Statement on the operations of
the Freeport McMoRan Mine in West Papua, Indonesia
Submitted by the
West Papua Advocacy Team and the East Timor and
Indonesia Action Network for the hearing on
Extracting Natural Resources: Corporate Responsibility and
the Rule of Law before the Senate Judiciary
Committee’s Subcommittee on Human Rights and the Law
September 24, 2008
We would first like to thank the Senate Judiciary
Committee’s Subcommittee on Human Rights and the Law for
holding a hearing on “Extracting Natural Resources:
Corporate Responsibility and the Rule of Law.” In particular
we thank Senators Durbin and Coburn for taking leadership on
this issue.
There are few more tragic examples of the negative impact of
US corporations on local peoples than the four decade
operation of the Freeport McMoRan copper and gold mine in
West Papua which has entailed continuing violation of human
rights and environmental destruction: Freeport makes direct payments
to the military for “protection” while the military uses
provocation and may engineer incidents to justify its
continued presence. When local people protest the major
social and environmental impact the mine has had, they are
repressed with force. This deadly cycle must end. U.S.
policymakers can help by demanding transparency concerning
U.S. corporate activities, and suspending military
assistance until real reform occurs.
Below we highlight some areas of
concern, and summarize several reports that provide much
more detailed documentation and context.
Linkages with the military
Perhaps the most devastating consequence of the Freeport
operation has been the Freeport hiring of the unreformed
Indonesian military, purportedly for its "protection." These
forces have carried out property destruction, torture and
murder aimed at intimidating the local Papuan population.
This brutality has been documented by the US State
Department (in its annual human rights Reports), the United
Nations, the Indonesian Human Rights Commission (a
government entity), the Catholic Church and numerous
Indonesian and international NGOs. In what amounts to
shakedowns, the Indonesian military in particular has on
occasion engineered "incidents" aimed at pressuring Freeport
to increase payments for "security.."1
In addition to such shakedown operations, the Indonesian
military has also sought to generate what in Indonesia are
known as "horizontal conflicts," or inter-communal strife,
as a basis for an expansion of security force presence and
influence. In recent years this has meant the creation of
militias, including
fundamentalist Islamic militias, which the Indonesian
military employs to intimidate civilian populations and to
stir communal tensions.2 The
threat of such violence in the Freeport mine area and
elsewhere in West Papua is a growing concern, with fears of
strife along the lines of the terrible blood letting in the
neighboring Maluku islands earlier in this decade.
Indonesian security forces
regularly conduct months-long "sweeps" supposedly targeting
small resistance elements. One focus of these sweeps is in
the highlands just north of the Freeport operation. These
sweeps have been devastating to rural Papuans, entailing
burned houses and churches, destruction of gardens and
displacement of civilians to the surrounding mountains and
jungles where many perish due to inadequate food, shelter
and access to medical care. Moreover, Indonesian military
blocking of humanitarian assistance to these besieged
populations has greatly exacerbated conditions and increased
the number of civilian victims of these sweeps. These sweep
operations are vastly disproportionate to the "threat" posed
by small groups of pro-independence Papuan militants who are
often armed with nothing more than bows and arrows.3
U.S. citizens have been caught in
this conflict as well. New evidence implicates the
Indonesia’s military in the killing of two school teachers
and their Indonesian companion in 2002 new Freeport’s
operations in Timika [see abstract below].
Environmental Impact and
Destruction of Local Culture
For Papuans, and particularly
the local Amungme and Kamoro, the 41-year operation of
the Freeport mine has meant utter destruction of the
Ajkwa river system, central to their economic life, as a
consequence of the disposal of millions of tons of
tailings and other mine waste, poisoning of local water
sources due to acid mine drainage and the
marginalization of the local population as a consequence
of a massive infusion of non-Papuans organized by the
Indonesian Government and Freeport to operate the mine.
