militias was implemented by the Kopassus (Special Forces Command of TNI) and other intelligence agencies of the Indonesian army. The policy manifested itself in the form of active recruitment, funding, arming and guidance, and the provision of logistics to support the militias in intimidation and terror attacks.
17. There is evidence to show that, in certain cases, Indonesian army personnel, in addition to directing the militias, were directly involved in intimidation and terror attacks. The intimidation, terror, destruction of property, displacement and evacuation of people would not have been possible without the active involvement of the Indonesian army, and the knowledge and approval of the top military command.
18. The Indonesian police, who were responsible for security under the 5 May agreement,[†] appear to have been involved in acts of intimidation and terror and in other cases to have been inactive in preventing such acts.

¹⁵³ Several such budgets are in the CAVR Archive.

[†] Talks between Indonesia and Portugal in New York City on 5 May 1999 resulted in the two governments entrusting the UN Secretary-General with organising and conducting a Popular Consultation to determine whether the East Timorese

19. The Commission is of the view that ultimately the Indonesian army was responsible for the intimidation, terror, killings and other acts of violence experienced by the people of East Timor before and after the Popular Consultation. Further, the evidence collected to date indicates that particular individuals were directly involved in violations of human rights.¹⁵⁸

The consequences of militia-TNI cooperation

136. Ian Martin, the Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General during UNAMET, told the Commission:

[T]he Deputy-Prosecutor for Serious Crimes appointed by the United Nations has found sufficient evidence to charge the highest leadership of the TNI with crimes against humanity...In my opinion, it is beyond doubt that the destruction of East Timor was not merely the result of an emotional response of militia and a mutiny of East Timorese within the TNI: it was a planned and coordinated operation under TNI direction.¹⁵⁹

137. The violent events of 1999 are covered elsewhere in this report (see Part 3: The History of the Conflict, Chapter 7.2: Unlawful Killings and Enforced Disappearances, Chapter 7.3: Forced Displacement and Famine, Chapter 7.4: Detention, Torture and Ill-Treatment, and Chapter 7.7: Sexual violence). For the purposes of this chapter, it is important to note the close relationship between the TNI and the East Timorese militia groups, as well as TNI's domination of the civil administration and the national police in East Timor. When the UN entered East Timor in May 1999, the militias backed by the TNI were terrorising the population, unchecked by intervention of the Indonesian police.¹⁶⁰

138. The Indonesian authorities asserted that these militia groups were spontaneous expressions of local support for integration, and that the violence was the result of conflict among pro-independence and pro-integration East Timorese. But there were no real efforts to rein in this threat. Those responsible for the massacres in Liquiça and Dili in April 1999 were not pursued or brought to justice. The supposed disarmament of the militias in August 1999 was clearly designed to create the impression that the militias were reciprocating the decision of Falintil to place its forces in cantonment (see Part 3: The History of the Conflict).

139. When massive violence occurred after the ballot, the TNI tried to paint a picture of spontaneous violence caused by shock and anger at the pro-independence result. However, the rapid implementation and widespread extent of the violence and destruction indicated a well-planned and resourced operation with sophisticated logistical support.¹⁶¹ Although militia were often the frontline of these activities, in many cases they were supported directly by military or police personnel.¹⁶² They were in effect implementing a TNI plan. Indeed, the militia's threatened destruction of East Timor in the event of a vote for independence had been foreshadowed by East Timor's military Commander, Colonel Suratman, months before the consultation, when he said in an interview on Australian television:

people accepted or rejected special autonomy for East Timor within the unitary Republic of Indonesia. The Indonesian National Police Force had the task of maintaining security during the Popular Consultation.

I want to give you this message: if the pro-independence side wins, it's not going to just be the Government of Indonesia that has to deal with what follows. The UN and Australia are also going to have to solve the problem and well, if this does happen, then there'll be no winners. Everything is going to be destroyed. East Timor won't exist as it does now. It'll be much worse than 23 years ago.¹⁶³

140. Throughout the lead-up to the ballot the East Timorese civilian population was terrorised and could not look to the police or to the civil administration to respect the rule of law and restore law and order. The military and police, whose job it was to protect the population, instead allowed and supported this violence and intimidation. With the withdrawal of the UN and international observers in the days after the ballot,^{*} cooperation between the militia and TNI was overt as both participated in the removal of huge numbers of the civilian population to West Timor and other parts of Indonesia.¹⁶⁴ During this process Indonesian military, police and Timorese militia committed murders, sexual violence and other abuses against civilians.

4.4. Civil administration

The Provisional Government of East Timor

141. On 18 December 1975, shortly after its full-scale invasion of Timor-Leste, Indonesia established the Provisional Government of East Timor (Pemerintah Sementara Timor Timur, PSTT).[†] Most positions in this government were filled with East Timorese supporters of integration with Indonesia, predominately from Apodeti and UDT. Members of the Provisional Government were appointed in Dili as fierce fighting was taking place as the invasion pushed towards the interior. In the seven months of its existence the Provisional Government was virtually powerless to make autonomous decisions in the face of Indonesian military domination. Former Governor Mário Viegas Carrascalão told the Commission:

I could not say that PSTT [the East Timor Provisional Government] was an actual government. The Executive Chairman was Arnaldo de Araújo, with Lopes da Cruz as his Deputy. The President of the Popular Assembly was Guilherme Gonçalves. The Popular Assembly had just begun to function...it met once in May 1976 here, just to go over one point of its "charter", that is, the integration without referendum.¹⁶⁵

