

Part 5: Resistance: Structure and Strategy

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Part 5: Resistance: Structure and Strategy

5.1 Introduction

1. The resistance against Indonesian occupation in Timor-Leste went through a complex development. This Part provides an overview of the Resistance movement including its emergence during the period of Fretilin administration following the coup; the effect of destruction of the Fretilin bases in 1978-79 by the Indonesian military including the loss of a number of Fretilin/Falintil leaders and the end of the protracted people's war strategy; the regeneration of Falintil, the armed front of the Resistance, after 1987 and its structure and strategies until the referendum in 1999; and the structure and strategies of the clandestine front over the course of the occupation. The third front in the Resistance movement, the diplomatic front, is discussed in Chapter 7.1: The Right to Self-Determination, and so is not considered in detail here. The Commission notes that this chapter is only a first step in understanding the complex history of this aspect of Timorese history and that there is considerable scope for further research in the future.

2. The Resistance had its origins in the armed conflict triggered by the armed movement of 11 August 1975. The UDT movement aimed to eradicate the so-called "communist" elements within Fretilin, who UDT considered dangerous to the national interest of Timor-Leste. The Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor (Frente Revolucionaria de Timor Leste Independente, Fretilin), which succeeded in securing the support from most East Timorese in the Portuguese colonial armed forces, won the conflict in fewer than 20 days. With its victory over UDT, and the departure of the Portuguese colonial government, Fretilin found itself having to act as the *de facto* government of Timor-Leste. Its leadership, which previously believed they could secure independence without armed conflict, suddenly faced a new situation that forced them to reorganise.

3. The invasion of the powerful Indonesian military on 7 December 1975 forced Fretilin and its armed wing, the Armed Forces for the Liberation of Timor-Leste (Forças Armadas de Libertação Nacional de Timor Leste, Falintil) to flee to the mountains to reorganise into an armed resistance force. Fretilin were confronted with many problems during the process of reorganisation. Differences of opinion on the structure and even more so the strategy to be used by Fretilin/Falintil arose. The changes in structure and strategy over time reflected not only the changes in the nature of the conflict, but were also a result of conflicts within the Resistance movement itself.

4. The fact that the majority of people fled to the forest also became a problem. A number of Resistance leaders believed that the war they were fighting was not only about the expulsion of foreign aggressors, but also a revolution to erase the old social order that oppressed people, known as "exploitation of man by man" (*exploração do homem pelo homem*) and to build in its place a new social structure without oppression. For them the war was a revolutionary war. In the aftermath of the Indonesian invasion, a majority of Fretilin leaders held this view. In the forest civilians were organised to support the armed resistance logistically or politically. People were organised through social and political programmes to create the new social structures.

5. Other leaders, especially those with a military background, tended to see the war only from its military aspect, and regarded the people as a burden to the Resistance because of the military resources required to protect civilian lives. With the Indonesian military's relentless offensive against Fretilin resistance bases, the conflicts within the Resistance

increased. Unable to endure the attacks, some leaders allowed or even advised people to surrender.

6. Other leaders tried to negotiate with the enemy, but these actions were strongly opposed and sometimes became a source of armed conflict within the Resistance itself.

7. The destruction of the “liberated zones” (“*zonas libertadas*”) brought about an entirely new situation. Civilians, some Fretilin civilian leaders and some Falintil troops were captured or surrendered because they could not withstand the Indonesian military assaults. Other Falintil units and a few Fretilin leaders managed to escape the “encirclement and annihilation” operations and survived in the forest by constantly moving from one place to another. The separation of civilians from the armed resistance prompted the Resistance movement to enter a new phase, in which Falintil in the forest were supported by civilians in the settled, Indonesian-controlled areas. Previously, by contrast, civilians had been organised by Fretilin cadres in the Resistance support bases (*bases de apoio*), and Falintil had been responsible only for security.

8. Falintil troops regrouped into small independent units without a fixed base, and made guerrilla attacks on the Indonesian military. Logistical support, which was once provided from civilians in the Resistance *bases de apoio*, now had to be obtained from civilians in the occupied territory. As such, the armed resistance movement in the forest had to develop new ways to organise civilians as their main source of support.

9. Underground activities (*clandestina*) supporting the armed struggle in the forest and the diplomatic struggle overseas became increasingly important. These activities were first carried out by Fretilin cadres in the city who had not fled to the interior at the time of the Indonesian invasion on 7 December 1975. After the destruction of the *zonas libertadas*, the Fretilin political cadres as well as ex-Falintil commanders and soldiers also began to undertake clandestine activities to support the struggle. Their role was crucial to providing logistics and information to Falintil, for communication between Falintil forces who were separated from each other, and for communication between leaders of the armed resistance in the forest and leaders of the diplomatic resistance overseas.

10. In 1981 the Revolutionary Council of National Resistance (Conselho Revolucionário de Resistência Nacional, CRRN) was established and formally took over the leadership of the Resistance. In practice Falintil led the Resistance as it represented the only functioning Resistance leadership. Although the commander of Falintil was the National Political Commissar (Comissário Política Nacional), Falintil’s real power came from its position as the most active branch of the Resistance. Indeed, political activities among the civilian population at this time were limited to assisting Falintil logistically.

11. The National Council of Maubere Resistance (Concelho Nacional da Resistência Maubere, CNRM) was founded in 1987 to replace the CRRN. This changed Fretilin’s role in the leadership of the Resistance to a purely symbolic one. The Resistance leadership accepted that independence could never be achieved through war because of the enemy’s military dominance, and instead focused on achieving independence through a peaceful resolution with primary attention to the international arena. The diplomatic struggle, which had been launched before the Indonesian invasion in 1975, was given greater emphasis. International support was sought not only from non-aligned nations and socialist nations, but also from liberal democratic nations that had previously paid little attention to the plight of Timor-Leste.

12. Some Resistance leaders felt the need to establish a new forum to accommodate all political parties and movements that supported independence, particularly those outside Fretilin. The CNRM aimed to be a movement of national unity, struggling against occupation on three fronts: the armed front in the forest and interior, the clandestine front in the villages

and towns in Timor-Leste and Indonesia, and the diplomatic front in the international arena (for more information on the diplomatic front see Chapter 7.1: The Right to Self-Determination). At this time, Falintil went through a “breaking of party ties” (*despartidarização*) with Fretilin, and became the national armed forces under the leadership of the CNRM. This arrangement continued after the establishment of the National Council of Timorese Resistance (Concelho Nacional da Resistência Timorense, CNRT) in place of the CNRM in April 1998 in Peniche, Portugal, which led the Resistance until the end of Indonesian occupation in 1999.

5.2 Fretilin and the *Base de Apoio*

13. The Indonesian invasion caused major displacement of civilians to the forests and mountains with Fretilin. This is considered in detail in Chapter 7.3: Forced Displacement and Famine.

14. Providing the large number of refugees with shelter, food and other basic necessities was a huge problem for Fretilin. Fretilin, having written a social and political programme as early as November 1974, appeared well prepared to organise the people. Cadres immediately arranged administration from the sub-village (*aldeia*), to the village (*suco*) up to the district (*região*) level using their existing organisational structures. Administrators at the *aldeia* level reorganised people from their own *aldeia*, village administrators reorganised people from their village, and so on, until there was a Fretilin administration in the mountains. It appears that this reorganisation was an initiative from the rank and file cadre. Eduardo de Jesus Barreto, a cadre from the Ermera Zone stated:

Up until early 1976 there was no strong formal structure at the ground level, but Fretilin militants in the bases managed to organise people although not formally...People also performed farming activities like growing corn, tubers, and other edible plants individually or in groups.¹

15. This spontaneous restructuring lasted from the beginning of the war until mid-1976. At that time, the Indonesian army had managed to take control of only the towns, the north coastal road from west to east and the central corridor running from north to south. Xanana Gusmão testified to the Commission:

*The enemy came into Dili, Baucau and Lospalos, and people fled. There was still major confusion. After that it began to stabilise...When the enemy managed to take over the main roads, the north road and from north to south, it began to feel stable. Because of this situation the Central Committee came up with the idea to establish six sectors in May 1976...based on the division of the political administration from *aldeia*, *suco*, *zona*, *região*, and *sector*.²*

Organisation of civilians

16. The organisation of civilians (and the military) was discussed at the Fretilin Central Committee’s second plenary session held in Soibada (Manatuto) in May 1976 (the Soibada

Conference).^{*} At this conference, it was decided to form national civilian and military structures. The *zonas libertadas* were divided into six sectors.[†] These sectors defined both military zones under military command and political and administrative units under Fretilin administration. In accordance with the principle that politics commands the gun (*política comanda fuzil*), the military commanders deferred to the civilian political administrators.[‡] However, some of the highest military positions, such as chief of staff and the minister and two deputy ministers of defence, were also members of the Fretilin Central Committee.

17. The position of political commissar (*comissário política*), the supreme leader in each sector with responsibility for both political and military matters, was also created in Soibada. All political commissars were members of the Fretilin Central Committee.[§] The sectors, the districts they covered and the political commissar in each sector are set out below:

Table 1 - Fretilin regional structure from May 1976

Sector	Districts included	Political Commissar
Ponta Leste (Eastern End)	Lautém	Juvenal Inácio (Sera Key)**
Centro Leste (Central East)	Baucau and Viqueque	Vicente dos Reis (Sa'he) ^{††}
Centro Norte (Central North)	Manatuto, Aileu, and Dili	João Bosco Soares
Centro Sul (Central South)	Manufahi and Ainaro	Hamis Bassarewan (Hata)
Fronteira Norte (Northern Frontier)	Ermera, Liquiça and some parts of Bobonaro	Hélio Pina (Maukruma)
Fronteira Sul (Southern Frontier)	Covalima and some parts of Bobonaro	César Correia (César Mau Laka)

18. Political commissars worked with assistant commissars (*assistente comissariado*).^{‡‡} Assistant commissars were each responsible for organising specific tasks such as health, agriculture, education, the women's organisations and political propaganda. The secretariat of the Fretilin administrators was called the *Comissariado*. Sectors were divided into smaller administrative units.^{§§}

Table 2 - Fretilin administrative structure

Administrative unit	Area	Leadership
Region (região)	Similar to the area	A secretary (<i>secretário</i>) and a regional vice secretary

* The plenary session was held from 15 May to 2 June 1976. The session decided "three guiding principles of the Maubere Revolution": people's war, protracted war, and self-reliance [Fretilin, *Relatório da Delegação do Comité Central da Fretilin em Missão de Serviço no Exterior do País*, p. 3].

† There were supposed to be seven sectors, with the Oecusse enclave as the seventh, but circumstances did not allow for the establishment of the Oecusse sector [CAVR Interviews with Jacinto Alves, Dili, 11 May 2004 and Francisco Gonçalves, Dili, 14 June 2003].

‡ This principle had already been in effect since the establishment of Falintil in August 1975 after the 11 August movement by UDT. From that time, Falintil was under the command of the Fretilin Central Committee [see, for example, CAVR Interviews with Lucas da Costa, Dili, 21 June 2004, with Taur Matan Ruak, Dili, 9 June 2004 and Xanana Gusmão, Dili, 7 July 2004].

§ According to Xanana Gusmão, who at the time was a member of the Fretilin Central Committee, departments of the RDTL government were no longer functioning at this time [CAVR Interview with Xanana Gusmão, Dili, 7 July 2004]. In the Fretilin Central Committee there was a Permanent Committee, in charge of making decisions if a Central Committee plenary session was not possible [CAVR Interview with Jacinto Alves, Dili, 11 May 2004].

** In the RDTL Board of Ministers, Sera Key was the Minister of Finance. After the Aikurus (Remexio, Aileu) meeting, some parts of Baucau and Viqueque, east of the road connecting Baucau to Viqueque, were included in the Ponta Leste Sector. This change was due to the fact that Indonesian military control of that road made it difficult for the two territories in that sector to communicate [CAVR Interview with Francisco Gonçalves, Dili, 14 June 2003; Xanana Gusmão, Sarah Niner (ed.), *To Resist is to Win! The autobiography of Xanana Gusmão*, Victoria: Aurora Books, 2000, p. 49].

†† In the RDTL Board of Ministers he occupied the position of the Minister of Labour and Welfare.

‡‡ In the Ponta Leste sector, the delegado komisariado was better known as "DK" (pronounced "de kapa") [CAVR Interview with Egas da Costa Freitas, 19 May 2004].

§§ Some mentioned the existence of *barracas* (barracks) units, but they were not part of the formal administrative structure.

	covered by a conselho in the Portuguese colonial administration system, today referred to as district.	(<i>vice secretário regional</i>).
Zone (zona)	Similar to the territory that, in the Portuguese administrative system, was called a posto, today referred to as sub-district.	The Zone Committee (<i>Comite de Zona</i>) led by a <i>secretário</i> and <i>vice secretário de zona</i> . In the <i>Comite da Zona</i> there was a Health Commission (<i>Comissão de Saude</i>), Agriculture Commission (<i>Comissão da Agricultura</i>) and Education Commission (<i>Comissão da Educação</i>). ³ Attached to each commission was an <i>activista</i> , whose task was to implement the programmes. There was also an <i>activista</i> responsible for political education.
Village (suco)	Same as a village today. Still generally referred to as a suco.	<i>Secretário de suco</i> , assisted by a <i>vice secretário</i> . They were in charge of suco-level bodies called sections (<i>secções</i>), such as the health section (<i>secção de saude</i>), agriculture section (<i>secção da agricultura</i>), education section (<i>secção da educação</i>) and political propaganda section (<i>secção da propaganda política</i>).
Sub-village (aldeia)	Same as a sub-village today. Still generally referred to as an aldeia.	<i>Responsável da aldeia</i> .

19. This structure was a continuation of the government system established by Fretilin when it took control of Timor-Leste after the defeat of the 11 August movement of UDT. For instance at the zona level, some informants told the Commission that the government was run by a directorate (*direcção*), which consisted of a secretary and vice secretary, assistants, and the local leaders of OPMT and the youth organisation, the Popular Organisation of Timorese Youth (Organização Popular de Jovens Timorenses, OPJT).⁴ This followed the structural model Fretilin employed at the district level after 11 August 1975 (see Part 3: The History of the Conflict).

20. This structure changed little until the destruction of the *zona libertadas*. In 1977, as the *zona libertadas* came under growing pressure from Indonesian military attacks, the Fretilin leadership abolished the região level of administration, and the zona was placed immediately under the administration of the sectors. A new position of adjunct (*adjunto*) was created. The *adjunto*, who like political commissars were members of the Fretilin Central Committee, assisted the zona administrators in the implementation of Fretilin social-political programmes.⁵ There were two to three *adjunto* in each sector. In 1978, the title of *activista* was changed to assistant (*assistente*).⁶

Military organisation

21. There was also confusion within the military organisation after the invasion of December 1975. Falintil troops assigned to the border areas and towns, which fell immediately after the invasion, retreated to their places of origin. In the zonas, Falintil regrouped into units called companies (*companhias*),^{*} led by a zona commander (*comandante de zona*). Most *comandantes de zona* were sergeants in the Portuguese

* These companies consisted of former East Timorese soldiers of the Portuguese colonial armed forces and civilians who had joined the militia formed by Fretilin after the 11 August movement of UDT and received some military training. Some militia members joined Falintil units that were assigned to face the Indonesian army in the border area following attacks in October 1975 [CAVR Interviews with Xanana Gusmão, Dili, 7 July 2004; Adriano João, Dili, 23 April 2003; Filomeno Paixão de Jesus, Dili, 17 June 2004; Lucas da Costa, Dili, 21 June 2004; Agostinho Carvaleira Soares, Cailaco, Bobonaro, 14 June 2003; Sebastião da Silva, June 2003, and Cornelio Gama (aka Nahak Leki, L-7), Baucau, 9 April 2003; see also Lere Anan Timor, Archives of the *Tuba Rai Metin Oral History Project*, Submission to CAVR, CD No. 18].

colonial armed forces.* There were between one and four companies in each zona, depending on the availability of trained men and weapons.⁷ Each company consisted of three or four platoons (*pelotões*).⁸

22. These companies were theoretically under the control of the Falintil General Staff (*Estado Maior das Falintil*). After the unilateral declaration of independence on 28 November 1975, Falintil came under the Department of National Defence, which was led by a minister and two deputy ministers. Rogério Lobato was the Minister of Defence, as well as the Commander of Falintil. The deputy ministers were Hermenegildo Alves and Guido Soares. When Rogério Lobato left Timor-Leste days after the 28 November to seek international support, the two deputy ministers took over the ministry. The department of defence oversaw the Falintil General Staff, which was under the command of the Chief of Staff, Guido Soares, whose Deputy Chief was José da Silva.[†]

23. After the invasion this structure proved ineffective. Companies were under the control of the zona commanders, who operated relatively independently of the central command and focused mainly on defending their own zona. This created problems when it came to conducting military operations. Filomeno Paixão, who was a company commander in Liquiça, told the Commission:

*In one zona...there was one zona commander. The zona commander had between one and three companies under his command. In Liquiça, for example, there were three companies with one zona commander. But each [company] only took the initiative in their own sub-districts...Some sub-districts had plenty of weapons, while others didn't have any weapons at all.*⁹

24. This problem was resolved by a decision made at the Soibada Conference (Manatuto) to reorganise the military. With the establishment of sectors, regions, and zones for all *zona libertadas*, sector commands (*comandos de sector*), regional commands (*comandos de região*), and zone commands (*comando de zona*) were created and a commander was appointed for each sector, region and zone.¹⁰ In addition to battle companies, the Self-Defence Forces (Força Auto Defesa, Fade) were established in settlements. A Fade unit comprised people from the local area with basic military training. The strength of the Fade varied between local areas; one zone could have up to one company.¹¹ Some were armed with traditional weapons like spears and arrows, others with automatic rifles. Because most did not have firearms, Fade units were also known as the “white forces” (armed with traditional weapons only) (*armas brancas*). The Fade’s main task was to defend settlements, although some were also sent to assist Falintil units on the frontline.¹²

25. The zona commanders continued to oversee the troop companies, but they operated under the authority of the região commander, while the região commander himself was under the command of the sector commander.[‡] With this reorganisation, the Falintil General Staff oversaw all the territorial commands. The reorganisation at Soibada increased Falintil’s

* For instance, the zona commander of Quelicai (Baucau), Aquilis Freitas, had been a colonial soldier with the rank of first sergeant (*sargento*). He was a cavalry troop company commander in Atabae (Bobonaro) [CAVR Interview with Adriano João, Dili, 10 June 2003]. The zona commander of Cailaco (Bobonaro), José Maria, was a second sergeant (*furiel*) in the Portuguese army in Timor-Leste [CAVR Interview with Agostino Carvaleira Soares, 13 August 2003].

† José da Silva was replaced by Domingos Ribeiro in the second half of 1976. José da Silva was replaced because he challenged the decision at the Soibada Conference to reorganise the troops, which brought him into conflict with the political commissar of the Fronteira Norte, Maukruma, who was responsible for implementing the new structure [CAVR Interview with Filomeno Paixão de Jesus, Dili, 17 June 2004].

‡ Up to that point, the biggest army unit was a company (*companhia*); there were no larger units such as battalions (*batalhão*).

capacity to face the Indonesian army. Falintil's operational territory became larger because they could now operate in areas larger than a zona. Troops and weapons could also be moved from one zona to another according to military need.¹³

26. Further changes in the military structure were decided at the Laline Conference (Lacluta, Viqueque), held between March and May 1977.^{*} The Laline Conference agreed that the concentration of military units in zonas was another weakness. Filomeno Paixão, who attended the conference, recalled:

We thought that the strategy was not so good, because [the Ermera] região would say "we are Ermera so we belong only to Ermera", and Liquiça would say it belonged only to Liquiça. It was hard to supply weapons and ammunition to other regiões. That was why, after the Laline Conference, sector companies were formed to provide people with security, and intervention companies were formed that no longer could act from behind or outside...So while previously the war was fought within a região, now it was fought across all the whole sector.¹⁴

27. Thus every company in a sector was placed directly under the command of the sector commander.

28. Further change took place in mid-1977, related to the Fretilin internal conflict. The Fretilin Central Committee, meeting in Aikurus (Remexio, Aileu), abolished the National Department of Defence, including the deputy minister positions, after an evaluation found it was not effective. Leadership of Falintil fell to the Falintil General Staff. Both deputy defence ministers were demoted to the positions of sector commanders. Hermenegildo Alves became the commander of the Centro Leste Sector and Guido Soares became the commander of Centro Sul. Domingos Ribeiro, who was previously deputy chief of staff, became the chief of staff. The deputy chief of staff position was abolished. In the Falintil General Staff, there were eight staff positions called the *colaborador do estado maior*, responsible for areas under the General Staff's authority such as operations, codes, information, logistics and training.¹⁵

29. In accordance with the principle of civilian control of the military, the President of Timor-Leste, also the President of Fretilin, Nicolau Lobato, directed the Falintil General Staff. At the same time, Nicolau Lobato also held the position of political commissar for the Falintil General Staff, with the function of providing political orientation to the army.[†]

30. At this time, a new unit called the Shock Troops (*Brigada Choque*, usually abbreviated as Brichoq) was formed.[‡] This brigade was formed by the chief of staff and was directly under his command. It operated throughout Timor-Leste.¹⁶ Guido Soares, who was previously the chief of the Falintil General Staff, became the commander of the Brichoq.¹⁷

^{*} This was the session of the Highest Resistance Council and the Political Committee of the Fretilin Central Committee, held from 8 March to 20 May 1977 [Fretilin, *Relatório da Delegação do Comité Central da Fretilin em Missão de Serviço no Exterior do País*, p. 4]. It is possible that the Highest Resistance Council referred to in this document was the Highest Struggle Council (*Concelho Superior da Luta*), which consisted of the RDTL President (who also was the president of Fretilin), RDTL Vice President (deputy chairman of Fretilin), Deputy Minister of Defence, Minister of Information and National Security, and Comissário Política Nacional [CAVR Interviews with Jacinto Alves, Dili, 11 May 2004 and Egas da Costa Freitas, 19 May 2004]. If this was its composition, it is clear that the Council was a hybrid between party (Fretilin) and government (RDTL).