The military-organized and protected prostitution and
other criminal enterprises that have accompanied this
invasion have debased Papuan society and culture. It has
also meant an explosion of HIV-AIDS in the Papuan
population that lacks even the most basic health care
infrastructure and other central government services.
 |
Freeport's
Grasberg mine. Credit: Panos Pictures/Rob
Huibers. |
Papuan Resistance to Freeport
Papuans have responded to this
systematic assault on their culture, lifestyle and
livelihood with peaceful demonstrations in the region
typically calling for real self-determination, justice and
the closure of the Freeport operation. These demonstrations
have been supported by fellow Papuans who have staged large,
sympathetic rallies in Jayapura and even Jakarta. Indonesian
security forces have responded to these peaceful protests
with harsh repression. The Indonesian "justice system,"
rather than defending the right to peaceful assembly and
protest, has partnered with the security forces, meting out
harsh sentences to those who dared to raise their voices to
demand their rights.
Papuan civil society leaders,
especially including Christian and Islamic clergy,
intellectuals and, human rights, women and student
organizations, have persistently and with remarkable success urged their fellow Papuans to rely on peaceful protest.
They have also pressed for internationally-mediated dialogue
between Papuans and Indonesian officials, the
demilitarization of West Papua through the removal of
non-organic military forces and an end to Freeport's
destructive exploitation of West Papua's natural resources.
The Indonesian response to such Papuan dissent has been to
label dissenters "separatists" and to employ both security
forces and the "justice system" against them.
We Must Change U.S. Policy
Despite the progress of
democratization in Indonesia, the Indonesian military
continues to operate as an unaccountable, corrupt force
throughout Indonesia. The Indonesian military has been able
to rely on the financial support of Freeport, a channel of
support that contributes significantly to the ability of the
Indonesian military to remain a rogue force not accountable
to the civilian government.
Legislation that requires
transparent reporting by U.S. corporations concerning their
foreign direct investments is desperately needed. As this
hearing will demonstrate, linkages between security forces
that engage in gross human rights violations and U.S.
corporations is a global phenomenon. Congress should do
whatever it can to force these relationships into the light.
The U.S. Congress should also
take immediate steps to better encourage accountability by
restricting military and other security assistance to
security forces that are known to engage in human rights
abuse. This is already the law, but it is poorly enforced.
In the case highlighted above, U.S. government training and
other assistance to the Indonesian military, which has been
normalized since 2005, should simply be suspended until
there is real reform of that institution. Otherwise the U.S.
government is contributing to the problem of on an
out-of-control Indonesian military.
Contact:
-
Ed McWilliams, West Papua
Advocacy Team, edmcw@msn.com (author)
-
John M. Miller, East Timor
and Indonesia Action Network,
etan@igc.org
or
www.etan.org
Brief Annotated Bibliography on
Freeport and human rights violations in West Papua
1.)
Development Aggression: Observations on Human Rights
Conditions in the PT Freeport Indonesia Contract of Work
Areas With Recommendations, Prepared by Abigail
Abrash, Consultant For the Robert F. Kennedy Memorial Center
for Human Rights, July 2002.
This is perhaps the most
detailed report treating the history of Freeport operations
in West Papua. See especially section on human rights
violations, pp 11-22. Consider (emphasis added):
While fact-finding regarding human rights conditions in
Freeport’s COW areas remains incomplete, well-documented
human rights abuses there have included:
·
Torture, rape, indiscriminate and
extrajudicial killings, disappearances, arbitrary detention,
surveillance and intimidation, employment discrimination,
and severe restrictions o freedom of movement;
·
Interference with access to legal
representation;
·
Violation of subsistence and livelihood rights
resulting from seizure and destruction of thousands of acres
of rainforest, including community hunting grounds and
forest gardens, and contamination of water supplies and
fishing grounds;
·
Violation of cultural rights, including
destruction of a mountain and other spiritually significant
sites held sacred by the Amungme;
·
Forced resettlement of communities and
destruction of housing, churches, and other shelters.