142. When the Indonesian People's Representative Council (DPR) passed Law 7/76, and President Soeharto signed this into law on 17 July 1976, Indonesia claimed the integration of East Timor was formally complete. Law 7/76 decreed the formation of a provincial government. To implement this Indonesia issued on 30 July 1976 Government Decree 19/1976 which established a government structure at the provincial and district levels in East Timor. This imposed the standard Indonesian structure of civil government in East Timor. However, with some minor modifications it retained the structure of the Portuguese civil administration: *concelhos* became *kabupaten* (districts), *postos* turned into *kecamatan* (sub-districts), *sucos* became *desas* (villages), and *aldeias* became *kampungs* (hamlets). The result of this policy was that there were far more administrative units at the district and sub-district levels and therefore a

^{*} Twelve UN Military Liaison Officers remained in the Australian Embassy in Dili after UNAMET evacuated on 14 September 1999. They were protected by Army Strategic Reserve (Kostrad) troops.

[†] In this sub-section the report will denote East Timor, in English, to represent the Indonesian administrative title of Timor Timur used for the territory. Timor-Leste is retained when describing the territory other than as the Indonesian administrative unit.

far more extensive civil administrative presence in Timor-Leste than in Indonesia. Moreover, as in Indonesia, in Timor-Leste the Indonesian military (ABRI) established a territorial command structure that paralleled the civil administration, meaning it too had a heavier presence at the local level than was normal in Indonesia.

Table 3 - Indonesian administration structure, with Portuguese and Indonesian military equivalents

Level	Indonesian term	Administrative post	Portuguese equivalent	Parallel Military command
province	propinsi	governor (<i>gubernur</i>)	territory	sub-regional military command (Korem)
district (13)	kabupaten	district administrator (<i>bupati</i>) and secretary	concelhos	district military command (Kodim)
sub-district (62)	kecamatan	sub-district administrator (<i>camat</i>) and administrative assistant	postos administrativos	sub-district military command (Koramil)
village (442)	kelurahan/desa	village head (<i>kepala desa</i>)	suco	non-commissioned guidance officer or team (Babinsa)
hamlet	kampung/dusun RW (rukun warga) RT (rukun tetangga)	hamlet head (<i>kepala kampung</i>)	aldeia/ povoação	-
neighbourhood	RT/RW	neighbourhood head (<i>kepala RT</i>)	bairro	

Source: CAVR research document, CAVR Archive.

The position of Governor*

143. During Soeharto's New Order regime, the governor of an Indonesian province was appointed to a five-year term by the president, and approved by the national People's Representative Council (DPR).[†] Active or retired military officers were appointed to the governorship of many Indonesian provinces. In East Timor, Indonesia appointed indigenous, civilian governors throughout the occupation.

144. On 4 August 1976, Jakarta appointed Arnaldo dos Reis Araújo, leader of Apodeti, as its first governor, bringing the new province of East Timor (Timor Timur) into existence. The UDT leader, Francisco Lopes da Cruz, was appointed deputy governor. Araújo was replaced in 1978, after he was openly critical of Indonesia.¹⁶⁶ In an interview with an Indonesian journalist in September 1980, he said:

* The governors in East Timor from 1976-99 were as follows: Arnaldo dos Reis Araújo, 1976-78, Apodeti; Guilherme Maria Gonçalves, 1978-82, Apodeti; Mário Viegas Carrascalão, 1982-87 and 1987-92, UDT; Abílio José Osório Soares, 1992-97 and 1997-99, Apodeti.

† The governor, as the executive and the chairman of the Provincial People's Representative Council (DPRD), is formally the highest authority in an Indonesian province.

The government is showing great attention [to East Timor], but unfortunately it is not being directed to the East Timorese. It's like during the Portuguese colonial period: money came from Portugal earmarked for the East Timorese people only to be sent back to Portugal in the name of private individuals who had been sent by Portugal itself.

145. He advised the Indonesian Government to:

[C]reate a normal situation as quickly as possible and put an end to the situation of terror, unchecked power, arbitrariness, of taking the law into one's own hands, lawlessness, economic monopolies and so on, similar to the time of Portuguese colonialism.¹⁶⁷

146. Araújo's replacement, Guilherme Maria Gonçalves, was a member of the Apodeti Presidium, a signatory of the Balibo Declaration and a *liurai*. He had been a prominent supporter of the Indonesian annexation, having supplied many of the men who formed the East Timorese Partisan units that accompanied the invasion forces. His term as governor ended in 1982 after a dispute with the Regional Administrative Secretary (*Sekretaris Wilayah Daerah, Sekwilda*), Colonel Paul Kalangi, over the assignment of coffee tax payable to the local government.¹⁶⁸

147. During these early years the civil administration faced many problems. It lacked personnel, communication was difficult owing to limited understanding of Indonesian of the East Timorese, and at the leadership level there were disputes between the Apodeti and UDT members working with Indonesia. A March 1983 Indonesian police report stated:

Ever since the establishment of the PSTT [East Timor Provision Government], in appointing local government officials the Indonesians gave priority to former members of the Apodeti party [whether governor, district or sub-district administrator], while former members of the UDT party had to be content to be their assistants and deputies. However, many of the former UDT in administrative positions had poor relations with their superiors. This resulted in a muddled local administration.¹⁶⁹

148. In addition, civil administration was a secondary consideration for Indonesia in the early years of occupation when ABRI was fighting a major conflict with Fretilin troops.