[†] While the political commissar for sectors were under the Comissário Política Nacional (CPN, National Political Commissioner), that was not the case with Falintil General Staff's Political Commissar according to Jacinto Alves Nicolau Lobato, who was also the President of RDTL at that time, and who worked daily at the Falintil General Staff [CAVR Interview with Jacinto Alves, Dili, 11 May 2004].

[‡] This Brigade was also known as the "Brigada Intervenção" ("Intervention Brigade"), "Força de Intervenção" ("Intervention Forces") or "Companhia de Intervenção" ("Intervention Company").

With the establishment of this brigade, there were Brichoq, sector and zona companies, and the Fade.

Fretilin's socio-political programme

31. The organisation of civilians in the *zonas libertadas* was the responsibility of the Fretilin civil administration. After the invasion, Fretilin's main focus was launching and supporting the Resistance. Xanana Gusmão, then a member of the Fretilin Central Committee, told the Commission:

We had just begun the war and the people were with us [in the interior]. [We established] bases de apoio, with the idea they would function as a base to provide logistical and political support, which we could describe as revolution...In May 1976 the Fretilin Central Committee put the bases de apoio into effect. So six sectors were established...with that the base de apoio...structure was formed. Bases de apoio were implemented as a mechanism to organise people so they could continue to fight in the war.¹⁸

32. Settlements, which at first were strategic territories called "retreat zones" (*zona reta guarda*), changed to become the *bases de apoio*. The people were organised to run programmes in agriculture, health, education, culture and women's liberation.¹⁹

Agricultural production

33. To increase production, agricultural work was performed by people organised into teams.²⁰ Agricultural land was divided into three types of ownership: private, cooperative and state ownership. * Families owned private land and, while all members of a given work group farmed this land, the produce belonged to each family. Cooperative land was owned and worked on by all members of a work group and the produce was distributed equally among its members. † Everybody worked on state property and the produce was used by the state to feed Falintil, the civilian administration, the elderly and disabled, and kept for seed reserves.²¹ As well as food crops such as corn, tubers, sweet potatoes and bananas, cotton was also planted.²²

34. Women also worked in agricultural production performing activities such as pounding sago palm into flour and making plaited items like baskets.²³ If a woman had small children, they were cared for in a crèche, and some people were assigned to a team to maintain the crèche.²⁴

35. Initially agricultural production proceeded smoothly. The situation worsened once the major military offensive began in September 1978. Planted land could not be harvested as the population had to move constantly because of attacks by the Indonesian army. These attacks also prevented planting new crops.²⁵

Health

36. The Fretilin cadres responsible for health, including traditional doctors, produced medicine from plants including quinine pills and treatments for gunshot wounds.²⁶ They also

* Meaning the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste.

† The Fretilin administrators also had to work in work groups but they only did a small amount of farm work because their time was mostly taken up with politics [CAVR Interview with Virgílio Guterres Silva, Dili, 25 May 2004].

cared for the wounded and performed minor operations. Research was conducted to find plants with healing qualities. Lucas da Costa, who was the head of the hospital in Same (Manufahi) during the Portuguese colonial era, recalled his experiences in the Uaimori area (Viqueque):

I did research on plant therapy and medication using traditional medicines around the middle of 1976...We built a hospital. We conducted studies on traditional medicines. We gathered together some people who knew about traditional medicines and conducted a number of experiments. We built a pharmacy to make tablets and [methods for] injecting medicine. Our injections didn't work, but our tablets for malaria were a success. We also successfully made tablets for headaches, and, although it was very basic, it was quite effective.²⁷

37. Former students provided public education on healthy living and the construction and use of public toilets. Virgílio da Silva Guterres from the Venilale zona (Baucau) described his experiences:

[Boys] who were in the third grade of primary school were...given training on literacy, health and politics. After the training the participants were divided into groups called Brigada Dinamisadora [Dynamisation Brigades], each consisting of five people. The groups' task was to teach literacy and health and assist people to make toilets to maintain health standards.²⁸

Education and culture

38. Fretilin provided education in two main areas: literacy and politics. Literacy programmes appear to have been conducted in a piecemeal fashion because of the lack of people trained in this field at the time. In certain places OPMT activists ran the programmes and focused particularly on women.²⁹ In some zones school activities were conducted for children.³⁰

39. The most common educational activity was political education. Fretilin gave much attention to providing political training for Fretilin cadres to increase their capacity to organise people and their political and ideological knowledge. The commissariat in each sector established a Centre for Political Training (Centro da Formação Política, Ceforpol). These centres were run by the região and zona committees, or by village and aldeia administrators. Topics covered included the history of Timor-Leste from the arrival of the Portuguese, theories of social development, the philosophy of dialectical materialism, building people-power, the organisational principles of "the mass line" (*linha de massa*) and democratic centralism, women's emancipation and collective food production. Military strategy and national liberation were also discussed, as well as wars of national liberation in other countries such as Guinea Bissau, China and Vietnam. The instructors in the Ceforpols were members of the Fretilin Central Committee and Falintil commanders.³¹ Overall, the Ceforpols were under the supervision of the Department of Political and Ideological Orientation (Departamento da Orientação Política e Ideológica, DOPI), which was a department of the Fretilin Central Committee.³²

40. The goal of political education for the general public was to encourage the spirit of nationalism and support the national liberation struggle.³³ Zone administrators conducted "enlightenment" (*esclarecimento*) programmes. In certain places *brigada dinamisadoras* carried out the *esclarecimento*, travelling to settlements to explain the *Fretilin Political*

Program Manual (Manual e Programa Políticos, Fretilin) and the need to work and support the Falintil armed forces fighting to restore independence in Timor-Leste.³⁴ Where there was no *brigada dinamisadora*, the *assistente de zona* carried out the programme. OPMT activists also provided political education.³⁵ Usually, popular political education was conducted together with cultural activities. A member of a *brigada dinamisadora* told the Commission:

*Every brigada was sent to an aldeia to teach during the day. At night there were activities like traditional dancing, reading traditional poems and singing folk songs...The verses in the poems were about the poor people and their suffering because of the invasion, and tributes to the people who had died fighting for the fatherland. Hearing such words aroused people's sympathy for the poor and their determination to fight for the independence of the fatherland.*³⁶

41. Fretilin cultural activities aimed to develop a sense of nationhood, based on the idea that the nation could progress only if the people fought to free themselves from the negative mentality sown by colonialism. The theme of the poor needing to fight for their liberation had been developed before the Indonesian invasion. Fretilin took traditional songs from many regions and politicised the lyrics to further this cause. Songs were sung to traditional dances such as the *tebe* and *dahur*.

42. Cultural activities were guided by the Fretilin concept of the equality of all human beings. Fretilin saw colonialism as a form of inequality by which a minority exploited and oppressed the majority. Oppression and exploitation occurred not only between the colonial power and the people of Timor-Leste, but also among the East Timorese population itself between the traditional kings (*liurai*) and the people. This was clear in such practices as mandatory tributes that people were required to pay to the *liurai*, and the use of forced labour. Inequality was also apparent in the form of discrimination and violence against women as a result of their low status in traditional society.³⁷ Fretilin introduced the concept of "comaraderie" ("*camarada*") which viewed each person as a friend and an equal. The need to eradicate inequality caused by exploitation and oppression and replace it with equality became a theme in both songs and verse which were sung at cultural events and in literacy programmes.

Women's emancipation

43. The emancipation of women was also part of Fretilin's socio-political programme. Women were encouraged to get involved in education, health, agricultural production and the production of items to be used by the military such as baskets (*lafatik, luhu*) and bags. Crèches were built in order to make it possible for women to carry out these activities. Men and women took turns in looking after the children in the crèches. The crèches also served as a place to teach children to become revolutionary nationalists through songs of struggle, poetry and theatre.³⁸

44. In some areas, courses were run to prepare women for marriage. For example, OPMT ran a course in Zona Modok in the Centro Norte Sector. The aim was to create nationalist families with respect for men's and women's rights. The future brides were taught the concept of women's emancipation. The tradition of *barlaque*, which required an exchange of goods between the families of the bride and groom and had previously been considered degrading to women, was reaffirmed as a symbol honouring women's dignity. Through these courses future brides also learned to challenge colonial and feudal attitudes and preconceptions about women, and to defend the dignity of both women and men.³⁹

Justice system

45. Fretilin created a justice system to deal with people who committed crimes. People were tried according to the type of crime they committed. For what were considered relatively minor offences, such as swearing, harassing women and stealing, a process called self-criticism was administered. In this process, the perpetrator pleaded guilty in front of a small public audience, expressed their remorse and promised not to reoffend. The perpetrators would be forgiven once they had received a light punishment, such as gathering firewood or fetching water for the public kitchen for two days. This kind of punishment was called “corrective justice” (“*justo correctivo*”).

46. For serious crimes, the process was called popular justice (*justiça popular*). Serious offences included having contact with the enemy, cooperating with the enemy, spying, betraying civilians to the enemy and treason. The accused was considered to have opposed Fretilin policies and were put on trial in public, often in front of a large crowd. The military commander who had captured the person laid the charges, the crowd decided on guilt or innocence, while the political commissar, sometimes with the assistance of the sector commander, handed down the sentence.⁴⁰ Punishments ranged from death to rehabilitation in an institution called the National Rehabilitation (Reabilitação Nacional, Renal). A Renal was “a place to rehabilitate reactionaries to become revolutionaries”,⁴¹ and were under the authority of the sector commissariat. The number of Renals varied from sector to sector (see Chapter 7.4: Detention, Torture and Ill-Treatment).*

47. Rehabilitation was the punishment for people who, despite the seriousness of their crimes, were considered to be able to realise their mistakes and change their ways.⁴² In the Renals, detainees were required to work during the day, including agricultural production such as planting and working in rice fields, and other tasks like collecting firewood and fetching water. Food produced was used to feed them and to meet Falintil’s needs.⁴³ At night they were required to attend classes in political education. In one Renal, literacy classes were provided.⁴⁴

48. There were at least two kinds of detention facilities in the Renals. The first type was a hole in the ground covered with wooden bars or by a wooden panel with a large rock on top of it. These holes varied in size: some were only 80 centimetres in height, forcing people held in there to sit on the floor, while others, such as the one in Nundamar (Remexio, Aileu), were as much as three metres deep.⁴⁵ The second type was an enclosure above ground, which was surrounded by walls of stones two to three metres in height.⁴⁶

49. There were cases where people were deprived of food or water for days in Renals. Sometimes family members were allowed to give them food or water, but on other occasions it was prohibited. Alexandrino de Jesus, a Falintil soldier captured and accused of trying to surrender to the Indonesian army, told the Commission of his experiences in a Renal:

* Renals were under the direct responsibility of an adjunto. The Renal in Nundamar, Remexio, for example, was under the responsibility of Adjunto Sebastião Montalbão (“Lais”) [CAVR Interviews with António Amado de Deus Guterres, 11 December 2003 and Egas da Costa Freitas, Dili, 19 May 2004. See generally Chapter 7.4: Detention, Torture and Ill-Treatment].

We were taken to the Renal in Sau-kata in the village of Ura Hou [Hatulia, Ermera]. We were ordered to work although we were very physically weak and we were not provided with farming tools. They ordered us to pull up and tidy one-and-a-half hectares of grass to plant corn. While we worked there, we were never fed. We split our group into two. One group worked to clear the grass, while the other group of four people, including me, searched for cassava. Luckily there was plenty of cassava around the area. [While we worked] eight Falintil members guarded us...We slept at the place where we worked, and each week we were required to report to Fatubessi [Ermera]. None of us died.

After we had been working for one-and-a-half months at the Renal and the corn was planted the commander of Fronteira Norte Sector, Filomeno Paixão, summoned us. When we arrived at [the sector command centre in Fatubessi Ermera] we were treated well. We were told to line up to receive food rations. Then we were reinstated as Falintil members.⁴⁷

50. People who were held for investigation and the process of *justiça popular* were also detained in Renals. Interrogation was the main form of investigation and some detainees were tortured during interrogation to extract confessions.⁴⁸ Eduardo de Jesus Barreto from the Fronteira Norte Sector, told the Commission:

I saw the regional commander Martinho [Soares] being buried up to his waist in a standing position, without clothes and with his hands tied. Then they burned a car tyre, allowing the melting rubber to burn his body. I couldn't stand to watch, so I walked away.⁴⁹

51. Not all serious cases were investigated. There were cases where people suspected of having planned to surrender or of being spies for the Indonesian military were simply accused by the local commander, and a decision was made on the spot. A former political assistant told the Commission:

The guilty person would be brought in front of the public. There, many people would say that he was guilty. Nobody challenged it even if they were innocent. No judge defended them. I witnessed around three cases. One person was suspected and captured in the war zone, and the commander accused him of being a spy. The commander said: "This man was captured in the guerrilla zona. He is a spy." Then people said: "If he is a spy, he must die." A Falintil commander usually handled cases like these and people just went along with whatever he said.⁵⁰

52. As a result, people were punished for crimes they did not commit. A cadre described one such case:

Some people had gone down to the town...[and] their families came under suspicion. [The commanders] were prepared to do anything to them. Torture them for instance. I opposed that. I said: "Don't do it. Because if someone goes down to the town, it means [that only] they no longer care about our struggle. Why do we have to harass their families?" I always opposed it. They accused me of having contacts with them, of betraying the struggle. I was eventually imprisoned for no reason. I wasn't tortured but I spent a few months below ground.⁵¹

Strategy

53. The resistance strategy adopted by Fretilin derived from the idea that it was engaged in a revolutionary war for independence. The concept of revolution was linked to independence, but Fretilin's idea of independence involved more than simply the departure of Portuguese colonial rulers and their replacement by an East Timorese government. For Fretilin, independence without a change in the social structure would mean only replacing one master with another. Fretilin saw independence as the creation of equality among people by "ending the inequality of the colonial situation, which was based on exploitation of the majority by a minority. The colonial minority and the wealthy exploited the majority".⁵² The process through which Fretilin wanted to eliminate the colonial social structure was revolution.*

54. The Fretilin *Political Programme and Manual* published around September 1975 stated:

[Fretilin] is called revolutionary because in order for the Timorese people to live prosperously, for true liberation, people have to change, transform, and REVOLUTIONISE all structures, which have been in place for five hundred years. We have to make a major transformation by creating new structures to serve the Timorese people. If we do not erase the oppressive structures and replace them with new structures, the Timorese people will never live prosperously, the Timorese people will never gain Independence; only a small number of people will live prosperously, just as has been happening up to this day. Many people would still live in misery.⁵³

55. Fretilin considered that traditional East Timorese society was also oppressive. In the traditional social structure the *liurai* held power over the people by forcing them to work for them and to pay tithes. Colonial rulers also used the *liurai* traditional status to mobilise people to work on plantations producing goods for export.[†] Fretilin saw the *liurai* authority as feudalism and aimed to eliminate it.

56. Colonialism and tradition were also considered oppressive towards women. Fretilin saw that Timorese women experienced twofold oppression; the general colonial oppression that all Timorese experienced, and the more specific oppression they suffered as a result of

* Article 2 of the RDTL Constitution stated: "The Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste is led based on FRETILIN's political orientation, which is aimed to erase colonial structures for the creation of a new society free from all kinds of occupation and exploitation." Fretilin also considered that colonialism could take a new form after the nation gained its independence, when foreign capital controlled Timor-Leste's economy. This situation would create an economic dependence called "neo-colonialism" that Fretilin wanted to prevent [Fretilin, *Manual e Programa Políticos Fretilin*, point 5].

† This forced labour was called "*auxiliar*" ("helper"), which the Timorese pronounced "*assuliar*."

traditional and colonialist attitudes towards women.⁵⁴ While general colonial oppression took the form of such practices as forced labour, inadequate wages and racism, women's oppression was manifested in the way women were treated as an object of pleasure for colonialist employers and as commodities traded in *barlaque* practices and polygamy. Fretilin aimed to eliminate this oppression. Fretilin's revolutionary programme included "the liberation of women as social creatures".⁵⁵

57. To create a new social structure free of oppression, Fretilin conducted socio-political programmes from September 1975. The most important programmes, according to Fretilin, were those in the fields of agriculture, health, education and culture.⁵⁶ Fretilin saw that in the agriculture sector, colonialism had made the people of Timor-Leste poorer by focusing on export crops. People starved because of food shortages and a limited variety of food.⁵⁷ Fretilin sought to develop an agriculture sector that served the interests of the people and enabled "everyone to get proper food for good health, so everyone can live in prosperity".⁵⁸ A system of cooperative ownership and organisation was deemed the most appropriate to achieve this goal. Fretilin planned to build production, distribution and consumption cooperatives all over the country. When Timor-Leste was still under Portuguese rule, Fretilin put this idea into practice in a number of places, among them Bazartete (Liquiça) and Bucoli (Baucau), the home villages of leaders Nicolau Lobato and Sahe respectively, who had pioneered these projects.⁵⁹

58. In education, Fretilin carried out literacy programmes inspired by the methods developed by the Brazilian educator, Paulo Freire.[†] Education was considered important because, for Fretilin, true independence would only happen if people actively participated in government, and people could only participate actively if they knew what they wanted and why. If people lived in ignorance, they would always be exploited. From Fretilin's perspective, the education system under the Portuguese colonial administration was the opposite of what was needed.⁶⁰ Freire's method of *conscientização* was preferable because people not only learned to read and write, but also went through a process of gaining awareness of colonial oppression and how to overcome it. The literacy programme, which had been prepared in May 1974, was first implemented in January 1975.⁶¹

59. Health was viewed as being closely connected to education. Fretilin believed that poor public health was caused by people's lack of knowledge about health and nutrition, which was in turn caused by colonialism. That was why, for Fretilin, health education was the only solution to the problem.⁶²

60. Fretilin's ideas about culture were closely linked to the need to develop a new national awareness among the people of Timor-Leste. During colonial times people generally understood that they were members of a particular village community, a particular kingdom, or a particular ethno-linguistic group. For instance, people considered themselves as Turiscai (Manufahi) people, as members of the Mambai ethno-linguistic group, rather than as an East Timorese person, and they viewed outsiders, even people from Dili, as foreigners (*malae*).⁶³ Fretilin tried to develop national awareness through programmes of cultural exchange between regions, and giving all East Timorese people a sense of ownership of these forms. For instance the *tebe* dance from one place was introduced in literacy programmes in other places. Similarly, songs, such as *Kolele Mai* which originated in a village in Baucau, were introduced throughout the nation. Fretilin also used Tetum, which was the lingua franca throughout the territory, in their meetings and literacy programmes.

^{*} Fretilin also developed a land reform programme, planning to confiscate big plantations and give them to people's cooperatives [Fretilin, *Manual e Programa Políticos Fretilin*, Program Políticos part, point 2.B.1].

[†] Fretilin played an important role influencing Portuguese government policy on education when the colonial administration under Governor Mário Lemos Pires formed an Education Committee to oversee reform during the decolonisation period [Helen Hill, *Stirrings of Nationalism in East Timor*, p. 122].

