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Subject: New Matilda The Pebble In Gareth's Shoe
http://newmatilda.com/2010/02/03/pebble-gareths-shoe
New Matilda
3 Feb 2010
The Pebble In Gareth's Shoe
By Adam Hughes Henry
Since quitting politics, Gareth Evans has been doing okay for himself,
preaching the need for ethical foreign policy. The East Timorese must be
wondering who he thinks he's kidding, writes Adam Hughes Henry
If you missed the announcement late last year, former foreign minister
Gareth Evans has been <http://www.abc.net.au/news/stories/2009/12/04/2762158.htm>appointed
chancellor of arguably the most prestigious and most successful university
in the country: the ANU. A steady stream of foreign policy seminars,
lectures, awards, receptions, cocktails, cheese and crackers now awaits
him.
Since leaving Australian politics Evans has set about making a name for
himself among the mainstream foreign affairs glitterati as a deep thinker
on international affairs, particularly on conflict resolution and
humanitarian interventionism. His earnest reflections on ethics and
humanitarianism are now garnering him <http://news.anu.edu.au/?p=1881>accolades,
including for his latest book: <http://books.google.com.au/booksThe
Responsibility to Protect: Ending mass atrocity crimes once and for all.
Most of Evans's opportunities since leaving Australia have somehow
derived from his former role as Australia's foreign minister.
Unfortunately for Evans, his tenure as foreign minister was distinguished
by a series of disastrous errors of judgment toward East Timor and
toward one of the most hideous dictatorships in Asia: Suharto's New Order
in Indonesia.
It's true that Evans's latest book sets out some noble concepts, but it
strangely avoids going into detail about how his experience of East Timor
fits into them. The book does refer to East Timor, but it does not examine
Evans's own East Timor policies during the 1990s. Given its title and
topic, why is East Timor not extensively covered? With a former foreign
minister's access to primary sources, you’d think this kind of
information would be most useful to a treatise on preventing mass
atrocities.
Perhaps it's missing because Evans is ambivalent about it. As foreign
minister, Evans enjoyed a strong professional relationship with his
Indonesian opposite number, Ali Alatas, who once likened East Timor to
<http://lite.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/JAK332746.htm>
a pebble in Indonesia's shoe. It would appear that Evans has an idea how
Alatas felt.
What happened in East Timor was proportionally one of the greatest
crimes against humanity committed in the 20th century. With diplomatic and
logistical assistance from Australia, the UK and the US, the Indonesian
security forces committed <http://www.yayasanhak.minihub.org/mot/index.htm>
ongoing human rights atrocities in East Timor from 1975 until 1999.
For someone making the argument that an ethical dimension to diplomacy
and foreign policy might prevent mass atrocities from occurring, the
absence of specific detail on East Timor in the 1990s is striking.
Canadian political philosopher and writer John Ralston Saul provides a
useful definition of ethics, describing them as "a matter of daily
practical concern described glowingly in universal terms by those who
intend to ignore them". When it counted, did Evans embrace the
ethical notion that he had a responsibility to protect? Let us refer to
his record on East Timor so that we may decide for ourselves.
After signing the 1989 Timor Gap treaty with the Indonesians, Evans
fawned over Alatas, drinking a toast with him for the cameras as they flew
over the territory in question. Despite the fact that Alatas was foreign
minister for Suharto, Evans personally nominated him for an Order of
Australia. He also allowed himself to muse over the historical nature of
the treaty and the enormous wealth it could bring, <http://www.newstatesman.com/200012110009>
saying that it would be worth "zillions" of dollars.
Indonesia's only right to the territory came from military invasion and
a brutal occupation, yet the Australian government negotiated with the
Indonesians on how to <http://www.newstatesman.com/200404050005>jointly
steal the rightful resources of an impoverished and subjugated people.
Australia, an extremely wealthy Western nation with natural resources
envied by the world, gained the power to commercially exploit East
Timorese oil.
As Foreign Minister, Evans dismissed and denigrated the possibilities
of Timorese self-determination, or freedom from Indonesian military rule.
He defended or downplayed accusations of endemic human rights abuses in
East Timor by the Indonesian authorities.
Even after the notorious 1991 Dili Massacre, Evans again rejected the
notion of endemic human rights abuses. We can only speculate about the
evidentiary basis for this extraordinary judgment.
He also heralded the Indonesian investigation into the massacre as a
positive development. This investigation downplayed casualties and blamed
the massacre on the unarmed crowd of protesters. John Pilger <http://www.newstatesman.com/200404050005>reminds
us how "After the massacre, where 450 human beings were killed or
wounded, the joint Australian-Indonesian board overseeing implementation
of the treaty awarded 11 contracts to Australian oil and gas
companies." When he was asked "about the international principle
of not recognising and exploiting territory taken by force, Evans said,
'The world is a pretty unfair place.'"