149. The third governor, Mário Viegas Carrascalão, one of the founders of UDT, was appointed on 18 September 1982. He held the position for two terms, until June 1992.^{*} Carrascalão was one of few Timorese with a university degree, and had been part of Indonesia's delegation at the UN from 1980-82.¹⁷⁰ He told the Commission that he was appointed at the instruction of General Moerdani.¹⁷¹ During Carrascalão's period as Governor, East Timor underwent a process of "normalisation" within the Indonesian system. The administration was consolidated and East Timor brought into line with most Indonesian provinces. In late 1988, President Soeharto signed Presidential Decree 62 1988, formally ending the sealing off of the territory and normalising its status as a province.¹⁷² Mário Carrascalão told the Commission that it was only after this decision that the military lightened its control of the territory.¹⁷³

^{*} Mário Carrascalão told the Commission that he resigned his position as Governor after the Santa Cruz Massacre of November 1991, at the CAVR National Public Hearing on Women and Conflict, April 2003. In fact, this coincided with the completion of his second term in office.

150. After two five-year terms, Carrascalão was replaced in 1992 by Abilio Osorio Soares, a relatively minor figure in Apodeti.¹⁷⁴ Soares's candidacy was supported by President Soeharto's son-in-law, Lieutenant-Colonel Prabowo, then of Kopassus, which was deeply engaged in East Timor at the time.¹⁷⁵ Abilio Soares was governor until the end of the Indonesian occupation.

151. The former UDT president, Francisco Lopes da Cruz, remained deputy governor until 1982. He was replaced by an Indonesian military officer, Brigadier-General A B Saridjo, who held the position until 1993.¹⁷⁶ He was then succeeded by another military officer, Lieutenant-Colonel J Haribowo, who held the office until 1999. Both of the two last deputy governors were former Regional Administrative Secretaries (*Sekwilda*).

152. In 1987 East Timor was divided into three administrative districts: the east, based in Baucau, the central district, based in Gleno, and the west, administered from Maliana (Bobonaro).[†] Each of these was administered by an assistant governor, who was often a military officer.¹⁷⁷

Regional administrative secretary (Sekwilda)

153. Officially, the second in command in the provincial executive was the Regional Administrative Secretary (*Sekretaris Wilayah Daerah, Sekwilda*). In reality, as in Indonesian provinces, because the Regional Administrative Secretary had control of the provincial budget this was a very influential position. The position was formally appointed by the Minister of the Interior. Initially an East Timorese filled this post, although all but one of the subsequent appointees were military officers.[‡] The Regional Administrative Secretary managed a secretariat which was responsible for the processing of projects.¹⁷⁸ An equivalent position also existed at the district level.

The People's Representative Council

154. The People's Representative Council is the legislative branch at each level of government in Indonesia. It exists at the national level (DPR), the provincial level (DPRD Level I) and the district level (DPRD Level II). In theory, the chair of the DPRD I is, with the Governor, the highest authority in the province. At the time of Indonesia's occupation of Timor-Leste, 80% of the seats in each level of the council were contested by three state-sanctioned parties.[§] ABRI automatically received the remaining 20% of the available seats.

155. The first DPRD in East Timor was established by Law I/AD, 1976 on 4 August 1976, with Guilherme Gonçalves as its chair. It had 30 members, none of whom were elected. District level DPRD's were also established. The former Viqueque Deputy District Administrator (Wakil Bupati), Armindo Soares Mariano, told the Commission that to be a member of the Assembly at the beginning of 1976, the only criteria was to be appointed and approved by the Regional Leadership Consultation* (*Musyawah Pimpinan Daerah, Muspida*) consisting of the administrator and military commander at the district level. He added:

* Abilio Soares was the younger brother of prominent Apodeti figure José Osório Soares, who had been executed while in Fretilin custody in January 1976, on the south coast of Timor-Leste.

† These divisions varied from the five military divisions.

‡ Regional Administrative Secretaries in East Timor: José Bonifacio dos Reis Araújo (1976), J R Sinaga (ABRI), A Paul Kalangi (ABRI, 1980), Drs A B Saridjo (ABRI), Antonio Freitas Parada, Johannes Haribowo (ABRI), Drs Radjarkarina Brahmana (ABRI, 1993-99).

§ Golkar, PDI (Indonesian Democratic Party), PPP (United Development Party).

** Muspida was theoretically a consultative exchange mechanism to enable coordination between civil administration and local territorial police and military commands. In practice this was dominated by the military.

*At the time they [Muspida] would appoint members directly because there was no parliamentary institution yet, there were no general elections. At the district level the members were also appointed. Although there was a legislative institution, they were all appointed...everyone...this person came from this village and this sub-district. Let's say they needed 20 people for the DPRD in Viqueque at the time, so these 20 people would be taken from five sub-districts, four people each, and they were non-formal leaders, local liurai or sons of liurai with some prominence, so they were appointed and they sat there.*¹⁷⁹

156. There is no record of the DPRD paying attention to the plight of the East Timorese people during the famine of 1979-80.¹⁸⁰ However, in 1981 the economic exploitation of East Timor by Indonesian officials inspired local parliamentarians to write a report to President Soeharto.¹⁸¹ The report, signed by the oldest and youngest parliamentarians, expressed dismay at the economic regime the occupying power had created and its impact on ordinary East Timorese:

