|
East Timor Achieves Hard-won Nationhood
Changes and Challenges in Washington
The Women of East Timor Demand Justice
A Dangerous Oil Slick
Documents Detailing Role of Kissinger and Ford
in 1975 Invasion Released
Ten Years for Justice and Self-Determination
ETAN Continues Refugee and Justice Campaigns
About East Timor and the East Timor Action Network Spring
2002
Estafeta
back issues
ETAN
Home Page
|
|
A Dangerous Oil Slick
Australia Tries to Hijack East Timor’s Future
by Joseph Nevins
It is hoped that revenues from oil and natural gas will provide East
Timor the financial means necessary to successfully battle the country’s
profound poverty and the legacy of underdevelopment brought about by 24
years of Indonesian occupation and centuries of Portuguese colonialism.
These lucrative resources are contained in a seabed between East Timor’s
south coast and the north coast of Australia in an area called the Timor
Gap. But an intensifying struggle between the East Timorese and Australian
governments over the eastern and western boundaries of the seabed has
thrown into doubt an agreement between the two countries.
The Timor Gap is a continental shelf area between northern Australia and
the island of Timor. In 1972, Australia and Indonesia agreed to a shelf
boundary between the two countries to the east and the west of East Timor;
the agreement gave Australia 85 percent of the sea territory between the
two countries. The Portuguese, however, refused to sign a similar
agreement, arguing that the boundary should be halfway between the
coastlines of the two territories. The disputed area in between the
boundaries delimited by Indonesia and Australia is what is popularly known
as the “Timor Gap.”
Australia was more than willing to exploit the opportunity presented by
Indonesia’s bloody annexation of East Timor to “close the gap.”
Negotiations began in 1979. Ten years later, the Australian and Indonesian
foreign ministers signed the Timor Gap Treaty while flying in a plane over
the seabed. The treaty divided the area into three sectors: one under
Indonesian control; a second under Australia; and a third controlled
jointly. Observers and analysts tend to agree that Australia got the
better deal. Indonesia was eager to sign the treaty as a way of
solidifying its claim to East Timor and gaining international support for
that claim. Australia, in fact, extended legal or de jure
recognition of Indonesia’s annexation of the former Portuguese colony as
a pre-condition for entering into formal negotiations over the seabed.
In the aftermath of Indonesia’s withdrawal and the United Nations’
assumption of power, Australia has had to renegotiate with East Timor, now
standing in for its former occupier. This is an ongoing process.
A July 5, 2001 “memorandum of understanding” (MoU) signed by
Canberra and Dili granted East Timor 90 percent of the revenues from the
entire “Gap,” leaving only 10 percent to Australia. While this may
seem to be a good deal for East Timor, it is problematic for two reasons.
First, because international law states that sea boundaries should be the
median line between the two countries concerned, it is highly questionable
if Australia has a right to any of the resources within the seabed.
Second, and most important, because the MoU only revised the division of
the resources within the gap, and did not call into question its east-west
boundaries.
International experts who participated in a seminar in Dili in March
2002 contended that, were the east-west boundaries to be drawn in a manner
consistent with international law, the boundaries would move outward and
include the most lucrative Timor Sea deposits within the gap’s
boundaries. This would make a dramatic difference in the amount of
revenues earned by East Timor.
It is impossible to know with certainty how much East Timor will earn
from the gap as they are predicated on always changing commodity prices.
But were the MoU to become a treaty once East Timor becomes independent,
as Australia wants, it is thought that the country would receive about
US$8 billion in revenues over a few decades. But if the would-be treaty
were to reflect international law, East Timor could earn up to $US36
billion, the difference being monies that Australia would have received
otherwise.
It is for this reason that Canberra announced in late March that it
will no longer submit to international legal rulings regarding its
maritime boundaries. Instead, the Australian government states that it
will only negotiate such boundaries directly with the concerned parties,
in this case East Timor.
Canberra is well aware that there are tremendous pressures on East
Timor to ensure that revenues from exploitation begin flowing into the
country’s poverty-stricken treasury as soon as possible (which requires
an agreement with Australia). East Timor also needs to maintain good
relations with its powerful southern neighbor. Canberra’s expectation is
that East Timor will thus not be able to negotiate from a position based
fully on principle and will feel compelled to take a “pragmatic”
approach to the renegotiation.
It is unclear if East Timor’s post-independence government will have
the political will and the strength needed to take on Australia and to
ensure East Timor’s control over what are clearly its own resources—at
least as defined under international law. It is for such reasons that the
roles of pro-East Timor forces within Australia, East Timorese civil
society, and the international solidarity movement could prove to be very
important in this evolving controversy.
see Timor
Gap links
|