61. Fretilin believed that the revolution could be peaceful for two reasons.^{*} First, it was becoming clearer that the Portuguese policy of decolonisation was more likely to lead to independence at the time Fretilin wrote its programme in November 1974. This assured Fretilin that colonialism was bankrupt politically and administratively.⁶⁴ Second, Fretilin was becoming increasingly popular because of its socio-political programmes.⁶⁵ For example, in the local election of village chiefs in May 1975 in a number of villages in Lospalos (Lautém), a clear majority of the elected village chiefs were Fretilin supporters.⁶⁶ According to Francisco Xavier do Amaral this increased popularity made the leaders of Fretilin confident that the majority of people wanted independence and that they would easily defeat UDT's idea of federation with Portugal and Apodeti's idea of integration with Indonesia, without an armed struggle.⁶⁷ For Fretilin, the way to launching the revolution was to mobilise people to accelerate the agricultural, education, health and cultural programmes.[†]

62. The socio-political programme implemented after the Indonesian invasion was a continuation of the programmes implemented before 11 August 1975. The difference after the invasion was that the programmes were implemented in the *bases de apoio* to support the war. During the course of the war, Fretilin itself was radicalised, giving greater emphasis to the elimination of classes in society and declaring Marxism to be its ideology.[‡]

Protracted people's war

63. Initially, as noted above, the war was fought as a spontaneous and decentralised reaction to attacks by the Indonesian military, without a clear overall strategy. At the Fretilin Central Committee's second plenary session in Soibada (Manatuto), held between 15 May and 2 June 1976, Fretilin adopted the strategy of a protracted people's war.[§] Fretilin conceded that the war could not be won easily and quickly, because of Indonesia's much greater economic and military strength.⁶⁸ If Timor-Leste wanted independence, the war would have to be long and hard. Based on its analysis of the international political situation, Fretilin believed that Timor-Leste could not depend on foreign assistance for victory.^{**}

^{*} Francisco Xavier do Amaral stated that Fretilin hoped Portugal "would be willing to give [Timor-Leste independence] peacefully" and therefore there was no plan within Fretilin to organise for armed struggle. According to him, armed activities were conducted only after the armed action of movement of 11 August by UDT [CAVR Interview with Francisco Xavier do Amaral, Dili, 18 June 2004]. Terra Maubulak also mentioned the establishment of an *Exercito de Libertação Maubere* among the Timorese serving in the Portuguese colonial army by a number of Fretilin Central Committee members around May 1975 [Terra Maubulak, Archives of the *Tuba Rai Metin Oral History Project*, Submission to CAVR, CD No. 18]. But this was denied by Mari Alkatiri (who was a national political commissar) and Francisco Xavier do Amaral (who was the President of Fretilin) [CAVR Interviews with Mari Alkatiri, Dili, 25 June 2004 and Francisco Xavier do Amaral, Dili, 18 June 2004].

[†] Helen Hill mentioned that Fretilin searched for "a peaceful alternative to the guerilla war, which was to draw on people's power to fight the colonial structures" [Helen Hill, *Stirrings of Nationalism in East Timor*, p. 159].

[‡] According to Xanana Gusmão, Marxism officially became Fretilin's ideology at the Laline (Lacluta, Viqueque) Conference in 1977. Fretilin President Xavier do Amaral did not attend this conference. Another source said that Marxism was not confirmed as the official ideology at the conference because of Xavier do Amaral's absence [CAVR Interviews with Xanana Gusmão, Dili, 7 July 2004 and Jacinto Alves, Dili, 11 May 2004]. Fretilin cadres who participated in Ceforpol's political education remembered that they studied Marxism in Ceforpol classes [see for example, CAVR Interview with Egas da Costa Freitas, 19 May 2004; Lere Anan Timor, Archives of the *Tuba Rai Metin Oral History Project*, Submission to CAVR].

[§] This strategy was formulated by Mao Zedong based on China's experience of war against Japanese imperialism [Mao Zedong, "On Protracted War", 1938, in *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung*, Foreign Languages Press, Peking, 1965]. It seemed that some Fretilin leaders learned this strategy from materials from the African national liberation movements in Portuguese colonies.

^{**} The idea to ask for Western countries' assistance was rejected because those countries were "imperialists", and were opponents to countries who wanted "true liberation". Indonesia, which launched the military aggression, was viewed as a lackey of the United States, which was seen as the leader of imperialist powers in the world. The idea to seek assistance from socialist bloc countries was also rejected, on the basis that the assistance would bind the country in the future [CAVR Interview with Egas da Costa Freitas, Dili, 19 May 2004].

64. The three main principles adopted at the Soibada Conference were: that the war would be fought by and for the people, that it would be protracted, and that Timor-Leste would have to depend on its own strength. According to this strategy, war was not simply a military conflict between two armed forces, but was also viewed as a war of the people. From a purely military perspective, the deciding factors would be military and economic. But Fretilin believed that the strength and will of the people would be the deciding factor, and that they could be continuously strengthened through education and mobilisation.

65. In the protracted people's war strategy, the *bases de apoio* played a central role. They provided logistical support for the armed forces, and also built people-power through education and mobilisation.⁶⁹ Egas da Costa, an *assistente de zona* in the propaganda section in one of the zonas in the Centro Leste Sector, said:

*Because this war was a protracted war, people were educated, trained in bases, so they could develop a new view on life.*⁷⁰

66. Fretilin saw Indonesian military assaults as attacks against the people of Timor-Leste, who were attempting to liberate themselves from the oppression of man by man. In carrying out these assaults, Indonesia was considered an accomplice of the world imperialist powers. A document from DOPI, which was ratified at the Laline Conference in 1977, stated:

[T]he experiences of other countries in the struggle against colonial powers, and our own experience, show that this kind of movement is met by total violence from the imperialist power, and that the only way for a true nationalist movement to protect people from genocide or mass slaughter is to organise, mobilise and educate people to work for the full and complete eviction of the enemy and to beat imperialism.⁷¹

67. The war was considered a war of all the people against the enemy powers who were promoting their imperialist interests. Mobilising and educating people would create a popular force that was invincible in the face of imperialist aggression. The relationship between the people and the soldiers was likened to that of water and fish, meaning the people were the water that allowed the soldiers to live.⁷²

68. In more practical terms people supplied food to Falintil soldiers and were thus the source of power for the armed forces. In turn Falintil was considered to be the protector of the people, allowing them to live a life without oppression and exploitation in the liberated zones.⁷³ Falintil was under the command of Fretilin, which was the guide (*matadalan*) of the liberation struggle. The principle that regulated this relationship was "politics commands the gun" ("*a política comanda fuzil*"). According to Taur Matan Ruak, "Falintil was like the knife, used by political leaders to cut."⁷⁴

Internal conflict

69. During the period of the *zonas libertadas*, conflicts began to surface among the Fretilin leaders. These conflicts have been represented previously as occurring between ideological factions within Fretilin. This view holds that there were nationalist, social democrat, and Marxist, even Maoist groups, in Fretilin, and that the conflict between them was won by the Marxist or radical group.⁷⁵ Accounts received by the Commission describe a

different ideological divide centred on military strategy.* This divide manifested through issues such as how the principle of civilian control of the military was to be put into practice, the idea of “ideological suicide” (“*suicido ideológico*”) and the presence of civilians in Fretilin-controlled territories.

Civilian control of the military

70. The first conflict arose around the implementation of the principle that “politics commands the gun”. According to Lucas da Costa’s testimony to the Commission, opposition to this principle had already surfaced soon after Fretilin launched its “counter-coup” in August 1975, and it reached a crisis point in October 1975.⁷⁶ At that time, not long after Fretilin took control of the whole territory of Timor-Leste, the military commanders, who were mostly former Portuguese soldiers, had stronger *de facto* authority than the political leaders.[†] Adoption of the “politics commands the gun” principle had reduced their authority. Their dissatisfaction was compounded by the fact that many of the political leaders had less military knowledge and experience than them. Lucas da Costa (Rama Metan) testified to the Commission:

When Fretilin took control of the territory, frictions were felt between the Fretilin armed forces and several commanders, especially here in Dili. It reached its peak in October.

In Fretilin there was a principle, “A política comanda fuzil” meaning that politics controls the armed forces. [That principle] had been effective since we took control, it was established by the Fretilin Central Committee. Because of that principle, some company commanders felt that their authority had been compromised, because they had to obey the politicians when it was them who actually oversaw the armed forces, the soldiers. They felt uncomfortable about interacting with CCF members who were young or inexperienced.⁷⁷

71. This problem continued in the forest after the invasion, culminating in incidents such as the death of Falintil’s deputy chief of staff, José da Silva. José da Silva had been a sergeant in the Portuguese colonial armed forces, and was commander of Falintil’s first company in August 1975. He was also deputy chief of staff. After the invasion he fought in Ermera, which became part of the Centro Norte Sector. Conflicts among Fretilin leaders occurred over some of the decisions reached at the Soibada Conference. Hélio Pina (Maukruma), who was elected political commissar with Antonio Carvalho (Fera Lafaek) as his assistant, was given the task of restructuring the civilian and military relationship as decided

* Egas da Costa Freitas gave a different categorisation, which were socialist, social democrat, and “a rather fascist right”. It seems that the first persons to mention the existence of “groups” within Fretilin were Carmel Budiardjo and Liem Soei Liong, *The War Against East Timor* (Zed Books Ltd., London, 1984). According to them, there were four “groups” inside Fretilin: the underground anti-colonial group, the *Casa dos Timorenses* group, the “group around Xavier do Amaral”, and the “group around Alarico Fernandes” (pp. 53-54). John G Taylor, *Indonesia’s Forgotten War: The Hidden History of East Timor* (Zed Books, London, 1991) described a different grouping: “social-democrat groups” (represented by José Ramos-Horta, Justino Mota, Alarico Fernandes, and Francisco Xavier do Amaral), the group “that combined the tough anti-colonial nationalism with economic independence and political advancement” (Nicolau Lobato with the support of former sergeants of the Portuguese army) and the “nationalist-Marxist” group around Mau Lear and Sahe [in the revised version of *East Timor: The Price of Freedom* (Zed Books, London and New York, 1999), pp. 46-48].

† According to Jill Jolliffe, at the time the military police placed road-blocks around Dili and sent a delegate to the Fretilin leaders to demand the arrest of a number of Fretilin militants considered to be communists. This incident was resolved through a four-hour discussion on 4 November, which managed to convince the soldiers that their accusations were wrong [Jill Jolliffe, *East Timor: Nationalism and Colonialism*, pp. 185-186].

at the conference. José da Silva refused to accept the restructuring and so he captured Maukruma and several of his commanders. A fire-fight ensued and José da Silva was captured and imprisoned. He was executed by Fretilin in the middle of 1977.⁷⁸

72. It appears that conflicts about the principle of civilian control of military affairs were also factors in the executions of Agostinho Espírito Santo (a commander in the Fronteira Norte Sector), Aquiles Freitas (a commander in the Centro Leste sector) and Martinho Soares.

Suicido Ideológico

73. Fretilin's ideas about the revolution also caused conflict. As the goal of the revolution was to create a classless society, those from the upper classes, such as *liurai*, were required to abandon their special status in society and commit *suicido ideológico*. As Xanana Gusmão stated:

*Revolution was communism. No class, no wealthy people, no poor people, no exploitation, everyone was equal. The revolution followed communist ideology...So that there would be no classes and all of us would be equal, the upper classes had to commit suicide, those from the top must sit alongside the people.*⁷⁹

74. In the *zonas libertadas*, opposition to Fretilin ideology was denounced as "reactionary" and considered a serious crime.⁸⁰ According to Xanana Gusmão, someone who continually committed reactionary actions would be considered a traitor.⁸¹

75. The execution of Aquiles Freitas is a case in point. Aquiles Freitas was a commander in Atabae (Bobonaro) when Indonesia launched border raids in October and November 1975. His last rank in the Portuguese military was staff sergeant (*primeiro-sargento*). After the 7 December 1975 invasion of Dili by Indonesian forces he became a zona commander in Quelicai (Baucau), his home. He was then promoted to the position of second commander of the Baucau Region, under first commander Reinaldo Correia (Kilik Wae Gae). Aquiles Freitas was not happy about being put under Kilik Wae Gae, who had been a private in the Portuguese army, a lower rank than he had been.⁸² A former Fretilin administrator in the Uatu-Carbau Zona (Viqueque) told the Commission that Aquiles Freitas could not disguise his contempt for Fretilin and Falintil:

One day he visited our zona office in Zona Furak Kaun. I was there. I was already the vice-secretary. It was strange because this man contacted only certain people; he never had business with the zona. From his words, "What's Falintil?" he seemed to be derisive of Falintil. So we finally concluded that he was indeed anti-revolutionary. And while I was the vice-secretary, he never came to the office. We were derided as being officials. That is why I dare to say that he was anti-revolutionary.

⁷⁸ According to Lucas da Costa, Comandante Agostinho Espírito Santo often had disagreements with the political commissar César Maulaka [CAVR Interview with Lucas da Costa, Dili, 21 June 2004].

[Aquiles] came to Uatu-Carbau [Viqueque] in 1976, if I'm not mistaken, around 1976 or 1977...I was still the assistant at Uatu-Carbau...I met him there, I knew for certain that he never respected the presence of the secretary, vice secretary, administrators, assistants. He never did. I heard that he said: "Ahh, what is Falintil anyway?"⁸³

76. The execution of Francisco Hornay is another example of this conflict. Problems began at the time of the restructuring of Ponta Leste Sector by Political Commissar Sera Key after the Soibada Conference. Francisco Hornay rejected the appointment of Tomás Pinto as the Iliomar (Lautém) Zona secretary because he thought that the position should be held by a *liurai*. Tito da Costa (Lere Anan Timor, Lere), who was the vice-secretary in Iliomar Zona at the time, told the Commission that:

They didn't want Tomás Pinto [Lesamau] to be the zona secretary, because they wanted a "blue-blood". He [Francisco Hornay] wanted me to be the zona secretary, because I was a "blue-blood". We opposed him because of the struggle, because we opposed exploitation...

Tomás Pinto and I made a report to the Regional Committee and Sera Key, the political commissar of Ponta Leste. On the basis of that report they [denounced] Hornay's action as reactionary and part of the national reaction led by [Francisco] Xavier [do Amaral]. They held a meeting. Noone was allowed to carry arms. [Hornay] stuck to his opinion, and said that Tomás could not be the secretary. In the debate [they] blamed Hornay. They took a unanimous decision...The political commissar, who had a platoon, ordered the troops to strip them of their weapons.

The reaction was that almost an entire company was stripped of its weapons. [The commissar's troops] captured around five or six people and took them to Belta Tres [Irrara, Lospalos, Lautém] where the commissariat was, and detained them for between one and seven months. After the political commissar thought they had changed, they were released. But after their release they didn't change, they still continued being reactionary. They were required to report to the zona, but they never did. They went straight to Aquiles in Quelicai [Baucau].⁸⁴

77. According to Lere, Aquiles Freitas gave them weapons.⁸⁵ Francisco Hornay and two others were then captured again in Bagaia (Baucau) and killed in Iliomar (Lautém).⁸⁶

Military strategy

78. The most serious internal conflict within Fretilin appears to have been about which military strategy to use against Indonesia. Some political leaders, who came to be in the majority, thought that the East Timorese must depend on their own strengths and not expect outside assistance. Other military commanders and civilian leaders disagreed, believing that foreign assistance was necessary because of Indonesia's superior strength. In the first Central Committee plenary session held in April 1976 in Barique (Manatuto), there was a

debate on this question. Requesting assistance from the United States and its allies was rejected because these nations were considered to be imperialist. Requesting assistance from the Soviet Union was also rejected because it was considered to be socialist imperialist.⁸⁷ According to Xanana Gusmão, in that meeting Francisco Xavier do Amaral said that it did not matter where the assistance came from as long as it came soon. Many military commanders agreed and showed their dislike of the political leadership.⁸⁸

Youth were brought in to become mid-level cadres. Many youths were involved because in Fretilin's view youth were easier to educate compared to older people, who were already familiar with colonialist traditions. These youth became the link between the people and the Fretilin Central Committee.⁸⁹

79. Another conflict related to the role of civilian population. Civilians had a very important role in the strategy of a protracted people's war adopted at the Soibada Conference of May-June 1976. At that time further disagreements surfaced between a number of civilian leaders and military commanders, backed by Francisco Xavier do Amaral. For Francisco Xavier do Amaral, the presence of civilians could cause problems for Falintil, as the soldiers would be burdened with the task of guaranteeing their safety. He thought that it would be better for civilians, especially children and the elderly, to surrender to the enemy, while those who were physically strong would remain in the interior to fight with Falintil.⁹⁰ This idea won support from military commanders.⁹¹

80. This difference of opinion was sharpened by the tensions between the military commanders and civilian leaders about the reduced authority of military commanders, which dated from before the exodus to the interior. The tensions were compounded further by the animosity felt by some of the former Portuguese army sergeants towards military commanders who had previously been political leaders. Lucas da Costa (Rama Metan) told the Commission:

[Falintil soldiers who had served in the Portuguese army] felt uncomfortable interacting with some CCF members, who were young or inexperienced...There were some [CCF members], especially the young ones who, just because they had been brave enough to take up weapons, declared themselves commanders. Meno Paixão, for example, managed to confiscate a gun then made himself a commander.⁹²

81. The former sergeants, who viewed the war from a purely military perspective, believed that the protracted people's war strategy was inappropriate for Timor-Leste. They believed that foreign assistance was necessary, and that civilians should surrender so that they would not become a burden for Falintil. According to them, Falintil's ammunition was limited, because of the lack of foreign assistance, and would quickly run out if they had to protect civilians. As the war would continue for a long time, it would be better to use ammunition attacking the enemy rather than protecting the civilian population.⁹³

82. The supporters of the protracted people's war strategy considered the idea that civilians should surrender to be treachery. They thought that only with the people could they win the war. Strategically, people were considered a source of power, while ideologically the

⁸⁷ Xanana Gusmão remembered that a former sergeant, who served in an African country occupied by the Portuguese, opposed the protracted people's war strategy by saying that the strategy had worked in Africa because the guerrilla forces had bases outside the borders of their country, and in those bases they were trained and received foreign assistance. These circumstances did not prevail in Timor-Leste [CAVR Interview with Xanana Gusmão, Dili, 7 July 2004].

war was seen as a revolutionary war. The CCF was also concerned about the people's support for independence.^{*} Lucas da Costa told the Commission:

Some people, especially those [who had returned] from Portugal, wanted to keep people in the forest to be educated and become revolutionary. They thought that if the people were to surrender without adequate knowledge of revolution, they would reclaim their previous social status and it would grow back, preventing the success of the proletarian revolution.⁹⁴

83. For those who viewed the war militarily, the problem was how to drive Indonesia out of Timor-Leste. For those who viewed the war as a revolution, war could erase classes in society, and war had to be made with the people. As such, telling the civilian population to surrender was a betrayal of the national liberation struggle.

84. Many commanders who suggested or allowed people to surrender were captured or even killed. Examples include the capture of Sebastião Sarmento and his removal from the position of commander of Fronteira Norte Sector,⁹⁵ the capture of Francisco Xavier do Amaral and his removal from the positions of President of Fretilin and President of the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste,⁹⁶ and the killing of Agostinho Espírito Santo (commander of Fronteira Sul Sector)[†] and Martinho Soares (a commander in Fronteira Norte Sector).⁹⁷

85. The conflict regarding civilians was not merely ideological, but also related to military developments. With the increase in attacks by the Indonesian military many parts of the *zonas libertadas* could no longer be defended. There were ad hoc efforts from military commanders and civilian leaders to negotiate surrender with the enemy.⁹⁸ Adriano Soares Lemos told the Commission:

The Fretilin leaders Ali Alkatiri, Meno Paixão and Pedro Gonçalves from the Fronteira Norte Sector agreed to bring people down to surrender to [ABRI], because the people's condition was critical at the time...If they continued to stay in the forest, everyone would die either from starvation or illness...So Ali Alkatiri and Filomeno Paixão had contacts with [ABRI] in Fatubessi [Ermera], to inform them that the people would surrender. [ABRI] agreed to it, so on 6 February 1979, we began to come down from Fatubessi to the area of Caisoru [Liquiça]. [We] surrendered to [ABRI] Battalion 512 on 7 February 1979.⁹⁹

86. Such actions aggravated the conflicts between political leaders and military commanders. When Meno Paixão and a large group of political leaders and civilians surrendered in February 1979, the political commissar of Fronteira Norte Sector, Maukruma, refused to join them. He continued resisting until he was killed with his wife in March 1979.

87. These conflicts were never resolved within the Resistance itself. They ended when the Indonesian military offensive of 1978-79 led to the destruction of the *zonas libertadas*.

^{*} Francisco Xavier do Amaral also mentioned another possible reason, that if people surrendered the world would think that it was only Fretilin that wanted independence, and that they did not have the people's support [CAVR Interview with Francisco Xavier do Amaral, part III, Dili, 18 June 2004].

[†] According to Maria de Jesus, Commander Agostinho Espírito Santo had a conflict with Political Commissar César Maulaka on the strategies of war [CAVR Interviews with Maria de Fátima Vaz de Jesus, 23 September 2004 and Lucas da Costa, Dili, 21 June 2004].