Some of these violations—such as those caused by
environmental destruction—are the direct by-products of
Freeport’s mining operations. Others—such as physical
attacks—are the result of the illegal, indiscriminate,
and/or disproportionate use of force against civilians by
the Indonesian military and police providing security for
and funded by Freeport
2.)
Indonesian Human Rights Abuses in West Papua: Application of
the Law of Genocide to the History of Indonesian Control
A paper prepared for the Indonesia Human Rights Network by
the Allard K. Lowenstein International Human Rights Clinic
Yale Law School
This is a comprehensive account of human rights abuses
committed by the Indonesian military and other security
forces in West Papua from 1963 through the current period
(2003). This report is not primarily concerned with Freeport
operations, but the consequences of its operations are
detailed in places. For example,
To enable PT Freeport mining operations, the Amungme
people were compelled to move from their homes in the
Tembagapura area (in the cool, highlands region) to the
hot, coastal Timika region. This move, in fact, caused
the death of a large number of the group, due to their
introduction to new diseases for which they had no
immunity. In another case, a government- owned
plantation seized the property of indigenous people,
forcing them to relocate on land that was insufficient
to support their needs, and refused to compensate them
fairly. (p. 64)
For more see pp. 63-68, on “Resource Exploitation,
Relocation of Groups, and Environmental Harm.”
3.) Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review,
Indonesia Summary Prepared by the office of the High
Commissioner for Human Rights, in Accordance with paragraph
15 © of the Annex to Human Rights Council Resolution 5/1*
UN Doc: A/HRC/WG.6/1/IDN/3 Geneva, 7-18 April 2008
This is a summary of stakeholder submissions on the state of
human rights in Indonesia , submitted to the United Nations
Human Rights Council as part of the Universal Periodic
Review process. There are many references to ongoing
problems in West Papua. For example, regarding threats to
human rights defenders:
While many such threats are anonymous, some intimidation
can be traced directly to the statements and actions of
police, military, and intelligence officers, and
occasionally prosecutors.15 Human Rights Watch (HRW)
added that in Papua and West Papua, human rights
defenders face increasing intimidation including death
threats, arbitrary detention and surveillance by
Indonesian security forces. In 2007, the head of the
Papua branch of Indonesia’s national human rights
commission was subjected to continued surveillance,
death threats and phone intimidation throughout the
second half of 2007.16 In this context, FI [Pax Romana]
noted that after the visit of the Special Representative
of the Secretary General on Human Rights Defenders, Ms
Hina Jilani, in June 2007, many human rights defenders
with whom she spoke were intimidated and received
threats. [pp. 3-4]
4.)
Kirksey, Eben S.; Harsono, Andreas. “Criminal
collaborations? Antonius Wamang and the Indonesian military
in Timika,” South East Asia Research, Volume 16,
Number 2, July 2008 , pp. 165-197(33)
[abstract] US intelligence
reports linked the Indonesian military to the August
2002 murder of two American schoolteachers and an
Indonesian in Timika, Papua province. Restrictions on
the US Foreign Military Financing (FMF) and
International Military Education and Training (IMET) for
Indonesia came to be linked to the investigation of this
murder. However, a Jakarta court subsequently sentenced
a Papuan villager, Antonius Wamang, to life in prison
for leading the attack. Six other villagers were given
sentences ranging from five to eight years. The same day
that Wamang was sentenced, Pentagon officials announced
a 'new era of military cooperation' with Indonesia. Yet
many irregularities were not resolved during the trial.
Questions remain about whether Wamang's group acted
alone. Did Indonesian military agents help Wamang stage
the attack? Did Bush Administration officials help cover
up evidence of Indonesian military involvement so that
they could pursue objectives in the war on terror? The
idiom of co-production offers insight into ambivalent
and contingent collaborations that develop during covert
operations and acts of terrorism.