*The economic situation of the people of East Timor is passing through the most tragic phase since the beginning of the civil war...Considerable assistance for the purpose of building up the economy has been received...but the people of East Timor have not felt any benefit from their production of agricultural commodities such as coffee, sandalwood, candlenut, timber, copra and other produce. PT Denok is a special enterprise that has been located in East Timor to absorb all the main economic products of the province in return for its services to the Government of Indonesia...Five years after integration, most of the population is not yet able to enjoy stable living conditions.*¹⁸²

157. The report also complained of the misuse of development funds by military officers working in senior positions in the civil administration. The report accused the Regional Administrative Secretary, Colonel Paul Kalangi and his deputy, Captain A. Azis Hasyam, of plundering development funds allocated from the central government in Jakarta. The DPRD members claimed to know of expenditures of "hundreds of millions of rupiah" which they found to be "totally fictitious". The report also alleged that medicines sent as aid could be found in local shops in Dili, while hospitals continued to experience shortages. Finally, the members complained that to obtain jobs in the "provincial" government, the largest source of employment in the country, an applicant had to become an Indonesian citizen. Employment in the public service, then, was effectively available only to those who supported the occupation.^{*} In an indication of how the military occupation dealt with human rights issues and even the mildest expressions of dissent, the parliamentarians who wrote the report were later arrested.¹⁸³

158. General elections are held in Indonesia every five years. The first national election in East Timor was held in 1982. 311,375 East Timorese voted. The results were clearly fraudulent and initially showed over 100% of registered voters casting their ballot for the government party, Golkar (see Part 3: The History of the Conflict). As a result of the general election, 36 took the seats in the DPRD Level I, while eight members of this assembly represented East Timor at the national DPR. In later years a degree of pluralism developed within the tightly controlled limits of the New Order. By 1995 the East Timor DPRD I had grown to 45 seats. In that year's election Golkar won 20 seats, PDI five, PPP two, and ABRI received its allotted nine.

^{*} This systematic discrimination in employment is similar to the New Order requirement that all government employees be Golkar party members who swear to protect the *Pancasila* ideology.

Table 4 - Composition of the East Timor Provincial Assembly by Faction, 1980-97

Year	PPP Faction	Golkar Faction	PDI Faction	ABRI Faction	Non-ABRI Faction	Total Assembly Members
1980	0	25	0	0	0	25
1981	0	24	0	0	0	24
1982*	0	32	0	4	0	36
1987*	0	34	2	9	0	45
1988	0	34	2	9	0	45
1989	0	33	2	9	0	44
1990	0	34	2	9	0	45
1991	0	34	2	9	0	45
1992*	2	29	5	9	0	45
1997*	1	30	5	9	0	45

*General election year

Source: East Timor Provincial Parliament

Government administrative bodies: The national programme at the provincial level

159. Indonesian government administration during the New Order period was highly centralised. Most policy decisions were made in Jakarta as part of a structured national planning system. Indonesia implemented five-year plans (Rencana Pembangunan Lima Tahun, Repelita) as the basis of its fiscal and development policy. The Jakarta-based ministries, government departments and bureaus implemented policy through their counterpart offices at the provincial level. It took several years before this structure was operational in East Timor, as Indonesia's primary focus was on military operations. The government also needed to recruit and train government functionaries. From the outset of the Indonesian occupation, East Timor was controlled by the military. During the early years of the occupation, unlike any other territory in Indonesia, the Department of Defence and Security established teams that directly administered East Timor. East Timor was passed to the Department of the Interior in 1978, with the administration conforming to normal Indonesia practice.^{*} However, the military retained ultimate control of the administration. The military held key positions in the civil administration and wielded effective veto power over appointments. This gave it immense power, primarily over the province's economy, but also over local policy.

160. Once formal integration had taken place in July 1976, the Indonesian military began to implement standards in line with those in place with Indonesian structures. On 14 August 1976 the Ministry of Defence and Security made East Timor a domestic military operation by establishing the East Timor Regional Defence and Security Command (Kodahankam Timor Timur) operating beneath the Ministry of Defence and Security.¹⁸⁴ Ministry documents stated that:

The East Timor Regional Defence and Security Command was established with the aim of laying the foundation for the Guidance and Development of Defence and Security in East Timor during the "transitional period" which lasts until the end of the Second Development Plan [in April 1979], along with implementing the Guidance and Development of the National Defence and Security Policy.¹⁸⁵

^{*} Even after its administration was brought into line with ordinary Indonesian practice, Timor-Leste remained a special case. Timor-Leste got a special budget directly from the central government. Also, it received extensive special funds through a presidential instruction (*Instruksi Presiden, Inpres*). In addition, in the national budget there was a special budget line for East Timor (budget item 16).

161. The subsection on ABRI in this chapter discusses this process in more detail. The military established a territorial structure that introduced the system of military and police commands and posts that paralleled the civil administration down to the village level.

162. During the first few years of the Indonesian occupation, Jakarta directly administered East Timor. In 1976-77 the Central Coordinating Team for Education and Culture (Tim Koordinasi Pusat Pendidikan dan Kebudayaan) was responsible for educational programming and coordination. It reflected the early focus of the occupying regime on language training to assimilate the East Timorese into the Indonesian state.¹⁸⁶ On the ground in East Timor, it functioned through an Assistant Team for Education and Culture (Tim Pendamping Pendidikan dan Kebudayaan).