And when, nearly a year after the massacre, US authorities suspended
military training programs with the Indonesians, Evans and DFAT instead
implemented an expansive program of Australian-Indonesian military
exercises. The question of military cooperation with the very army
occupying East Timor has never troubled either Evans or Paul Keating.
Despite the <http://www.cavr-timorleste.org/updateFiles/english/CONFLICT-RELATED%20DEATHS.pdf>documentary
evidence and this devastating <http://www.cavr-timorleste.org/en/chegaReport.htm>
CAVR report, neither Evans nor Keating have ever expressed true contrition
for their <http://www.cavr-timorleste.org/chegaFiles/ChegaPlainGuide.pdf>policies
and personal attitudes.
In May 1994 the Sydney Morning Herald <http://www.albionmonitor.com/9812a/copyright/dilimassacrenews.html>
revealed that Australia's ambassador to Indonesia had passed startling
information about the massacre to the Department of Foreign Affairs that
had been gained from an Indonesian special forces officer. That
<http://www.asia-pacific-solidarity.net/news/cf_garethevanstobenewanuchan_041209.htm>information
was that "Indonesian soldiers and intelligence agents had killed even
more civilians around Dili... The [ambassador's predecessor had] kept this
information confidential, in line with the wishes of the Kopassus officer
who conveyed it to him, Lieutenant-Colonel Prabowo Subianto." This
information was later sent to Evans.
Evans had famously downplayed the massacre as "an aberration, not
an act of state policy", but the revelation that information about
the extra killings had been sent to him made it hard to justify that
statement. He <http://www.albionmonitor.com/9812a/copyright/dilimassacrenews.html>
defended his position: while there was some evidence of additional
killings, there was no evidence of a second massacre of people wounded in
the original massacre. Evans also <http://www.albionmonitor.com/9812a/copyright/dilimassacrenews.html>stated
that: "I did not at any time as foreign minister conceal from the
Australian public any knowledge I had about the nature of the scale of
killings that occurred in or around Dili in November 1991."
So rather than viewing this as a serious occasion for personal or
organisational ethical reflection, Evans argued that these additional
murders did not in fact constitute additional statistics for the Dili
massacre. In Evans's view, there was no need to count the extra atrocities
as part of the Dili massacre, because they belonged to a separate and
distinct body count. Following this cold line of argument, Evans had not
misled anyone about the Dili dead, and his personal honour was unscathed.
Such weasel words in response to a heinous and inexcusable atrocity is
troubling, particularly from anyone who dares call their book, "The
Responsibility to Protect". Evans has <http://www.asia-pacific-solidarity.net/news/cf_garethevanstobenewanuchan_041209.htm>stated
that "the notion that we had anything to answer for morally or
otherwise over the way we handled the Indonesia-East Timor relationship, I
absolutely reject".
The question of what our government knew during the period in which the
East Timorese desperately needed protection has been a recurrent one for
Evans. While it is not widely publicised, there is plenty of academic
literature highlighting the military, technological and intelligence
advantages that Australia holds over its nearest neighbours, including
surveillance advantages that enable our security agencies to listen in to
almost everything occurring in its region as it happens. It is seemingly
an open secret in the Australian Intelligence Community (<http://www.asio.gov.au/About/content/AIC.aspx>
AIC) that the Indonesians are easily eavesdropped.
ANU academic Desmond Ball has published a number of articles <ingentaconnect.com/content/routledg/rpre/2001/00000014/00000001/art00003>
highlighting this fact, and the Indonesians are certainly well aware of
this reality. If Evans was unaware of Indonesian atrocities throughout the
1980s and 1990s, it was not because the AIC was ignorant. Did Evans really
have no proper briefings with ASIS or other members of the AIC?
The idea of bringing ethics into his practice of foreign affairs paid
dividends in the case of Cambodia, which Evans outlines extensively in his
book. Yet in his ministerial contribution to Indonesia and East Timor,
Evans appears to have been able to repeatedly sideline such ethical
concerns .
Erasing ethics from the policy equation isn't necessarily an immoral
practice rather it is better understood as a type of
"amorality". Saul defines amorality in this way:
"[It is] a quality admired and rewarded in modern organisations,
where it is referred to through metaphors such as professionalism and
efficiency. Amorality is corporatist wisdom. It is one of the terms which
highlights the confusion in society between what is officially taught as a
value and what is actually rewarded by the structure. Immorality is doing
something wrong of our own volition. Amorality is doing it because a
structure or an organisation expects us to do it. Amorality is thus worse
than immorality because it involves denying our responsibility and
therefore our existence as anything more than an animal."
Gareth Evans may have been made chancellor at ANU, but his other
achievements cannot erase the past. What's stopping Evans being taken
seriously as an ethical torchbearer for 21st century international
relations? It is a pebble a pebble called East Timor, and it sits
uncomfortably inside his expensive shoes wherever he chooses to walk.
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