From press release concerning
article’s release by the authors:
Agus Anggaibak, a 27-year old
member of the regional parliament, helped plan the
ambush, according to reliable sources. He also
reportedly facilitated contacts between the shooters and
active duty military agents. In an interview with report
authors, Anggaibak admitted to having ties with
Indonesia's intelligence agency, BIN, but denied any
involvement in the attack. But, he also admitted to
meeting with Antonius Wamang, the convicted ringleader.
"Credible journalists have long reported that the
highest levels of the Indonesian military had
foreknowledge of this murder," said Dr. Kirksey. "We
have identified the probable field agent who carried out
the plan."
---
See for example,
Paying for Protection: The Freeport mine
and Indonesian security forces, report by Global
Witness, 2005. See also, “Government Slammed for TNI Security Payments,”
Jakarta Post, September, 8, 2008, “Freeport…said
in its latest annual report that it had paid US$9 million in
"support costs" to the Indonesian military and police in
2007 to protect its operations; and Lisa Misol’s commentary
“Indonesia: U.S. Aid to Corrupt TNI Risks more Rights
Abuses,” originally published in the Jakarta Post,
March 14, 2005: “U.S. mining giant Freeport McMoRan makes
huge security payments to Indonesia's military, totaling
around US$60 million through 2004. Freeport reportedly doled
out at least a third of that directly to individual
commanders and units.”
2
On TNI financing of Islamic
militias, see, for example, Gaye Christoffersen’s 2002
report for the Naval Postgraduate School’s Center for
Contemporary Conflict published as, “The War on Terrorism in
Southeast Asia: Searching for Partners, Delimiting Targets,”
in Strategic Insights, Vol. 1:1 (March 2002) [online
at
http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/si/mar02/eastAsia.asp,
accessed 10/08/08]. On TNI support for Laskar
Jihad, for example, Christoffersen says: “Created
secretly by one faction of army hard-line generals in 2000,
Laskar Jihad was meant to be a tool for them to undermine
and destabilize former President Wahid's government, thus
blocking his policies to establish civilian control over the
military. The army financed Laskar Jihad with money
embezzled from its defense budget, estimated to be about
$9.3 million. Laskar Jihad's commander, Jafar Umar Thalib,
led the group against Christians in the Mulukus, killing
thousands. He had met Osama bin Laden in Afghanistan but
unconvincingly downplayed connections with al-Qaeda.” See
also, Kirsten E. Schulze, “Laskar Jihad and the Conflict in
Ambon” in The Brown Journal of World Affairs Vol. 9:1
(Spring 2002), p 60.
3 For summary of
TNI operations near Freeport see, for example
Development Aggression: Observations on Human Rights
Conditions in the PT Freeport Indonesia Contract of Work
Areas With Recommendations, Prepared by Abigail Abrash,
Consultant For the Robert F. Kennedy Memorial Center for
Human Rights, July 2002. See also, Working Group on the
Universal Periodic Review,
Indonesia Summary Prepared by the office of the High
Commissioner for Human Rights, in Accordance with paragraph
15 © of the Annex to Human Rights Council Resolution 5/1*
UN Doc: A/HRC/WG.6/1/IDN/3 Geneva, 7-18 April 2008, p.
3.
4 For a full
discussion of environmental and social impacts of the
Freeport mines operations see, Development Aggression:
Observations on Human Rights Conditions in the PT Freeport
Indonesia Contract of Work Areas With Recommendations,
Prepared by Abigail Abrash, Consultant For the Robert F.
Kennedy Memorial Center for Human Rights, July 2002, pages
15-19. For more thorough discussion of human rights abuses
and social policies targeting Papuan indigenous peoples see
Indonesian Human Rights Abuses in West Papua: Application of
the Law of Genocide to the History of Indonesian Control
A paper prepared for the Indonesia Human Rights Network by
the Allard K. Lowenstein International Human Rights Clinic
Yale Law School, 2003.