163. By 1978 a more broadly based team had been established to handle administration. This was the Central Development Implementation Team (Tim Pelaksana Pembangunan Pusat, TPPP). Staffed by personnel from government agencies in Jakarta, it was chaired by General Moerdani. It worked through the Regional Development Implementation Team (Tim Pelaksana Pembangunan Daerah, TPPD) which was formally headed by the governor, but actually under the control of Colonel Paul Kalangi, then Regional Administrative Secretary.¹⁸⁷ Most sectors of the administration, such as security and order, political affairs, information, communications, population control and settlements, labour, family reunions and religion were under the direct supervision of the TPPP in Jakarta. The local government was responsible only for five sectors: primary education, health, public works, agriculture and social welfare.¹⁸⁸

164. After 1978, when administrative control of East Timor formally passed from the Department of Defence to the Ministry of Home Affairs, Indonesia established more administrative units. Its focus was on education and public information. The first operational government unit was a preliminary education office which opened in 1978. In addition to language, another early focus was information, and in 1978 the Timor Department of Information installed a television transmitter at Marabia in the hills to the south just outside Dili. The department prioritised the distribution of television sets throughout East Timor to ensure broadcasts could be watched.¹⁸⁹

165. Also in the late 1970s a preliminary Regional Planning and Development Board (*Badan Perencanaan Pembangunan Daerah, Bappeda*) began to function. It focused on infrastructure, primarily building schools and teacher training. In 1979 the education department was formed, thus establishing a separate process from the Regional Office of the Department for Education and Culture for the Province of East Timor (*Kantor Wilayah Departemen Pendidikan dan Kebudayaan Propinsi Timor Timur*).¹⁹⁰ When the third national five-year plan was launched in April 1979, East Timor was partially incorporated into the national planning mechanism. At the start of the fourth national five-year plan in 1984, East Timor became an integral part of Indonesian policy planning and implementation.

166. During the early 1980s Indonesia developed conventional administrative structures in East Timor. It established the two types of office ordinarily present at the provincial level – regional branches (*kantor wilayah, kanwil*) of central government departments based in Jakarta, and operational units (*dinas*) administered directly by the provincial government. The regional bureaus and agencies are important offices in the Indonesian system of government, being vertically integrated with their national offices and responsible for direct implementation of policies, for example taxation and industrial policy.¹⁹¹ In East Timor, these agencies were mostly

¹⁸⁶ The “vertical” regional bureaus and agencies under the office of national cabinet ministers included Mining and Energy, Agriculture, Co-operatives, Education and Culture, Industry, Transmigration, Trade, Health, Forestry, Transportation, Information, Public Works, Social Affairs, Employment, Rural Development, State Ideology, and Family Planning (BKKBN). Other branches included Regional Logistics, the Regional Development Planning Board (Bappeda), the Provincial Inspector, Statistics and Social and Political Affairs.

headed by military officers seconded into the civil administration (*karyawan*)^{*} and predominantly staffed by non-Timorese personnel.¹⁹² Among these regional branches was the powerful Regional Development Planning Board (Badan Perencanaan Pembangunan Daerah, Bappeda). As the primary coordinating board for government projects, this Board allocated lucrative projects to business, the military and government officials.¹⁹³

167. The other group of offices administered directly by the provincial government were operational units called *dinas*,[†] some of which had branches at the district level. These had a higher proportion of East Timorese staff, sometimes up to 60%.¹⁹⁴ Despite provincial administrative responsibility for these operational units, a high degree of overlap between provincial offices and regional branches of central offices meant that overall local government was “a mere extension of the central government”.¹⁹⁵

District and Sub-district administration

168. District-level administration was headed by a district administrator (*Bupati*) appointed by the governor. The district administrator was responsible for coordinating the sub-districts (*kecamatan*) within that district. East Timor’s sparse settlement, coupled with the relatively high number of district and sub-district administrative divisions, meant that it was an over-administered province.

169. Government administration at a district level consisted primarily of *dinas* sub-offices. For example, there was a *dinas* for each unit of local administration - employees, public services and infrastructure. Among the *dinas* at the district level there was a relatively high proportion of Timorese staff, roughly 60%, though most of these held lower-ranking jobs.¹⁹⁶ After East Timor was sub-divided into three administrative regions in 1987, an assistant governor who coordinated the district administrators was assigned to each region.

170. In the early years of the occupation, very few qualified candidates were available for public service, and this affected the appointment of many positions. An account by the former district administrator of Lautém during the early years of the occupation indicates the difficulties the military faced in putting together an administration:

*Public servants from the Portuguese era were immediately appointed. It had to be approved by ABRI...Those of us who came down [from the hills] early and had been public servants were immediately appointed, whether Fretilin, Apodeti or UDT...just appoint him...But every sub-district had a camat [sub-district administrator]. There was staff from [the] central government to assist us. They were also ABRI...They assisted us because we didn't speak Indonesian.*¹⁹⁷

171. The first district administrators were all but one either members of or affiliated to the Apodeti or UDT political parties. Some, like Claudio Vieira, were former Partisan members. Appointments seem to have been based on a mixture of desperation for skilled personnel and the

^{*} *Karyawan* officers were active military officers seconded to the civilian administration as part of ABRI's "dual function" doctrine that gave it a role in politics and development, as well as defence (see section on the Militarisation of East Timor society above). At the end of the occupation, *karyawan* filled 140 key positions in the government of East Timor, including the leadership of 19 provincial administrative offices, the Deputy Governor position, and two assistant governor posts. The Regional Administrative Secretary (*Sekwilida*), the head of Social and Political Affairs (*Kakansospol*), and the Director of the Regional Development Planning Board (Bappeda) were all military personnel. At the district level, the military controlled 64 posts, including three of the 13 District Administrator (*Bupati*) positions. See 1998 captured military documents, *Rekapitulasi Karyawan ABRI yang bertugas di eksekutif + legislative*, pp. 16-17.