5.3 The End of *Bases de Apoio*

88. The period of the *bases de apoio* ended with the major Indonesian offensive of 1978-79. The offensive, which Fretilin called “encirclement and annihilation” (“*cerco e aniquilamento*”), began in mid-1978 with heavy assaults on the western territories (Fronteira Sul Sector and Fronteira Norte Sector). The offensive was then directed eastwards with assaults on bases around Mount Matebian and the Natarbora (Manatuto) Plain, and later the base in Manatuto. The attacks resumed in the west and centre in the early months of 1979, aimed at destroying the remaining forces in those regions. This offensive involved strafing and bombings and artillery fire from navy ships, as well as attacks by ground troops (see Part 3.11: The History of the Conflict_Military Intensification).

89. Falintil could not withstand these new attacks. Its response was static positional defence.[†] Unlike the Chinese during the war against Japan, Fretilin was unable to retreat to a remote base, unreachable by the Indonesian army, which was one of the basic principles of a protracted people’s war strategy. Falintil’s bases, such as those around Mount Matebian, Mount Kablaki, and Cailaco (Bobonaro), were reachable by Indonesian soldiers by land, air and/or sea. A Fretilin cadre described the destruction of the base in Manatuto to the Commission:

In May 1978 the situation became worse. The enemy began to surround us. In July the [Indonesian] military started “encirclement and annihilation” from the Centro Norte Sector. Forces from Manatuto began to advance, then [they] came from Aileu and from Laclubar [Manatuto]. We were forced to leave Hatuconan [Laclo, Manatuto] for Remexio [Aileu]. Then we circled from Aileu back to Hatuconan. Many people died there – because of leg injuries, people couldn’t walk, and newborn babies starved. We just covered the dead with mats and then left them because we didn’t have time to bury them with the enemy still chasing us.

At night we moved on foot, in the morning we had to hide because the OV-10 fighter planes kept following and shooting at us...and dropping bombs killing many people...[‡]There were also some killed by landmines.

[†] It seemed that this term copied the term “encirclement and suppression” used by Mao Zedong in “Problems on War and Strategy”, 1938, in *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung*, Vol. 2 (Foreign Languages Press, Peking, 1967). That term showed on page 222 of this edition.

[†] Chamberlain, *The Struggle in Iliomar*, p.18. One Fretilin document, *Relatório da Delegação do Comité Central da Fretilin em Missão de Serviço no Exterior do País*, mentioned that the “encirclement and annihilation” offensive launched toward the Fatubesi Base on 1 January 1978 was contained by Falintil, but the battles escalated in Fatululik, Dili, Remexio (Aileu), Baucau, Baguia (Baucau) and Bazartete (Liquiça). Further battles took place in Fatululik (Covalima), Fatubesi (Ermera), Fatumean, Suai (Covalima) and Atsabe (Bobonaro) on the second week of March 1978 and many Falintil soldiers died. Then “encirclement and annihilation” was launched toward the Centro Norte, Centro Sul, and Centro Leste Sectors, and at the end of June, Remexio (located 15 km from Dili) fell to the Indonesian army [Fretilin, *Relatório da Delegação do Comité Central da Fretilin em Missão de Serviço no Exterior do País*, p. 5].

[‡] In the aerial assaults, as well as testimony about the use of the OV-10 Bronco airplane, the Commission also received reports of Skyhawk bomber airplanes [CAVR Interviews with Adriano João, Dili, 21 September 2004 and Jacinto Alves, Dili, 5 August 2004.] Note however that the British government denied that Skyhawk airplanes were used for combat purposes in East Timor during this period [see written submission of Pat Walsh to the CAVR, based on his testimony as an expert witness to the CAVR National Public Hearing on Forced Displacement and Famine, 28-29 July 2003].

When the OV-10 planes shot, people were not in bushes or the forest. Thousands of them were in open fields. So many died...

In the encirclement and annihilation [campaign] in July 1978, nobody surrendered. We hid in Ilimanu [Laclo, Manatuto]. The next morning the Indonesian military bombed us in Ilimanu, until we couldn't escape.¹⁰⁰

90. Maria José da Costa, who at the time was in the Centro Sul Sector base in Alas (Manufahi), gave a similar account:

In 1978, the enemy began the strategic siege in Dolok [Alas, Manufahi]. Many died of starvation. Everyone's food was burned, and some had to abandon their families. The siege was like this: warships fired from the sea, warplanes attacked from the air and burned the dry, tall grass, then the troops attacked on the ground.

It was the dry season [in August]. The army set the tall grass alight and the fire quickly burned the whole area as if it was soaked with gasoline. Those of us who were surrounded didn't have the chance to escape because the fire was so huge. Because of this desperate situation, many people couldn't save themselves. [The Indonesian's] strategy prevented many people from escaping.

People managed to escape the encirclement when the Indonesian soldiers returned to their camps to rest in the middle of the night. When we left we were still showered with bullets from the warships at sea. I witnessed many people being burned to death...After we managed to escape the encirclement the enemy surrounded us in a semi-circle. With support from the sea, they drove us to a plain. This made us run in all directions and the enemy was able to capture us.¹⁰¹

91. The eastern region base on Mount Matebian fell on 22 November 1978.¹⁰² Falintil troops were divided into groups: some headed to the Centro Leste Sector to join the national forces, and some headed east to become guerrilla fighters. Xanana Gusmão, who was an *adjunto* in Ponta Leste Sector, told the Commission:

[O]n 22 November we split up on Matebian. Even though we were surrounded, we always tried to maintain contacts with the Central Committee in Centro [Leste]. We informed them that we could no longer hold out and they told people to surrender and form a guerrilla company in the Ponta Leste Sector...

We had contact with a nearby Racal [radio operator]. That was how we knew the situation throughout the country. We thought the other sectors were totally destroyed. Some people surrendered, some were captured.¹⁰³

92. The last base destroyed was in Fatubessi (Ermera) in February 1979. Adriano João, a mid-level cadre in Fronteira Sul Sector, told the Commission:

*The base de apoio [in Fatubessi] was destroyed on 16 February 1979. People surrendered en masse because they were surrounded by Indonesian military warplanes, which were destroying the defence base around the Cailaco [Bobonaro] mountains. As a result of the Indonesian military campaign, nearly all people came down to the town on the orders of the adjunto, Rui Fernandes, and the commander of Sector Fronteira Norte, Meno Paixão, who wrote to us at that time.*¹⁰⁴

93. Xanana Gusmão states that before the *zonas libertadas* were destroyed, the Fretilin Central Committee decided that civilians should surrender and that Falintil troops should continue the war of resistance. The news of this decision was spread to all sectors. Jacinto Alves recalled:

*When "encirclement and annihilation" happened, the Central Committee realised that it was better if people surrendered...It was announced to the people the elderly, aged over 56 years, and those aged below 18 years could surrender, and the rest could stay [in the forest].*¹⁰⁵

94. Surrender, which before the major Indonesian offensive had been condemned as treason, was forced on the Fretilin Central Committee.^{*} The decision did not mean that the continuing struggle was to be carried out only by Falintil soldiers. The Fretilin Central Committee reminded people to keep helping Falintil and keep fighting for the independence of Timor-Leste, although they did not specifically describe how the struggle was to be continued.¹⁰⁶ Benvinda Lopes, an OPMT administrator in the Uatu-Lari area (Viqueque), described her experience:

*On 23 December 1978 a letter came from Baucau informing Commander Calisae and Moiseskin: "Now people must surrender because this war still has a long way to go." On that same day my brother Moiseskin came and explained to us: "Now you can leave, you don't have to stay here. You'll die because there is no more food and medicine. We are telling all of you that you can surrender to Indonesia, but you must never forget one thing. Your hands may work for Indonesia but you must remember us always. You can go there but you must find a way to look for us, continue to contact us, you must not be scared." That night on 23 December 1978 we came down from Kilobuti [Uatu-Lari, Viqueque] to Matebian. Then we surrendered to the Indonesian army.*¹⁰⁷

95. Fretilin suffered many losses in this Indonesian military offensive. Francisco Xavier do Amaral, the former President of Fretilin and of Timor-Leste, was captured by the Indonesian army near the Dilor River (Lacluta, Viqueque) in August 1978.¹⁰⁸ Alarico Fernandes, the Fretilin minister of information and internal security, surrendered with a

^{*} Taur Matan Ruak compared two actions in different circumstances: "In 1976 when people voluntarily surrendered it was a big problem...[A] big problem! Now...1979, this surrender, we didn't voluntarily come down. Because we were forced...and that was why the leaders accepted this. They were forced to accept." [CAVR Interview with Taur Matan Ruak, Part II, Dili, 14 June 2004].

number of other Central Committee members.^{*} Perhaps the biggest loss was the death of Nicolau Lobato, President of Fretilin and the RDTL, in battle on 31 December 1978.¹⁰⁹ Other important leaders such as Mau Lear (the vice-president of Fretilin and the RDTL) and Vicente dos Reis (Sahe, the national political commissar) were killed in February 1979.¹¹⁰ Mau Kruma, the political commissar in Fronteira Norte, was killed in battle around March 1979.¹¹¹ After the offensive ended, only three members of the Fretilin Central Committee were left to continue the struggle from the forest after March 1979; all the others died in battle, were captured, or surrendered to the Indonesian military.[†] Many of those who were captured or surrendered were subsequently executed or disappeared.

96. With the fall of the *bases de apoio* in 1978-79, the *zonas libertadas* and the protracted people's war strategy were finished. Any hopes of pursuing a strategy of defending particular areas containing the people was over.[‡] The project of creating a new society without oppression and exploitation was also abandoned. People surrendered to the Indonesian army and then lived life under the occupying power. A number of Fretilin civilian leaders, Falintil commanders and soldiers who managed to escape formed small units and continued the guerrilla war.

5.4 Restructuring the Resistance: 1981-87

97. For the first two years after the fall of the *bases de apoio* in the *zonas libertadas*, the remaining Fretilin leaders in the Ponta Leste Sector searched for Fretilin Central Committee members and Falintil troops in other places. They tried to make contact with Fretilin activists and Falintil commanders who had been captured and were living in areas occupied by the Indonesian army. They sought out those they could trust to resume the struggle in a new form. They also tried to gather intelligence on the conditions under which the population in the occupied areas were living and on the strategy and deployment of ABRI units. Their ability to carry out these activities was limited by continued harassment by Indonesian forces, which culminated with *Operasi Keamanan* (Operation Security) in mid-1981 and which compelled them constantly to take evasive action to avoid direct combat (see Part 3: The History of the Conflict).

^{*} It is still not clear why Alarico Fernandes surrendered to the Indonesian army. Fretilin's official source said that it was a "treason" caused by his disbelief in their own strength and that he kept hoping for foreign assistance, that Alarico Fernandes tried to compromise with Indonesia and he separated himself from the Fretilin Central Committee and betrayed them [Fretilin, *Relatório da Delegação do Comité Central da Fretilin em Missão de Serviço no Exterior do País*, p. 6]. He was said to be involved in what was called the "Skylight" operation by the Indonesian military, which had the objective of capturing or persuading the surrender of Fretilin's highest leaders [CAVR Interview with Xanana Gusmão, Dili, 7 July 2004; "Six Years of Heroic Armed Resistance," *East Timor News*, Winter 1982, pp. 10-12]. Mari Alkatiri mentioned the possibility that Alarico Fernandes was disappointed because, after the removal of Francisco Xavier do Amaral as the President of Fretilin and the RDTL, it was Mau Lear who was appointed to replace Nicolau Lobato as vice-president of Fretilin and prime minister of the RDTL, not him [CAVR Interview with Mari Alkatiri, Dili, 25 June 2003]. Mari Alkatiri also stated that Alarico Fernandes "didn't have an ideology": he captured Xavier hoping that he would be appointed as Vice-President of Fretilin and Prime Minister of the RDTL, and when that didn't happen, he accused Nicolau Lobato as "the hat that covered communists" and launched anti-communist propaganda [CAVR Interview with Mari Alkatiri, Dili, 25 June 2004]. While Xanana Gusmão called Alarico Fernandes a person who "joga sala, joga ba joga mai" ("played around badly, played back and forth"), he suddenly proclaimed himself Marxist-Leninist in the 1976 Soibada Conference, captured and tortured Xavier do Amaral in 1977, and then surrendered and showed up in the "Skylight" operation. Xanana Gusmão described Skylight as "Alarico's movement", and that Resistance leaders in the Matebian area heard of this movement after Alarico Fernandes surrendered in September and just as Indonesia was preparing to launch incessant offensives at the end of 1978 [CAVR Interview with Xanana Gusmão, Dili, 7 July 2004; see also Part 3: History of the Conflict].

[†] The three members of the Fretilin Central Committee were: Xanana Gusmão, Fernando Txay and António Manuel Gomes da Costa (Mau Hunu).

[‡] According to Ernest Chamberlain, when the base at Matebian fell, Falintil was converting its defence strategy from "positional-bases" to "moving", which involved reorganising troops into mobile troops together with the strength of 11,000 people [Chamberlain, *The Struggle in Iliomar*, p. 19; Indonesian translation version, *Perjuangan di Iliomar*, p. 20]. It is still not clear why this strategy was implemented only at the end of 1978, when the decision to launch the protracted people's war was taken in May 1976, a decision that meant that positional war would be launched with moving and guerrilla troops.

98. After the fall of the *bases de apoio* in the *zonas libertadas*, Falintil forces divided into small units of three to four people. Previously the smallest unit had been the *secção*, comprising seven people. If they entered villages in occupied areas to establish contact with civilians, Falintil troop units would not carry their weapons or wear uniforms. Sometimes Falintil was able to form larger units for specific purposes. Xanana Gusmão recalled that in May 1980 he took a company (of about 60 people) as far west as Mount Kablaki in search of Resistance forces still holding out in the mountains.^{*} The military commander, Kilik Wae Gae, attempted to build a fixed base that could support a full battalion.[†] One informant told the Commission that in early 1979 Xanana Gusmão and Kilik Wae Gae succeeded in forming a “brigade” consisting of four companies.[‡]

Reorganising the Resistance for the new situation

99. At a gathering of surviving military commanders and political cadres in March 1981 a new organisational structure for the Resistance began to emerge. The first “Reorganisation of the Nation Conference” after the fall of the *zonas libertadas* was held in the area of Maubai on Mount Aitana in the sub-district of Lacluta (Viqueque) from 1 to 8 March 1981. The conference was organised by the two members of the Fretilin Central Committee still actively engaged in the struggle in the interior, Xanana Gusmão and Mau Hunu Bulerek Karataianu. The first item on the agenda was the inauguration of nine new members of the Central Committee: José da Costa (Mau Hodu Ran Kadalak), Bere Malae Laka, Reinaldo Correia (Kilik Wae Gae), Dinis Carvalho (Nelo Kadomi Timor), Sakin Nere Ulas Timor Lemo Rai, Holy Natxa, Tito da Costa (Lere Anan Timor), Hari Nere and Paulino Gama (Mauk Moruk Teki Timor Ran Nakali Lemo Rai).¹¹² Together with the two other Central Committee members, Xanana Gusmão and Mau Hunu Bolerek Karataianu, they became the leaders of the internal struggle. The members of the Central Committee living abroad retained their positions: Abílio Abrantes Araújo, Mari Alkatiri, Roque Rodrigues, José Luís Guterres, Guilhermina Araújo, José Ramos-Horta and Rogério Lobato. Abílio Araújo was also appointed Secretary General, while Xanana Gusmão was appointed as the National Political Commissar (Comissário Político Nacional).¹¹³ They became the official Resistance leaders.

100. At the conference, the members of the Central Committee decided to establish the Fretilin Marxist-Leninist Party (Partido Marxista-Leninista Fretilin, PMLF), the Revolutionary Council of National Resistance (Concelho Revolucionário de Resistência Nacional, CRRN), and to form new structures for Falintil.¹¹⁴ The reason for the change of name from Fretilin to PMLF is not clear. [§] Xanana Gusmão said that what they did was only to “ratify” the decision taken by the “pioneers” at the Laline Conference in 1977 when, following the lead of the Central Committee’s Department of Political Orientation and Ideology (Departamento de Orientação Política e Ideologica, DOPI) Marxism-Leninism was officially declared the party’s ideology.¹¹⁵ The Commission was unable to gather any information on party structures under the Central Committee. It is possible that the PMLF consisted only of the Central Committee, which had no subordinate organs operating below it.

^{*} Xanana Gusmão said that he conducted a search for Central Committee members all the way to Dili with a company of troops [Xanana Gusmão, in Niner (ed.) *To Resist is To Win!*, p. 64].

[†] Lere Anan Timor, who at the time was a mid-ranking *cadre* in Ponta Leste, said that Kilik Wae Gae, a sector commander before the fall of the *zonas libertadas*, led this effort [Lere Anan Timor, Archives of the *Tuba Rai Metin Oral History Project*, Submission to CAVR, CD No.18].

[‡] A source related that “after Nicolau Lobato was shot dead”, Xanana Gusmão and Kilik Wae Gae formed a “brigade” consisting of four companies: Lospalos, Laga (and Quelicai), Sul and western Ponta Leste [CAVR Interview with Sebastião da Silva, Viqueque, June 2003].

[§] Several testimonies stated that the reason for that name-change was tactical, to seek assistance from the Socialist Bloc countries. José da Conceição told the Commission that after attending the National Reorganisation Conference, Fretilin Central Committee member Mau Hunu explained to him that the change was needed to gain political and diplomatic support from socialist bloc countries in their struggle for national liberation. Justo Talenta gave a similar explanation [CAVR Interviews with José da Conceição, Dili, 20 October 2004 and Justo Talenta, Dili, 3 November 2002].

101. The CRRN was intended to be the organisational vehicle for everyone who wanted to join the struggle to end the Indonesian occupation of Timor-Leste. The CRRN was in effect the PMLF's invitation to all East Timorese regardless of party or other affiliation to join the resistance to the Indonesian occupation. Clear information on CRRN's structures is also not available. One source testified that the CRRN leadership at the national level consisted of Fretilin's political activists, Falintil military commanders, and "representatives of the people [living] in Indonesian-occupied territories".¹¹⁶ The Committees for Regional Resistance (Comissões Regionais de Resistência) were to operate as the arm of the CRRN in the districts and below them at the sub-district level would be National Resistance Centres (Centros de Resistência Nacional, Cernac) and at the village-level, Nuclei of the People's Resistance (Núcleos de Resistência Popular, Nureps).¹¹⁷ These structures operated unevenly throughout the country. An underground activist at the time testified to the Commission:

*The CRRN structure at the time was operating only at top level or in the forest, while there was no structure or base in the towns. It was just a kind of tactic to signal that an armed front [of the] Resistance, which wanted to continue the struggle, still existed. The structure only existed at the level of the Falintil command. The highest official was Xanana Gusmão. Only the members of Falintil knew the structure. We ourselves did not know exactly what the structure was.*¹¹⁸

102. The CRRN had its headquarters in the forest. Some of the district and sub-district level organs also operated from the forest. Others operated clandestinely in Indonesian-controlled territory in the towns, villages and the new settlements (*pemukiman baru*).

103. Falintil's highest military authorities were the Commander in Chief (Comandante-em-Chefe) and the Chief of Staff (Chefe do Estado Maior) positions held by Xanana Gusmão and Reinaldo Correia (Kilik Wae Gae) respectively. They were in charge of four Falintil companies placed in each region where guerrillas were operating. Unlike the period of the *zonas libertadas*, these companies did not have a fixed base but were highly mobile guerrilla units. After the "Reorganisation of the Nation Conference", a Red Brigade (Brigada Vermelha), led by Mauk Moruk as the First Commander (*Primeiro Comandante*) and Ologari Assuwain as the Deputy Commander (*Segundo Comandante*) was created. It is not clear whether the Brigada Vermelha was one of the units of Falintil or whether all Falintil troops were reorganised under the Brigada Vermelha.[†]

^{*} António Tomás Amaral da Costa (Aitahan Matak) said that the CRRN consisted of: Xanana Gusmão, Mau Hodu Ran Kadalak (José da Costa), Mau Hunu Bulerek Karataianu, Bere Malae Laka, Kilik Wae Gae, Nelo Kadomi Timur (Dinis Carvalho), Mauk Moruk Teki Timor Ran Nakali Lemo Rai, Ologari Assuwain, Lere Anan Timor, Konis Santana, Venancio Ferraz, Merak, Okan and Taur Matan Ruak [CAVR Interview with António Tomás Amaral da Costa (Aitahan Matak), Dili, 18 December 2003]. Six of those people, who were not members of PMLF Central Committee, were Venancio Ferraz, Ologari Assuwain, Konis Santana, Merak, Okan and Taur Matan Ruak, but they were Fretilin's middle ranking cadres or Falintil commanders.

