| Subject: JP: East Timor Indictments : A
chance to save reform
Received from Joyo Indonesian News
The Jakarta Post March 10, 2003
Opinion
East Timor Indictments : A chance to save reform
Aboeprijadi Santoso, Journalist, Amsterdam
Instead of expressing regret over Dili's indictment of Indonesian
generals (as East Timor President Xanana Gusmao did) or flatly rejecting
it (as Indonesian Foreign Minister Hassan Wirayuda and President Megawati
Soekarnoputri hastily did), Jakarta and Dili would do well to review their
policies and consider the long-term implications of the issue.
A new myth has emerged since East Timor's independence in May last
year. In order to foster a good relationship with Jakarta, it is believed,
Dili should avoid sensitive issues, including efforts to bring those
responsible for killings, deportation and destruction in East Timor in
1999 to justice. For Jakarta, having been humiliated when it lost East
Timor's independence vote, would only be too happy to welcome a new
neighbor that puts the importance of a good relationship before everything
else.
This myth ignores four intertwined factors, ranging from international
support for East Timor and for the indictments, to the need in Indonesia
for real reform.
First, a tiny half-island amidst a great archipelagic neighbor, East
Timor's geo-political predicament is unfortunate since it virtually
dictates much of the country's foreign policy outlook. Metaphorically,
East Timor has, in fact, opted to become a Finland, an independent country
living in the shadow of or dependent upon its powerful neighbor, the
Soviet Union, rather than a Baltic state, which evolved from domination to
occupation by the same giant.
But, unlike Finland or the Baltics in the past, post-Cold War,
independent East Timor has obtained the good will and commitment of the
international community, which has, in the past, ignored its sufferings,
to help the country if its security is at stake.
A recent proposal by UN Chief Kofi Annan to postpone the withdrawal of
UN troops from East Timor and its endorsement by the UN Security Council,
expresses that awareness acutely. Annan has explicitly spoken of a real
threat by former pro-Jakarta militias both inside the country and from
Indonesian West Timor.
While the war on terrorism and the crisis on Iraq have pushed the case
of crimes against humanity committed by the Indonesian officers and the
militias in East Timor in 1999 from the front pages, the issue has
certainly not been, and will not be forgotten.
Second, the elections in East Timor in 2001 and 2002 have proved beyond
doubt that Xanana Gusmao and Fretilin are the country's most legitimate
leader and ruling political party. Whatever the differences between the
president and the party on the issue of Dili's indictment of the
Indonesian generals, the fact that matters most, is that the judicial
authorities in Dili will continue the proceedings. The ruling party and
the local populace have strongly supported the process. Reports have
indicated that the Dili indictment, if it continues to be ignored by
Jakarta, may in the long run damage the popular support for the president,
who is sincerely concerned to preserve a good relationship between his
country and Indonesia.
Local human rights organizations have expressed concerns on the issue.
Perkumpulan Hak's director Jose-Luis de Oliveira has pointed out that
victims of the 1999 mayhem have begun to ask, "whose president is
Xanana Gusmao really?" For a small population whose majority suffered
under the Indonesian Army and had been victimized by the rampage, that's a
pregnant question -potentially critical even for a charismatic leader who
liberated his country from the colonial joke.
It is too early to conclude on this double institutional leadership,
but with a potential threat to the leadership of Xanana Gusmao whose
presidency, modeled on the Portuguese, is not as strong as the U.S.'s or
Indonesia's -- Jakarta cannot simply rely on President Xanana's good will.
On the contrary, if Jakarta wishes to help strengthen Xanana's position,
it should seriously consider Dili's indictment.
Third, East Timor's civil society is not alone in demanding justice on
the violence in 1999. There has always been and still is relatively broad
international public opinion supporting these demands, including human
rights organizations in Indonesia, which call for breaking the chain of
impunity.
For a number of generals with leading positions at the ministry of
defense and the military headquarter in 1999, were neither investigated
(including former coordinating minister Gen. (ret) Feisal Tanjung) nor
tried (former military chief Gen. (ret) Wiranto). Seven independent
researchers in a document titled, Masters of Terror: Indonesia's Military
and Violence in East Timor in 1999, Canberra, 2002 have listed 11 major
events, 124 officers and militia members as (possible) suspects and
several institutions and military and police units as possibly involved in
the violence and its planning.
Yet of those, only 5 cases were selected for Jakarta's trial, one was
dropped, and of the 18 suspects tried, most have been acquitted and a few
got light verdicts despite a minimum sentence of ten years defined for
crimes against humanity.
Not surprisingly, the Dili indictments, issued by the UN-sponsored
Serious Crimes Investigation Unit within the East Timor justice system,
has been welcomed and seen as implicit criticism of Jakarta's
"fake" trials.
Fourth, for the Megawati government to cooperate with the justice
authorities in Dili would not only be a unique political and moral
investment, both internationally and domestically, but it would also be an
important contribution, on the part of Jakarta, to foster a good
relationship between Indonesia and East Timor, and, ultimately, real
reform in Indonesian politics and reconciliation with East Timor.
The political leaders' indignant responses, first, to President
Megawati attending East Timor independence day, and, second, to the loss
of Sipadan and Ligitan islands at the World Court last year, revealed the
depth of the humiliation Jakarta felt, more than it has publicly admitted,
since it lost East Timor.
With the shame so deeply felt about East Timor, a creative and
imaginative policy change in Jakarta by responding positively to the
indictment on 1999 violence could restore the country's dignity and may
have a liberating effect. But Megawati is not the type of leader who would
initiate a policy break and, with her close links to the military's
top-brass, it is hard to envisage such a change.
Yet that's precisely the point. With the military leaders' growing
impatient with Aceh and Papua, some have envisioned the possibility of a
military strike without presidential consent, ignoring that civil
supremacy that rests with the president, who is also the
commander-in-chief.
President Megawati could justifiably strike back and restrain her
generals. With the Timor atrocities in 1999 now recognized as the Army's
achilles heel, she could acquire the leverage and seize the momentum to
liberate the Army from its post-colonial trauma in order to definitely
close Indonesia's Timor chapter.
For now, the least Jakarta can do, if it is to prevent an international
tribunal and to restore Indonesia's dignity after the shameful events of
1999, is to encourage the generals to fully cooperate with the justice
authorities and human rights institutions in Indonesia and East Timor.
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