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Subject: AT: Unhappy Anniversary for US-Indonesia Ties
Received from Joyo Indonesia News
Asia Times September 11, 2003
Unhappy Anniversary for US-Indonesia Ties
By Gary LaMoshi
DENPASAR, Bali - It has been an exciting two years in the relationship
between the United States, the world's only remaining superpower, and
Indonesia, the nation with the world's largest Muslim population.
The good fortune that paved Megawati Sukarnoputri's path to her
father's old job just weeks earlier fated her to be the first foreign
leader to visit the White House after the September 11, 2001, attacks.
That visit established some enduring themes:
The US would seek Indonesian support for the "war on terror"
for symbolic and strategic reasons. Renewed US aid to Indonesian's largely
unreformed military would be a focus for that support.
Indonesia would be coy about the presence of terrorist organizations on
its soil and adamant about denying links between terrorism and Islam.
Over the past 24 months, those themes have been played out with such
great skill that not only has each nation failed to get what it wants, but
each has suffered serious damage to its interests, and the bilateral
relationship has deteriorated. Happy anniversary!
Cracked embargo
The post-September 11 meeting between George W Bush and Megawati went
as well as could be expected for this pair of presidential offspring who
jointly comprise a full wit. Megawati got nearly a half-billion dollars in
aid that cracked the embargo on military assistance; Bush got a photo
opportunity with a Muslim national leader who denounced terror as well as
those who would equate terrorism and Islam.
Despite support from the United Nations, Indonesia was among the most
vocal opponents of the US-led invasion of Afghanistan. Jakarta's US
Embassy was the site of fiery protests denouncing the US war on Islam that
Indonesian leaders pointedly tolerated, though threats of violence such as
"sweeping" Westerners out of Indonesia were condemned. Indonesia
denied it had terrorists, despite violence directed at civilians across
the archipelago, from communal warfare to bombs at the Jakarta Stock
Exchange and churches on Christmas Eve.
Bilateral relations were frosty publicly and, embassy sources say,
politically, though security forces welcomed renewed links with Uncle Sam.
The US also cherished these rekindled contacts, even though the military
remained unrepentant about past abuses while undertaking new ones. For
instance, in November 2001, elite Kopassus troops murdered Papuan
independence leader Theys Eluay.
The security forces, politicians and the West argued about whether
there were terrorists operating in Indonesia even after the evidence from
Omar al-Faruq, an al-Qaeda operative seized in West Java. Then the Bali
bombings in October last year changed the debate.
Pages turn
After Bali, Megawati appeared on television and dared utter the T-word.
Police vigorously pursued the bombers with the help of investigators from
Australia, the United States and other friendly nations. The security
forces withdrew their support from violent groups such as Laksar Jihad,
which recruited fighters to kill Christians in the Malukus and Sulawesi.
An anti-terrorism law
quickly went on the books. Everyone seemed to be on the same page, more
or less.
The invasion of Iraq changed things from Indonesia's perspective. The
US "war on terrorism" looked much more like a war on Islam.
Public protests in Jakarta were more muted, but politicians again felt
compelled to condemn the United States. This new attitude didn't change
Indonesia's expectations for US aid as well as investment by US companies
and spending by US tourists despite concerns about security that last
month's Marriott bombing in Jakarta confirmed. (Indonesia nevertheless
condemns Western travel warnings against visiting the country.)
Indonesia, for its part, has disappointed the United States and its
allies. Local politicians have sought to exploit situations for their own
purposes. (Gee, what a shock that must be to the folks in Washington!) The
police have failed to prevent two high-profile attacks targeting Americans
(many victims were Indonesians, but it's the thought that counts), the
Bali and Marriott attacks. Local and expatriate populations are aware of
the threat even if they're not cowed by it; that's a partial victory for
the terrorists.
The armed forces, which the United States saw as the most viable
national institution and the one it hopes to influence, hasn't changed. In
addition to the Theys murder, investigators found that the armed forces
were behind the ambush outside the Freeport-McMoran complex in Papua (see
Indonesia's gold standard, September 7, 2002). That incident gave the US
Congress ammunition to delay the resumption of aid to the army. Trials for
atrocities in East Timor whitewashed the military's role. After the
Marriott blast, there was a brief move to upgrade last year's
anti-terrorism law to a more draconian measure modeled after the Internal
Security Acts found in Malaysia or Singapore, which would have given
security forces more clout. The military has also resumed the war in Aceh,
meaning the armed forces are in charge of the two areas with resources of
greatest interest to the United States. Whether that's coincidence or
design is open to question, but the US blueprint envisaged more influence
over the generals at this point.
Trial separation
The verdict in the trial of alleged Jemaah Islamya leader Abu Bakar
Ba'asyir displayed the sense of mutual disappointment and frustration
between Indonesia and the West. US officials complained privately that the
four-year term for Ba'asyir was too lenient, and Australian Prime Minister
John Howard said so publicly.
Those comments elevate Ba'asyir's claims of martyrdom and offer
confirmation that his prosecution and other anti-terrorism measures are
part of a Western conspiracy against Islam. They also underline the
Western assumption that courts follow the direction of politicians. The
verdict suggests political leaders are reluctant to alienate what they
contend is a tiny minority of radicals.
Islamic leaders also fail to speak out against the alleged fringe: when
a lawyer for convicted Bali bomber Amrozi said he planned to appeal his
client's death sentence on the grounds that he "only wanted to kill
Americans and Jews",
no mainstream leader stood up to denounce the sentiment. However, don't
think mainstream Muslim organizations are insensitive. They scolded police
for using the term Jemaah Islamya (since it translates as "Muslim
community") in connection with the Marriott attack, even though
confessed members of the radical group implicated their colleagues in the
bombing.
Indonesians also bristle at the criticism of their judicial system,
pointing out that Ba'asyir was convicted and death sentences have been
handed down in the Bali cases, all in transparent trials under the world
spotlight, something the United States hasn't managed in two years since
September 11. The justice minister blamed the US - and questioned its
commitment fighting terrorism - for not providing greater access to
Hambali, al-Qaeda's alleged kingpin in Southeast Asia. Since
Indonesia-born Hambali was captured, Indonesia has complained about its
inability to question him, alternating with announcements that it
dispatched teams to do so, and lobbied for his eventual return for trial
in his homeland. The verdict in the Ba'asyir case probably lessens that
possibility dramatically.
Indonesian Vice President Hamzah Haz unwittingly summed up the sad
state of the relationship between his country and the West when he
criticized the United States for backing Muslims (as the head of an
Islamic party, Haz and others tend to ignore the 20 million to 50 million
Indonesians who are not Muslims) into a corner. He warned the US not to
punish Indonesia for the actions of a few radicals - and not to withhold
investment that Indonesia so desperately needs.
After two years of engagement on the terrorism issue, the United States
and Indonesia are talking past each other, neither side is getting what it
wants, and the terrorists continue to prosper. The US can help the
situation by dropping its focus on the Indonesian military that's failed
to seize its good fortune (or thinks it can get away with anything in the
eyes of kindly Uncle Sam) and finding new subjects to discuss besides
terrorism, but Indonesia has the real heavy lifting to do.
Unfair as it may seem, Indonesia's main complaints - US favoritism
toward Israel and the Iraq occupation - are things over which it has
little control and, more to the point, have little real impact on
Indonesia, which should be focused on its own shattered economy and
security. Thrust into a potential leading role in the global war on
terrorism, two years on, Indonesia's leadership has led the nation to a
position as one of terrorism's leading victims.
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