[†] *Dinas* units included Agriculture, Animal Husbandry, Education and Culture, Fisheries, Forestry, Local Revenue, Mining, Plantations, Public Health, Public Works, Roads and Traffic, Social Affairs, and Tourism.

military concern for control and compliance. Other key appointments, such as that of the sub-district administrator (*camat*), were made by the district administrator in conjunction with the local Regional Leadership Deliberation (*Musyawarah Pimpinan Daerah, Muspida*).¹⁹⁸ The former district administrator of Viqueque, Armino Soares Mariano, described the procedure to the Commission:

It was the Bupati [district administrator] together with the Muspida [regional leadership deliberation] who made the recommendation. At that time there were nothing like proper criteria being applied. So the Bupati submitted the name. It was his suggestion and was signed by the Dandim [District Military Commander], who was the chairman of the Muspida. The Bupati also signed it. Then the name was sent to the provincial level, and a Governor's Decree issued [to appoint him].¹⁹⁹

172. Over the duration of the Indonesian occupation, military officers filled some of the district administrator positions, although East Timorese tended to be appointed to the position, as was the governor.

¹⁹⁸ At the district level, the district administrator (*bupati*), sub-regional military commander (*danrem*) and police chief (*kapolres*) met in the regional leadership deliberation (*muspida*).

Table 5 - District Administrators by Origin and Affiliation, 1976-99

District	Dates	District Administrator	Party	Origin	Ethnicity
Aileu	May 1976-89	Abel dos Santos F	UDT	-	Timorese
	1989-94	Fernão Verdial	-	Ainaro	Timorese
	1994	Waluyo	ABRI	-	Indonesian
	1994-99	Suprpto Tarman	ABRI	-	Indonesian
Ainaro	May 1976-84	Moises da Silva Barros	Apodeti	Ainaro	Timorese
		Lieutenant-Colonel H Hutagalung	ABRI	-	Indonesian
	1994-99	José A B dos Reis Araújo	Apodeti	Ainaro	Timorese
	1999	Norberto de Araújo Evaristo D Sarmiento	Apodeti UDT	Ainaro Maubisse	Timorese Timorese
Ambeno	May 1976-84	Jaime dos R de Oliveira	UDT	Same	Timorese
	1984-89	Lieutenant-Colonel Imam Sujuti	ABRI	-	Indonesian
	1994-99	Vicente Tilman P D Filomeno Sequeira	Apodeti Apodeti	Viqueque Oecuesse	Timorese Timorese
Baucau	May 1976-82	Abel da Costa Belo	Apodeti	Baucau	Timorese
	1982-87	Colonel I Gusti Ngurah O.	ABRI	-	Indonesian
	1987-92	Drs Herman Sediono	ABRI	-	Indonesian
	1992-99	Virgilio Dias Marçal	UDT	Baucau	Timorese
Bobonaro	May 1976-84	João da Costa Tavares	UDT	Bobonaro	Timorese
	1984-89	João da Costa Tavares	UDT	Bobonaro	Timorese
	1989-92?	Mariano Lopes da Cruz	UDT	Manatuto	Timorese
	1992?-99	Guilherme dos Santos	Apodeti	Bobonaro	Timorese
Covalima	May 77 - c. 81	Américo da Costa Nunes	Apodeti	Bobonaro	Timorese
	c. 1981-89	Rui Emiliano T Lopes	UDT		Timorese
		Rui Emiliano T Lopes	UDT	Suai	Timorese
	1994-99	Drs Herman Sediono	ABRI	Suai	Indonesian
Dili	May 1976-84	Mário Sanches da Costa	Ex-Fretilin	Laleia	Timorese
	1984-89	Raimundo Sarmiento	UDT	Manatuto	Timorese
		Armindo Soares Mariano	Apodeti	Viqueque	Timorese
	1994-99	Domingos M D Soares	-	Manatuto	Timorese
Ermera	May 1976-84	Tomás Aquino Gonçalves	Apodeti	Atsabe	Timorese
	1984-89	Tomás Aquino Gonçalves	Apodeti	Atsabe	Timorese
	1994-99	Lieutenant-Colonel Inf Hidayat Constantino Soares	ABRI -	Ermera	Indonesian Timorese
Liquiça	May 1977-84	Francisco dos Santos	Apodeti	Liquiça	Timorese
	1984-89	Ribeiro	UDT	Same	Timorese
	1994-99	Jaime Remedios de Oliveira Gaspar Sarmiento Leoneto Martins	UDT Apodeti	Liquiça Ossu	Timorese Timorese Timorese
Lautém	May 1976-85	Claudio Vieira	Apodeti	Moro	Timorese
	1985-90	Lieutenant-Colonel Hendrikus	ABRI	-	Indonesian
	1990-95	José Valente	Fretilin	Lore	Timorese
	1995-99	Edmundo Conceição da Silva	Apodeti	Moro	Timorese
Manatuto	May 1976-84	Luis Maria da Silva	Apodeti	Manatuto	Timorese
	1984-89	Elias Enes Carceres	KOTA	Manatuto	Timorese
	1994-99	Abilio José Osorio Soares Vidal Doutel Sarmiento	Apodeti Manatuto	Laclubar Manatuto	Timorese Timorese
Manufahi	May 1976-84	Alexandrino Borromeo	UDT	Manufahi	Timorese
	1984-89	Tomás Correia	UDT	Manatuto	Timorese
		Nazario Andrade	UDT	Manatuto	Timorese
	1995-99	Nazario Andrade	UDT	Manatuto	Timorese
Viqueque	May 1976-84	Jaime dos Santos Carvalho	Apodeti	Viqueque	Timorese
	1984-89	Mayor Syarif Hidayat	ABRI	-	Indonesian
	1989-94	Y Hendro S	ABRI	-	Indonesian
	1995-99	I Ketut Lunca	ABRI	-	Indonesian
	1999	Martinho Fernandes	Apodeti	Uatu-Lari	Timorese