[†] It seems that the Brigada Vermelha served the same function as had been performed by the *Brigada de Choque* before the destruction of the *zonas libertadas*. Their troops were not stationed in one place but were mobile and would launch surprise attacks on the Indonesian army. Jacinto Alves, a former *colaborador* (staff) in the Falintil General Staff (1977-78), said that in 1977 the Falintil General Staff devised a strategy of mobile warfare concentrating on a central line running from the extreme east to the western border. At the time the Resistance had evacuated the northern coastal area, and large numbers of people had moved to the fertile lands of the south. The central line stretching from east to west therefore became a shifting battleground for Falintil's *Brigada de Choque* troops. Several *Brigada de Choque* companies were formed and trained under the guidance of the former commander of the Fronteira Norte Sector, Sebastião Sarmento. Ernest Chamberlain said that before the fall of the Matebian Base there was a plan to form mobile war units totalling 11,000 people [CAVR Interview with Jacinto Alves, Dili, 16 May 2004; Chamberlain, *The Struggle in Iliomar*, p.19].

104. The CRRN leaders were people who before the fall of the *zonas libertadas* had been high or mid-level Fretilin cadres (*quadros superiores* and *quadros medios*) and Falintil commanders, an indication that the CRRN was dominated by Fretilin.^{*}

105. The military division of the territory changed completely. Previously the country had been divided into six sectors; at the National Reorganisation Conference, it was divided into three regions (*regiões*):

Region	Districts covered	Commander
Far Eastern Region (Região Ponta Leste, also known as Funu Sei Nafatin)	Lospalos, Viqueque, Baucau and Manatuto	Kroasu and Lemorai
Central Region (Região Centro, also known as Nakroman)	Dili, Aileu, Same, Ermera and Liquiça	Fera Lafaek
The Border Region (Região Fronteira, also known as Haksolok)	Suai, Ainaro and Maliana	Venancio Ferraz ¹¹⁹

106. District-level *zonas* were also established and led by three *adjunto* - one of them became the main official (*responsável principal*). Each *zona's adjunto* oversaw several cells (*celula*), consisting of *assistente* (assistants) and *activista* (activists).¹²⁰

107. These territorial divisions differed completely from those of the period of the *zonas libertadas*. Then, the territory had been divided into political and administrative units as well as military units. At every level of that structure political activists managed agricultural production, health education and cultural programmes. After the fall of the *zonas libertadas*, the regions were exclusively military in character and were based on guerrilla operations. There were no large groups of civilians left in the three *regiões*, making both civilian administrative units and their associated support activities redundant. The main work of the political cadres—the *adjunto*, the *assistente* and the *activista*—was to form underground cells in Indonesian-army occupied villages, to create and disseminate propaganda to sustain the people's commitment to independence, and to provide logistical support and intelligence for the guerrillas in the forest. For these purposes a system of *caixas* (literally, boxes) was organised in every *zona* and operated by a liaison officer (*responsável de caixa*) and couriers (*ligações*).[†]

108. Without a civilian population in their midst, the internal Resistance focused on armed struggle. The political cadres maintained contact with the people, not in order to organise them in “building new structures to serve the people”, but to assist Falintil guerrilla units with intelligence and logistical support.¹²¹ Their role changed to that of the link between the guerrillas in the forest and the people in the villages and towns under Indonesian occupation.

109. Given that the armed resistance was based in the forest, operationally the core of the Resistance was Falintil, not Fretilin or the CRRN. Fretilin, as the “guide” (*matadalan* in Tetum) of the struggle, still formally set the political line, but as the struggle was now primarily an armed one the politics was chiefly that of the armed struggle. In the earlier period the Fretilin Central Committee, either in plenary sessions or, if the Central Committee was unable to convene, through its Permanent Committee, made decisions on the broad issues of policy. Decisions on military strategy had been subordinate. After the fall of the *zonas libertadas* the

^{*} Xanana Gusmão and Mau Hunu were members of the Central Committee, which meant they were high ranking cadres. Bere Malae Laka, Lere Anan Timor, Mau Hodu and Konis Santana were cadres responsible for *regiões* and *zonas*; they were the mid-level cadres. Kilik Wae Gae and Nelo Kadomi Timor were former Falintil commanders responsible for *região*, while Taur Matan Ruak was a company commander. There is no information on the non-Fretilin membership of the CRRN.

[†] *Ligação* was then replaced by the term *vias de canais* and from 1986 the role became better known by the term of *estafeta* [CAVR Interview with Vasco da Gama, Dili, 18 May 2004]. They functioned as couriers carrying mail, intelligence and goods from one connecting hub (*caixa*) to another, based on Falintil's needs.

decisions that had to be made were chiefly about the armed struggle, and as such fell within the purview of the Falintil commander, sometimes, though not always, acting in concert with the Chief of Staff.^{*} This was inferred in Xanana Gusmão's interview with the Commission in connection with the 1984 restructuring, which was not accepted by several of the reassigned commanders:

I said as Commander in Chief that in the military there is no democracy. Either we make war or we don't make war. I made a restructuring...

*But when it came to the problem of restructuring the military, I gave new instructions on my own initiative...If it is a political problem, we can have an intelligent discussion. If the problem is a military one, in war the commander gives the orders.*¹²²

110. The Resistance had become a fully armed struggle, with Falintil playing the main role. Fretilin's civilian structure was subordinate to Falintil's. The Fretilin *adjuntos* evolved into logistics and intelligence officers for the Falintil company commanders. As a revolutionary party, the PMLF seems to have existed only on paper. There was no longer mass mobilisation to "build new structures to serve the people" or for the "total elimination of all forms of exploitation". The PMLF activists took up arms to fight as guerrillas or to become couriers between the guerrillas and the people, to obtain food supplies, medicine, clothes and information on the enemy's movements.

Strategy

111. The new reality brought about by the fall of the *zonas libertadas* required new thinking from the Resistance. A protracted people's war strategy was no longer sustainable. The Indonesian army's relentless attacks had forced Falintil to split into small units.[†] After seriously reconsidering the military strategy, the remaining commanders and political activists determined that the war of resistance against Indonesia was to take the form of guerrilla warfare. Attacks were launched by highly mobile small units around the country. They had no fixed base. Intelligence was obtained from civilians who were organised in clandestine cells in the occupied territories.

112. Falintil's guerrilla attacks had as their tactical objective the destruction of targeted Indonesian troops, though at the same time Falintil recognised that it could never defeat the Indonesians militarily. The war of resistance shifted from its initial objective of expelling the Indonesian aggressors to demonstrating to the international community that Falintil was still capable of fighting against the Indonesian occupation and that the East Timorese people wanted independence.[‡]

^{*} In 1982 the Comissário Política Nacional's function was eliminated in structural readjustment (*Rejustamento Estrutural*). This meant that Xanana Gusmão relinquished the highest internal political position in Fretilin and from then on acted only as Falintil Commander [Xanana Gusmão, *Timor Leste-Um Povo, Uma Patria*, p. 98; Budiardjo and Liem, pp xii and pp. 67-70].

[†] Xanana Gusmão and Taur Matan Ruak stated that initially they split troops into small units in response to the situation created by the Indonesian army; it was not a strategy adopted by the Resistance out of choice. [CAVR Interviews with Xanana Gusmão, part II, Dili, 10 August 2004 and Taur Matan Ruak, part II, Dili, 14 June 2004].

[‡] In 1983 the Indonesian army wrote a summary of the strategy of the Resistance as they saw it, namely that the objectives of the protracted war launched by Fretilin were: (a) to stay alive by avoiding decisive combat, so as to have the time to restore their forces while at the same time cultivating a high spirit of motivation and strong discipline; (b) to preserve and develop support networks in resettlement areas and in the towns; (c) to show their presence or existence, particularly in the months before the UN General Assembly; (d) to create conditions which would make ABRI feel unsafe

113. This military strategy was in line with their changed view regarding negotiations. During the period of the *zonas libertadas*, Fretilin categorically refused to negotiate with Indonesia. One of the slogans at the time was *Negociação – Não e Nunca* (Negotiation – No and Never). With the failure of the protracted people's war the leaders slowly began to see negotiation as a means to end the Indonesian occupation. The meetings between Resistance leaders and the Indonesian army leadership were initiated in Timor-Leste in March-April 1983. They were known as the "*Kontak Dame*" (or "*Kontak Damai*", "Peace Contacts"). Taur Matan Ruak remembers:

*We sought opportunities for peace. That was why in 1983 Xanana accepted the offer of contacts with Indonesia...Their overriding objective was to use the opportunity to strike at us...On the other hand we were thinking of how it could be used to reach a peaceful resolution of the conflict.*¹²³

114. During the various *Kontak Dame* Falintil proposed a plan for resolving the conflict through negotiations between the armed resistance and Indonesia under the supervision of the United Nations. Some of the proposals of the Resistance, such as the unconditional withdrawal of Indonesian troops, were still in the uncompromising tradition of the Fretilin of the *zonas libertadas*. Others included the establishment of a UN peacekeeping force in Timor-Leste to supervise the withdrawal of the Indonesian army providing security for the transitional government, and retaining Falintil troops "to protect people from pressure". The Resistance also proposed a referendum to decide Timor-Leste's political future.¹²⁴ This was clearly a softening of the position that had been taken in 1975. Then Fretilin had asserted that the East Timorese people had the right to independence and that the people had stated their desire for this through the Fretilin Central Committee's Proclamation of Independence on 28 November 1975. By proposing a referendum as a way to end the Indonesian occupation of Timor-Leste, Fretilin was in fact endorsing the position that had been taken much earlier by the diplomatic front: that since Fretilin's Proclamation of Independence stood no chance of gaining recognition from more than a handful of states, the only course open to the independence movement was to seek to gain international backing for the right of the people of Timor-Leste to self-determination (see Chapter 7.1: The Right to Self-Determination). If in the past diplomatic efforts had been aimed primarily at winning the support of the Socialist bloc and the non-aligned states, now, the Western bloc countries became important, not least because of their influence at the UN including on the UN Security Council (see section on the Clandestine Front below). The idea of the primacy of the struggle on the diplomatic front gained weight in Resistance thinking, until by late 1984 it was the dominant view among Resistance leaders. José da Costa (Mau Hodu Ran Kadalak), a prominent member of the PMLF Central Committee, said that the Resistance leadership now centred its strategy on dialogue and shifted its focus to the diplomatic front, in preference to the armed struggle, although armed operations were to continue whenever possible and necessary.¹²⁵

115. At the same time another shift in thinking was underway. For several years the dominant view within the Resistance had been that Fretilin was the only true champion of independence, and the only true patriots were to be found within Fretilin ranks. After 1982 the idea that other parties and social groupings could also take part in the national liberation struggle began to gain ground. An important milestone in this process was the meeting between the Falintil Commander and National Political Commissar, Xanana Gusmão and the Apostolic Administrator, Monsignor Martinho da Costa Lopes, in the village of Mehara, Tutuala, Lautém District. At that meeting Dom Martinho said that national unity between Fretilin and UDT was needed if the independence struggle was going to succeed. At first

anywhere in the territory; (e) to establish mobile bases in many regions, particularly in formerly fertile villages now abandoned by their inhabitants [Attachment Document 3 in Budiardjo and Liem, *The War Against East Timor*, p. 197].

Xanana Gusmão rejected the idea,^{*} but slowly it became more acceptable until in 1983 the PMLF Central Committee affirmed National Unity (*Unidade Nacional*) as its official policy.¹²⁶

116. The politics of National Unity and the idea of a negotiated, UN-sponsored end to the Indonesian occupation of Timor-Leste amounted to a radical shift in the ideology of the Resistance, and it also had organisational implications. Hopes of gaining the cooperation of parties such as UDT, especially its leadership abroad, who rejected Timor-Leste's integration with Indonesia could easily founder on their abhorrence of Fretilin's revolutionary politics. Another party whose cooperation was crucial was the Catholic Church. Several priests, including Monsignor Martinho da Costa Lopes, had shown their sympathy for the predicament of the Resistance, though not for its ideology. The Church often protected people on the run from the Indonesian army and sent information outside the country. Relations between Fretilin and the Catholic Church had been strained in the past, as the conservative Church could not come to terms with several aspects of Fretilin's ideology.¹²⁷ To gain the explicit support of UDT and the Catholic Church, the PMLF needed to abandon its revolutionary politics. Monsignor Martinho Costa Lopes addressed this matter at his secret meeting with Xanana Gusmão in Mehara in 1982.¹²⁸

117. The dissolution of the PMLF occurred during a Central Committee meeting held in April 1984.¹²⁹ From this time Marxism-Leninism ceased to be Fretilin's ideology, revolutionary politics were abandoned, the principle of "Negotiation – No and Never" adopted in the 1977 Laline Conference was dropped, and the PMLF became simply Fretilin again.¹³⁰

118. With those changes the politics of National Unity and negotiation as a means of defeating Indonesia became central to the struggle. This led to the CRRN becoming increasingly more visible than Fretilin. Although Fretilin, while still the PMLF, formulated the policies of National Unity, their implementation was a matter for the CRRN. This gave the CRRN a more important role. The reality was that the struggle was the armed guerrilla struggle, led by Falintil. For this reason Falintil's role became more prominent, as did Xanana Gusmão's position as a military leader. One indication of this was the decision to abolish the position of the National Political Commissar in 1982.¹³¹

119. Nonetheless, these changes did not go unchallenged. Several members of the Central Committee, including the Falintil Chief of Staff, Kilik Wae Gae, and the Red Brigade Commander, Mauk Moruk, opposed the decision to disband the PMLF. They also opposed the policy of National Unity adopted the previous year.¹³² This conflict caused a crisis in the Resistance leadership. Kilik Wae Gae and friends attempted a coup against Xanana Gusmão, the struggle's highest leader.¹³³

120. Xanana Gusmão said that the dispute was not really about politics or ideology, but about his decision to change the military structure. Several units under the leadership of Kilik Wae Gae, Mauk Moruk and Ologari in the Central Sector were not taking the offensive against the Indonesian army, while Falintil troops in the eastern sector were facing repeated Indonesian attacks. Xanana Gusmão reshuffled several command positions, demoting the recalcitrant commanders to operational level. Kilik Wae Gae was demoted from Chief of Staff to Red Brigade Commander. Mauk Moruk was demoted from Red Brigade Commander to Company Commander as was Mauk Moruk's deputy Ologari Assuwain. In an interview with the Commission, Xanana Gusmão said:

^{*} José da Conceição, an *adjunto* at the time, said that in the beginning Xanana Gusmão did not agree with the concept and believed that unification of Fretilin and UDT was like "marrying a frog and a crocodile" [CAVR Interview with José da Conceição, Dili, 20 October 2004].

I carried out a reshuffle. Mauk Moruk didn't have real plans to lead the company [into action]. He just sat up there in the mountains. The troops around him [kept him] secure. I said: "If you want to lead a company, then you will." Ologari, who was the Deputy Commander, just sat around doing nothing. I said: "You will also be a company commander." Because of this [change] they called me a traitor, that I was no longer a Marxist. They held on to the ideology, making it into a problem. But the [real] problem was the military reshuffle. I gave new instructions, gave new directions to the companies, ordering them: "Now find the enemy and kill them."¹³⁴

121. Other witnesses agreed that the reshuffle caused problems.¹³⁵ Cornelio Gama (Leki Nahak Foho Rai Boot), a company commander at the time, told the Commission:

[There were] differences over [the dissolution of the] PMLF. There was also an issue about senior commanders not getting positions. In fact most of them were demoted. Like Mauk Moruk, who previously had been the Red Brigade Commander [sic] and Ologari Assuwain, who previously was the Brigade Deputy Commander [sic], and Kilik Wae Gae, who previously was the Chief of General Staff. Kilik became the Red Brigade Commander [sic], while Mauk Moruk and Ologari both became Region Commanders.¹³⁶

122. Taur Matan Ruak, who at the time was a member of the Falintil General Staff, suggested that the attitude of Kilik and his allies was "strange". Taur Matan Ruak reflected:

Whenever President [Xanana Gusmão] mentioned the Marxist-Leninist Party, they would say: "the Marxist-Leninist Party is the wrong politics; social democratic politics are better." Then when it changed to social democratic politics, they said: "This is not good, the Marxist-Leninist Party is better." Nothing was ever right, what did they want?...

Basically when a man defends an ideology, a theory or a view, he should have the capacity to defend it, to be ready intellectually to defend his views. But he didn't defend them and he jumped around. That was our situation. We didn't know what we should call [the party], how to name it...I saw that there was something strange going on.¹³⁷

123. Mauk Moruk said that the reason for the opposition from Kilik and his allies was Xanana Gusmão's proposal to separate Falintil from Fretilin.¹³⁸ Whatever the cause of the conflict, several of the commanders and political leaders who were at odds with Xanana Gusmão died or surrendered with their troops to the Indonesian military. The dissident group broke away from main body of the resistance group. Kilik Wae Gae and Okan were killed

fighting the Indonesian army. Mauk Moruk* and Ologari Assuwain surrendered to the Indonesian army.¹³⁹

124. The deaths and surrender of the opponents of the policy of National Unity strengthened the position of Xanana Gusmão as leader of the Resistance. The Central Committee expelled Kilik and Mauk Moruk. The Falintil Commander in Chief assumed the position of Chief of Staff left vacant by the expulsion of Kilik.¹⁴⁰ The demise of the opponents of National Unity did not immediately result in the CRRN becoming an effective vehicle for national unity. UDT, in particular, continued to refuse to cooperate with the CRRN. Taur Matan Ruak reflected:

There were different interpretations of the CRRN...For instance UDT said [that the name] "Conselho Revolucionário"...[the term] "Revolucionário" came from those who were Marxist-Leninist...So they had their own definition. The important field of strategy, the strategy for resolving the conflict...required a consensus...Consensus only existed in the armed resistance. But at the political level those who were abroad, those who were closely affiliated, such as the Fretilin [External] Delegation they accepted it, but UDT and the others didn't accept it.¹⁴¹

125. This was probably the reason why the CRRN leadership continued to be drawn from Fretilin. A representative of the Resistance in Australia said that CRRN was not effective because of the internal conflicts within the Resistance leadership "and the lack of resources to resist and to fend off Indonesia's attacks".¹⁴² Even so, there was some progress towards National Unity in March 1986 when an agreement was reached in Lisbon between Fretilin and UDT leaders to unite in the diplomatic struggle for the independence of Timor-Leste. This became known as the Nationalist Convergence (*Convergência Nacionalista*).¹⁴³ This agreement proved to be fragile because of the persistent mutual suspicion and the sectarian attitudes among those who were representing Fretilin and UDT abroad. Reflecting on that period, Xanana Gusmão later observed:

In 1986, the Nationalist Convergence was formed in an attempt to dispel the climate of suspicion that existed between the political parties but, once again, good intentions were not enough to create harmony between our separate objectives.¹⁴⁴

* Aleixo Ximenes told the Commission that before Mauk Moruk surrendered he sent a letter to him saying that Xanana Gusmão would kill him if he found out that Mauk Moruk wrote a letter of surrender. When he met Aleixo Ximenes, Mauk Moruk reportedly told him that after breaking with the Falintil leadership, Kilik faced the possibility of death at the hands of Xanana Gusmão or ABRI, should either find him [CAVR Interview with Aleixo Ximenes, Dili, 2 February 2004.]

5.5 Falintil after 1987

126. In 1987, the Falintil commander in chief, Xanana Gusmão, took the important step of establishing Falintil as a non-partisan movement, removing the military wing from the Fretilin structure. This decision, known as the “Structural Readjustment of the Resistance” (*Reajustamento Estrutural da Resistência*), was taken at a meeting in Aitana (Lacluta, Viqueque). It was also decided that the Resistance leadership must remain inside the country and that Xanana Gusmão, as Falintil commander, resign from Fretilin.¹⁴⁵ Detaching Falintil from its political party roots was intended to make the armed front a genuine national force and consolidate its leadership role in the Resistance. Previously, the struggle against the Indonesian occupation had been led officially by the CRRN, with Fretilin at the forefront. With the national unity policy of the Resistance leaders coming increasingly to the fore, the CRRN became associated with the broader national interest. Fretilin, in contrast, was perceived to be more narrow and partisan. As the only real resistance against Indonesian occupation existed in the form of armed struggle, Falintil became the dominant force in the CRRN, with the Falintil commanders leading the struggle. As a consequence, Falintil was seen to be the only organisation truly fighting for the national interest.

127. Falintil's exit from Fretilin was typical of Xanana Gusmão's new approach of the politics of national unity. The previous approach had been to try to unify the political parties of Fretilin and UDT under the CRRN. This had proved unsuccessful because of fundamental differences both within and between the two parties. The perceived “radicalism” of the Fretilin Delegation for the Exterior (*Delegação da Fretilin em Serviço no Exterior, DFSE*) was one sticking point.¹⁴⁶ The new approach's emphasis on Falintil as a truly non-partisan organisation fighting the Indonesian occupation of Timor-Leste met with some initial resistance. Here, a Falintil commander at the time, reflected:

Falintil left Fretilin with a message from Commander Xanana on 7 December 1987...At the time I was with Mau Hodu...Mau Hodu asked: “Has Commander Xanana spoken about it...about leaving the party...about the dissolution of the Marxist-Leninist Party? What do we think? How do we explain it?” I said: “You explain it. You have to explain it [because] you're the political commissar. I don't know how to explain it.” This was a big problem...

