| Subject: Ousting Dark Forces Behind West
Timor Militia
Also: Chief of the Udayana Military Command (TNI) Denies Supporting the
Militia
The Australian 30 August 2000
Opinion
Ousting dark forces behind West Timor militia
By Jakarta correspondent Don Greenlees
WESTERN diplomats and senior Indonesian military officers say the
pro-Jakarta militias operating in West Timor are still being sponsored by
a group of retired and serving generals with links to the ousted Suharto
regime.
If true, and there is ample evidence to suggest outside financial
assistance to the militias, the task of ensuring East Timor's security
against armed marauders will depend more on politics in Jakarta than on
the skill of UN peacekeepers.
The battle over the fate of the militias appears to be one dimension of
a broader contest between President Abdurrahman Wahid and what some
analysts term the status quo forces – those civilians and elements
of the armed forces (TNI) who prospered under Suharto and face not only a
decline of influence but persecution under Wahid.
Western diplomats have been told by TNI officers that militias based in
the crowded refugee camps along the border dividing West and East Timor
are receiving money and uniforms from individuals close to former TNI
commander General Wiranto. A high-ranking officer recently repeated this
allegation to The Australian.
Although the specific allegation is hard to confirm, the likelihood of
outside funding is lent credibility by the absence of any visible means of
independent support for the militias. Senior UN commanders discount the
view TNI, as an institution, is co-operating with the militias, yet leave
open the possibility of aid from rogue elements.
So far, the UN and foreign governments have expressed the hope that
resettlement of the 130,000 people still in the West Timor camps will have
the secondary effect of denying the militias a cover for their incursions
into East Timor.
Closure of the camps would be a huge step towards curtailing militia
activity. But the existence of substantial sources of funding means that
it does not necessarily follow that all the militias would be directly put
out of business. A well-trained hard core, especially those threatened
with prosecution for serious crime, could press on.
This raises some troubling issues. The mandate of the UN peacekeeping
force is due to expire when East Timor gains formal independence, about
the end of next year. The most likely scenario for the future East
Timorese army, based on a recently concluded British study, is a full-time
force of 1500 men with another 1500 reservists – an insufficient
number to manage a sustained border campaign.
There is a strong possibility, therefore, that the UN will need to
renew the peacekeeping mandate for an indefinite period. Australia's
contribution would probably be at least battalion strength. It would mean
Australian troops continuing to face militias and Indonesian troops across
the border with, of course, a risk of casualties and miscalculations that
would have serious consequences for Canberra-Jakarta relations.
Australian soldiers have done a professional job and shown great
compassion to the people they have been asked to protect. But there have
been some close calls on the border and a long-term mission would
obviously extend the risk.
SO what can be done by foreign governments to resolve the militia
problem? Unfortunately, the options are limited. Ministers in Jakarta have
shown a lack of appreciation of the scale of the militia activity. Their
education hasn't been assisted by TNI's old habit of disinformation; at
one recent briefing Indonesian commanders told their UN counterparts that
criminals unconnected to the militias were behind shooting incidents,
including the death of New Zealand Private Leonard Manning.
After 12 months of unfulfilled promises, Jakarta takes umbrage at
international criticism and still drags its feet over the disarmament of
militias and resettling the refugees. For much of that time the diplomatic
pressure has been intense.
Foreign Minister Alwi Shihab's latest promise is to close the camps
within six months. If the deadline passes and the refugees and militias
remain, the international community ought to consider adding substance to
the diplomatic rhetoric. But the use of punitive measures requires fine
judgment.
The answer to the militias is likely to be determined by the political
game being played between Wahid and his opponents. One theory offered by
diplomats sees various instances of unrest across the archipelago,
including sponsorship of the militias, as a warning to Wahid, in the
middle of human rights and corruption investigations, not to push his
reforms too far.
In this power struggle, Wahid needs foreign support. Isolating him
diplomatically could strengthen those who oppose a more just and
democratic Indonesia.
Report from Bali: Chief of the Udayana Military Command (TNI) Denies
Supporting the Militia 29 Aug 2000 16:34:58 WIB
TEMPO Interaktif, Denpasar: The Chief of Udayana Military Command
(TNI), Major General Kiki Syahnakri, denied TNI responsibility for
increased militia operations in Dili, East Timor. Kiki, instead, blamed
political infighting within the CNRT (National Resistance Council for an
Independent East Timor). CNRT factions, insisted the TNI officer, are
recruiting ex-militia members. “They recruit ex-militia to go back to
East Timor. They (CNRT factions) know that some military power still
exists in West Timor,” Kiki said in Bali on Monday, August 28. Kiki
admitted that militia members have conducted clandestine activities.
However, he insisted that the TNI would take strict action against any
violation. He cited the recent discovery by TNI personnel of a cache of
smuggled guns in a border area.
Kiki hoped for a good CNRT Congress, held on August 20 to 29. A poorly
run congress will only create further problems and lead to an additional
exodus of refugees. “We really don’t expect that to happen,” he
said. Kiki claimed that he does not know why CNRT factions are fighting.
However, he suggested that the problem involves the transitional and
future governance of East Timor.
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