Source: CAVR research and compilation

Village-level administration

173. An Indonesian village is administered by a village head (*Kepala Desa*), who coordinates with two subsidiary neighbourhood administrative units (*Rukun Tetangga*, RT and *Rukun Warga*, RW). In Portuguese times, the East Timorese village (*suco*) was often administered by the local king (*liurai*). During the Indonesian occupation, as was the case in most of Indonesia, the hereditary traditional leader was often someone imposed on by the state.²⁰⁰

174. After major displacements and resettlement of most of the population between 1976 and the early 1980s, Indonesia began economically and socially to develop the villages of East Timor. The Villagers' Defence Organisation was created by the Ministry of Home Affairs (*Mendagri*), Decree 25, in 1980, and in 1982 Indonesia established this organisation in East Timor. The organisation was staffed by villagers who were tasked with implementing state development goals at the village level.

175. Another significant body of village administration was the Village Cooperative Unit (Koperasi Unit Desa, KUD). This was a farming cooperative that worked with state monopolies to sell farm produce. Although its stated goal was for the state to guarantee farmers with an income and market, in practice these good intentions were often abused by the various state monopolies. This was the case in East Timor, where the Village Cooperative Unit was used to purchase coffee from farmers at prices far below market rates, a practice which the military-backed coffee monopoly PT Denok profited from extensively (see extensive discussion in Chapter 7.9: Economic and Social Rights). The Indonesian economist, Professor Mubyarto, commented on the impact this had on the East Timorese coffee industry and on the credibility of the civil administration:

[T]he stagnation of the coffee economy is due mainly to the arrangement by which private monopolies buy coffee through the official Village Unit Cooperatives system. In the eyes of the general public the private monopoly which operates through the village cooperatives diminishes the government's credibility, especially in relation to its capabilities (or even its integrity) in village development.²⁰¹

176. Military commanders and high-level administration officials such as the governor benefited from their control of the coffee industry. Former governor Mário Carrascalão described the division of the huge profits reaped at the expense of East Timorese farmers, and how these "coffee fee" funds were divided between district- and provincial-level military and civilian officials - the governor, the state prosecutor, the military commander and others.²⁰²

177. In 1984 a military-run development programme called "ABRI Enters the Village" (*ABRI Masuk Desa*, AMD) was launched.²⁰³ ABRI contended that this was a valuable contribution to village development by territorial troops, whereas critics of the programme saw it as yet another way for the military to keep the population under surveillance.

178. The degree of control by the military over local administration and the economy, as well as security matters, left many East Timorese deeply embittered, including some of those who had initially supported the Indonesian intervention and occupation. A team of Indonesian economists described the impact of the military on the province's economy:

Because of the military's excessive interference in economic and development matters, local people tend not to have much respect for them. Indeed, some among the East Timorese elite detest the military because they are held responsible for the region's economic stagnation.²⁰⁴

The civil service

179. Indonesia built a large civil service in East Timor, nearly twice as large in relation to population than the national civil service.* In 1981 there were 780 public servants. By 1997 there were over 33,602.²⁰⁵ Of these, 18,000 were in the districts, and the remainder, 15,300, were in Dili. Many of these were teachers and health workers. Many civil servants in East Timor were recruited from Indonesia. They generally held more powerful positions than their East Timorese counterparts. East Timorese applicants to government positions had to acquire Indonesian citizenship. They were typically treated with suspicion and were always screened to prove their loyalty to the Indonesian state and its doctrine, *Pancasila*. A special division of ABRI known as the Tactical Command (*Komando Taktis, Kotis*) conducted the screenings.† The deep suspicion of East Timorese personnel indicated by this process was a factor in their lack of opportunity to rise to higher levels of the civil service.²⁰⁶

180. The Indonesian civil administration in East Timor was, for most of the occupation, subservient to the military administration and its structures. The military dominated all aspects of administration in the early years of occupation when pacification of the resistance was the first priority and full-scale military operations were underway. As this situation eased in the late 1970s, the military failed to completely destroy the armed Resistance, and its preoccupation with controlling the civilian population resulted in the predominance of military administrative structures all the way to sub-district and village levels. Military personnel also held key positions within the civil administration itself. Many used these positions for their own financial advantage. The results were dual administrations, over-administration and a stifling impact on the economy and development. The civil administration was also compromised by its closeness to ABRI.

181. The New Order regime produced a highly centralised process of government based in Jakarta which meant that outlying provinces such as East Timor were removed from policy decisions and lacked direction over their own future. This was exacerbated in the militarised context of conflict in the territory. This regime also politicised civil administration, and this was further entrenched in the context of East Timor where East Timorese with active pro-integration backgrounds were favoured over others. In addition, Indonesian authorities' distrust of East Timorese resulted in posts, particularly senior ones, within the civil administration being dominated by Indonesians brought to the territory.