We retreated to a place near Vemasse [Baucau] and at night we held a meeting. [Mau Hodu] called me [but] I refused to [go]. The meeting was being held nearby [so I could hear it]. They started a discussion. Many commanders didn't want to accept it. [They said]: “Many people died, we suffered, we lost families...Why did he say that? Now the leader is playing games!”

They didn't want Falintil to separate from Fretilin, didn't want the Marxist-Leninist Part abolished. But slowly, as the situation developed, they [finally] accepted the reasons.¹⁴⁷

128. The next step in the campaign for national unity was the establishment of the National Council of Maubere* Resistance (*Conselho Nacional de Resistência Maubere*,

* “Maubere” is a common Timorese male name and was first used by José Ramos-Horta to refer to the East Timorese common man. It was subsequently taken up by Fretilin [see Part 3: History of the Conflict].

CNRM) in December 1988 to replace the CRRN. The CNRM consisted of ten members: three Falintil commanders, five from the clandestine resistance front and two Fretilin members.¹⁴⁸ The Falintil commander in chief, Xanana Gusmão, became the highest leader of the CNRM with the title *Responsável Principal*. The power of this post was extensive, encompassing “full authority over all matters connected with the struggle in Timor-Leste, including the international diplomatic struggle”.¹⁴⁹

129. In keeping with the decision to keep the Resistance leadership in the country, the Resistance Delegation for External Work (Delegação da Resistência em Serviço no Exterior, DRSE) was formed to carry out resistance activities abroad. Abílio de Araújo (Fretilin’s secretary-general), Moisés Amaral, and the outspoken former Apostolic Administrator of Dili, Dom Martinho Costa Lopes, were appointed the caretakers of the DRSE. The new structure replaced the DFSE.¹⁵⁰ The change was intended to reinforce the new non-partisan approach and combat the perceived ineffectiveness of the DFSE, which was attributed to internal conflicts within its leadership. The DFSE resisted the change. Its response was to turn itself into the Fretilin External Delegation (Delegação Externa da Fretilin, DEF).¹⁵¹

130. The document *Reajustamento Estrutural da Resistência e Proposta da Paz (Structural Readjustment of the Resistance and a Proposal for Peace)* set out CNRM’s structure, including the new relationship between the DRSE and Falintil. Falintil was named responsible for running the CNRM internally, while the DRSE was to function internationally through diplomatic representations, dissemination of information, cultural activities and aid contributions to East Timorese refugees abroad.¹⁵²

131. In 1989 Xanana Gusmão appointed José Ramos-Horta as CNRM’s special representative and his personal representative abroad.¹⁵³ José Ramos-Horta subsequently resigned from his position in the DEF to concentrate on representing the CNRM at the UN and elsewhere.^{*} From this time the Resistance struggle at the international level was conducted by the CNRM alone, and Fretilin’s role in the struggle at the international level virtually ceased. The consolidation of the CNRM leadership at the international level was strengthened further by the appointment of non-political party representatives to key positions in a number of countries.[†]

132. The appointment of José Ramos-Horta as the CNRM special representative abroad, and the subsequent consolidation of CNRM’s leadership at the international level, resulted in progress being made in the diplomatic struggle. Through the efforts of CNRM representatives abroad, a degree of unity was forged between Fretilin and UDT, who successfully collaborated in carrying out joint diplomatic initiatives. For example, in March 1995, in preparation for the All-Inclusive intra East Timorese Dialogue (AIETD), the leaders of the CNRM, Fretilin and UDT held an official meeting to formulate a joint strategy.¹⁵⁴ In September 1996 a joint delegation from the three organisations visited South Africa and met with the African National Congress (ANC), labour unions and parliamentarians to gain support for Timor-Leste’s independence struggle.[‡] In recognition of these efforts, Xanana Gusmão stated in a 1994 message that Fretilin and UDT were “partners” of the CNRM.¹⁵⁵

133. Despite efforts to turn the CNRM into a broad non-partisan national front, political resistance to CNRM as the leader of the struggle lingered. Xanana Gusmão noted:

^{*} One source states that the reason for Ramos-Horta’s resignation from Fretilin was that “not all [Fretilin] Foreign Delegation members were active in the struggle.” [“Fretilin: Roots of Friction”, in *Fitun* (London) No. 11, September 1993].

[†] For example, in the 1990s CNRM’s representative for Australia and New Zealand was Abel Guterres, for the United States Constâncio Pinto, for Canada Abe Barreto, for Europe José Amorim Dias, and for Portugal Luis Cardoso [“East Timorese in the Diaspora,” <http://www.uc.pt/timor/diaspora.htm>].

[‡] The delegation consisted of José Ramos-Horta (CNRM Special Representative), João Carrascalão (Chairman of UDT), and Roque Rodrigues (Timor-Leste Ambassador in Luanda) [African National Congress, “East Timorese Visit,” in the African National Congress homepage, <http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/pr/1996/pr0910b.html>].

We made a pledge to our people to staunchly uphold the principle of “Unite to be able to resist better!” Side by side with our people, who easily understood the objectives of the CNRM, we were ready to cope with all the consequences. But there were distortions in the way the CNRM was perceived. It was seen as a party and incorrectly regarded as yet another player on the scene. It would have been better had this not been so.¹⁵⁶

134. Although Xanana Gusmão did not directly name those whom he believed held “distorted perceptions” of the CNRM, he was clearly referring to UDT. At this time UDT still considered CNRM to be just Fretilin in disguise, and was not ready to accept Xanana Gusmão as the ultimate leader of the Resistance. Francisco Guterres (Lu 'Olo), who at the time was the Fretilin vice-secretary, remembers:¹⁵⁷

*For over ten years the CNRM continued to promote national unity, but national unity still did not exist. Those of us who died remained in the forest, the enemy killed us every day, but what exactly did the people in the towns want? Until finally you understood that [the word] “Maubere” was worse than Marxist-Leninist. That was why it was changed to CNRT in Peniche.*¹⁵⁸

135. The progress in achieving unity was only confirmed at the Timor National Convention at Peniche, Portugal, in April 1998. At this meeting a number of key political achievements were made. Firstly, the CNRT (Conselho Nacional de Resistência Timorese, National Council of Timorese Resistance) was established, comprising not only of Fretilin and UDT, but also other political parties such as KOTA and Apodeti (Pro-Referendum), and non-political organisations such as the Church. Secondly, Xanana Gusmão was chosen as the *lider maximo* (highest leader) and was subsequently appointed President of the CNRT. Two vice presidents were appointed, José Ramos-Horta, and a “silent” (secret) vice president inside Timor-Leste, Mário Carrascalão. Finally, the word “Maubere” in title of the CNRM, which was considered by UDT as being synonymous with Fretilin and containing revolutionary nuances, was replaced by the word “*Timorese*” (“Timorese”).

136. The newly established CNRT consisted of three organs, the National Political Commission, the Executive Commission and the Judiciary Commission. Xanana Gusmão was appointed the leader of the National Political Commission, while José Ramos-Horta became the chairman of the Executive Commission. The membership of the National Political Commission consisted of party representatives, members of non-party organisations and a priest, the Executive Commission was made up of representatives from both the political parties and non-political groups, and the Judiciary Commission technical experts.¹⁵⁹ There were 22 representatives selected in Peniche to make up these three bodies, all of whom were outside of Timor-Leste. In September 1998, 12 further members of the CNRT National Political Commission were selected from inside Timor-Leste by the President of the CNRT, pursuant to the authority granted to him at the Peniche Conference in Portugal to establish the structure of CNRT within Timor-Leste.*

* The members of the National Political Commission selected in Peniche were Xanana Gusmão, José Ramos-Horta, João Carrascalão, Padre Francisco Fernandes, Mari Alkatiri, Ana Pessoa, Alberto Araújo and Domingos Oliveira and four alternate members: Estanislau da Silva, Agio Pereira, Vicente Guterres and Zacarias Costa. The 12 members of the National Political Commission from inside Timor-Leste were: Abel da Costa Belo, David Dias Ximenes, Domingos FJ Sousa, Leandro Isaac, João Baptista Fernandes Alves, Leão P dos Reis Amaral, Lú-Olo, Manuel Viegas Carrascalão, Paulo Freitas da Silva, Taur Matan Ruak, Francisco Lopes Carvalho and Lucas da Costa (based in Indonesia). The members of the Executive Commission were José Ramos-Horta, José Luis Guterres (head of the Foreign Relations Department), Manuel Tilman (head of the Administration and Resources Department), Roque Rodrigues (Central

137. The detachment of Falintil from Fretilin and the establishment of the CNRM confirmed Falintil as the political and military leader of the struggle. This was reinforced in the document *Reajustamento Estrutural da Resistência e Proposta da Paz* which set out the Falintil High Command's key responsibilities as:

- Deciding general strategy
- Providing the general political orientation
- Taking necessary action.¹⁶⁰

138. Endowed with this authority, the Falintil High Command began to take charge of the political and military aspects of the struggle, with the development of the general strategy for the political direction of diplomatic efforts abroad, and the launch of continued armed resistance by Falintil against the Indonesian occupation army. Falintil's role in the overall struggle was described by Taur Matan Ruak: "There were three fronts: the Diplomatic Front and the Clandestine Front took their orders from the Armed Front."¹⁶¹ In a speech in Uaimori (Viqueque) on Falintil's anniversary in August 2003 Xanana Gusmão confirmed Falintil's leading role after 1987:

*It was decided in 1987 to change Falintil into a non-partisan body to become the fundamental base to strengthen the whole resistance movement, which could then lead our struggle to final victory.*¹⁶¹

Services), Emilia Pires (Regional Services), Pascoela Barreto (Finance and Resources) and Lucas da Costa (Rama Metan, Youth Department). The members of the Judiciary Commission were Carlos Alberto Barbosa, Jerónimo Henriques, Alfredo Borges Ferreira and Filomeno Andrade [CNRT – National Council of Timorese Resistance, <http://www.labyrinth.net.au/~ftimor/cnrt.html>].

¹⁶¹ CAVR Interview with Taur Matan Ruak, Part II, 14 June 2004. José da Conceição (formerly an *adjunto*, and also after the fall of the *zonas libertadas*) said, "After the separation the military was dominant. Civilian activists' role was to support the military, although they shared the same goal, which was independence" [CAVR Interview with José da Conceição, Dili, 20 October 2004].

Falintil's Structures, 1987 to 1999

The Falintil High Command was under the leadership of Xanana Gusmão, as the commander in chief (*comandante-em-chefe*). He was also the chief of staff (*chefe do estado maior*), overseeing the deputy general chief of staff (*sub-chefe do estado maior*) Taur Matan Ruak, political advisor (*conselheiro político*) Mau Hodu, and military advisor (*conselheiro militar*) Mau Hunu Bolerek Karataianu.¹⁶² The guerrilla fighters operated under them in small units of four to eight people. During the CNRM period, the territorial structure of the armed resistance was the same as during the CRRN period. It was divided into three regions, Ponta Leste, Centro and Fronteira. Several guerrilla units operated in each region under the command of a regional commander.*

Between the late 1980s and early 1990s was a difficult period for Falintil. Commander in Chief Xanana Gusmão later stated that Falintil numbers were reduced to fewer than 100 troops.¹⁶³ According to Indonesian army reports around this time, there were 67 guerrillas in Ponta Leste, with 45 rifles operating in units of six people.¹⁶⁴ But in the wake of the Santa Cruz Massacre on 12 November 1991, Falintil's strength grew from 143 guerrillas with 100 rifles to 245 guerrillas with 130 rifles.¹⁶⁵

During the 1990s there were a number of changes in the leadership of the Falintil High Command as a result of the captures of several of its members by the Indonesian army. Mau Hodu, the political advisor to the chief of staff, was captured in January 1992. After the capture of Xanana Gusmão in November 1992, the CNRM's military advisor, Mau Hunu, took over command of Falintil for a brief period, until he too was captured by the Indonesian army on 3 April 1993. Konis Santana (Secretary of Comissão Directiva da Fretilin, the highest Fretilin organ inside Timor-Leste) then took over command of Falintil until his death in March 1998. Despite these changes, formally, the position of Falintil commander in chief and president of the CNRM still belonged to Xanana Gusmão even though he was incarcerated in Jakarta.

In 1998 the territorial structure was overhauled. The country was divided into four regions; Região 1 covering Lautém and most of Baucau districts; Região 2 covering parts of Baucau, Viqueque and parts of Manatuto; Região 3 covering Dili, Aileu, Ainaro and parts of Manatuto; and Região 4 covering Ermera, Liquiça, Bobonaro and Covalima.†

Falintil's force of only 300 guerrillas in early 1998 had increased to some 1,500 by late August 1999.¹⁶⁶ From mid-1998, the number of guerrillas increased rapidly for a number of reasons as former guerrillas returned to their units, young clandestine activists ran to the forest to avoid capture by the Indonesian army and the violence of the anti-independence militia, and East Timorese troops in the Indonesian army deserted.

139. Although the *Frente Armada* (Armed Front) was responsible for leading the Resistance, Falintil's strategy for winning the struggle was not primarily a military one. Falintil commanders and political leaders realised that they did not have the military capacity to defeat the Indonesian army, which was far more advanced in terms of weaponry and personnel. For Falintil leadership the key to winning the struggle was international diplomacy. Indonesia's invasion and occupation of Timor-Leste violated international law and therefore the integration of Timor-Leste into Indonesia was not internationally recognised.

140. In 1989 the CNRM proposed a peace plan, which envisaged a process sponsored by the United Nations which would eventually lead to the holding of a referendum through which

* Ponta Leste Region Commander was David Alex, Centro Region was Lere Anan Timor, Fronteira Region was Ernesto (Dudu).

† Comandante Região 1 was Lere Anan Timor, Comandante Região 2 Sabica Besi Kulit, Comandante Região 3 Falur Rate Laek (Domingos Raul) and Comandante Região 4 Ular Reik (Virgílio dos Anjos).

the people of Timor-Leste would exercise their right to self-determination. The process envisaged the following steps:

- The withdrawal of Indonesian troops
- The simultaneous disarmament of Indonesian-armed paramilitary groups and Falintil guerrillas
- The establishment of a transitional government which would set a date for a vote on the political status of Timor-Leste
- A cooperation agreement between the transitional government and Indonesia, with Australia, the European Union and other countries ensuring the rapid and peaceful development of Timor-Leste
- The establishment of a government of National Unity for a period of 5-15 years at the end of which a referendum would be held and, depending on the outcome, sovereignty transferred.¹⁶⁷

141. The CNRM believed that through dialogue all parties to the conflict would be persuaded of the need to hold a referendum on self-determination. The struggle for international support came to be seen as more important than victories on the battlefield. Armed resistance would continue although its purpose was no longer to win the war, but to add weight to the demands of the wider resistance. Agio Pereira described the role of the armed struggle as follows:

*Inside East Timor, the Armed Front would mobilise the people to continue for as long as necessary, to at least maintain a quagmire on the battleground so that the diplomatic front could press ahead with a solution which meets the aspirations of the Timorese people and is internationally acceptable.*¹⁶⁸

142. The former Fretilin vice-secretary of Falintil, Francisco Guterres “Lú-Olo”, told the Commission about its strategy:

*This defined the concrete strategy of resolving the conflict through negotiations...Resolution through negotiations did not mean that we didn't bring in the military to win the war...the military alone wouldn't [win]. It was the troops' task to defend [the existence] of the army. As far as the Indonesian army was concerned, you could say that we were ready to attack by being defensive. But, we couldn't compare our army [with the enemy's] in operating on a military basis. We went on with the guerrilla war and created an objective situation, and a politico-military reality which would achieve the goal of liberating our land.*¹⁶⁹

143. Falintil guerrilla attacks on Indonesian targets were launched mostly for tactical reasons, to obtain weapons and other equipment needed to keep Falintil in existence. Another goal was to exhaust the Indonesian army psychologically. But strategically, the principal goals of the Falintil guerrillas were not military but political. The last Falintil chief of staff, Taur Matan Ruak, told the Commission:

¹⁶⁷ One of the premises of the establishment of the CNRM was that the resolution of the question of Timor-Leste relied on taking the struggle into the international arena, rather than the armed arena [Agio Pereira, “The National Council of Maubere Resistance (CNRM), Overview of the History of the Struggle of East Timor”, paper presented at a solidarity meeting, Sydney, August 1994].

We evaluated the situation daily...on the international scene, we especially evaluated important events, parliamentary elections in [Indonesia], the presidential election [Indonesia], the 20th of May [the anniversary of the founding of the ASDT political party], troop withdrawals. On those occasions we undertook small actions which would have a large impact. That was why we normally made our evaluation based on such events. So, people would not have the impression that the situation was calm, that was why we had to create disturbances, why we always had to do something, however insignificant.

This could be considered a counter-campaign to their campaign to convince people that the situation was stable. The aim was more to destabilise the situation. That was why the operations normally had a specific purpose. It might be an economic purpose, taking food, money, paper, clothes for our use...It might be diplomatic, if it had international repercussions. It always had repercussions of some kind. The repercussions might be more of a military kind if we took arms and materials. And then there were times when the impact was strictly diplomatic, when we created a security situation which gave people the impression that the war would go on forever.¹⁷⁰

144. Falintil launched attacks with precision with a view to their impact on the diplomatic struggle, to impress on the world that in Timor-Leste there was still fighting and that the international community must take action to resolve it. From the time of the ceasefire in 1983, the CRRN and then subsequently the CNRM said that it would disarm if a peaceful solution, involving a referendum on self-determination, could be found. When the diplomatic solution bore fruit and President Habibie proposed a referendum to determine the future status of Timor-Leste, Falintil attacks virtually ceased, the Resistance turned its attention to preparing peacefully for referendum, and in July 1999 Falintil unilaterally decided to canton forces, as outlined under the 5 May 1999 Agreements on the implementation of the referendum.*

5.6 Clandestine liberation movement

145. The history of the clandestine movement during the Indonesian occupation is highly complex and, because of the nature of the movement, there has been very little written on the structures and strategies of the movement. The following overview has been compiled from interviews with former members of the Resistance, but the Commission notes that there is much scope for further research into this fascinating aspect of Timorese history.

146. The Commission has heard that clandestine activities began in the first years after the Indonesian invasion. Fretilin activists and their families in Dili and other parts of the country were organised into small groups and helped the guerrilla fighters by providing food, medicines, clothing and information on the situation in the towns. These small groups evolved

* The voluntary cantonment of Falintil troops was completed by 12 August, prior to the Popular Consultation on 30 August. Cantonment for Região 1 were in Atelari (Laga, Baucau District), for Região 2 and Região 3 in Uaimori (Manatuto District), for Região 4 in Poetete (Ermera District) and Odelgomo (Aiassa village, Bobonaro District). According to Falintil's information to UNAMET, 187 guerrillas were placed in Aiassa, 153 in Poetete, 260 in Uaimori, and 70 in Atelari, making a total of 670 people [D Greenlees and R Garran, *Deliverance: The Inside Story of East Timor's Fight for Freedom*, Allen & Unwin, Crows Nest, 2002, p. 182; Ian Martin, *Self-Determination for East Timor*, 2001, pp. 72-73; see also Part 3: The History of the Conflict].

spontaneously without a common strategy, worked independently and made their own contacts with the Falintil commanders in the interior.¹⁷¹

147. These clandestine groups became increasingly important after the obliteration of the *zonas libertadas*. Two-way radio communication between guerrilla units, which broke down at this time, was replaced by communication through couriers. The guerrilla leaders in the interior established clandestine networks by forming organisations such as the Democratic Revolutionary Committee (Comité Democrático Revolucionário, CDR) and the Popular Militia for National Liberation (Milícia Popular de Libertação Nacional, Miplin).¹⁷² Their main objective was to establish new support bases for the armed struggle because Falintil had to fight without logistical support in the forest. The network expanded over the years following the destruction of the *zonas libertadas* and was able to support Falintil's armed struggle, eliminating the need for a permanent base in the interior. The leaders of the Resistance were therefore able to claim that their support base had shifted to urban and rural settlements controlled by the Indonesian military.¹⁷³

148. The Falintil Resistance leadership in the mountains tried to direct the clandestine struggle by forming Miplin. Unlike most clandestine groups, Miplin had a military-type structure. Recruits were organised in unarmed teams and platoons. Taur Matan Ruak, an assistant to the chief of staff in 1981 in the Central region, then operations commander in the eastern region between 1982 and 1984, explained Miplin's role to the Commission:

The mission of those known as militia was usually to relay information about spies in their midst to prevent [the spies] from doing any harm, and about Indonesian army movements. Normally that is what we called a militia. But it wasn't necessary for them to carry weapons because there were no arms [to give them]...