182. The civil administration in East Timor was seriously flawed and compromised. In the context of continuing conflict and a heavily militarised society for the 24 years of Indonesian occupation, its effectiveness as a professional institution serving the people of the territory was limited. This in itself obstructed the protection and promotion of human rights of the East Timorese people.

* Civil servants were 3.09% of the population, versus 2.12% at a national level [*Timor Timur Dalam Angka* , Biro Pusat Statistik (*East Timor in Figures*, Central Bureau of Statistics), Dili, 1993].

† Tactical command officers could be found at every structural level of the military command and were responsible for daily intelligence and population surveillance. In the late 1970s they had responsibility for screening people who had come down from the Mountains. Anyone wanting to apply for a work permit, travel permit, identity card, or even a marriage certificate, first had to complete a 15-page questionnaire before the tactical command officer. The questionnaire covered the individual's personal life in great detail, going back generations. It also covered someone's political affiliations, attitudes and reactions to UDT's August 1975 armed movement, Indonesia's December 1975 invasion, integration, Fretilin, and more. The answers were legally binding, and "incorrect statements" were punishable.

183. Further, in late 1998 and through 1999 the Indonesian civil service was highly politicised in relation to the issue of self-determination, both before and after the signing of the 5 May Agreements. Government funds were used to support the pro-autonomy campaign, including being channelled to support the activities of militias (see Part: 3: The History of the Conflict).

¹ Carmel Budiardjo and Liem Soei Liong, *The War Against East Timor*, Zed Books, London, 1984, pp. 7-17; James Dunn, *East Timor: Rough Passage to Independence*, Longueville Books, NSW, 2003, p. 254; Robert Lowry, *The Armed Forces of Indonesia*, Allen and Unwin, St. Leonards, NSW, 1996, pp. 315-316.

² Most of the information in this section is taken from Ulf Sundhaussen, *The Road to Power: Indonesian Military Politics 1945-1967*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1982, pp. 1-50.

³ Ian MacFarling, *The Dual Function of the Indonesian Armed Forces*, Australian Defence Studies Center, University of New South Wales, NSW, 1996, p. 114.

⁴ Robert Cribb, "How Many Deaths? Problems in the Statistics of Massacre in Indonesia (1965-1966) and East Timor (1975-1980)" in Ingrid Wessel and Georgia Wimhöfer (eds.), *Violence in Indonesia*, Abera Verlas, Hamburg, Germany 2001, pp. 82-98.

⁵ Dunn, p. 159.

⁶ Lowry, p. 135.

⁷ MacFarling, p. 87.

⁸ Lowry, p. 20.

⁹ Ibid, p. 94.

¹⁰ Ibid, p. 110.

¹¹ Ulf Sundhaussen, "The Inner Contradiction of the Suharto Regime: A starting point for a withdrawal to the barracks" in David Bourchier and John Legge (eds.), *Democracy in Indonesia 1950s and 1990s*, Centre for Southeast Asian Studies Monash University, Victoria, 1994, pp. 277-278.

¹² Harold Crouch, "The Trend to Authoritarianism: The Post-1945 Period" in Harry Aveling (ed.), *The Development of Indonesian Society*, University of Queensland Press, St. Lucia, 1979, p. 197.

¹³ Harold Crouch, *The Army and Politics in Indonesia*, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 1978, p. 274.

¹⁴ Ibid, p. 280.

¹⁵ Department of State, *Annual Report on Military Expenditures, 1998*, submitted to the Committee on Appropriations of the U.S. Senate and the Committee on Appropriations of the U.S. House of Representatives, 19 February 1999.

¹⁶ Douglas Kammen, "Notes on the Transformation of the East Timor Military Command and its Implications for Indonesia", *Indonesia* 67, April 1999, Cornell University South East Asia Program (SEAP), Ithaca, pp. 64; Lowry, p. 23.

¹⁷ Crouch, *The Army and Politics in Indonesia*, p. 273.

¹⁸ MacFarling, p. 100.

¹⁹ Ibid, p. 130.

²⁰ Ibid, p. 145.

²¹ Crouch, *The Army and Politics in Indonesia*, pp. 275-77.

²² Yusuf Wanandi, statement to the CAVR National Public Hearing on Self-Determination and the International Community, 15-17 March 2004; see also Chapter 7.9: Economic and Social Rights.

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- ²³ Crouch, *The Army and Politics in Indonesia*, p. 299.
- ²⁴ *Ibid*, p. 300.
- ²⁵ Lowry, pp. 47-48.
- ²⁶ Arnold C Brackman, *Indonesia: Suharto's Road*, American-Asian Educational Exchange, New York, 1973, p. 29.
- ²⁷ MacFarling, p. 139.
- ²⁸ *Ibid*, p. 92.
- ²⁹ *Keputusan Presiden 19/1969 [Presidential Decree 19/1969]* 3 March 1969, cited in MacFarling, p. 92.
- ³⁰ Lowry, pp. 70-72.
- ³¹ Ken Conboy, *Kopassus: Inside Indonesia's Special Forces*, Equinox Publishing, Jakarta, 2003, p. 197.
- ³² Pusat Sejarah dan Tradisi TNI, Markas Besar TNI, *Sejarah TNI Jilid IV (1966-1983)* [Center for TNI History and Tradition, TNI Main Headquarters, *TNI History Volume IV (1966-1983)*], Jakarta, 2000, p. 145; Conboy, p. 199.
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