Miplin is a concept we created and it is difficult to compare it to the classic understanding of the term [militia]. Sometimes foreigners were surprised because they compared it with their classic concept...[laughter]...Their classic militias are armed and trained in the use of arms. We did not have arms...we used [the militias] to motivate the population to remain alert.¹⁷⁴

149. Despite the early efforts of the leadership to formalise the clandestine structure, groups still operated independently. Groups were established by former political activists or guerrillas. At first they only exchanged information on the situation. Later, they started to have contact with Falintil guerrillas and to collect food, medicines and clothes to take to the guerrillas. These groups operated in cells of three to five individuals, known as a *núcleos*. People in these groups liaised between guerrillas and sometimes with other *núcleos*. Some groups were organised into networks which were controlled by individuals that the Resistance leadership in the forest appointed.¹⁷⁵ Other clandestine groups were independent but had direct links to Falintil commanders.

150. In 1986, when the CRRN increased the effectiveness of the clandestine network by placing it under the coordination of the Inter-regional Coordination Organisation (Organização Coordenadora Inter-Regional, OCR).[†] The OCR was the regional arm of CRRN and operated

¹⁷¹ Those who at the beginning were called *ligação* (liaison), *vias de canais* (channels) and since the mid-1980s became known as *estafeta* (couriers) [CAVR Interview with Vasco da Gama (Criado), Dili, 18 May 2004.]

[†] According to Vasco da Gama, Aitahan Matak and Paulo Assis Belo were active in this body [CAVR Interview with Vasco da Gama, Dili, 18 May 2004].

through the civilian population. It remained effective until around 1988. Although its leaders worked hard in all regions to establish networks, not all groups could be placed under the OCR because the number of clandestine groups kept increasing and because the blanket presence of the Indonesian military and its intelligence network restricted their ability to operate.

151. An important development in the clandestine movement was the formation of urban student cells in high schools. These cells successfully infiltrated and controlled legal organisations such as the Catholic Scouts (Escuteiros) and the Intra-School Students Organisation (Organisasi Siswa Intra-Sekolah, OSIS), the student bodies in each high school created by the Indonesian government. For example, the members of a clandestine cell called 007 in Dili, Constâncio Pinto and José Manuel Fernandes, were scout leaders.¹⁷⁶ Ricardo Ribeiro, a Sagrada Familia activist who in 1988 became the liaison between the clandestine and Falintil in the eastern zone, also became an OSIS organiser and eventually the chairman of the association in his high school in Dili, Hati Kudus.¹⁷⁷

152. With the establishment of the University of East Timor (Universitas Timor Timur, Untim) by the Indonesian government in 1986, university students became targets for clandestine organisational activity. In early 1991 the members of several clandestine cells, including those formerly and secretly based at the Externato de São José school, established the Association of Anti-integration Youth and Students (Himpunan Pemuda, Pelajar, dan Mahasiswa Anti-Integrasi, HPPMAI).*

153. A parallel development took place outside Timor-Leste in the early 1980s, when the government of Indonesia started to send East Timorese students to study in universities in Java, Bali and other parts of Indonesia. Among them were people who had been Fretilin activists during the period of the *zonas libertadas*. In Indonesia they continued their activism in a student organisation called the Organisation of East Timorese Students and Youth (Ikatan Mahasiswa, Pemuda, dan Pelajar Timor Timur, IMPPETTU), which had been established by the Indonesian military and government in an attempt to control them. Active students were able to use the organisation to serve the needs of the continuing struggle in Timor-Leste.[†] In 1988 the National Resistance of East Timorese Students (Resistência Nacional dos Estudantes de Timor-Leste, Renetil) was established in Bali, and in the following two years was established in Java and other islands. At about the same time the Secret Commission of the Timorese Students Resistance (Comissão Secreto da Resistência Nacional dos Estudantes Timorenses, CSRNET) was formed. Among the students who continued their education in Bali and Java there were also activists from the East Timorese Catholic Youth Organisation (Organização de Juventude e Estudante Católica de Timor-Leste, OJECTIL), while others organised clandestine groups such as the Clandestine Front of East Timorese Students (Frente Estudantil Clandestina de Timor Leste, FECLÉTIL) in their own places of study.¹⁷⁸

154. During this period in Timor-Leste demonstrations and acts of civil disobedience were increasing in number and intensity, along with other political actions in opposition to the Indonesian occupation. These included flying the national flag of the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste, secretly writing messages on walls that condemned the Indonesian occupation and supported independence, and posting and distributing leaflets with the same messages. In Indonesia, in addition to demonstrations, students jumped the fence into foreign embassies to seek political asylum and to attract international attention.

* The Chairman of this organisation was Augusto Gama (who came from a clandestine cell at the Externato and at the time was a member of the Comité Executivo) with Vasco da Gama as vice-chairman. Formerly Vasco da Gama had been active in the Raculima clandestine cell [CAVR Interview with Vasco da Gama, Dili, 18 May 2004].

† For example, João Freitas da Câmara, a political assistant in Bobonaro, after his arrest by the Indonesian military was employed by the sub-district administration of Same and then obtained a scholarship to study at the Atmajaya University, Jakarta in 1981. He became active in support of the clandestine resistance inside Indonesia until his arrest and imprisonment for organising the first demonstration held in Jakarta on 19 November 1991 to protest the Santa Cruz Massacre a week earlier [CAVR Interview with João Freitas da Câmara, Dili, 5 June 2004].

155. With the proliferation of organisations and political activities, and the need to prepare for the expected visit of the Portuguese parliamentary delegation in 1991, the Resistance leadership tried to coordinate all clandestine groups operating in the territory. In June 1990 the political advisor to the CNRM, José da Costa (Mau Hodu Ran Kadalak), called a meeting in Baucau with leaders of the clandestine movements. As a result of this meeting, several clandestine leaders formed the CNRM Executive Committee of the Clandestine Front (Comité Executivo da CNRM na Frente Clandestina, the Executive Committee) in Dili. This became the official organ of the CNRM for the coordination of all clandestine groups.* Constâncio Pinto, who at the time was working as a teacher and was active in the clandestine group Orgão 8, was elected secretary of the Executive Committee, with Donaciano Gomes and José Manuel Fernandes as his deputies.¹⁷⁹ António Tomás Amaral da Costa (Aitahan Matak) was later added to the executive.[†]

156. The decision to form the Executive Committee was also related to a new strategy adopted by CNRM.¹⁸⁰ This strategy, which aimed to obtain independence through diplomatic channels rather than armed struggle, required that the Resistance gain international visibility. When political actions such as the entry of students into foreign embassies attracted international attention, Resistance leaders began to see that the combination of clandestine activity and civil disobedience could achieve this goal. Avelino Coelho, one of the clandestine activists at the time, told the Commission:

After we sought asylum [and] after the demonstration in Tacitolu [Dili], actions started being coordinated. Students sought asylum in the embassies of the Vatican and Japan [and] then [Pope] John [Paul II] visited [Timor-Leste] and there was a demonstration on 12...October [1989] in Tacitolu. Xanana also changed his strategy...[having realised] the great power of the youth movement. So there was still a guerrilla movement but [it was] not active in a military sense. It was more active in a political sense, as a source of inspiration for the struggle, not using Falintil as a military movement because of lack of ammunition and for other reasons and also to protect the movement itself. So in 1989 the strategy of the struggle started to shift towards seeking asylum and [holding] demonstrations. In this period...the students' initiatives started to change Xanana's thinking, to change how he led the movement.¹⁸¹

157. The Executive Committee was placed directly under Xanana Gusmão, the President of the CNRM and the commander in chief of Falintil. The role of the Executive Committee was to monitor, direct and coordinate all clandestine movements.¹⁸² It comprised several sections including ones for Youth and Mass Mobilisation, Agitation and Propaganda, Study and Analysis, Information and Security, and Finance. Although the Executive Committee was formally under the CNRM leadership, this did not mean that all clandestine organisations and groups were under its authority. Some of the organisations active in Indonesia worked with the Committee but continued to operate independently. Similarly, in Timor-Leste many clandestine groups maintained their individual relationships with Falintil commanders in the

* Constâncio Pinto said that the Committee was under the CNRM because with the increasing number of UDT and Apodeti members and their children joining the clandestine struggle there was concern that putting the Committee under Fretilin would cause a schism [Constâncio Pinto and Matthew Jardine, *East Timor's Unfinished Struggle*, South End Press, Boston, 1997, p. 123].

† Avelino Coelho Silva, one of the founders of OJECTIL, said that Aitahan Matak was included in the Executive Committee leadership by Mau Hodu, after a protest [CAVR Interview with Avelino Coelho Silva, Dili, 17 July 2004; see also CAVR Interview with Vasco da Gama, Dili, 18 May 2004].

forest.^{*} Gregório Saldanha, who was responsible for the Youth and Mass Mobilisation section, related an incident to the Commission to illustrate the problem:

Sometimes there was stubbornness. For example, Constâncio Pinto brought a letter to Motael for Julião Mausiri about the visit of the Portuguese parliamentarians. Constâncio said: "This is a letter with instructions from Xanana."

At that time [Mausiri] said: "I want all orders to come directly from Xanana and not through intermediaries." He asked Constâncio: "Where is the letter of instructions?" So, formally he was refusing because he did not want to acknowledge the Executive Committee, but independently he asked his courier to ask for that information."¹⁸³

158. António Tomás Amaral da Costa (Aitahan Matak), a vice-secretary of the Executive Committee at the time, remembers:¹⁸⁴

Organisations like 3-3, 5-5, 7-7 were all under the CNRM structure but they struggled for independence. Ojetil and Renetil were part of the CNRM structure.

All organisations under the umbrella of Orgão 8 [joined the CNRM]. Sometimes [there were organisations that] had a network with specific commanders, like David Alex, Konis [Santana], Venancio Ferras, Merak and others. Those were special networks that did not go through Orgão 8.

159. Over time the importance of the clandestine movement in the overall struggle to free Timor-Leste from Indonesian occupation increased. Falintil, which did not receive any logistical support or weapons from overseas, relied on the clandestine activists to obtain food, ammunition, intelligence and the support of the local population. Falintil's very survival depended on the clandestine movement. The Falintil leadership also relied on the underground movement to send information out of the country to activists playing their role in the Diplomatic Front who, without information from inside, would have found it very difficult to convince the international community to continue to take an interest in the Timor-Leste issue.

160. Despite its importance, there was no mention of the clandestine movement in the CNRM structure. The document *Structural Readjustment of the Resistance and a Proposal for Peace* from the CNRM leadership only mentioned the existence of two organs under the CNRM: the Falintil command and the DRSE. This indicated that the movement was considered to be under the command of Falintil as a channel of communication between Falintil on the one hand and the domestic support base and the Diplomatic Front on the other, in support of the armed resistance.

161. The Executive Committee experienced great difficulties when some leaders had to go into hiding to escape the security forces, which were hunting them after the incident at the Paulus VI High School in October 1990. One of the leaders fled to the forest to join Falintil.¹⁸⁵

^{*} For example, the Fitun youth organisation established after the formation of the Executive Committee operated independently and maintained direct relations with the Chairman of CNRM/Commander in Chief of Falintil, Xanana Gusmão [CAVR Interview with a Fitun founder, Armando José Dourado da Silva, Dili, 10 June 2004]. Gregório Saldanha admitted that the CE "could not control" all clandestine groups because there were too many and that some "did not admit to being involved in the struggle" [CAVR Interview with Gregório Saldanha, Dili, 5 June 2004].

This difficulty was overcome by including people with past experience in clandestine work. One of those who joined the Executive Committee remembered:

When they began looking for us after the Paulus school incident, we managed to get away...I hid and then I surfaced again. Some of my friends went into hiding and only came out after Indonesia left Timor-Leste. Some even left the country. Others hid and when the situation improved came back to continue their activities. At that time Constâncio Pinto continued to work. José Manuel Fernandes ran into the forest and Donanciano [Gomes] left the country. So the Executive Committee's programmes stopped. I hid in Balibar [Dili] and after conditions improved I returned and got in touch with Constâncio Pinto and other friends such as Juvencio Martins, Jacinto Alves, Francisco Branco and Filomeno da Silva. Then we revived and reactivated the Executive and the climax came when we were arrested again on 12 November 1991 [after Santa Cruz].¹⁸⁶

162. The Executive Committee was hit badly by the crackdown that followed the Santa Cruz Massacre of 12 November 1991. Some Executive Committee officials including Filomeno da Silva, Francisco Branco, Jacinto Alves, Juvencio Martins and Gregório Saldanha were arrested, tried and sentenced to long terms of imprisonment. The Executive Committee secretary, Constâncio Pinto, managed to escape overseas. The next blow was the arrest in Dili in November 1992 of the President of the CNRM and commander in chief of Falintil, Xanana Gusmão.¹⁸⁷

163. To restore its links with the clandestine movement in 1993 and to resume control of its activities, the CNRM, at the time under the leadership of Konis Santana, established the Executive Committee of Struggle/Clandestine Front (Comité Executivo da Luta/Frente Clandestina, CEL/FC). The CEL/FC was formed as a wing of the CNRM with the specific task of coordinating the clandestine movement. The Executive Committee of Struggle/Armed Front (Comité Executivo da Luta/Frete Armada, CEL/FA) was established at the same time to conduct the armed struggle from the interior.¹⁸⁸ With the formation of the CEL/FC the position of the clandestine resistance within the CNRM structure continued to gain in strength. Probably at this time three forms of struggle – the armed struggle from the forest, the clandestine struggle of civilians in the villages and the towns, and the diplomatic struggle in the international arena – were “made official” under the names of Armed Front, Clandestine Front and Diplomatic Front although the Falintil leadership continued to be highly visible. Regarding the role of Falintil, the last leader of the Clandestine Front, Francisco Guterres “Lú-Olo” told the Commission:

All groups, so that they could control the work of the Clandestine Front, were in contact with the Armed Front. But the Armed Front also established its own clandestine people. The practical structure of the Clandestine Front functioned in Dili but it was mostly the Armed Front that coordinated the clandestine people. Hence the Clandestine Front here in Dili had to coordinate with us [the Armed Front] so that the activities of the clandestine people could be developed with various commanders.¹⁸⁹

164. After the Indonesian military captured Xanana Gusmão it was suggested that the leadership be replaced by a “troika” comprising the leader of the armed struggle, the leader of the clandestine resistance and the leader of the diplomatic resistance. Konis Santana,

CNRM's chief of staff, and Xanana Gusmão rejected the idea. Xanana Gusmão retained his position as Falintil commander in chief and chairman of the CNRM while in Jakarta serving a 20-year sentence. However, according to Agio Pereira, the day to day operations were in the hands of Taur Matan Ruak, Konis Santana and José Ramos-Horta, who were responsible for the armed front, the clandestine front and the diplomatic front respectively.¹⁹⁰

165. The CEL/FC was led by Keri Laran Sabalae (Pedro Nunes) as secretary and David Dias Ximenes as vice secretary. They were helped by three *adjuntos*, Paulo Alves (Tubir Loke Dalan), Paulo Assis (Funu Matak), and Virgílio Simith (Kranek).¹⁹¹ The *adjuntos* were given the task of organising the clandestine movement throughout the country. The CEL/FC formed Regional Directive Organ (Orgão Directiva Regional, ODIR), which had responsibility for organising the clandestine movement in the districts. There were three ODIRs covering the whole of Timor-Leste: the eastern region (Paulo Assis), the central region (Paulo Alves) and the western region (Aquilino Fraga Guterres, Ete Uco). In theory the ODIRs presided over a structure consisting of the Zone Executive Committee (Comité Executivo de Zona, Cezo), operating at sub-district level, Nucleus of Popular Resistance (Núcleo de Resistência Popular, Nureps) at the village level and Community Cells (Celula de Comunidade, Celcoms) at the aldeia level. In practice this structure did not function at all levels throughout the country.¹⁹²

166. With the disappearance of Sabalae on 1 June 1995, Konis Santana, who was heading the CNRM in the country at the time, took over the leadership of the Clandestine Front.¹⁹³ With the formation of the CNRT to replace the CNRM in April 1998, the CEL/FC was replaced by the Internal Political Front (Frente Política Internal, FPI).¹⁹⁴ Konis Santana remained the leader of the clandestine movement until his death on 11 March 1998 due to illness. Francisco Guterres (Lu'Olo), who until Konis Santana's death had been the vice secretary of the Comissão Directiva da Fretilin (the highest Fretilin organ in the country) became the secretary of the FPI with David Dias Ximenes still in the position of vice secretary.¹⁹⁵

167. The formation of the CNRT was followed by extensive organisational changes in the clandestine movement. The movement was restructured to bring it into line with the four-regions structure of Falintil, with the addition of an extra region, Região Autónoma Dili, covering the capital and its district. The CNRT executive in the regions were drawn from the Clandestine Front and the Armed Front. According to clandestine activists, the CNRT executive unified the Clandestine Front and Armed Front structures.¹⁹⁶

168. The top officials in each region were those of secretary and vice secretary.* The secretary of Região 1 was Renan Selac, the secretary of Região 2 was Sabika Bessi Kulit (who was Falintil commander for that region) with Marito Reis as vice secretary. The secretary of Região 3 was Falur Rate Laek (who was also Falintil commander in the region) with Virgílio Simith (Kranek) as his vice secretary. The secretary of Região 4 was Riak Leman with Aquilino Fraga Guterres (Ete Uco) as his vice secretary. The secretary of the Região Autónoma Dili was José da Silva (Fo Laran).¹⁹⁷

169. The existing clandestine organs from sub-district to aldeia became organs of the CNRT, but retained their old names (Cezo, Nurep and Celcom). A layer was created to operate at district (sub-região) level.

170. Not long after the formation of the CNRT, President Soeharto fell and Indonesia began to undergo a process of democratisation. This gave more room for clandestine activists to manoeuvre. The new Indonesian President, B J Habibie, created even more

* Marito Reis, vice secretary of Região 2, said that when establishing the structure of CNRT it was decided that the secretary had to be a military commander, while the vice secretary should be "a political activist living in the city" [CAVR Interview with Nicolau Marito Reis, Baucau, 17 November 2002].

space for the movement to operate in when in June 1998 he offered “broad autonomy” to Timor-Leste. In 1999 the President went further with his offer of two options: broad autonomy or independence. Although in 1998 TNI/ABRI-backed militias began to form to spread terror among independence activists, this did not shake the resolve of those in the clandestine network. The clandestine organs from aldeia to regional level stepped up their activities and the population were emboldened in their demands for independence. With the arrival of UNAMET to conduct the Popular Consultation, the focus of the CNRT’s work became the task of preparing the population to vote for independence in the ballot of 30 August 1999. Having achieved independence through the vote, the main task of the clandestine movement was over.

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- ¹ CAVR Interview with Eduardo de Deus Barreto, Gleno (Ermera), 12 August 2003.
- ² CAVR Interview with Xanana Gusmão, Dili, 7 July 2004.
- ³ CAVR Interviews with Adriano João, Dili, 23 April 2004; Egas da Costa Freitas, Dili, 19 May 2004; and Jacinto Alves, Dili, 11 May 2004.
- ⁴ CAVR Interviews with Egas da Costa Freitas, Dili, 19 May 2004 and Adriano João, Dili, 23 April 2004.
- ⁵ CAVR Interviews with Jacinto Alves, Dili, 11 May 2004; Adriano João, Dili, 23 April 2004; Egas da Costa Freitas, Dili, 19 May 2004. See also CAVR Interview with Francisco Gonçalves, Dili, 14 June 2003.
- ⁶ CAVR Interview with Adriano João, Dili, 23 April 2004.
- ⁷ CAVR Interviews with Julio Maria de Jesus (Unetim activist in Ponta Leste), 29 May 2004; Filomeno Paixão de Jesus, Dili, 17 June 2004; Tomás Araújo, 14 October 2003; and Agostino Carvaleira Soares, Cailaco (Bobonaro), 14 June 2003. See also Lere Anan Timor, Archives of the *Tuba Rai Metin Oral History Project*, Submission to CAVR, CD No. 18.
- ⁸ CAVR Interview with Agostinho Carvaleira Soares (former company commander in Fronteira Norte), Cailaco (Bobonaro), 14 June 2003.
- ⁹ CAVR Interview with Filomeno Paixão de Jesus, Dili, 17 June 2004.
- ¹⁰ CAVR Interview with Jacinto Alves (who after 1977 became a staff member of the chief of staff of Falntil), Dili, 11 May 2004. See also CAVR interviews with Filomeno Paixão de Jesus, Dili, 17 June 2004; Xanana Gusmão, Dili, 7 July 2004; and Taur Matan Ruak, Dili, 9 June 2004.
- ¹¹ CAVR Interview with Lucas da Costa, Dili, 21 June 2004.
- ¹² CAVR Interviews with Sebastião da Silva (“Mendeo”), June 2003; Agostinho Carvaleira Soares, Cailaco (Bobonaro), 14 June 2003; and Eduardo de Deus Barreto, Gleno (Ermera), 12 August 2003.
- ¹³ CAVR Interview with Filomeno Paixão de Jesus, Dili, 17 June 2004.
- ¹⁴ Ibid.
- ¹⁵ CAVR Interview, Jacinto Alves, Dili, 11 May 2004.
- ¹⁶ Ibid.
- ¹⁷ CAVR Interview with Lucas da Costa, Dili, 21 June 2004.
- ¹⁸ CAVR Interview with Xanana Gusmão, Dili, 7 July 2004.
- ¹⁹ CAVR Interviews with Lucas da Costa, Dili, 21 June 2004; Xanana Gusmão, Dili, 7 July 2004; and Filomeno Paixão de Jesus, Dili, 17 June 2004.
- ²⁰ CAVR Interview with Lucas da Costa, Dili, 21 June 2004.
- ²¹ CAVR Interviews with Jacinto Alves, Dili, 11 May 2004 (from researcher’s notes); Egas da Costa Freitas, Dili, 19 May 2004; António da Silva, Dili, 10 June 2003; José Francisco Silva, Dili, 12 January 2004; Fausto do Carmo Mendonça, Dili, 16 October 2003; and Fernando Amaral, Dili, 28 May 2003.
- ²² CAVR Interview with Eduardo de Deus Barreto, Gleno (Ermera), 12 August 2003.
- ²³ CAVR Interview with Umbelina Pires, Manumera (Turiscaí, Manufahi), (undated).
- ²⁴ CAVR Interviews with Jacinto Alves, Dili, 11 May 2004 and António Amado de Deus Ramos Guterres, Manatuto, 11 December 2003; Office for Promotion of Equality, Office of the Prime Minister of the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste, *Written with Blood*, Dili, 2004, pp. 18-19.

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- ²⁵ CAVR Interview with Virgílio da Silva Guterres, Dili, 25 May 2004.
- ²⁶ CAVR Interviews with Eduardo de Deus Barreto, Gleno (Ermera), 12 August 2003 and Fausto do Carmo Mendonça, Dili, 16 October 2003.
- ²⁷ CAVR Interview with Lucas da Costa, Dili, 21 June 2004.
- ²⁸ CAVR Interview with Virgílio da Silva Guterres, Dili, 25 May 2004.
- ²⁹ Office for Promotion of Equality, *Written with Blood*, p. 19.
- ³⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 23 mentioned this activity in Modok Zona, Centro Norte Sector.
- ³¹ CAVR Interviews with Lucas da Costa, Dili, 21 June 2004 and Egas da Costa Freitas, Dili, 19 May 2004. See also Office for Promotion of Equality, *Written with Blood*, p. 20.
- ³² CAVR Interview with Lucas da Costa, Dili, 21 June 2004.
- ³³ CAVR Interview with Taur Matan Ruak, Dili, 9 June 2004.
- ³⁴ CAVR Interview with Virgílio da Silva Guterres, Dili, 25 May 2004.
- ³⁵ Office for Promotion of Equality, *Written with Blood*, p. 23.
- ³⁶ CAVR Interview with Virgílio da Silva Guterres, Dili, 25 May 2004.
- ³⁷ “Timorese Women ‘Are Fighting on All Fronts’”, *East Timor News*, Australia, No. 14, 25 August 1977. This was written by the first OPMT Secretary, Rosa Bonaparte “Muki” and was translated and a little shortened by the East Timor News editor.
- ³⁸ CAVR Interview with Jacinto Alves, Dili, 11 May 2004. See also Office for Promotion of Equality, *Written with Blood*, pp. 18-19.
- ³⁹ Office for Promotion of Equality, *Written with Blood*, p. 21.
- ⁴⁰ CAVR Interview with Egas da Costa Freitas, Dili, 19 May 2004.
- ⁴¹ CAVR Interview with Jacinto Alves, Dili, 5 August 2004.
- ⁴² CAVR Interview with Gaspar Seixas, Iliomar, Lautém, 29 May 2003.
- ⁴³ CAVR Interview with Eduardo Jesus Barreto, Gleno (Ermera), 12 August 2003.
- ⁴⁴ CAVR Interview with Xanana Gusmão, Dili, 7 July 2004.
- ⁴⁵ CAVR Interview with António Amado de Jesus Ramos Guterres, Manatuto, 11 December 2003.
- ⁴⁶ CAVR Interviews with António da Silva and Raquel da Silva, Dili, 10 June 2003 and Bernardo Quintão, Dili, 4 June 2003.
- ⁴⁷ CAVR Interview with Alexandrino de Jesus, Hatulia (Ermera), 20 October 2003.
- ⁴⁸ CAVR Interview with Jacinto Alves, Dili, 5 August 2004. Incidence of torture was also reported in CAVR Interviews with Francisco Gonçalves, Dili, 14 June 2003; António da Silva and Raquel da Silva, Dili, 10 June 2003; Domingos Maria Alves, Aileu, 15 October 2003; Filomeno Paixão de Jesus, Dili, 17 June 2004; António Amado de Deus Ramos Guterres, Manatuto, 11 December 2003; and Xanana Gusmão, Dili, 7 July 2004.
- ⁴⁹ CAVR Interview with Eduardo de Deus Barreto, Gleno (Ermera), 12 August 2003.
- ⁵⁰ CAVR Interview with Egas da Costa Freitas, Dili, 19 May 2004.
- ⁵¹ CAVR Interview with António da Silva, Dili, 11 August 2004.
- ⁵² *Departamento da Orientação Política e Ideológica (DOPI)*, Fretilin Central Committee document titled “The National Liberation Movement, Imperialism and the Puppet Parties,” approved at the Highest Resistance Board session, Laline (Lacluta, Viqueque), 20 May 1977. This document was published again in

ETNA with the title “National Independence is not only a flag and an Anthem”, *East Timor News*, No. 36, June 29, 1978.

⁵³ Fretilin, *Manual e Programa Políticos Fretilin*, Fretilin Manual and Political Programme, 1974, point 3.

⁵⁴ “Timorese Women ‘Are Fighting on All Fronts’”, *East Timor News*, No. 14, 25 August 1977

⁵⁵ Ibid.

⁵⁶ Fretilin, *Manual e Programa Políticos Fretilin*, point 6.

⁵⁷ Ibid., point 9.

⁵⁸ Ibid., point 10.

⁵⁹ Helen Hill, *Stirrings of Nationalism in East Timor: Fretilin 1974-1978: the origins, ideologies and strategies of a nationalist movement*, Otford Press, 2002, pp. 104 and 107.

⁶⁰ *Manual e Programa Políticos Fretilin*, Fretilin Manual and Political Programme, points 11 and 12.

⁶¹ Hill, *Stirrings of Nationalism in East Timor*, pp. 131-132, 138.

⁶² *Manual e Programa Políticos Fretilin*, Fretilin Manual and Political Programme, point 13.

⁶³ Hill, *Stirrings of Nationalism in East Timor*, p. 95.

⁶⁴ Mari Alkatiri, testimony to the CAVR National Public Hearing on The Internal Political Conflict 1974-76, 15-18 December 2003; CAVR Interview with Mari Alkatiri, Dili, 25 June 2004.

⁶⁵ Jill Joliffe, *East Timor: Nationalism & Colonialism*, University of Queensland Press, St. Lucia, Queensland, 1978, p. 90; CAVR Interviews with Mari Alkatiri, Dili, 25 June 2004 and Francisco Xavier do Amaral, Dili, 18 June 2004.

⁶⁶ See testimonies of Mário Carrascãlo, João Carrascãlo and Francisco Xavier Amaral at the CAVR National Public Hearing on The Internal Political Conflict 1974-76, 15-18 December. See also Hill, *Stirrings of Nationalism in East Timor*, p. 126.

⁶⁷ CAVR Interview with Francisco Xavier do Amaral, Dili, 18 June 2004.

⁶⁸ CAVR Interviews with Egas da Costa Freitas, Dili, 19 May 2004; Taur Matan Ruak, Dili, 9 June 2004; and Xanana Gusmão, Dili, 7 July 2004.

⁶⁹ CAVR Interviews with Xanana Gusmão, Dili, 7 July 2004; Egas da Costa Freitas, Dili, 19 May 2004; Filomeno Paixão de Jesus, Dili, 17 June 2004; Taur Matan Ruak, Dili, 9 June 2004; and Lucas da Costa, Dili, 21 June 2004.

⁷⁰ CAVR Interview with Egas da Costa Freitas, Dili, 19 May 2004.

⁷¹ “National Independence is not only a Flag and an Anthem”, *East Timor News*, No. 36, 29 June 1978, p. 2.

⁷² CAVR Interview with Marito Reis, Dili, 19 June 2003.

⁷³ CAVR Interviews with Egas da Costa Freitas, Dili, 19 May 2004; Jacinto Alves, Dili, 11 May 2004; and Albino da Costa, Soibada (Manatuto), June 2003.

⁷⁴ CAVR Interview with Taur Matan Ruak, Dili, 9 June 2004.

⁷⁵ CAVR Interviews with Xanana Gusmão, Dili, 7 July 2004 and Francisco Xavier do Amaral, Dili, 18 June 2004.

⁷⁶ CAVR Interview with Lucas da Costa, Dili, 21 June 2004.

⁷⁷ Ibid.

⁷⁸ CAVR Interviews with Filomeno Paixão de Jesus, Dili, 17 June 2004 and Jeronimo Albino, Dili, 10 September 2003.

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- ⁷⁹ CAVR, Interview with Xanana Gusmão, Dili, 7 July 2004.
- ⁸⁰ CAVR Interview with António da Silva, Jakarta, 11 August 2004.
- ⁸¹ CAVR Interview with Xanana Gusmão, Dili, 7 July 2004.
- ⁸² CAVR Interview with Egas da Costa Freitas, Dili, 19 May 2004.
- ⁸³ CAVR Interview with António da Silva, Jakarta, 11 August 2004.
- ⁸⁴ Lere Anan Timor, *Tuba Rai Metin Oral History Project*, Submission to CAVR, CD No. 18.
- ⁸⁵ Ibid.
- ⁸⁶ Xanana Gusmão, “Autobiography”, in Sarah Niner (ed.), *To Resist is To Win! The autobiography of Xanana Gusmão with selected letters and speeches*, Aurora Books, Victoria, 2000, p. 50; Ernest Chamberlain, *The Struggle in Iliomar: Resistance in Rural East Timor*, Point Lonsdale, 2003, p. 16.
- ⁸⁷ Xanana Gusmão, “Autobiography”, in *To Resist is To Win!*, p. 32. See also CAVR Interview with Xanana Gusmão, Dili, 7 July 2004.
- ⁸⁸ Ibid.
- ⁸⁹ CAVR Interview with Jacinto Alves, Dili, 16 May 2005.
- ⁹⁰ CAVR Interview with Francisco Xavier do Amaral (part III), Dili, 18 June 2004.
- ⁹¹ CAVR Interviews with Lucas da Costa, Dili, 21 June 2004 and Xanana Gusmão, Dili, 7 July 2004.
- ⁹² CAVR Interview with Lucas da Costa, Dili, 21 June 2004.
- ⁹³ CAVR Interviews with Jacinto Alves, Dili, 11 May 2004 and Xanana Gusmão, Dili, 7 July 2004.
- ⁹⁴ CAVR Interview with Lucas da Costa, Dili, 21 June 2004.
- ⁹⁵ CAVR Interview with Filomeno Paixão de Jesus, Dili, 17 June 2004.
- ⁹⁶ CAVR Interviews with Francisco Xavier do Amaral, 18 June 2004; Lucas da Costa, Dili, 21 June 2004; and Xanana Gusmão, Dili, 7 July 2004.
- ⁹⁷ CAVR Interviews with Alexandrino de Jesus, Hatulia (Ermera), 20 October 2003; Eduardo de Deus Barreto, Gleno (Ermera), 12 August 2003; and Adriano João, Dili, 10 June 2003.
- ⁹⁸ CAVR Interview with Adriano João, Dili, 10 June 2003.
- ⁹⁹ CAVR Interview with Adriano Soares Lemos, Hatulia (Ermera), 12 August 2003.
- ¹⁰⁰ CAVR Interview with Manuel Carceres da Costa, Dili, July 2003.
- ¹⁰¹ CAVR Interview with Maria José da Costa, Manufahi, February 2003.
- ¹⁰² CAVR Interview with Xanana Gusmão, Dili, 7 July 2004.
- ¹⁰³ Ibid.
- ¹⁰⁴ CAVR Interview with Adriano João, Dili, 10 June 2003.
- ¹⁰⁵ CAVR Interview with Jacinto Alves, Dili, 5 August 2004.
- ¹⁰⁶ CAVR Interviews with Celestino de Carvalho Alves, Dili, 6 October 2003; José da Silva Amaral, Dili, 18 September 2003; José da Silva, Dili, 18 March 2003; Francisco Gonçalves, Dili, 14 June 2003; and Taur Matan Ruak, Dili, 14 June 2004.
- ¹⁰⁷ CAVR Interview with Benvinda G D Lopes, Dili, 16 September 2003.
- ¹⁰⁸ CAVR Interview with Francisco Xavier do Amaral, Dili, 18 June 2004.
- ¹⁰⁹ “Memoria Comandante Falintil Ida Kona Ba Nicolau Lobato,” *Nacroman*, No. 2/VIII/2002, p. 3 (“Remembering a Falintil Commander, about Nicolau Lobato”, *Nacroman*, No. 2/VII/2002, p. 3).

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- ¹¹⁰ Chamberlain, *The Struggle in Iliomar*, p. 20.
- ¹¹¹ CAVR Interview with Eduardo de Deus Barreto, Gleno (Ermera), 12 August 2003.
- ¹¹² Lere Anan Timor, *Tuba Rai Metin Oral History Project*, Submission to CAVR, CD No. 18.
- ¹¹³ “Reajustamento Estrutural da Resistência Nacional e Proposta da Paz,” in Xanana Gusmão, *Timor Leste: Um Povo, Uma Pátria*, Editora Colibri, Lisbon, 1994, p. 96. (“The Structural Readjustment of the National Resistance and the Peace Proposal”, in Xanana Gusmão, *Timor Leste: A People, A Fatherland*, Edition Colibri, Lisbon, 1994, p. 96)
- ¹¹⁴ CAVR Interview with Xanana Gusmão, part II, Dili, 10 August 2004.
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- ¹¹⁶ Carmel Budiardjo and Liem Soei Liong, *The War Against East Timor*, Zed Books, London, 1984, p. 71.
- ¹¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 71.
- ¹¹⁸ CAVR Interview with Eduardo de Jesus Barreto, Gleno (Ermera), 12 August 2003.
- ¹¹⁹ CAVR Interview with Francisco Guterres “Lú-Olo”, Dili, 26 March 2003.
- ¹²⁰ CAVR Interview with José da Conceição, Dili, 20 October 2004.
- ¹²¹ *Ibid.*
- ¹²² CAVR Interview with Xanana Gusmão, part II, Dili, 10 August 2004.
- ¹²³ CAVR Interview with Taur Matan Ruak, Dili, 14 June 2004
- ¹²⁴ Carmel Budiardjo and Liem Soei Liong, *The War Against East Timor*, pp. 72-73; Jill Jolliffe, “Timor, Terra Sangrenta”, *O Jornal*, Lisboa, 1989, p. 137 (Jill Jolliffe, “Timor, Bloody Land”, *O Jornal*, Lisbon, 1989, p. 137).
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- ¹²⁷ Hill, *Stirrings of Nationalism in East Timor*, pp. 161-162.
- ¹²⁸ CAVR Interviews with Xanana Gusmão, 10 August 2004; José da Conceição, Dili, 20 October 2004; and Lere Anan Timor, *Tuba Rai Metin Oral History Project*, Submission to CAVR, CD No. 18. See also Part 3: The History of the Conflict.
- ¹²⁹ CAVR Interview with Cornelio Gama, Baucau, 9 April 2003; Lere Anan Timor, *Tuba Rai Metin Oral History Project*, Submission to CAVR, CD No.18.
- ¹³⁰ Agio Pereira, “The National Council of Maubere Resistance (CNRM)”, 1994.
- ¹³¹ “Reajustamento Estrutural da Resistência e Proposta de Paz,” in Xanana Gusmão, *Timor Leste: Um Povo, Uma Pátria*, p. 96.
- ¹³² CAVR Interviews with Francisco Guterres “Lú-Olo”, Dili, 26 March 2003 and Cornelio Gama (L-7), Baucau, 9 April 2003; Lere Anan Timor, Archives of the *Tuba Rai Metin Oral History Project*, Submission to CAVR, CD No. 18.
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- ¹⁴⁴ Xanana Gusmão, “Message to the National Timorese Convention”, in Sarah Niner (ed.), *To Resist is To Win!*, p. 214
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- ¹⁵¹ Ibid.; “Readjustamento Estrutural da Resistência,” in Xanana Gusmão, *Timor Leste: Um Povo, Uma Patria*, p. 102, footnote no. 14.
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- ¹⁵³ Agio Pereira, “The National Council of Maubere Resistance (CNRM)”, 1994.
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- ¹⁵⁶ Xanana Gusmão, “Message to the Timorese National Convention,” in *ibid.*, p. 214.
- ¹⁵⁷ CAVR Interview with Francisco Guterres “Lú-Olo”, 26 March 2003.
- ¹⁵⁸ CAVR Interview with Francisco Guterres “Lú-Olo”, 26 March 2003.
- ¹⁵⁹ CNRT – National Council of Timorese Resistance, <http://www.labyrinth.net.au/~ftimor/cnrt.html>.
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- ¹⁶¹ Xanana Gusmão, “Message to the Nation”, Uaimori (Viqueque), 20 August 2003.

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- ¹⁶² “Reajustamento Estrutural da Resistência e Proposta de Paz”, in Xanana Gusmão, *Timor Leste: Um Povo, Uma Patria*, p. 102. See “Fretilin: Roots of Friction,” first published in *Fitun* (London) No. 11, September 1993, then posted in reg.easttimor www.hamline.edu/apakabar/basisdata/1993/10/13/0006.html.
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- ¹⁶⁸ Agio Pereira, “The National Council of Maubere Resistance”, 1994.
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- ¹⁷¹ CAVR Interview with Cornelio Gama (“L-7”), former commander of Região 3, Dili, 9 April 2003.
- ¹⁷² CAVR Interviews with António Tomás Amaral da Costa (Aitahan Matak), Dili, 28 April 2004; Henrique Belmiro da Costa, Dili, 25 May 2004; and Vasco da Gama, Dili, 18 May 2004.
- ¹⁷³ CAVR Interview with Egas da Costa Freitas, Dili, 19 May 2004.
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- ¹⁷⁷ CAVR Interview with Ricardo Ribeiro, Dili, 14 May 2004.
- ¹⁷⁸ CAVR Interview with Avelino Coelho da Silva, Dili, 17 July 2004.
- ¹⁷⁹ Pinto and Jardine, *East Timor's Unfinished Struggle*, p. 124
- ¹⁸⁰ CAVR Interview with Avelino Coelho Silva, Dili, 17 July 2004.
- ¹⁸¹ CAVR Interview with Avelino Coelho Silva, Dili, 17 July 2004.
- ¹⁸² Pinto and Jardine, *East Timor's Unfinished Struggle*, p. 123.
- ¹⁸³ CAVR Interview with Gregório Saldanha, Dili, 5 June 2004.
- ¹⁸⁴ CAVR Interview with António Tomás Amaral da Costa (Aitahan Matak), Dili, 8 December 2003.
- ¹⁸⁵ CAVR Interviews with Gregório Saldanha, Dili, 5 June 2004 and José Manuel Fernandes, Dili, 31 October 2002.
- ¹⁸⁶ CAVR, Interview with Gregório Saldanha, Dili, 5 June 2004.
- ¹⁸⁷ CAVR Interview with Francisco Guterres “Lú-Olo”, Dili, 26 March 2003.
- ¹⁸⁸ CAVR Interview with Vasco da Gama, Dili, 18 May 2004.
- ¹⁸⁹ CAVR Interview with Francisco Guterres “Lú-Olo”, Dili, 26 March 2003.

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¹⁹² CAVR Interviews with Eduardo de Deus Barreto, Gleno, Ermera, 12 August 2003; António Tomás Amaral da Costa (Aitahan Matak), Dili, 11 February 2004; and José da Silva Amaral, Ossu, 27 February 2003.

¹⁹³ CAVR Interview with Francisco Guterres “Lú-Olo”, Dili, 26 March 2003.

¹⁹⁴ CAVR Interview with Vasco da Gama, Dili, 18 May 2004.

¹⁹⁵ CAVR Interview with António Tomás Amaral da Costa (Aitahan Matak), Dili, 11 February 2004.

¹⁹⁶ CAVR Interviews with Vasco da Gama, Dili, 18 May 2004 and Marito Reis, Baucau, 17 November 2002.

¹⁹⁷ *Ibid.*